Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2020

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

We are not opposed to either of these two draft orders. The first of the two draft orders we are debating adds a further five additional public authorities to the list that are now deemed to have a “necessary and proportionate” requirement to obtain communications data, which is, of course, information about communications rather than what was said or written.

This power to obtain communications data is, according to an extra government factsheet memorandum explaining the purpose and effect of the draft instrument, on the basis that these five public authorities

“are increasingly unable to rely on local police forces to investigate crimes on their behalf”.

The five additional public authorities are the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Environment Agency, the Insolvency Service, the UK National Authority for Counter Eavesdropping and the Pensions Regulator. Can the Minister explain why it is that, in the light of cuts in police numbers since 2010, each of these five additional public authorities

“are increasingly unable to rely on local police forces to investigate crimes on their behalf”?

Could the Minister say whether this inability to investigate these crimes applies across all local police forces or only to some police forces, and if the latter, which ones?

We will support measures that cut crime and deal effectively and meaningfully with offenders. Can the Minister explain why the remedy is not to increase the capacity of local police forces so that they can investigate these crimes, rather than give powers to obtain communications data to civilians within these five public authorities? On the latter point about civilians, can the Government give a categorical assurance that this draft instrument does not lower the rank or seniority of designated officers and that there is no widening of the authority to exercise the powers here within the organisations covered by this or by previous orders?

The Explanatory Memorandum states that in deciding whether to grant these powers to the public authorities concerned, the Government consider the seriousness of the offences they investigate and the number of requests for data the public authorities each estimate they will make. Can these powers be used only in respect of serious offences or can they be used in respect of any offence? Can the Minister also say how many such requests for communications data each of the five additional authorities have estimated they will make and how that compares with the number being made currently by local police forces investigating crimes on their behalf? How do the estimates of the number of requests each of the five public authorities have said they will make compare with the number of requests being made by broadly comparable public authorities that already have these powers?

Currently, the public authorities that can obtain communications data under the provisions of the 2016 IP Act include, among others, intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, the Food Standards Agency, the Gambling Commission, the Prison and Probation Service, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. Can the Minister give details of which public authorities have already been given powers in relation to investigating crimes because increasingly they too cannot rely on local police forces being able to investigate crimes on their behalf? Can she also say if any public authorities for whom powers to obtain communications data have been sought have had that request declined by the Government? This point was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

The IP Act sets out the circumstances in which various investigatory powers may be used and the safeguards that apply in relation to ensuring that any interference with privacy is strictly necessary, proportionate, authorised and accountable. Since the Government are not required to report on the operation of the Act until five and a half years from Royal Assent, what assurances can the Government provide now that the statutory safeguards in relation to interference with privacy are proving to be effective and are delivering in line with the intentions of Parliament? What views did the Investigatory Powers Commissioner express about the addition to the list of these five further public authorities, and did the commissioner have any reservations or other comments?

The second draft instrument provides the statutory basis for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to have the required oversight of compliance by UK public authorities on access to electronic data in relation to serious crime, as provided for in the 2019 international agreement between the UK and USA and exercisable under the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Act 2019 and the IP Act 2016. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, this arrangement, which presumably relates to the IPC providing independent oversight of UK activity under the agreement with the USA, has been agreed with the US Department of Justice. However, to avoid any misunderstanding, can the Minister place on record in her response exactly what it is that has been agreed with the US Department of Justice? Can she also place on record in her response what arrangements the US Department of Justice has agreed with the UK in relation to independent oversight of USA activity under the agreement, since presumably there is reciprocity when it comes to agreeing each other’s arrangements?

Can the Minister also say if any UK public authorities have yet sought to obtain data directly from US-based telecommunications operators under the terms of the 2019 COPOA Act using an overseas production order? If so, on how many occasions? Likewise, have any US public authorities sought to obtain data from UK-based service providers under the same, or similar, arrangements? If so, on how many occasions? Have assurances been given in relation to the non-use of the death penalty, and has protection been given to journalistic sources and material? Finally, is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner likely to be using statutory oversight and compliance powers in relation to agreements between the UK and any other countries apart from the US?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate and the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, for his brief appearance. I could not keep up with the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, so I have missed some bits out. I hope to pick them up in the answers to other questions, but I will write to him if not.

