Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Bethell

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendments 1 to 8, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Jolly, are to correct drafting. None of them, individually or collectively, alters the meaning or substance of the parts of the Bill that they would amend. I beg to move Amendment 1.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord Bethell) (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, made his points cogently on Report. We do not intend to oppose the amendments on the Marshalled List, as they are technical tidying amendments, consequential on those in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that were passed on Report.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I am very grateful to the Minister.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Bethell

Committee stage & Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 19th November 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I will seek to provide an answer to my noble friend. Should it not be quite the right answer I will endeavour to write to him. It is my understanding that no substantive provision of an Act should be brought into operation earlier than two months after Royal Assent. However, some sections of the Act can be brought into force on Royal Assent, typically those setting out how the Act is to be cited and what the procedure is for making regulations or commencing them. It is under those arrangements that the sequencing which he describes can be undertaken.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for his intervention. I will read Hansard carefully tomorrow to make sure that I understand not only his question but the Minister’s reply. I thank the Minister for his explanations—they were useful—and for the brief preview of his next speech.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

We all know that the words “have regard to” create no real obligations, whereas the words “act in accordance with” do create real obligations. Clause 13 seems to contain important restrictions on the actions of the Secretary of State, but it does so via guidance. As the Bill stands, with its “have regard to” wording, that guidance has no statutory force. If the restrictions are to have any reality—and I assume that the Government would like them to, or they would not have written them into the Bill—we must replace “have regard to” with “act in accordance with” as the amendment proposes. We support the amendment.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for her amendment, which is designed to require that the Secretary of State must “act in accordance with” the guidance on the use of civil sanctions that he is required to publish under paragraph 13 of Schedule 1, as opposed to having regard to the guidance. Paragraph 13 requires the Secretary of State to prepare and publish guidance about the use of civil sanctions. More specifically, this guidance must cover the sanctions that may be imposed if a person commits an offence, the action the Secretary of State may take, and the circumstances in which action is likely to be taken.

I understand the intention behind Amendment 146 and recognise that it is crucial that civil sanctions are imposed in a transparent and consistent manner to ensure that the regime operates effectively. However, the current drafting of Schedule 1, including the obligation on the Secretary of State to publish and have regard to guidance on the civil sanctions regime, will ensure this transparency and consistency.

The guidance will be prepared after consultation with the devolved Administrations and others. The purpose of any guidance is to provide clarity to the civil sanctions regime and detail the circumstances in which different civil sanctions may be pursued. However, instances of non-compliance or criminal activity, where the medical device regulations are concerned, need to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The scale, complexity and severity of non-compliance can vary significantly. As such, any resultant enforcement activity needs to be proportionate, effective and commensurate with the non-compliance or criminal activity.

The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, would bind the Secretary of State, acting through the MRHA, to act in accordance with guidance in every instance. This would limit the regulator’s ability to arrive at and undertake the most appropriate course of enforcement action commensurate to the multifaceted nature of the case at hand. The MHRA cannot set out every circumstance where it may be appropriate to impose civil sanctions. However, by preparing, consulting and publishing a clear set of guidance we can be clear on the framework and illustrate circumstances on how and why a civil sanction might be imposed without being exhaustive.

The regulator needs civil sanction guidance that is flexible enough to appropriately address all forms of non-compliance. To mandate following the guidance to the letter could potentially mean that no action can be taken if the MHRA encounters a new example of non-compliance that has not been explicitly catered for in the guidance but clearly warrants a civil sanction. Under such circumstances, the Secretary of State will, of course, comply with obligation to publish revised guidance as required in paragraph 13 of Schedule 1.

I remind noble Lords that recipients of civil sanctions can contest the imposition of a civil sanction before it takes effect by appealing to the First-tier Tribunal. It is also worth highlighting that, as currently provided, the guidance will be statutory guidance and the regulator must have regard to it when carrying out enforcement activity.

Furthermore, this type of provision is standard across the statute book. For instance, provisions requiring regulators and statutory bodies to “have regard” to statutory guidance can be found in a wide range of legislation, from Section 2 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 to Section 5 of the Business and Planning Act 2020. In a civil sanctions context, Section 63 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 provides that provisions conferring a power on a regulator to impose a civil sanction must also make provision relating to guidance—in particular, that the regulator “must publish guidance” about its use of a sanction and

“have regard to the guidance … in exercising its functions.”

The Ecodesign for Energy-Related Products Regulations 2010 has a similar civil sanctions regime. These regulations are concerned with the establishment of a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-related products. In paragraph 28 of Schedule 5 to those regulations the market surveillance authority

“must have regard to guidance”

while exercising his or her functions with regard to the imposition of civil sanctions. I hope that the reassurance we seek is not unusual but in line with how civil sanction and, indeed, other regimes operate domestically. For that reason, I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 146.