Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2011

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 20th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I broadly concur with what other noble Lords have said in support of this order. I wonder whether the House is aware that over the past decade 60,000 to 70,000 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, yet not a single successful prosecution has been brought in the Pakistani courts. While proscribing an organisation is indeed an extremely grave and serious matter, one has to live with the reality that if a country that has less than ideal procedures for taking people through due process is unable to take control of these elements of its population, it rests on the rest of us to ensure that our populations are secure and safe.

I am a little disappointed that it has taken this long to proscribe this organisation, as I know from a great deal of openly available evidence in the Pakistani communities that it has left its signature against some of the most heinous crimes committed in recent years. It has a rather innocent sounding name “the community of the learned students of Pakistan” and sounds entirely inoffensive, but in fact it is armed to the teeth, it has some of the nastiest propaganda at its disposal and it particularly selects people who support human rights to target. The Minister told us of its attacks on the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan, a peaceful, law-abiding, extremely well educated community that provides professionals, such as doctors and others in the most difficult professions, who work across the country to alleviate poverty and hardship. They specifically target this community because they have a warped view of what their religion comprises. In the past two years, they have also taken to targeting journalists and lawyers. I personally know of people in Pakistan who have been sent anonymous letters, whose fax numbers have been obtained and who have been told by this group, “We are watching you, we are going to come and get you”. I would have thought there was sufficient evidence to have proscribed them some time ago.

The Government’s statement talks about the possibility of de-proscription and my noble friend mentioned that 46 organisations have been proscribed under these powers. Can she tell us how many have applied for successful deproscription because as a liberal at heart I am very conscious of free expression? It worries me that organisations, once proscribed, would find themselves in that situation and unable to be deproscribed. I wonder if she could tell us how many applications there have been and how many have been successfully de-proscribed. We must recall that freedom’s struggles in other parts of the world involve organisations that—due to the exegesis of their operating circumstances—might have been somewhat implicated in some kinds of violence. Yet when they revert to the path of peace, it is also right that we reconsider their standing at that time.

I hope it is not too wide of this particular order to ask the Minister what steps the Government are taking to train up judges, police officers, forensics teams and so on, so that Pakistan is better equipped to bring people to trial itself rather than waiting for them to be unable to travel to other countries.

Finally, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, a lot of these organisations are known, the minute they are proscribed, to sail under a new flag. In other words, they find another innocent-sounding name but their aims continue as before and many of the same individuals are involved in the same heinous activities.

Several noble Lords have made reference to the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is established perfectly legally in the United Kingdom. I would not therefore draw that analogy as it is an entirely different ball game, but can my noble friend tell us, since it is not clear to me, whether this organisation is established in any sense openly in this country?

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, first, I thank the Minister for setting out the background to and the Government’s reasons for this order, which is intended to help protect our national security and which we support. I will make a number of points and ask a number of questions, some of which I recognise the Minister may not feel in a position to answer in any detail. Some of the points that I wish to raise have already been made in one form or another by other noble Lords.

The TTP—the organisation we are discussing today—was set up some three or four years ago, and about a year after that was proscribed by the Pakistani authorities. Last year, the United States took similar action. Are other countries considering similar action and are we pressing other countries to take similar action in respect of this organisation? Proscription—which is based on clear evidence that an organisation is involved in terrorism—means that an organisation is outlawed and is unable to operate in the United Kingdom, with it being a criminal offence to be involved in the activities of the proscribed organisation.

The TTP has been very active in Pakistan since its formation. Among the factors that the Home Secretary takes into account is the specific threat that an organisation poses to British nationals overseas and the need to support other members of the international community in the fight against terrorism. The Minister said that the TTP had been implicated in attacks in the West, such as the attempted Times Square car bomb attack in May 2010. In very general terms, are there also concerns that the TTP has been, or is likely to be, active in this country? Also in general terms, can the Minister assure the House that there is evidence that previous proscription orders have proved effective in their objective of tackling terrorist activities through disrupting and preventing the organisations concerned achieving their aims?

There are 46 international terrorist organisations listed under Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. As the Minister said, this is the ninth proscription order amending that schedule. The criteria for deciding whether to proscribe an organisation were determined some 10 years ago. Do the Government intend to stick with the current criteria; or do they intend to review or amend them? A proscribed organisation can appeal to an independent committee, and proscribed organisations are currently reviewed annually. Do the Government intend to keep the present arrangements; or are they considering more or less frequent reviews or changes in the appeal mechanism?