I was very pleased to hear the opening remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett; I thought he would be supportive. He admitted to never having heard of the UK National Authority for Counter Eavesdropping. I join him in that: neither have I. It is the national authority for technical security and counter-eavesdropping. It helps the Government on technical espionage attacks by hostile state actors. Its capabilities and purpose are distinct and focus on countering close-access technical operations that could ultimately damage national security.

As he will know only too well, hostile state actors currently have the desire and the means to gain access to or otherwise compromise the integrity of highly classified communications systems and secure facilities. They are known to be able to carry out close-attack technical attacks, as demonstrated by the attack on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague by the Russian intelligence services in 2018. In that case, the Dutch authorities were able to detect and apprehend the agents involved, along with a car full of equipment.

We assessed that Russia and other hostile state actors, particularly China, will continue to attempt to disrupt, attack and commit espionage in the UK. I do not think any noble Lords in the Committee would disagree with that. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s recent report into the interference by Russia in UK democracy demonstrates intent, capability and, indeed, tenacity.

There is also the insider threat to consider, whereby an individual in an organisation may place a device for eavesdropping purposes. Insider threats can be from corrupt, compromised, disgruntled staff or from contractors. They can be among the hardest threats to identify. In order to fulfil its role, the UK National Authority for Counter Eavesdropping needs to be able to identify illicit and covert eavesdropping devices that may be present in sensitive and classified areas and then identify the user behind the device using communications data. We are now all experts in that particular agency.

There were a number of questions, particularly from the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Foulkes, about agencies being added and taken away, about why that happens and about the purposes of the various agencies that have been added. For clarity, the authorities we are talking about are the Pensions Regulator, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Environment Agency and the Insolvency Service. It was right that those powers were removed in 2015, just as it is right for them to be reinstated now. We cannot foresee how operational requirements will evolve in response to the crimes that public authorities are investigating. We need to have the option to add and remove authorities depending on the necessity of the powers; the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was right that it is nothing to do with the coalition. This is precisely why the IPA included the power to add and remove bodies from Schedule 4.

These authorities have all demonstrated a strong necessity and proportionality case against similar criteria that the Home Office applied when removing powers in 2015. Those criteria were: the statutory responsibilities of the authorities with access; the seriousness of the offences that they investigate; and the number of requests that they made. As is demonstrated by the case of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary in particular, which does not expect to use the powers often, assessing the volume of applications made is perhaps not the most effective of criteria for deciding which bodies should be listed in Schedule 4. The risk here is just too high to ignore. A public authority can make infrequent use of powers, yet still lead on investigations where communications data is critical.

I congratulate my noble friend Lord Naseby on celebrating his diamond wedding anniversary today.

Hong Kong British National (Overseas) Visa

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 29th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is right: there are countries that do not recognise dual nationality. The individuals concerned will have choices to make. We are quite clear that we will continue to honour the commitment we made to people who have BNO status.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

The Written Ministerial Statement does not make clear whether British national (overseas) citizens who enter the UK on the Hong Kong British national (overseas) visa will have recourse to public funds. It simply says:

“BN(O) citizens will need to support themselves independently while living in the UK.”


In some cases, the people of Hong Kong will not be able to bring money with them and could have their bank accounts frozen, so what recourse to public funds will be available to them?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is right that they will not have recourse to public funds. They will have to demonstrate that they can support themselves for the first six months. They can of course, from thereon in, apply for the visa when it comes into place in January.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

The purpose of this Bill is narrow in scope. It is to end EU freedom of movement rules in the United Kingdom and it has just nine clauses. EEA nationals will become subject to United Kingdom immigration laws after the Brexit transition period, and thus be covered by the Government’s points-based immigration system, to be introduced next year. This Bill is nearly identical to its predecessor, which fell due to the general election last year. It took just six weeks to complete all its stages in the Commons before being passed unamended at Third Reading on 30 June. Progress in the Lords will not be so rapid as in the Commons, although it remains to be seen whether that will be due solely to the August Recess.

