(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey has made the very powerful point that, frankly, everything depends on how intelligently or otherwise community protection notices are sought and applied and—to use the Minister’s words—whether anybody is acting mischievously in trying to seek or impose these notices. I am sure that when the Minister responds to the debate he will assure us that everybody will use them intelligently and everybody will work together in a great, grand partnership. That has been his basic theme throughout our debates but, of course, the Minister has no idea whether that will actually happen. I am sure that it will happen in the vast majority of cases, but it certainly will not happen in every case. The Minister must know that it is almost certain that, before long, the provision for community protection notices will be used in a way that is not being envisaged at the present time and, to that extent, is likely to be abused.
I will speak in particular to Amendments 22NB and 22NG which stand in my name. If a community protection notice is issued to an individual or body, the Bill states that they are required to,
“take reasonable steps to achieve specified results”.
Amendment 22NB deletes this wording because we would like to hear a little more from the Minister as to how this phrase will be interpreted and how it is expected to work. Can the Minister explain what counts as “reasonable” in this context and who will define what would be “reasonable steps”? Is it the intention that the person or body issued with a community protection notice will be told by the person issuing it what will be deemed to constitute,
“reasonable steps to achieve specified results”,
or is that all to be left up in the air?
Clause 40(3)(a) and (3)(b) refer to “specified things” with no requirement to take reasonable steps to do them but Clause 40(3)(c) refers to “specified results” and has a requirement to “take reasonable steps”. Why is there a difference in wording? If the reference to “reasonable steps” is so important, why does it not appear in Clause 40(3)(a) and (3)(b), which refer to “specified things”?
I turn now to Amendment 22NG. Clause 40(8) states:
“A community protection notice may specify periods within which, or times by which, requirements within subsection (3)(b) or (c) are to be complied with”.
Can the Minister explain why the Government have chosen to use the word “may” and not something more specific, such as “must” or “shall”? Why do the Government feel that there is no need for a specified period within which the requirements will be complied with—that is, requirements that are fair and clear to both the recipient of the community protection notice and the community itself? In what circumstances would a specified period not be helpful or would cause difficulties?
My Lords, these amendments seek to make a number of changes to the test for a community protection notice and to the arrangements of the service of a notice and the appeal against a notice. They also deal with the relationship with existing legislation, namely the statutory nuisance regime. I will first address the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee.
Amendment 22NA seeks to ensure that any detrimental effect on an individual is “significant” in order for the test to be met and the notice issued. I appreciate that a community protection notice should not be issued lightly. However, the test already includes appropriate safeguards. Not only does behaviour have to be persistent or continuing as well as unreasonable, but the individual in question has also to be served with a written warning. That is on top of any formal interventions that the council or a police officer may have already tried. By the time a community protection notice is issued there can be no doubt in the perpetrator’s mind that their behaviour is unacceptable. At that point the council or the police should be able to act, and quickly, to prevent further harm being caused to victims or communities.
I do not believe, given the multi-limbed test and written warning, that trivial or benign behaviours will be dealt with using the new notice. Not least, it is hard to see how those could be considered “unreasonable”. As my noble friend is aware, we have already published draft guidance for professionals, which provides some information on how the test should be interpreted. We are working closely with professionals and victims’ groups over the coming months to ensure that this is as helpful as possible. I will be very happy to look at this further to ensure that guidance is fit for purpose.
Amendment 22NF is well intentioned and I can understand why my noble friend raises it. When a community protection notice is issued, she is right that the person issued with it should fully understand the consequences of what is happening. In fact, as the draft guidance outlines, we would consider it good practice for some of this detail to be also included in the written warning. Under Clause 40(7)(b), the effects of Sections 43 to 48, including the possibility of remedial action and the financial implications of that, have to be outlined in the CPN, so that is already covered. Councils or the police should not be required to outline exactly what remedial action could be undertaken in case the situation changes. However, there is certainly nothing to stop the local agency from including it if appropriate. The purpose of a community protection notice is to require the person on whom it is served to take specified action. The power for a local authority to take remedial action is very much a fallback.