The Minister said that the Home Secretary has exercised her power to proscribe the TTP only after carefully examining all the evidence and information available from a number of sources. I do not doubt that. Bearing in mind that the Prime Minister, when he was leader of the Opposition, gave a commitment to ban another organisation, Hizb ut-Tahrir—when presumably he had not been able to examine carefully all the evidence and information available—can the Minister give an assurance that if the activities of that other organisation or under review, the Home Secretary will make any decision, as she has in the case before us today, only on the basis of the relevant information and evidence available? I repeat: we support the order.

UK Border Agency: Visas and Passports

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 11th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hooper, for securing this debate on an issue that, as the noble Baroness said, has previously been the source of concern to Members of your Lordships’ House. Operating in some 135 countries, the UK Border Agency provides a front-line border control before people ever reach the UK. As we know, that is an important role, since over 75 per cent of the world’s population require a visa to come to the UK and all businesspeople, workers and students staying longer than six months need a visa regardless of their nationality.

The UK Border Agency international group visa services directorate handles the overseas visa service and, as I understand it, at the start of 2009 managed over 150 visa application centres in British missions. Of these, 73 were spoke posts, from which some or all of the applications are transferred to a hub post, where the decision is made. In addition, there are large numbers of visa application centres run by the border agency’s commercial partners and by the Department of Homeland Security in the United States.

In 2006, the independent monitor for entry clearance refusals, whose role was to oversee and review the visa clearance system, reported on the inconsistencies and lack of fairness faced by people when applying for visas. The report was made following visits to different parts of the world, including Latin America. Some three years later, in 2009, the independent monitor reported on what she described as an organisation under pressure and identified a number of issues for the UK Border Agency international group to address, including what one would have thought were fairly basic points, such as ensuring that all the evidence is taken into account when reaching a decision and ensuring adequate data capture.

A report by the Home Affairs Committee in the other place in early 2009 indicated that the independent monitor had said that refusals of UK visa applications were taking too long and were unintelligible. She also expressed concerns to the committee that UKBA staff were predisposed to approving entry to the UK because of the increased workload caused by visa refusals. We have heard examples this evening from your Lordships of apparently complex and time-consuming procedures for application that appear to at least some of those having to go through those procedures to be far from user-friendly and lacking in easy contact with a human being who can give information or guidance about the application. This, of course, is not some new or recent development, as the reports from the independent monitor make clear.

From the point of view of the Government of the day, over recent years there has been a desire to tighten up border controls and to have procedures and processes in place that are consistent and fair but achieve that objective. Overseas, all visa applications are checked against security, criminal and immigration watch lists and the e-Borders system allows the agency to vet passengers bound for the UK before they arrive.

While its focus is on protecting the UK by ensuring that harmful and illicit goods and people do not reach this country, the UK Border Agency—this has been said in the debate—also has an important role in facilitating the smooth passage of legitimate travel and trade, which benefit the UK economy. In 2009-10 the agency processed nearly 2.5 million visa applications, of which just over 2 million resulted in a visa being issued. The independent monitor identified in her final published report—her role has now been taken over by the independent chief inspector—that in just under 85 per cent of 906 cases sampled the refusal notices were reasonable and provided correct information.

In his annual report for 2009-10, the independent chief inspector states that he is now also reporting in his capacity as the independent monitor for entry clearance refusals and highlights four major recurring concerns, including the need for the UK Border Agency to make good-quality decisions, the need for agency staff to maintain and have reliable access to accurate case information and the need to treat people fairly and consistently. The independent chief inspector also states in his report that during his inspections he repeatedly found examples of agency staff not following the agency’s own standards and guidance.

The UK Border Agency has as one of its objectives the implementation of fast and fair decisions, but the concerns being raised in the debate this evening, which seem to have been shared at least in part by the independent monitor and now by the independent chief inspector, are whether speed, consistency and fairness have been achieved to the extent that they should and whether the procedures and processes in place are always geared to taking account of the fact that there are very different categories of people making applications who are seeking to spend widely differing periods of time in the UK.

I am sure that when she responds the Minister will want to address the points that have been raised this evening, including the extent to which the recommendations and issues for action identified by the independent monitor, and the independent chief inspector now that he has taken over the role, have or have not been implemented and the progress that has been made. No doubt the Minister will also wish to say where the Government are with their review of the student visa system in the light of the criticisms of the student visa provisions.