The Bill does not itself create a new immigration system. The change to the points-based system will be covered in unamendable Immigration Rules. However, the Bill gives Henry VIII powers to the Government which are so wide-ranging in the way they are worded that they would enable the Government to modify, by unamendable statutory instrument, both primary immigration legislation and retained direct EU legislation. The Government maintain that the Henry VIII powers in Clause 4 are only to address necessary technical legislative changes to primary legislation, arising from the ending of free movement.

The same powers in Clause 5, say the Government, are there to enable, first, consequential modifications to be made to primary legislation and other retained EU law if areas of the retained EU social security co-ordination regulations, co-ordinating access to social security for individuals moving between EEA states, have to be repealed because they are not covered in a reciprocal agreement with the EU following the end of the transition period; and, secondly, if consequential technical amendments are needed to legislation arising from any new reciprocal agreement with the EU.

The Lords Delegated Powers Committee said of the previous Bill, however, that Clause 4 presents

“a very significant delegation of power from Parliament to the Executive”,

and on Clause 5 it said that

“Parliament is being asked to scrutinise a clause so lacking in any substance whatsoever that it cannot even be described as a skeleton.”

Parliament is going to be denied any proper say and involvement in determining even the basic principles of our future immigration policy post Brexit, and the ending of free movement. Yet the Government admit in their fact sheet 3 on the Bill that:

“By ending free movement, the Bill makes a substantial change to the UK’s immigration laws.”


This is not about the merits or otherwise of Brexit; that decision has been made. It is about the Government’s attitude towards Parliament and its major law-making process in scrutinising and then deciding which Government legislative proposals should, or should not, be passed, rejected or amended.

While the Bill seeks to deny an opportunity to address issues of concern about our immigration system, that does not mean they were not raised in the Commons and will not be raised in the Lords. Issues that have had cross-party support include a time limit on immigration detention for the purpose of deportation, the granting of automatic indefinite leave to remain to eligible EEA and Swiss national children who are in care, or are care leavers, and the need for the continuation of the existing EU arrangements on unaccompanied child refugees and family reunification.

Further issues include, but are not confined to: the application of the “no recourse to public funds” rules, in the light of an apparent promise of a review made by the Prime Minister on 27 May; the progress being made on the Government’s commitment to abolish the immigration health charge for all migrants working in the NHS and social care; exemption from the immigration skills charge for NHS employers in the light of the reality that some hospitals are now paying nearly £1 million a year; clarity on the rights and status of EU nationals in the UK following the end of the transition period, including proof of settled status; and limitations on the duration of the Henry VIII powers.

The end of free movement and the move to the points-based immigration system, with its general salary threshold of £25,600 per annum for coming to work in the UK, seeks to equate low pay with low skills and low value. Consequently, this sends a very clear negative message to low-paid, but not low-skilled, EU nationals currently working in the UK. Many of these people have been among those who have kept, and are keeping, our public services going during the pandemic, not least in the care sector. This sends a clear negative message that, in today’s sometimes distorted view of the value of different jobs to society, we do not appreciate the contribution they make and the skills they bring.

In the Commons last week, a Home Office Minister said that the reason that care workers had been excluded from the qualifying list for the health and care visa was because the Government had a “vision” for the social care sector that it should no longer carry on looking abroad to recruit at or near the minimum wage, and that the Government’s priority was that, in future, care sector jobs will be

“valued, rewarded and trained for, and that immigration should not be an alternative.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/7/20; col. 1250]

If that means significantly better rates of pay in the underpaid social care sector, I am sure it will have widespread support. However, yesterday the Government said that with the vast majority of social care workers employed in the private sector their

“ability to influence pay rates there is limited”.

Since there are already 100,000 vacancies in England’s care sector alone, and the current flow of people from abroad to fill low-paid care sector jobs is about to dry up, how have the Government been able to satisfy themselves not only that UK-based workers will immediately step in to fill that gap but that they can lower vacancy levels in the social care sector?

If higher pay rates materialise in the social care sector, as a result of the points-based immigration system, there will presumably be an increase in the cost of providing social care. Who will finance those higher costs? Will it be the elderly care home residents and residents receiving care at home? Will it be already cash-strapped local authorities, or will the providers of care provision have to absorb the costs? Or does the Government’s vision extend to them financing the additional costs of a welcome improvement in pay in the social care sector? Perhaps the Government could provide an answer to that question in their response at the end of this debate.