Amendment 22QB seeks to delete the ability for an authorised person to enter premises to serve a notice. I assure my noble friend that this is not a power of entry in the traditional sense. It simply allows the authorised person, when the occupier or owner is unascertainable, to serve the notice. That is only possible,
“to the extent reasonably necessary”.
For instance, where the problem occurs on derelict land that is owned by someone who cannot be identified, the authorised person can go on to the land to post the notice on, for instance, a prominent building on the site such as a shed. In many cases, posting the notice on the exterior of a building may be sufficient. It certainly does not give the authorised officer the ability to break down doors to serve the notice.
Amendments 22QD and 22QE seek to clarify the powers of the court when an individual appeals against a CPN served on them. I agree with my noble friend in the case of Amendment 22QE: the courts should be able to vary the notice by reducing the requirements. However, I believe that this is already covered in Clause 43(4)(b), which allows for the notice to be modified. I can also understand the point made by Amendment 22QD. It is hard to envisage a situation where an appeal would result in a notice being modified in a way that was not in favour of the appellant. However, the courts should have the flexibility to modify a notice in this way if it thinks that it is appropriate. Therefore, I do not believe that we should make this change to the legislation.
Amendments 22ND and 22NE bring us back to the subject of statutory nuisance. As my noble friend explained, the amendments are designed to ensure that there is no overlap between the new CPN and the statutory nuisance regime, established under Part III of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. Amendment 22ND would ensure that the new notice was not used wherever conduct was already subject to a control under another statute. Amendment 22NE goes further still and seeks to carve out noise nuisance from the new CPN. This goes completely against what we are trying to achieve through these reforms, and I hope my noble friend will now understand the way in which we see this working alongside the existing powers. Victims do not care which power is being exercised or from which statute it is derived. They do not really care who deals with their problem or who answers their telephone call at 3 am. They just want anti-social behaviour to stop. That seems like a pretty reasonable wish to me; that is what this Bill is seeking to provide. Those tasked with stopping the behaviour should be able to respond quickly and effectively, using more than one power where this is appropriate and justified. This is not least because the community protection notice can cover behaviour which does not fall within the ambit of statutory nuisance, even though there may be some overlap. These amendments could result in officers being unnecessarily risk averse, potentially not using the new power and so allowing anti-social behaviour to continue, ruining victims’ lives for longer than necessary.
The new CPN will be available to deal with a wide range of anti-social behaviour. To say “It can be used for this behaviour but not that behaviour” would simply return us to mistakes from the past. We must move on from focusing on the behaviour and instead understand the impact it is having on the victims and communities that are being damaged.
I was asked by my noble friend Lord Greaves for 10 ways CPNs could be used. I can give him three—I have three prepared already—and no doubt a certain amount of inventiveness will allow me to write to him with another seven, but at least these give an idea. They can be issued to any individual or body persistently behaving in a way that has a detrimental effect on the quality of life of people in the locality. That is the essence. For example, there is no current notice system to cover an individual who regularly allows their dog to foul a communal garden. A group regularly taking the same route home late at night while drunk, making noise and waking their neighbours: this behaviour is not covered by the statutory nuisance regime. A third example might involve a takeaway which persistently allows its customers to drop litter on the pavement outside and causes noise nuisance late at night. It could be required to put bins outside the shop and ensure that customers leave quietly after 10 pm. Current notices can only be used to deal with one particular type of behaviour. I am trying to give illustrations of the sort of issues that have considerable anti-social consequences and which can be dealt with through a CPN regime.
I have to say to my noble friend that we have acknowledged the importance of the statutory nuisance regime in guidance. We have acknowledged the wealth of experience available on the subject and made it clear that, when problems are persistent, police officers and social landlords should speak to their partners in the local authority to determine which action is most appropriate. The CPN is a simple but powerful tool, available to protect communities from persistent and unreasonable behaviour that is having a detrimental effect on people’s quality of life. It must remain so and, as such, I urge my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.