More than 2,600 UK Border Agency staff are directly involved in the overseas visa operation, of whom around 350 work in London. Visa sections around the world employ just under 700 UK-based staff who go overseas on short-term postings and just over 1,600 locally engaged staff. Following the recent comprehensive review, the UK Border Agency is facing cuts of about 20 per cent and is expecting to take that percentage out of the front line as well as making cuts in support services. There were 1,700 job cuts last year and a further 5,000 are anticipated by the UK Border Agency over the period of the spending review. Obviously, the UK Border Agency employs many more staff than those directly involved in the overseas visa operation, which is the principal focus of the debate this evening, but will there be any job cuts among staff involved in the overseas visa operation and, if so, how many? Will the Minister give an assurance that, whatever job cuts are made by the agency, there will be no adverse impact on the quality of service and decision-making in the overseas visa operation, particularly in the light of the concerns already expressed about the current situation—this has been going on for some time—by the independent monitor and the independent chief inspector?

Identity Documents Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 17th November 2010 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Rosser]

5: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Identity fraud
(1) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the impact of the repeal of the Identity Cards Act 2006 on combating identity fraud and the lessons learnt from the operation of the identity cards scheme.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay the report before Parliament within one year of the coming into force of this Act.”

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, this amendment calls on the Government to produce a report on the impact of the repeal of the Identity Cards Act on combating identity fraud and on the lessons learnt from the operation of the scheme. Identity fraud is one of the UK’s fastest growing crimes, with nearly 2 million people a year falling victim, and figures suggest it costs the country some £2.7 billion a year. More than nine out of 10 people in the UK consider themselves to be at risk from identity fraud. According to the Government’s own fraud prevention service, in the first three quarters of this year, levels of identity fraud increased by almost 10 per cent when compared with the same period in 2009 to nearly 80,000 cases. Any Government obviously have a duty to address this concern and to obtain whatever information is available to ensure that they have an up-to-date and coherent plan for action in this area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Skelmersdale]

My Lords, I wonder if, when he comes to wind up, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, could be a little more explicatory—for want of a better word—on the meaning of Amendment 4. Presumably, he is talking about the costs and savings incurred. We have just had a very long debate on the subject—

[Lord Rosser]

We are not actually on Amendment 4. I have been speaking to Amendment 5.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, perhaps the Minister could confirm that he would be happier—I am not quite sure that I took this from his speech—for such lessons as there may be from a relatively short and limited experience to be included in the wider work that the Government are doing. Of course, one would not disagree that any available lessons should be learnt; but I doubt whether that work is as useful to Parliament if it is provided separately and discreetly from other work being done on cyber crime and related areas. It is an enormously important area and Parliament will look forward to debating it further. I am not convinced that this is precisely the way to go.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

Obviously, the reason for bringing forward this amendment relates to the evidence given in Committee in the other place. One of the organisations that had had most involvement with the identity cards scheme—the pilot carried out with the Manchester Airports Group—clearly referred to the benefits of the scheme with regard to identity. Quite relevantly, it said it thought that, even if identity cards were no longer there, perhaps the benefits that it had seen arising from the scheme could be achieved through other means. In the light of that kind of evidence, I should have thought that the Government would have been interested in the impact of the repeal of the Identity Cards Act 2006 and of trying to ensure that the benefits that at least some of those involved in the pilot exercise saw coming from it could be retained through other means. I am a little disappointed that the Minister has not indicated that the Government intend to carry out any sort of investigation or review of the benefits that were achieved from it and of any benefits relating to the issue of identity fraud to see whether they could be maintained through other channels.

The part of the amendment about a report being required within one year is less important than actually looking at what happened with the identity card scheme and trying to ensure that any benefits that arose from it could be retained in other ways. I am very grateful for the interventions and contributions that have been made by noble Lords in this debate in which reference has been made to the problems of identity fraud. I think I am right in saying that there is a rollout of a new generation of identity documentation in Germany which will include a radio-frequency identity chip to help to facilitate, or so it is claimed, secure online transactions. I hope that as part of the action plan to which the Minister has referred that has been set up and is being developed that some regard will be paid to what is happening in Germany and whether that has a contribution to make in this field.

I am a little disappointed that the Minister, irrespective of the issue of the report, was not prepared to say that the Government would seek to take advantage, through an examination of what happened during the identity card scheme, of any contribution that could be made towards the fight against identity fraud and ensure that any benefits that the scheme had achieved were retained through other means. I am sorry that she has not been able to say that the Government will do that. Nevertheless, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

Intellectual Assets: Crime

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I think that the whole House will endorse the view that an economy such as ours depends crucially for its advance and future prosperity on its capacity to innovate and the intellectual capital on which that depends. Therefore, a central part of the Government’s strategy is very much concern not just with national security but with developing, with the private sector, a secure cyberplatform on which investment in this country from both domestic companies and companies abroad can be based.

