Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)]

I have to advise noble Lords that if Amendment 31 is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 32 or 33 because of pre-emption.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 33, 35, 37, 42 and 43 in this group. All these amendments, and my Clause 7 not-stand-part question, relate to the FOS and its regime. I will try very hard not to repeat too much of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, was saying a moment ago. The proposed reforms of the FOS regime are extensive and fundamental, but there is nowhere a clear and convincing explanation of why such fundamental changes are necessary. In fact, I see no real evidence at all of the need for reform on the scale being proposed here.

What we see, looking at the far-reaching proposals in the Bill, is an assault on the four key pillars designed into the FOS by Parliament: independence, speed and simplicity, time limits on bringing complaints, and the “fair and reasonable” test for determining those complaints. Taken together, Part 2 replaces each of those pillars with subordination to the FCA, a rather undefined change to time limits, and a heavy qualification of the “fair and reasonable” test amounting to its entire abandonment. This raises the question of why such a radical reform can be seen as necessary and/or beneficial. At Second Reading, I asked the Minister what evidence there was of systemic failure in the current operation of the FOS, and for evidence, for example, that the FOS was acting as a quasi-regulator. I have had no reply.

The obvious question in all this is: who benefits? The answer is: not the ordinary consumer. My amendments are aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, the weakening of consumer protection. To that end, my Amendments 33 and 35, to Clause 6, address the time limits for complaints to the FOS, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has dealt with extensively; I agree with most of what he said. What my amendments offer as an alternative to his is that they are perhaps not quite as strong—that might be their virtue. It is often very difficult to get things written into a Bill; it is sometimes easier to deal with them via secondary legislation, as I do rather obliquely.

In Part 2, the Bill proposes other very substantive changes to the way in which the FOS operates. One of these changes, in Clause 7, sets out the circumstances under which the FOS must notify the FCA of a matter relating to a complaint, under which the FOS must request an opinion from the FCA as to the interpretation of FCA rules. It then sets out in detail how consultation should take place on the matter. There really is detail: five whole pages of the Bill set out in great detail the various stages required in the referral process. It adds complexity for no obvious gain and subordinates the FOS’s judgments to the FCA’s. I have no doubt that the byzantine array of subclauses or qualifications will, overall, introduce greater complexity for no foreseeable benefits and will greatly increase the workload of the FCA. The FCA is already under pressure and is planning to absorb the PSR. The last thing we need is the creation of new systems, rules and powers that show no clear promise of benefit, or at least no benefit to the retail complainant.

On necessity, we have to take into consideration whether the current FOS methods are faulty or unproductive. I have seen no compelling evidence that this is the case, only a rather unconvincing summary of the consultation responses. The FOS received 214,000 new complaints in 2025-26. It is projecting a resolution of 207,000 complaints in the coming year, of which 206,000 concern banking and consumer credit companies. It has a target of 70% of cases being resolved within three months and 90% within six. It does not seem as though it is having difficulty operating, and I am not aware of any significant problems for the average consumer. I hear from the industry that the FOS acts inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator, but I have seen no evidence of that, and I am unconvinced by the simple assertion. Taken as a whole, Clause 7 in effect subordinates the FOS to the FCA, removing yet another foundational pillar: independence. We should remove Clause 7.

I turn now to the proposed amendments to Clause 8. I will speak to Amendments 37, 42 and 43, which deal with how a complaint to the FOS is to be determined. This is a controversial matter; the Bill proposes very significant changes. This has already provoked calls to have the whole clause removed from the Bill, and I recognise the strength of feeling behind that.

How the FOS decides on complaints is absolutely critical to its operations and to their general acceptability. At the moment and historically, the FOS rules on complaints on the basis of what is fair and reasonable under all circumstances. The Bill changes that. It says:

“A complaint may be determined in favour of the complainant only if, in the opinion of the Financial Ombudsman … at the time the disputed act or omission occurred, either … the act or omission did not comply with an FCA rule applying to the respondent, or … there was no FCA rule applying to the respondent that related to the act or omission, and the disputed act or omission was not fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case”.


This adds one of two requirements not present now, in addition to the “fair and reasonable” test. In essence, it removes the FOS’s current and critical independent status and reduces the FOS’s scope to a subset of FCA rules. If you ask who benefits from all this, the answer, it seems to me, is not likely to be the consumer.