The Government have said that ending free movement from the EU plus the future points-based immigration system should reduce net migration. On what basis have the Government come to that conclusion, bearing in mind that net migration from outside the EU, where there is no free movement, exceeds net migration from the EU, where there is free movement?

Perhaps the Government’s conclusion is an indication that, in the absence of publicly declared targets for net migration, they expect their approach to deter sufficient numbers of people from seeking to come and work here, in which case the hostile environment approach may still exist in spirit, if not officially in name. What happens and what is said during the passage of the Bill may throw some light on that. We will have to see whether some amendments to the Bill are accepted, or whether the absence of any movement on the Bill in the Commons really means a Government which think they are 100% right and that an alternative approach on anything related to the Bill is 100% wrong.

Knife Crime

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 21st July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord will know that I agree with him because I have agreed with him for many years on this. Family support is crucial. Through the troubled families programme we had that type of multiagency support for families. It is an absolute tragedy that very young people are carrying knives. They do so because they feel like victims; ultimately, they may become perpetrators, but at the heart of this, they are victims. That is why the multiagency approach is at the heart of the type of intervention and prevention we are taking forward.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

We know that the Home Secretary speaks to police chiefs every day. When she talks to them about the increase in knife crime, as she must do, what are the police chiefs telling the Government are the reasons for the national increase in knife crime? What action do they consider needs to be taken, and by whom, to address this issue and bring the knife crime figure down?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I know that the noble Lord will understand that I will not relay details of operational conversations. However, I will quote a Member of Your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who said that while the factors are multifaceted, one thing he is clear about is the rise in the demand from the drugs markets. While not directly related to it, some of the work that the NCA did the other week in taking drugs and weapons out of circulation will undoubtedly have eased some of the problems that our young people face.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2020

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

I thank the Minister for her explanation of the content and purpose of this order, which we support. It adds Feuerkrieg Division—FKD—to the list of proscribed organisations covered under Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. This is, I believe, the 25th order under that Act. To pursue points made by others, can the Minister indicate how many organisations are still on the proscribed list, and confirm that the Government still consider that they all remain in existence and continue to be concerned in terrorism?

The Home Secretary can seek to have an organisation proscribed if, and only if, she believes that it is concerned in terrorism as defined in the Terrorism Act, and then decides to exercise her discretion to do so. Proscription means outlawing an organisation and preventing it operating in the United Kingdom; it then becomes a criminal offence to belong to or support such an organisation.

As has been said, the organisation we are discussing today is a white supremacist group founded less than two years ago. It has members in North America and Europe, and advocates the use of violence and mass murder in pursuit of an all-out race war. Most of its activity is online but it also distributes violent, racist and anti-Semitic propaganda.

As we know, right-wing terrorism is the fastest-growing terror threat in the United Kingdom, and indeed in other countries. The Government need a coherent and comprehensive strategy in place to tackle far-right extremism, including availability of resources. I hope that the Minister can outline in her response what that strategy is beyond proscription orders.

As the Minister said, FKD members have been arrested on terrorism charges both in the UK and overseas. Last year, US authorities charged several individuals with offences including weapons charges, plotting to bomb a synagogue, plotting attacks on the LGBT community, plotting to bomb a major news network and distributing information related to explosives and weapons of mass destruction. As we know, 10 months ago, police in this country apprehended a 16 year-old on suspicion of the commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism, which led to the group urging members to carry out attacks in retaliation for the arrest of one of its followers. In October last year, a 21 year-old appeared in court charged with terror offences relating to his purported support for FKD after allegedly encouraging the mass murder of members of the Jewish and LGBT communities. Group members have also condoned and glorified acts of terrorism, including the Christchurch shooting.

In February this year, FKD announced that it would be dissolving but no reason was given and it is apparently considered that the group and its members remain active through other channels. As others have said, on the face of it, it is a little odd that when FKD did not seek to hide its existence, the Home Secretary did not take the necessary action to have it proscribed but once it claimed it would dissolve, the Home Secretary decided to act. Can the Minister comment on that in her response?