I would certainly wish to consider the concept that my noble friend has presented to the Committee by tabling the amendment. It is well worth noting the illustration that he has given; we need to be certain that we have protected against that sort of situation. I shall no doubt be getting in touch with him and will try to consider this matter before Report. Meanwhile, I am grateful to him for raising this issue. Transferring the interest after a notice is issued may solve a problem, but it is not a ground for appeal, as he will understand.
My noble friend also asked about the difference between nuisance and annoyance and detrimental effect and how come the definitions are different. We have taken elements from existing powers; nuisance and annoyance has worked well, as we have said, in housing law, while detrimental effect is used in current environmental powers. It is also well understood. That is why we have transferred that language to this notice.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. On Amendment 22NB, the provision specifically allows for a requirement to be attached to a community protection notice that includes reasonable steps to achieve specified results. This preventive limb of the new notice is integral to the process and I am surprised the noble Lord wishes to see it removed. Under this provision, authorised officers could, for example, include a requirement for a dog owner to attend dog training classes to ensure they are better able to control their dog in future. If there was any doubt as to why the provision is necessary, I hope I have clarified the issue.
In Clause 40(3)(a) there is,
“a requirement to stop doing specified things”.
In Clause 40(3)(b) there is,
“a requirement to do specified things.”
In Clause 40(3)(c) there is,
“a requirement to take reasonable steps to achieve specified results”.
I should have thought that what the Minister has just described is a requirement to do specified things and is covered by Clause 40(3)(b). What kind of things does Clause 40(3)(c) cover? Why is it, in relation to Clause 40(3)(c), a requirement to take reasonable steps to achieve specified results, whereas in Clause 40(3)(b), which is a requirement to do specified things, there is no reference to taking reasonable steps?
It is clear that, in the eyes of the Government, there is some significance in putting the requirement to take reasonable steps in Clause 40(3)(c), but not in Clause 40(3)(a) or Clause 40(3)(b). I should be grateful if the Minister could explain what that is and what the distinction is between a requirement to do specified things and a requirement to achieve specified results. I asked whether it was intended that the person or body issued with a community protection notice will be told, by the person issuing it, what will be deemed to constitute,
“reasonable steps to achieve specified results”.
Before the noble Lord answers, I wonder if I might add to his burden and suggest that the difference between paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) is really pretty obvious. In paragraphs (a) and (b), somebody has direct control over specified things that can or cannot be done, whereas in paragraph (c) we are talking about third parties, over whom the best that can be ordered is that reasonable steps are taken to achieve specified results. It is a classic example, frequently found in legislation.
I hope the noble Lord will accept that the definitions the Minister was giving seemed to come under the requirement to do specified things, not achieve specified results, which is what I had asked about.
My Lords, my much less elegant interpretation of these provisions is that paragraph (c) is about “how” and paragraphs (a) and (b) are about “what”. There is an absolute requirement to achieve paragraphs (a) and (b) but there can be only a reasonable requirement—and a choice of ways—as to how to to get there.
I would see it as being about outcomes as opposed to methodology. Noble Lords are familiar with this concept and understand the particular example.
Moving on to Amendment 22NG, while I cannot think of a specific example where it would not be necessary to include the specified time for actions to be undertaken on a notice, I am not the front-line officer dealing with anti-social behaviour on a daily basis. Those officers have told us that the additional flexibility afforded by the new powers is exactly what they want. They do not want to be constrained on a time limit. This is directional and they want to be satisfied that the direction of travel is working properly. To put a time limit on it may be counterproductive. The amendment would erode that flexibility.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what is meant by “reasonable”. We have discussed “reasonable” before. In this case, the power will be used by council enforcement officers and police officers. These are trained professionals who make this judgment on a daily basis. What is reasonable in one situation is not reasonable in another. The judgment has to be made on a case-by-case basis. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, came up with the notion of CPNs for a string of shops promoting payday loans or for an off-licence. The conduct has to be defined as being unreasonable and a notice that imposes unreasonable requirements can be appealed. However, if an off-licence has benches outside encouraging people to congregate and engage in conduct that would be detrimental, it could be required through a CPN to remove the benches. That would be a perfectly reasonable request.