The small print of the Bill makes the situation for the complainant even less attractive. The Bill specifies a long list of other requirements to be considered in making a determination, most of them tilting the scales in favour of FCA rule-based compliance. This long list includes

“any other matters specified in regulations made by the Treasury”

and the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions. Here, we are a very long way from the “fair and reasonable under all circumstances” test.

The net effect for the Bill’s proposals will inevitably be to increase bureaucracy and to increase a remoteness from practical circumstances and a reliance on box-ticking procedures. It will convert the independent FOS into a compliant subsidiary of the FCA. We have not seen spelled out any evidenced justification for such a radical narrowing of the FCA’s reach and independence. I ask the Minister again to provide the evidence that supports these radical changes. By “evidence”, I mean hard data, not simply a headcount of consultees’ opinions, as interpreted by HMT.

As I noted at Second Reading, the UK’s financial sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. For it to be trusted, consumers must have confidence that, when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress. We have one of those already: the FOS. My Amendments 37, 42 and 43 would remove the new bureaucratic and complex restrictions, qualifications and subordinations in the Bill. In their place, the amendments would restore a simple and clear operating framework. They would restore the primacy of the “fair and reasonable” test, and they would update the list of things that the ombudsman must or may take into account.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 34 again concerns symmetry of enforcement and redress periods. The Bill introduces a 10-year hard stop on complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service, but the problem is that the 10-year figure is already riddled with exemptions: for long-dated instruments, for latent harms, for products with extended maturities and for situations where the consumer could not reasonably have known they had a claim. The Government have already conceded that the 10-year period cannot sensibly apply in a wide range of cases. I have a concern that, once Parliament writes “10 years” into statute, that becomes the headline. Consumers may assume they have 10 years, even when they are in one of the many categories where the long stop does not apply. That creates a real risk that people will time themselves out because they believe the headline rather than the detail.

Then there is the deeper structural issue that I have referenced before: firms’ enforcement rights do not end at 10 years. They can enforce debts, pursue arrears, securitise portfolios and benefit from long-tail revenue streams well beyond that period. Yet the consumer’s ability to challenge an unfair relationship or to bring a complaint may fall away far earlier. That is the same kind of asymmetry that I raised before. My solution is that at least the starting point should be that the duration of rights, remedies and enforcement powers for firms must be aligned with the duration of rights and remedies for consumers arising from the same act or relationship.

I have addressed only that aspect of asymmetry in my amendment; I have not attacked the 10-year hard stop and the impact that that might have on consumer perception. My amendment would not interfere with the exemptions that the Government have already accepted. It would simply ensure that, where a firm retains enforcement rights beyond 10 years, in various circumstances, the consumer retains the corresponding right to challenge the fairness of that relationship for the same period—in other words, symmetry. I need not say any more, as we have been around this loop, but it is the same argument in a different place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

Would the Minister mind repeating that?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Certainly. We are trying to align the FOS’s “fair and reasonable” test with the FCA rules, but it retains some discretion.

I apologise for taking another moment to consult my officials. For clarity, where the FOS has aligned with the FCA rules, it has to believe that that is the case, and that determination has to be upheld.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

Looking at the legislation itself, it seems clear that if the act or omission is in breach of the FCA’s rules or the consumer duty that absolutely qualifies it as being okay. There is no subordinate reference to “fair and reasonable”.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will take the opportunity to write because this definitely needs clarification. The note that I have says that in cases where the omission being complained about is governed by FCA rules, if the firm has met its obligations under those rules, the FOS will be required to find that it acted fairly and reasonably. All the FCA’s handbook is relevant here, including the principles for businesses and, therefore, the consumer duty. There will be coherence between those determinations but only when the FOS believes that the fair test has not been met can it challenge the FCA. I will write to noble Lords because this is an important point that needs a definitive answer. I apologise for that.

On Amendments 37, 42 and 43, as I have set out, the reforms to the FOS’s fair and reasonable test are designed to preserve the FOS’s existing discretion in areas not covered by FCA rules. The Bill specifies the matters that the FOS must take into account when making determinations, taking this out of FCA rules and making it subject to parliamentary oversight. The matters listed include the law, relevant guidance, codes of practice and further materials published by the FCA or other regulators. This provides greater clarity around how the FOS makes its decisions. As I explained earlier, the Government’s view is that where there are relevant FCA rules, there are benefits from ensuring that FOS decisions are consistent with them. I will write to clarify further in case I have created confusion in this conversation.