[Lord Rosser]

Bearing in mind the increasing threat posed by the type of crime raised in this Question and the importance of developing still further links and levels of co-operation with other countries on this issue, can the Minister give a categorical assurance that the Government’s intention to merge the Serious Organised Crime Agency with the new national crime agency will not result in any diminution of personnel and resources directed at fighting crime of this kind? Furthermore, will the Government’s recently announced review of intellectual property and its value to the UK economy also address the threat posed by intellectual property crime?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, of course many sorts of crime are involved. The original Question was clearly about espionage but there is also theft, to which the noble Lord referred—that is, crime of a more straightforward kind—and both those aspects of our intellectual underpinning in this country need to be addressed. I can give the assurance that there will be no change in the status of SOCA, which will remain central—and I mean central—to crime-fighting in this country, so there will be no diminution in our efforts on that front. As those on the Benches opposite may know, we will produce a strategy for cybercrime by the end of the year. Therefore, I can give that assurance, and we agree with those on the Benches opposite that this is a matter of high national importance.

Immigration: Deportation

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Baroness raises some of the absolutely pertinent issues which our further review needs to take into account. I cannot comment precisely on the contract of the company that will be employed in addition to G4S but I think it fair to say that the Government feel they need to look at all aspects of the services provided. They need to start with the contract and go right through to what happens on the aircraft.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, what checks will the Government be making to ensure that the new private security firm involved in deportations carries them out in accordance with the laid-down practices and procedures, including, in particular, the use of force?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, as the House may know, there are several control and monitoring systems in place. Contrary, perhaps, to some of the prevalent views, they are in fact very active. The Chief Inspector of Prisons has oversight of all the detention facilities, which includes the escorts, and he conducts inspection visits on an unannounced basis. The independent monitoring board is based at Heathrow. After the last Question that I was asked on this subject I inquired how active that independent monitoring board was, and I was told that it is very active. It has produced critical comment on some of the practices it has observed, although not in this area, and it has said specifically that it does not think that there is a systemic problem, which I know is one of the anxieties in the House. Furthermore, detainees themselves have the right to make complaints. Those go to the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman and he reviews them. There are many controls trying to ensure that there is both a good system and proper practice.

Identity Documents Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 1st November 2010 Grand Committee

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 1 and 4 because, as I said on Second Reading, when we discussed this matter at length, it seemed a shame to throw out the one good bit of the scheme along with the bad bit. The bad bit comprises the national identity register, whereas having another bit of plastic with which to identify yourself is not a huge concern. As I said then—I may as well put this on record again—I should be very happy to see us have a plastic passport, as you might call it, comprising the photograph page of the passport with an identical chip in it. We are told that retaining this provision temporarily as a travel document for use in Europe would give rise to huge expense as whole sections of the national identity register would have to be preserved. I do not believe that that would be the case; I think the pudding is being over-egged here in order to make the case all one way.

I support Amendment 4 in preference to Amendment 2 because the latter seems to be rather all-embracing whereas Amendment 4 is concerned merely with the information that is relevant to a passport. That information would have to be retained for a passport anyway and would probably be sufficient to prove the authenticity of the card. I have not checked with my expert but I imagine that the card is very secure and that if you are in possession of the Government’s public key you can authenticate the card without having to have any of this background information off a database, and you can tell whether the card has been cloned or tampered with in any way. Therefore, I think we should do exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Brett, suggested and retain the card as a travel document. Perhaps in due course we could also have a convenient European travel card to go along with it, but we should retain the minimum of information that is required, if any.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I support both the amendments in my noble friend’s name in this group and the related Amendment 4, to which I am one of the signatories. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, for also being a signatory to Amendment 4. On Second Reading, we heard the noble Earl’s views on the sense and convenience of continuing to use ID cards as travel documents in Europe, and he has re-emphasised those points today. We on these Benches share that view and the annoyance and frustration of those cardholders who, under the Bill, would be prevented from continuing to use their cards in this way. The amendments before us would enable existing ID cards to continue to be used as travel documents in Europe.

On Second Reading, having asserted that maintaining full-life validity of the existing ID cards would probably cost an extra £60 million to £80 million, which she considered to be unacceptably high, the Minister inferred that the alternative proposition of a refund of £30 to existing holders of the ID cards was unacceptable not because it was too much but because it was so trifling, since it was,

“rather less than probably most people pay for a monthly subscription to Sky”.—[Official Report, 18/10/2010; col. 742.]

That was an interesting phrase from the Minister, suggesting that Rupert Murdoch and his interests are never far from this Government’s thoughts.