When the Government say that it is considered that the group and its members remain active through other channels, does that mean that it is suspected that the group has likely merged with another organisation; that it may have, in effect, simply renamed or unnamed itself and be operating exactly as before; or that it is operating in a different way, albeit continuing to be concerned in terrorism?

If FKD claims to be dissolving, does that claim also apply to the United States or is it only in this country or in Europe? If it does apply to the United States, do the US authorities also hold the view that the group and its members remain active through other channels? Can the Minister confirm that the Government do not consider that there would be any insuperable difficulty in proving membership of, or support for, FKD once it has been proscribed, despite its claim that it would be dissolving?

We support this order since we are committed to tackling all forms of terrorism and ensuring the safety of our nation and our citizens. We express our thanks to our police and security services for their work in this regard. I agree that there is a strong case to be made for FKD’s proscription. I accept that much of the information on which the Home Secretary has based her decision to pursue this order is likely to be of a nature and content that precludes it being disclosed for national security reasons. However, I hope that the Minister will be able to respond not only to my few brief questions but also to the questions asked and points made by the other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.

Metropolitan Police: Racism

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It is absolutely crucial that different parts of the system not only speak to but learn from each other, and that this forms what is best practice as we proceed.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

The Minister has made a number of references to diversity and to the police being more representative of the communities that they serve. The Home Secretary said in the Commons on Monday that she spoke to police chiefs every single day. What has the Home Secretary been telling police chiefs in these conversations that she expects them to achieve on greater diversity within police officer ranks, and over what period does she expect that to be achieved?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can vouch for the fact that the Home Secretary speaks to the police every day because I am on some of those calls. As I said, she is chairing the national policing board today and one item that will be discussed is diversity.

Port Examination Codes of Practice and National Security Determinations Guidance Regulations 2020

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Friday 10th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

I too thank the Minister for her explanation of the content and purpose of these regulations. When they were considered in the Commons two days ago the debate attracted two speakers, both of whom were required to be there, and was dealt with in 13 minutes. Clearly, life is harder for a Lords Minister than a Commons Minister.

These regulations address issues concerning our national security and the safety of our citizens. They bring into effect an amended code of practice for the counterterrorism port examination powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, a code of practice for the new hostile state activity port examination powers under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and amended guidance under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 relating to biometric retention provisions, as amended by the 2019 Act. The codes of practice have been the subject of public consultation.

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, a counterterrorism port and border officer can stop, question, search and detain a person at a UK port or the Northern Ireland border area to determine whether they are or have been involved in terrorism. The 2019 Act created similar powers to support law enforcement bodies in detecting and disrupting hostile state actors involved in, among other things, espionage, sabotage, assassination and subversion. The guidance under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 provides direction to law enforcement authorities about making or renewing a national security determination which allows for the retention and use of biometric material, fingerprints and DNA profiles for national security purposes.

The codes and guidance which these regulations bring into effect instruct and guide port and border officers in the procedural exercise of the powers to which I have referred, including rights and duties as well as safeguards for those who are subject to them. Only accredited officers will be able to exercise these powers, which must be done in accordance with the relevant code of practice. There will also be independent oversight of the use and application of the powers: by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in relation to Terrorism Act 2000 powers, and by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in relation to the 2019 Act powers. It is vital that these oversight protections are strong and effective, since the measures to which the codes of practice and guidelines we are discussing relate apply to individuals who have not, or have not yet, been convicted of any crime.

The attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in March 2018 in Salisbury, the related death of Dawn Sturgess and the evolving nature of risks and security threats highlight the need to reinforce and improve our lines of defence and fill the gaps in our legislation that come to light. The 2019 Act and these draft regulations, including the codes of practice, seek to do that. The issues that are the subject of the guidance and the code of practice related to the 2019 Act were debated at some length during the passage of the then Bill. Two key changes were made to the Bill, which are reflected in the code of practice: the right to confidential legal advice with safeguards, and securing a tighter definition of what constitutes hostile activity.