On Amendments 38 and 41, the Government recognise the important role the FOS plays within the wider financial services regulatory environment. The reforms included in the Bill are about making sure that the FOS and the FCA are able to carry out their respective roles effectively, co-operating where necessary but maintaining their separate responsibilities. These amendments would go further and require the FCA to become involved in the determination of individual complaints. This is a role that the FCA is not designed or equipped to undertake. It is, and should continue to be, the role of the FOS as the independent, impartial dispute resolution service.

Turning to Amendments 39 and 40, the Government’s review of the FOS concluded that the “fair and reasonable” test works well in the majority of cases to enable a quick and fair resolution of complaints. Removing the “fair and reasonable test”, as proposed by these amendments would undermine the FOS’s quick and informal role and put in its place a more legalistic approach based on strict adherence to the FCA’s rules. This could introduce additional costs and delays, and reduce the FOS’s effectiveness as an accessible and simple alternative to the courts.

I turn to Clause 7 and the new referral mechanism, which will require the FOS to seek a view from the FCA where it considers that a matter relating to a complaint may indicate ambiguity in the FCA’s rules or have wider implications for consumers and firms. As well as enabling the FOS to make decisions that are consistent with FCA rules, the referral process will ensure that systemic questions and issues are identified at an early stage and the FCA can consider whether a regulatory or supervisory intervention may be appropriate, rather than continuing to consider each individual complaint separately. Alongside the new reporting requirements provided for in Clause 9, this will improve understanding of the FCA’s rules and the standards expected of firms, in turn improving confidence in financial services and ultimately reducing the number of consumers who experience poor treatment, which all noble Lords will agree is preferable to providing redress after the fact.

Given the important role that the FOS plays, this is a clearly a matter of huge interest, and there is a range of views on exactly what the best system would look like. Notwithstanding that, I will write on the specific things that I might have caused confusion about.

I have listened carefully to the representations. The Government’s view is that the reforms set out in the Bill strike an appropriate balance, improving the clarity and consistency of redress arrangements while allowing the FOS to continue to make fact-specific decisions on individual complaints. They ensure that both the FOS and the FCA are equipped to fulfil their respective roles and responsibilities so that consumers can have confidence in the key financial services on which they rely, and so that firms understand what is expected of them and can act on it. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome this Bill and the growth in competitive objectives that inform it. I thank the many organisations that have provided us with briefings, especially the APPG on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services. Its 70-page analysis deals with each part of the Bill in depth and reaches an important overall conclusion, which is that the case for protecting consumers within any reform of financial services is not merely a moral case, although the moral case is strong, it is an economic case, grounded in a clear-eyed analysis of how trust works, how it is destroyed and what happens to markets when it is lost. The report also notes that the Bill should not simply make complaint handling faster or more predictable for institutions; it should ensure that ordinary people can get the real issue investigated, decided, escalated where necessary and put right. It is not at all clear that the Bill does this or does this sufficiently.

A look at Part 2 illustrates the problem. It contains a number of significant reforms: Clause 5, for example, which concerns the appointment of the chair of the FOS scheme operator. Under this clause, the chair is appointed directly by the Treasury. This is a major structural shift that was not included in the original consultation. The clause also states that the terms of appointment must secure the chair’s independence from both HMT and the FCA. The ombudsman scheme occupies a unique position within our regulatory architecture. It must command the confidence of consumers while maintaining credibility with the industry. Independence is therefore essential: it is not merely a matter of statutory wording; it is also a matter of perception. Where appointments are made directly by the Government, questions inevitably arise about whether sufficient distance exists between Ministers and those exercising important quasi-judicial functions.

Clause 6 also contains significant reform proposals. It addresses time limits for complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction. It introduces a long-stop period of 10 years from the relevant act or omission, while preserving the possibility of alternative limits set through rules and allowing exceptions in specified circumstances. This is a process which, though critical, allows no meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. It is of course true that there is a strong case for providing greater certainty. Financial firms should not face indefinite exposure to complaints relating to events that occurred decades earlier. It is also true that financial misconduct can sometimes take years to emerge. Consumers may not discover that they have suffered detriment until long after the original transaction occurred. The challenge is one of balance. Parliamentary involvement will be helpful.