ID cards were sold as documents that, among other things, would be valid as travel documents in Europe for 10 years. Those who bought the cards, planning to rely on them for future travel, will now have to spend additional money on obtaining a passport, or renewing it when it expires. Of the 12,000 to 13,000 individuals who bought ID cards, some did so because they only travel in Europe and never further afield, others because their passports were about to expire. Some bought ID cards because they were far more affordable than a full British passport. All these individuals have a right to feel cheated. They were sold a product—in this case, an identity card and its associated benefits—only to find, not that the terms of use are likely to be changed by the Government, but that the value and purpose of the document will be completely nullified without compensation. On the point of fairness, the Government's stance cannot be right. As the Minister, Mr Damian Green, eloquently put it in his impact assessment, there would be a reputational issue for the Government,

“in dealing with people who purchased a now-useless card in good faith”.

The Government's argument appears to be that because they said prior to the general election that they would scrap the ID card system, everyone should have known that, and it is their own fault if they bought one. However, the individuals concerned bought one from the Government.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Are we not now getting on to Amendment 3? The noble Lord seems to be talking entirely about compensation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I am not talking entirely about compensation: I am talking about the issue of scrapping the card and not continuing at all. The amendment deals with it continuing as a travel document in Europe. The individuals concerned bought a card from the Government: not from a Labour Government or a Conservative Government, but from the Government. To those individuals, it is still the Government who are now withdrawing them. Until now, we have not had a culture in which it is acceptable for an arrangement entered into with the Government by an individual for a service in return for a payment to be totally withdrawn shortly afterwards, but for the payment made by the individual to be retained on the grounds that it is rather less than most people pay for a monthly subscription to Sky.

The Minister said at Second Reading that we must have a sense of proportion about this. She should address that comment to herself. Accepting these amendments would be one way for the Government to show a sense of proportion. Perhaps the Minister will tell us whether the same approach as that being shown to individuals with ID cards is being adopted for contractors who have been working for the Government on developing and running the ID card scheme. Have they, too, been told that they should have known that the scheme would no longer continue if there was a change in the political colour of the Government at the election and that, knowing this, they should not have entered into any contracts; and accordingly that no further payments are being made to them and the terms of any contracts are null and void, with no compensation payable? I do not think so. For this Government, there appears to be one rule for their dealings with those who can fight their corner, such as the large contractors and their owners and shareholders, and another rule for their dealings with individual citizens who do not have the resources or muscle to stand up to what some would regard as sharp practice.

The impact assessment refers to the cost of termination of contracts with contractors, and the cost of the refund process. If there are to be no refunds—which is why we are tabling an amendment suggesting that the cards should continue as travel documents in Europe—what refund process is being referred to in the impact assessment? How much would it cost? How much compensation has been paid for termination of contracts?

Using an ID card as a form of travel document is not an unfamiliar phenomenon in Europe, as my noble friend Lord Brett explained. The identity cards of Germany, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, Greece, Slovakia and Sweden are all recognised by all EU members as valid for intra-EU travel. The argument that border agencies would be flummoxed by individuals using our ID cards for travel is not very convincing. Neither, incidentally, do there appear to have been problems with recognition of the limited number of identity cards issued here so far. As my noble friend Lord Brett explained, this is a facilitating amendment to enable the continued use of ID cards for travel purposes. We support the amendment. It is sensible—as is Amendment 4, to which the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, is a signatory. If the national identity register is to be destroyed, it makes sense to transfer data relevant to passports and international travel to the passport database and to the Identity and Passport Service. After all, the IPS is used to handling such information. Practically, such a transfer would not be hard to achieve. Transfer would require the permission of those individuals whose data are held, but these would not be difficult to obtain where, as is likely in most cases, the individual is willing to agree. That is because, on data transfer, the appropriate section of the Data Protection Act 1998 states:

“Personal data shall be obtained for only one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes”.

We do not see that what we are suggesting with this amendment falls foul of that criterion.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

The biometric data held on identity cards are different from those held on passports, so that is not quite right.

[Lord Rosser]

If that is the case, I take the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. I think what he is saying is that he does not think it is relevant to the particular issue of the ID card continuing as a travel document, rather than that it is not relevant at all. If so, I accept what the noble Earl says.

The Government are clearly not too sure of the wisdom of their position, as the Minister implied at Second Reading when she said that she did not consider that there was a need to do this “as things stand”. But I hope that, in the light of that, the Minister will reflect hard on the amendment, which seeks to ensure that the identity card can continue to be used as a document for travel in Europe. The disregard now being shown for those who bought ID cards on the basis that they would be valid for a range of purposes, including travel in Europe, for 10 years, is unworthy of any democratic government. This group of amendments seeks to redress the situation by providing that the existing ID cards should remain valid as travel documents in Europe for 10 years and that existing ID card data should, subject to the agreement of the individual, be transferred to the passport database if the information on the national identity register is to be destroyed. The Government ought to be prepared to agree to these amendments and I hope that, on reflection, the Minister will indicate that that is now her position.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the amendment does not contain all that accompanying detail. It is not easy, therefore, to interpret what the noble Lord actually thinks should be transferred. If he wants to make that clearer, perhaps that might help, but, as things stand, these amendments have not been thought through. That is a pity because there is the germ of a good idea here. The idea of a passport card is not new, and Members of this House may be aware that—