Except for the seven examples that I owe my noble friend Lord Greaves, I hope that I have given noble Lords the answers to their questions—but I appear not to have done so.
I really would like to hear the answers to my questions. I asked whether it was the intention that the person or body issued with a community protection notice would be told by the person issuing it what would be deemed to constitute,
“reasonable steps to achieve specified results”,
or will that be left in the air? Presumably, if there is an argument about the matter, it will be left for the courts to determine. Is that the case or will they be told what will be deemed to be reasonable steps to achieve specified results?
We should not make the methodology of serving the notice, which is what the noble Lord is referring to, specific. We discussed this when we talked about the requirement to do certain things. The steps that might have to be taken to achieve specified results may be up to the individual to judge. What is not in doubt is the need to indicate the specified result that is required. We discussed this issue when we were talking about the difference between paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).
(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I add my thanks to my noble friend Lord Soley for securing this debate. It is timely as today, as my noble friend Lord Reid of Cardowan has graphically pointed out, is the first public hearing for the Intelligence and Security Committee in front of the cameras with the intelligence chiefs. Of course, it is timely also because of the recent spate of stories in our national press about some alleged activities of our intelligence services that has raised the issue of oversight and the effectiveness or otherwise of current legislation.
There have already been significant changes in legislation over the past year or so relating to the Intelligence and Security Committee. These have led to the committee reporting not to the Prime Minister of the day but to Parliament, which also now has the final word on who will be the members of the committee, and to the committee in future choosing its own chairman from among its own members rather than that being a decision for the Prime Minister.
The Justice and Security Act 2013 now requires the intelligence agencies to respond to requests from the committee for information and to provide the information that it is seeking. Previously, the agencies could decline to give the information requested. Included in the information that now has to be provided if sought is that regarding nationally significant operations. The committee is also now in a position, which it was not before, to send its staff into GCHQ, MI5 and MI6 to look at papers and files that relate to an investigation that it is undertaking, and it is for the committee and the staff concerned to decide what it is they want to see. Those are significant recent changes as far as the powers of the ISC are concerned.
In addition, we have the two commissioners, the Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner, with responsibilities for overseeing the performance of the agencies, including GCHQ, under Parts 2 and 3, and under Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act respectively.
My noble friend Lord Soley referred to the advances in technology and the way in which the speed of technological innovation can quickly overtake Acts of Parliament set up to define the limits of surveillance. As I understand it, the Intelligence and Security Committee intends to conduct an investigation into whether the Human Rights Act, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and the Intelligence Services Act, and the interaction between them and the policies and procedures that underpin them, remain relevant with regard to the balance between security, liberty and privacy, given the significant advances in technology over the past few years.
An investigation of that nature is important, and we also need to be sure that the oversight arrangements are operating effectively, and are such—and remain such—as to inspire public confidence that what our intelligence and security services are doing is what they should be doing and are authorised to be doing, and is proportionate, not what they may have the capability of doing, which is something else. Co-operation is vital in the field of intelligence gathering, not least in the sharing of information with friendly countries and allies. Any activity that calls into question that trust could have serious security implications.
At a political level the intelligence agencies are ultimately responsible to the Prime Minister, but on a day-to-day basis it is Secretaries of State who are expected to balance national security considerations against the need to protect against an intrusion on individuals’ right to privacy. In the House of Commons on 10 June this year, the Foreign Secretary said that ministerial oversight and independent scrutiny was there as well as the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and that,
“the idea that operations are carried out without ministerial oversight, somehow getting around UK law, is mistaken”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/6/13; col. 37.]
Opening e-mails or tapping a phone requires a warrant in the United Kingdom, and effective legislation and oversight arrangements should ensure that that is what happens. However, in the light of the Foreign Secretary’s statement that the idea that operations are carried out without ministerial oversight is mistaken, will the Minister confirm that that statement also covered any operations that may be conducted by or with the knowledge of our agencies outside the UK, whether in relation to United Kingdom bodies or citizens or to bodies or citizens of other countries?