It was right that the Government undertook a consultation on the codes of practice. As a result of it, extra safeguards have been added to the code of practice relating to the 2019 Act to protect journalists and journalistic material. I know that the Minister referred to this, but can she reiterate precisely which additional safeguards were added following the consultation, as well as responding to the points raised by my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey and others?

That same code of practice specifies that an examining officer does not need “grounds for suspecting” that someone is engaged in hostile activity to stop them, but then also says that such stops must not be arbitrary and must be informed by the threat of hostile activity. The Government argued during Bill Committee that this was necessary because the security services sometimes have key information, but not enough to reach a reasonable suspicion threshold. Will the reason for a stop be recorded and, if so, where and by whom? If recorded, to whom would that information then be available? Would it be available on request and at any time to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner?

The code of practice for the 2019 Act also makes it clear that stopping someone based purely on a protected characteristic is not acceptable. There are concerns with any stop and search power that it will disproportionately impact BAME people. Will the Investigatory Powers Commissioner have access to information and statistics on how this power under the Act is used, and who is stopped?

In this code of practice, most of the reasons listed for the retention of an article or copy of an article are explicitly linked to preventing hostile activity under the 2019 Act. However, it also allows an article to be retained, or copied and retained, where the examining officer believes it may be needed for a decision to deport under the Immigration Act 1971. Can the Minister say how this provision will operate and whether the examining officer will be expected to proactively ascertain whether the article might be needed for a decision to deport?

Finally, the Biometrics Commissioner recommended that data be deleted within a reasonable period of time in circumstances where an individual has been arrested but not convicted of a non-terrorism offence. The guidance states that a reasonable period is up to six months. Can the Minister say what evidence led to that timeframe being provided for in the guidance, and whether it was proposed or suggested by the commissioner?

Our national security is of utmost importance to us all and, in that context, we support the action the Government are taking but await with interest the Minister’s response to the many points raised and questions asked. We also express our appreciation of the work of the counterterrorism and border officers at our ports, who are often our first line of defence against those of malign intent—state-sponsored or otherwise.

Immigration: Detainee Support

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 7th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I agree with the noble Lord. Anyone in asylum accommodation has access to our advice, issue reporting and eligibility provider, Migrant Help. He is right that there will be vulnerable people in our detention estate.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

I want to come back to a question raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Sheehan and Lady Warsi. They made the point that there has been a big reduction in the number of people in removal centres because of the risks due to the pandemic. My question is a follow-up to those previous questions: do the Government now expect that, in the light of being able to remove so many people from immigration removal centres, there will in future be a significant reduction in the use of such detention? Presumably, we have shown that we can manage these cases in the community. Will there be a reduction in future?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the Government do not want to put anyone in detention centres for the purposes of removal. Obviously, there are conditions around people being put on bail, including being asked to live at a specified address in the community. In the future, all these things will be based on a risk-management system.

Covid-19: Support and Accommodation for Asylum Seekers

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

This UQ has been prompted by the tragic events in Glasgow on Friday. I express our best wishes for a full recovery to those injured, not least to PC David Whyte, and our thanks to our emergency services for their professionalism and dedication.

I have two questions. First, asylum seekers are interviewed, including about vulnerabilities, at the point when their asylum claim is made. It appears that the 321 who were moved into hotels in Glasgow at the beginning of the lockdown did not have a further vulnerability risk assessment on being moved. What ongoing vulnerability assessments of asylum seekers are required, and in what circumstances? Secondly, is it correct that the limited daily allowance for asylum seekers is withdrawn when they are moved into hotel accommodation? If so, how are such asylum seekers able to pay even for items such as postage stamps, personal telephone calls or a non-prescription cough mixture, and how does that contribute to their general well-being?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord in paying tribute to all the emergency services and in sending our best wishes to those injured, including PC David Whyte, for a swift recovery.

The noble Lord is right: people get an initial assessment. Regarding further vulnerabilities, 24-hour healthcare is available to anyone who may need it who is in this or any other type of asylum accommodation. On the lack of cash for those in hotel accommodation, it is important to point out that anyone in hotel accommodation gets all essential living needs and costs met in terms of food, toiletries, hygiene products and healthcare, so there are no additional costs that they might need to meet. People can apply for additional assistance, should they need it.