[Lord Rosser]

I have a question in the light of what the Minister has said. If it were possible to produce something with which she agreed that achieved the objective to, as Amendment 1 said,

“remain valid as a travel document in Europe until their expiry date”,

by the moving of data on to the passport database, is that something that she would agree to?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I cannot give advance assent to a proposition that I have not seen in writing, so I cannot concede that point to the noble Lord.

Might I continue? It is the case that transport cards are issued by a number of countries for use with other countries where there is a bilateral or multilateral agreement, and there is a set of standards issued by ICAO that were adopted under a non-binding conclusion by the EU in 2005. It may be that the previous Administration chose not to invest in passport cards; they could have done so then. That might have been because of the work and the level of investment on ID cards themselves.

Another possibility at that stage would have been consideration of the use of vignettes. The ability to store the equivalent of a vignette in the passport card is under development, and we will wait to see how that progresses. At this stage, though, given that none of that base was laid by the previous Administration, we do not think it is possible or cost-effective to invest in passport cards as a priority.

My final point is again on costs. I appreciate that the amendments aim in effect to pass the data currently on the NIR to the passport database. As I have indicated, there is no existing provision, nor is it appropriate, for the IPS to establish a new database. The amendment also fails to recognise that it will be necessary to deal with lost or stolen cards that would have to be replaced. Once this thing is working, you cannot just say, “Well, if you lose your card, that’s too bad”; it has to be a living system.

Issuing replacement cards would require an infrastructure to be in place. Given what was said at Second Reading, I asked the IPS to estimate how much that would cost each year. The results are as follows: to maintain the infrastructure and pay service charges to the contractors would cost about £4 million; to replace lost or stolen cards would cost an estimated £500,000; and to maintain basic customer support facilities and appropriate levels of staffing would be another £500,000. Those are all per annum figures. About £5 million over one year—which, in the lifetime of these cards, means 10 years—gives a total of £50 million. I have tried to cover the issues raised by the Opposition. There are others—such as transgendered people having only one card, as they currently do with the passport, and the question, which we will come to, of refunds and consumer protection—which I shall go into in due course. However, even with the amendment, there is a catalogue of problems. Instead, I recommend that the amendment be withdrawn.

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[Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville]

My Lords, sitting between the Cross Benches and my noble friend’s Liberal Democrats, I have to confess that the difference between myself and them is that whereas they could not understand the Bill as it was originally written, I cannot understand it now that it has been rewritten by them. I grew up on childhood problems which involved Mr Black, Mr Brown, Mr Green and Mr White who lived in houses that were—but not necessarily respectively—green, white, brown and black. Then you were given a certain amount of information and you had to decide who was living in the right house. All I can say is that the Minister now constitutes my road to sanity because if she can explain what the original Bill meant and why this measure does not improve it, at least I shall sleep at night.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, are interesting. Those are the points that I understood. Other points were made which—through my own ignorance, not their failure to explain them—I could not fully understand. I am extremely grateful that I am not left with the hapless task of having to respond to them. No doubt when we have heard the Minister’s response, we will find out the validity or otherwise of the points that have been made. For people such as myself who are not lawyers and who do not profess to understand some fairly obscure wording, will the Minister please give the reasons why she is not accepting the amendments in a layman’s terms, not a lawyer’s? If she is accepting them, presumably there is no problem in that regard.

[The Countess of Mar]

My Lords, may I return to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights? It says, in relation to Clauses 4, 5 and 6:

“The practical use of these offences could engage the right to private life and we call on the Government to provide Parliament with a more detailed justification of why these offences are necessary and an explanation of what conduct is criminalised by these offences that is not already caught by existing legislation”.

I hope that the Minister will respond to that point as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

Absolutely. It is important to have an external view of these things that will report directly to Parliament, because it is our duty to protect the rights of citizens against the Executive.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I want to speak to my noble friend Lord Brett’s amendment as well as to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, which seem to raise a different issue. Primarily, though, I shall address my comments to the issue of identity fraud, which is raised in my noble friend’s amendment.

I think that it was on Second Reading that my noble friend Lord Bach pointed out that ID fraud is one of the UK’s fastest growing crimes, with nearly 2 million people a year falling victim to it and it costing the country some £2.7 billion. A huge proportion of people are affected; more than nine out of 10 people in the UK consider themselves to be at risk from identity fraud.

