Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome this Bill and the growth in competitive objectives that inform it. I thank the many organisations that have provided us with briefings, especially the APPG on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services. Its 70-page analysis deals with each part of the Bill in depth and reaches an important overall conclusion, which is that the case for protecting consumers within any reform of financial services is not merely a moral case, although the moral case is strong, it is an economic case, grounded in a clear-eyed analysis of how trust works, how it is destroyed and what happens to markets when it is lost. The report also notes that the Bill should not simply make complaint handling faster or more predictable for institutions; it should ensure that ordinary people can get the real issue investigated, decided, escalated where necessary and put right. It is not at all clear that the Bill does this or does this sufficiently.

A look at Part 2 illustrates the problem. It contains a number of significant reforms: Clause 5, for example, which concerns the appointment of the chair of the FOS scheme operator. Under this clause, the chair is appointed directly by the Treasury. This is a major structural shift that was not included in the original consultation. The clause also states that the terms of appointment must secure the chair’s independence from both HMT and the FCA. The ombudsman scheme occupies a unique position within our regulatory architecture. It must command the confidence of consumers while maintaining credibility with the industry. Independence is therefore essential: it is not merely a matter of statutory wording; it is also a matter of perception. Where appointments are made directly by the Government, questions inevitably arise about whether sufficient distance exists between Ministers and those exercising important quasi-judicial functions.

Clause 6 also contains significant reform proposals. It addresses time limits for complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction. It introduces a long-stop period of 10 years from the relevant act or omission, while preserving the possibility of alternative limits set through rules and allowing exceptions in specified circumstances. This is a process which, though critical, allows no meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. It is of course true that there is a strong case for providing greater certainty. Financial firms should not face indefinite exposure to complaints relating to events that occurred decades earlier. It is also true that financial misconduct can sometimes take years to emerge. Consumers may not discover that they have suffered detriment until long after the original transaction occurred. The challenge is one of balance. Parliamentary involvement will be helpful.

Still in Part 2, Clause 7 introduces one of the most consequential innovations in the Bill: the referral of matters from the FOS to the FCA. The ombudsman may also seek the FCA’s opinion of FCA rules where ambiguity exists. This proposed reform reflects the concern that individual complaints can sometimes raise wider questions affecting thousands of consumers and firms. The proposed reform also reflects long-standing industry criticism that the ombudsman has occasionally interpreted regulatory requirements differently from the regulator. In reality, however, it is hard to see this as a well-founded or convincing criticism of the current set-up.

The FOS resolves over 200,000 cases each year, upholding about 30%. We are told that the FOS is acting inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator. If that were true—if this were really a systemic problem—the Government should be able to produce a substantial body of evidence. If it were true, there should be hundreds or even thousands of FOS decisions demonstrating this pattern. If such a list exists, HMT and the FCA have not published it—it is certainly not in the impact assessment. If such a list does not exist, the case for much of the reforms to the FOS rests on assertion rather than evidence. I invite the Minister to point us towards the specific FOS cases that justify the proposed sweeping reforms.

As things stand, the Government appear to be jumping to conclusions that will reduce access to the FOS, reducing access to free and impartial redress; introduce extra bureaucracy and costs; and, ultimately, damage confidence and trust in the financial services industry. We must guard against any risk that the ombudsman becomes subordinate to the regulator or loses the independence that has been central to its legitimacy. There is a strong case for removing Clause 7.

Clause 8 reforms the test used when determining complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction. This may well be the most controversial provision in Part 2. Historically, the ombudsman has determined complaints according to what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Critics have argued that this has sometimes allowed decisions to diverge from the regulatory rule book, creating uncertainty for firms that believed that they had complied with the FCA requirements.

We should ask ourselves whether strict alignment with regulatory rules could weaken consumer protection in cases where the rules themselves are incomplete, outdated or silent on emerging risks. The strength of the ombudsman system has been its ability to look beyond technical compliance and to consider fairness in a broader sense. If that flexibility is narrowed too far, some consumers may find that conduct that was plainly unfair nevertheless escapes effective remedy.

There are already voices, such as the Centre for Responsible Credit, calling for the removal of Clause 8. StepChange has said:

“The ‘fair and reasonable’ test was carefully designed by Parliament”,


requiring FOS to consider

“all the circumstances of the case”.

In contrast,

“FCA rules are often high level and permissive”.


StepChange believes that:

“The scope and flexibility of the test is essential for FOS to decide cases in a manner that is … fair”.


Shifting this to be based on compliance with FCA rules risks creating a tick-box exercise and weakening consumer protection. Martin Lewis has warned that:

“Restricting … access to free and fair redress is not a recipe for economic growth. Once consumers are warned about the erosion of their rights, it’s possible it will lead to disengagement from … financial services … and diminishing trust”.


On this issue, as on others in the Bill, Parliament must ensure that in pursuing regulatory certainty, we do not sacrifice fairness; that in pursuing efficiency, we do not diminish accountability; and that in strengthening regulatory co-ordination, we do not weaken the independence of the ombudsman. The UK’s financial services sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. To be trusted, consumers must have confidence that when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress.

The Bill may not expressly repeal consumer protections or statutory rights; the concern is more subtle. Rights created by Parliament may be diminished in practice if access to redress depends on FCA rule compliance, FCA intent, FCA interpretation or Treasury-made conditions rather than independent interpretation of the underlying legal issue.

I close by quoting Which?:

“The proposed reforms to the FOS and the FCA appear to come at the expense of consumer protections. Any benefits arising from weaker consumer safeguards are likely to be temporary while longer term costs could be significant, particularly for vulnerable who rely most on access to redress and effective regulatory protections”.


I agree with that.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we move on to the Back Benches, I remind noble Lords that the advisory time limit is eight minutes. If we all stick within that, we can get everybody in, it is fair to everybody else and we will be able to finish at a reasonable time.