Windrush Compensation Scheme

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 24th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

The Windrush scandal is a national cause of shame, and the Wendy Williams review exposed the callousness and incompetence that caused such deep injustice. The Windrush generation and their families have made an enormous contribution to every aspect of our national life since the arrival of the “Empire Windrush” 72 years ago. However, many faced appalling racism, extending beyond abuse to a lack of fair access to the basic necessities of life, including housing and jobs. The Williams review has brought home the extent to which these issues, and the associated deep injustice, remain; injustices that have been highlighted by Black Lives Matter.

The Home Secretary has said that the Government are accepting all 30 recommendations in the Williams review, but we will have to wait until nearer the Summer Recess to find out how, and over what timescale, the Government intend to implement them. At the moment we are still at the stage of words, not actions, from the Government, which still have other reports, including the David Lammy review, on which they have so far failed to act. This Government are quick to set up reviews and working groups, but slow to act on findings and slow to right the wrongs identified.

In her Statement, the Home Secretary informs us that she has established another cross-government working group to address the challenges faced by the Windrush generation and their descendants. How does this further working group relate to the

“expanded cross-government Windrush working group, which will take a strategic view of a range of issues relating to Windrush and wider race inequalities”—[Official Report, 6/5/20; col. 551.]

announced by the Home Secretary on 19 March this year, to which the Minister made reference during our debate on the Windrush compensation scheme on 6 May?

On 6 May, the Minister, on behalf of the Government, said that the Home Office estimate was that the Windrush compensation scheme would cost between £90 million and £250 million, based on 11,500 eligible claims. At £250 million, that works out at just below £22,000 per head, and at £90 million, it works at below £8,000 per head. Is that still the Government’s estimate of the number of eligible claims, and is that still the Government’s estimate of the cost of the scheme? If it is, do the Government believe that an average compensation settlement, on the Government’s figures, of somewhere between less than £8,000 and just below £22,000 represents a fair figure in the light of Wendy Williams’s words that:

“The many stories of injustice and hardship are heartbreaking, with jobs lost, lives uprooted and untold damage done to so many individuals and families … They had no reason to doubt their status, or that they belonged in the UK”?


The impact assessment for the Windrush compensation scheme says:

“The Government will also mitigate the risk of litigation and associated legal costs, which is likely to be more expensive than compensation through the scheme.”


In other words, the Government also regard the Windrush compensation scheme as likely to save them money. Could the Minister clarify whether accepting an offer of compensation under the scheme also means that the claimant can no longer take legal proceedings against the Government on this issue?

There is provision for an independent review by an HMRC adjudicator where a claimant is not satisfied with the outcome of their claim. Can the Minister confirm what appears to be the case—namely, that the Home Office can choose to reject the recommendation of an independent review?

The Government also said in the debate on the Windrush compensation scheme last month that

“the award levels take into account existing precedents and ombudsman-recommended payments.”—[Official Report, 6/5/20; col. 548.]

What are the existing precedents, bearing in mind the way the Windrush generation were treated over so many years and the damning findings and words of Wendy Williams? Also, which ombudsman’s recommended payments were being referred to?

The progress in dealing with claims to date has been painfully slow. Apparently just 60 people were granted compensation in the first year of the scheme’s operation. The Home Secretary declines to apologise for the delay, but rather accepts it and simply implies that the pace is now increasing. Can the Minister say how many staff are involved in processing claims, expressed in full-time equivalents, and whether any of this work has been outsourced? The number of those who have received payment is small compared with the Government’s estimate of eligible claims. Does the Minister think that the number of claims to date reflects a lack of confidence in a Home Office that Wendy Williams said showed “a lack of empathy”?

Can the Minister say what the average compensation payment to date has been? How many claimants have referred their claim to an independent reviewer? In how many cases has as an independent reviewer recommended a change to the original decision? Have such recommendations all been accepted in full by the Home Office?