Minimising the paper trail of one’s identity details is an important part of facing up to the threat of fraud, and ID cards helped to do that, as the evidence that was presented in another place by the representative from the Manchester Airport group and the comments made today by my noble friend Lord Brett have indicated. The ID card scheme, of course, did not provide a panacea when it came to addressing identity fraud. The cards offered some help in that area, and we feel it is important that that is acknowledged, but with regard to, for example, identity fraud committed online, the ID card did not offer added security.

My noble friend’s amendment calls on the Government to produce a report on the lessons learnt for tackling identity fraud from the ID card scheme and its cancellation. It is interesting to refer back to the evidence given by the representative from the Manchester Airport Group to the committee in another place. I draw attention once again to points that he made. He said that the benefit that they got from the system was that they were absolutely sure that the person who was standing in the pass office was the right person. He was asked by committee members whether it might have been possible to achieve some of the benefits by other means—which is also important in relation to the amendment—for example, by using passports. He said that, yes, that was something that they would like to hold on to, but added:

“At the moment we are not getting very positive indications that that would be possible, but we will keep pushing”.

Later, he was asked whether he was saying that some of the innovative ideas in the identity card scheme could be replicated using the passport database or something similar. He said:

“I believe that if there is a will to do that, yes, we can. At the moment we are not actually feeling that will, but I believe that it is possible”.—[Official Report, Commons, Identity Documents Bill Committee, 29/6/10; cols. 29-30.]

Those observations suggest that there would be real benefit in having a report on the impact on combating identity fraud of the repeal—as that is the intention—of the Identity Cards Act 2006. The comments made in that evidence certainly suggested that the scheme had benefits, but that some of them might be achieved in other ways if it was scrapped. It is a case of looking not just at what may have been lost but at whether the benefits which were worth keeping, particularly relating to identity fraud, could continue to be achieved by other means. Reference was made in the evidence to the use of the passport database.

At page 7, paragraph 15 the impact assessment states:

“For Government and business, the benefits were expected to derive from simpler, quicker business processes and reduced cost of identity related fraud. However, the realisation of benefits depends very strongly upon high take-up rates for the card, because these are the key to engaging public and private sector organisations in offering card-based services”.

The point has been made that there was not a very high take-up; the system had only just come in. However, in the Government’s impact assessment there is a clear recognition that the identity card scheme could produce benefits for government and business by reducing the cost of identity-related fraud. Once again, that would seem to be an argument for the Minister to accept the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Brett, which simply calls for a report on the impact of the repeal of the Act on combating identity fraud.

The noble Baroness told the House on Second Reading that an action plan was being developed by the National Fraud Authority and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, following their strategic threat assessment of the harm impact of identity crime, and that that was being overseen by the Home Office. If there is an exercise or if an action plan is already in the process of being drawn up, it is surely not irrelevant to look at the impact of the repeal of the Identity Cards Act 2006 on combating identity fraud and the lessons learnt from the operation of the scheme. Once again, I say, particularly given some of the evidence presented in the other place and the statement in the Government's impact assessment, that there would have been benefits in relation to identity fraud—albeit that of course I accept that the document said that that would relate to a high take-up of the cards.

Can the Minister tell us any more about the action plan—obviously, not the details of what is in it but the progress being made, what it might involve and when we might hear more about it? I also take this opportunity to ask whether, as part of the action plan, the Government are following the rollout of the new generation of identity documentation in Germany, which will include the radio frequency identity chip—which, as I understand it, will facilitate secure online transactions. At least, that is the theory; whether it does in practice is presumably something that still must be seen. Does the Minister think that anything can be learnt from that new technology to address the very serious problem, which everybody recognises, of identity fraud?

I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept these amendments. My comments are mainly related to the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Brett, as clearly everyone has an interest in devoting the maximum resources and the maximum amount of information gained from operating other relevant schemes to trying to combat identity fraud.

Cyberattacks: EU Committee Report

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 14th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I am the final warm-up act before the much referred to and much awaited speech by the Minister. I wish to add my thanks to those already expressed to the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, for the work that he and his sub-committee have undertaken in producing such an informative report into a subject of ever increasing importance and concern. Those concerns have been reflected by every Member of your Lordships' House who has spoken with authority in this debate. I also congratulate my noble friends Lord Reid of Cardowan and Lord Browne of Ladyton on their, as anticipated, impressive and thought-provoking speeches, which gave us the benefit of their considerable and real expertise and knowledge in this field.