Still in Part 2, Clause 7 introduces one of the most consequential innovations in the Bill: the referral of matters from the FOS to the FCA. The ombudsman may also seek the FCA’s opinion of FCA rules where ambiguity exists. This proposed reform reflects the concern that individual complaints can sometimes raise wider questions affecting thousands of consumers and firms. The proposed reform also reflects long-standing industry criticism that the ombudsman has occasionally interpreted regulatory requirements differently from the regulator. In reality, however, it is hard to see this as a well-founded or convincing criticism of the current set-up.

The FOS resolves over 200,000 cases each year, upholding about 30%. We are told that the FOS is acting inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator. If that were true—if this were really a systemic problem—the Government should be able to produce a substantial body of evidence. If it were true, there should be hundreds or even thousands of FOS decisions demonstrating this pattern. If such a list exists, HMT and the FCA have not published it—it is certainly not in the impact assessment. If such a list does not exist, the case for much of the reforms to the FOS rests on assertion rather than evidence. I invite the Minister to point us towards the specific FOS cases that justify the proposed sweeping reforms.

As things stand, the Government appear to be jumping to conclusions that will reduce access to the FOS, reducing access to free and impartial redress; introduce extra bureaucracy and costs; and, ultimately, damage confidence and trust in the financial services industry. We must guard against any risk that the ombudsman becomes subordinate to the regulator or loses the independence that has been central to its legitimacy. There is a strong case for removing Clause 7.

Clause 8 reforms the test used when determining complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction. This may well be the most controversial provision in Part 2. Historically, the ombudsman has determined complaints according to what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Critics have argued that this has sometimes allowed decisions to diverge from the regulatory rule book, creating uncertainty for firms that believed that they had complied with the FCA requirements.

We should ask ourselves whether strict alignment with regulatory rules could weaken consumer protection in cases where the rules themselves are incomplete, outdated or silent on emerging risks. The strength of the ombudsman system has been its ability to look beyond technical compliance and to consider fairness in a broader sense. If that flexibility is narrowed too far, some consumers may find that conduct that was plainly unfair nevertheless escapes effective remedy.

There are already voices, such as the Centre for Responsible Credit, calling for the removal of Clause 8. StepChange has said:

“The ‘fair and reasonable’ test was carefully designed by Parliament”,


requiring FOS to consider

“all the circumstances of the case”.

In contrast,

“FCA rules are often high level and permissive”.


StepChange believes that:

“The scope and flexibility of the test is essential for FOS to decide cases in a manner that is … fair”.


Shifting this to be based on compliance with FCA rules risks creating a tick-box exercise and weakening consumer protection. Martin Lewis has warned that:

“Restricting … access to free and fair redress is not a recipe for economic growth. Once consumers are warned about the erosion of their rights, it’s possible it will lead to disengagement from … financial services … and diminishing trust”.


On this issue, as on others in the Bill, Parliament must ensure that in pursuing regulatory certainty, we do not sacrifice fairness; that in pursuing efficiency, we do not diminish accountability; and that in strengthening regulatory co-ordination, we do not weaken the independence of the ombudsman. The UK’s financial services sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. To be trusted, consumers must have confidence that when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress.

The Bill may not expressly repeal consumer protections or statutory rights; the concern is more subtle. Rights created by Parliament may be diminished in practice if access to redress depends on FCA rule compliance, FCA intent, FCA interpretation or Treasury-made conditions rather than independent interpretation of the underlying legal issue.

I close by quoting Which?:

“The proposed reforms to the FOS and the FCA appear to come at the expense of consumer protections. Any benefits arising from weaker consumer safeguards are likely to be temporary while longer term costs could be significant, particularly for vulnerable who rely most on access to redress and effective regulatory protections”.


I agree with that.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we move on to the Back Benches, I remind noble Lords that the advisory time limit is eight minutes. If we all stick within that, we can get everybody in, it is fair to everybody else and we will be able to finish at a reasonable time.