The Home Secretary has said that she will come back to Parliament before the Summer Recess to provide an update on how the Government will implement all the Williams review’s recommendations. That will be an opportunity for the Government to show that they recognise that the time for action is now. Not to do that would be to fail the Windrush generation yet again. I accept that I have asked a number of specific questions in response to the Statement. I would appreciate being given the information I seek and will be happy to accept a written response to the specific questions that cannot be responded to today.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, one of the recommendations of Wendy Williams’ review is that the Home Office

“devise, implement and review a comprehensive learning and development programme which makes sure all its existing and new staff learn about the history of the UK and its relationship with the rest of the world, including Britain’s colonial history, the history of inward and outward migration and the history of black Britons.”

I was struck by that when I read the review and three months on it has even greater resonance. I readily acknowledge that I am someone with gaping holes in her education that need to be filled. I, for one, need to learn what I need to learn, in the widest sense. It is not only Home Office staff who need that learning.

We all know the importance of leadership. The Home Secretary and the Permanent Secretary are reviewing Home Office leadership and culture. Can the Minister tell the House whether this has external facilitation? Does it cover the whole of the Home Office?

The Home Secretary says in her Statement:

“I have apologised for the appalling treatment suffered”.


A sincere apology is not something made and then done with; it must be constant and its sincerity demonstrated by action. The Statement later refers to the challenges faced by the Windrush generation and their descendants. It is wider than that. As Wendy Williams wrote in her first recommendation:

“The sincerity of this apology will be determined by how far the Home Office demonstrates a commitment to learn from its mistakes by making fundamental changes to its culture and way of working, that are both systemic and sustainable.”


Her seventh recommendation, which follows seamlessly, is for

“a full review … of the hostile/compliant environment policy and measures—individually and cumulatively.”

It should be scrupulous,

“designed in partnership with external experts and published in a timely way.”

That policy, whatever it is called—the hostile or compliant environment policy—is far-reaching and callous. It is racist.

The National Audit Office, in December 2018, commented on the department still showing a lack of curiosity about individuals who may have been affected and who are not of Caribbean heritage, on the basis that this would be a “disproportionate effort”. “In the circumstances”, the NAO reported, “we find this surprising”.

We all need to exercise our imagination and put ourselves in other people’s shoes when we consider what actions we may take, so I am pleased to hear that the Home Secretary will be accepting Wendy Williams’ 30 recommendations in full. I do not know whether there is any significance in the future tense “will be accepting”. We look forward to their implementation and to tangible outcomes.

When we first debated the report, I acknowledged that not all the implementation could be immediate. I also acknowledge that claims made to the compensation scheme must be considered and assessed. After all, some claimants may be claiming too little. But that does not mean that every “i” must be dotted and every “t” crossed before any payment is made.

The Statement refers to the urgent and exceptional payments scheme. I will resist going down the road of exploring whether the whole situation, and the claims, are exceptional, and whether they are urgent, given the age and current situation of many if not most of the claimants, brought about by their experiences, but I will ask the Minister whether the 35 payments totalling over £46,000 made to the end of March are the same as the

“many interim and exceptional payments”

that

“have been made to make sure that people have access … to the funds they need now”.

The figures seem woefully small. Does the Minister have more up-to-date figures? We are used to reporting by government on a three-monthly basis and reasonably so, but I would have thought in this case that Ministers would have wanted to see how payments are going month by month, in respect of every category of payment.

I will also ask the Minister about further offers. I cannot make the amounts mentioned add up to anywhere near “over £1 million”. Can she break that figure down? Can she explain “offered”? That suggests conditionality. Are claimants expected to agree that an offer is accepted in full and final settlement? If so, what advice can they access before doing so, and is this in the spirit of the apology?

The Home Secretary said she

“simply will not call for targets.”

I agree that these are “personal” and “individual” cases, as she said—or, indeed personal and individual people—to be treated with care and respect. However, I have asked in a Question for Written Answer—it was only last week, so I am not accusing the Minister of being slow in responding—what the Government’s targets are for the number of claims settled in full and the number of interim awards made within different periods after the commencement of the scheme. Sometimes there is a place for targets, and stretch targets at that. To aim high in paying what must for many must be much-needed cash is, in my view, one of those targets.

Finally, the Home Secretary is committed to ensuring that the Home Office delivers

“for each part of the community it serves”.

That is all of us, not only those with whom it has direct contact, but those on whose behalf it acts. We would all like to feel it acted in our name.