The noble Lord, Lord Jopling, in his helpful and informative opening speech, drew attention to the key findings in the report, including the issue of the part that the European Union can usefully play in protecting Europe against large-scale cyberattacks. It was certainly of some comfort to read that the committee did not feel that this was an area where our Government, in relation to our own country, were being complacent. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, said, the witnesses from whom the committee took both oral and written evidence generally thought that the United Kingdom had sophisticated defences compared to most other states.

To quote from the report, the European Network and Information Security Agency, referring to mechanisms for dealing with internet incidents, had stated that,

“the UK, along with a limited number of other Member States, is considered a leader in this area with developed practices that set benchmarks for others to adopt”.

Continued vigilance and development will be necessary to ensure that that continues to remain the case.

There has, of course, been a change of Government since the report was concluded. While we have read their written response, I hope that we will hear more from the Minister when she responds about the views of the new Government on the report and the serious issues it raises, and the extent to which the Government do or do not agree with the stance adopted by the previous Administration in their evidence to the sub-committee. In their reply of 6 July 2010 to the report, the Government state:

“While we are in agreement that cyber security is a significant and increasing facet of national security, the present Government is in the process of reviewing whether there are things we can do better or differently to achieve the same national security goal; that this is likely to extend to the European Union”.

It would be helpful if the Minister could explain what that statement means in practical terms. When did the review start? Who is undertaking the review? When will the review be complete? Will its findings be made public? What “things”—that is the word that the Government use—are being looked at to see if they can be done better or differently to achieve what is referred to as the “same national security goal”? Finally on that paragraph, what exactly is it that is,

“likely to extend to the European Union”?

A number of UK organisations and bodies with independent expertise are referred to in the report and in the Government’s response. Will the Minister confirm that these bodies will survive the forthcoming cull?

In their response, the Government say that they will remain actively involved in the discussions under way at the European level on the role for the European Union and that they support the committee’s recommendation that this should be focused on the promotion of best practice and on reducing the gap between the most advanced and the less advanced member states. As has been said on more than one occasion today, cyber does not recognise national or European Union boundaries but is also a global threat. We need our international partnerships and alliances, since we have common interests with other responsible nations in sharing information on threats and vulnerabilities.

The Government recognise that the prevention of cyberattacks has an important international dimension. They state:

“In developing a new cyber security strategy, the Government is putting significant resource into having a strong and proactive role in this”.

What are the objectives of this new cybersecurity strategy that it is felt may not currently be being addressed or need updating? Is it part of the “process of reviewing” referred to in the third paragraph of the Government’s response, to which I referred earlier?

The importance of this debate and the importance and relevance of the committee’s report has been further enhanced in the light of the speech the other day, to which the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, referred, by the director of GCHQ on cybersecurity. He said, as did the committee in its report, that this was not solely a national security or defence issue but went to the heart of our economic well-being and national interest. The committee’s report, as the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, highlighted, gives examples of cyberattacks that have occurred which seek to strike at the heart of a country’s ability to function. The GCHQ director added further weight to this point in relation to our own country when he said that the threat of cyberattacks to disrupt seriously critical national infrastructure,

“is a real and credible one”.

He also said that:

“There are over 20,000 malicious emails on Government networks each month, 1,000 of which are deliberately targeting them ... that we have seen the use of cyber techniques by one nation on another to bring diplomatic or economic pressure to bear ... we have seen the theft of intellectual property on a massive scale, some of it not just sensitive to the commercial enterprises in question but of national security concern too ... and that the risks in all these areas are growing along with the enormous growth of the Internet. At the moment it’s expanding by about 60% a year”.

This includes growth stimulated by the Government as they seek to get services online, not least in response to an increasing public expectation that services will be available in this way. The expectation is that within the next few years, online tax and benefit payment systems could be processing over £100 billion-worth of payments at a time when the increasing cost of e-crime to the economy runs into billions of pounds and organised groups attack not just commercial targets but also online tax systems across Europe.

The GCHQ director commented that cyberspace is contested every day, every hour, every minute, every second, and that he could vouch for that from the displays in his own operations centre of minute-by-minute cyberattempts to penetrate systems around the world. He went on to say that:

“Ministers are looking, in the context of the Strategic Defence and Security Review and the Spending Review, at what capabilities the United Kingdom needs to develop further”,

and added that:

“Clearly they will also be deciding how they trade off against other spending priorities”.

Perhaps the Minister could answer the question that the director in effect posed—namely, how high a priority compared with other spending priorities does this Government give to providing the necessary resources to ensure that this country continues to be protected effectively from cyberattacks?

I conclude by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, and his committee on a thorough, thoughtful and informative report which has rightly raised the profile of this important and, indeed, worrying issue.