We all recognise the importance of the work that our intelligence and security services undertake in protecting us against criminal and terrorist activity, international cyberattack and international global terrorism, and in ensuring our national security. We also recognise the reality that nearly all operations that have foiled a terrorist plot in this country in recent years have been dependent on information from communications data. I suspect that we will never fully appreciate or understand the debt we owe to our intelligence and security services since, for obvious reasons, the detail about what they do and how they do it cannot be in the full public domain.
It was Sir David Omand, a former head of GCHQ, who said that democratic legitimacy demanded that where new methods of intelligence gathering and use were to be introduced, they should be on a firm legal basis and rest on parliamentary and public understanding of what is involved, even though the operational details of the sources and method used would normally need to remain secret.
A number of issues and concerns have been raised in the debate, not least by my noble friend Lord Soley, who also made some proposals for change. I very much hope that the Minister will go as far as he feels he can in responding to them.
(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my point is a general one. I apologise to your Lordships if it is trite—it probably is—but to me it is blindingly obvious that you cannot play the ball if you have taken your bat home. Every noble Lord will have had experiences of negotiation in some context, if only the domestic, and we know that if you choose to walk away you have to pick your moment. You have to be clear what the deal breaker is and know what your own compromise would be. However, until then you have to remain part of the story, not least because you risk losing respect if you are not prepared to get stuck in and stay stuck in to the project. You certainly risk losing influence. My noble friend’s phrase that you are “looked on as petulant” was absolutely spot on. You risk not being regarded as a serious player if and when negotiations resume. Indeed, you risk being thought of as having disqualified yourself from further negotiations in a serious way if you have distanced yourself.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Corston for her introduction to the report from her committee and for the clarity of the committee’s case made in its report for the recommendation that the UK opt in to the negotiations on the proposed Eurojust regulation.
As has already been said, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Co-operation—Eurojust—was established just over 10 years ago. Provisions in the 2009 Lisbon treaty agreed by the member states included provisions that required the EU’s institutions to pass legislation in the form of regulations to determine Eurojust’s structure, operation, field of action and tasks. The proposed Eurojust regulation seeks to fulfil the member states’ aims.
Eurojust is involved in major crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism and financial crimes, which cross borders and require co-operation between different jurisdictions if they are to be successfully investigated and prosecuted. Since 2003 there have been just under 1,500 requests from EU member states for co-operation with Britain through Eurojust. The objective of Eurojust is to support member states in conducting investigations, and we are very supportive of the value of the work that it undertakes.
As has already been said, the proposed Eurojust regulation will apply to the United Kingdom only if the Government indicate a decision to opt in by 21 November. The Government’s position in the House of Commons when it was debated there, I think last week, was that we should not opt in to the new Eurojust proposals at the outset of negotiations but should conduct a thorough review of the final agreed text to inform active consideration of opting in to the Eurojust regulation post-adoption, in consultation with Parliament. If the Government decide to opt in to the negotiation of the proposed Eurojust regulation, which seeks to replace two existing Council decisions, the legislation currently governing Eurojust will no longer fall within the scope of the Government’s 2014 opt-out decision, under which the Government are seeking to rejoin the current Eurojust arrangements as part of their 2014 opt-out decision.
In the House of Commons debate last week, the Minister referred to government concerns about the proposed connections between Eurojust and the proposed and strongly opposed European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Minister also expressed government concern about the proposed new Eurojust regulation creating mandatory powers for national members. These powers, said the Minister, would allow a requirement for coercive measures at a national level with the ability to insist that national authorities take investigative measures in some circumstances, which could cut across the division of responsibilities and separation of powers between police and prosecutors in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the sole ultimate responsibility of the Lord Advocate in Scotland for determining investigative action in Scotland.
Unusually for this Government in regard to a European Union agency, they publicly rather value Eurojust. Their stance indicates they would prefer to stay in rather than find themselves outside because they do not like the look of the new regulation once it has been adopted following the deliberations of all those member states participating in the negotiations. In this regard it would at least clarify the Government’s position if the Minister could indicate whether, if the European Public Prosecutor’s Office proposal does not proceed, and with it the references to the link up with Eurojust, the Government will still not opt in to the proposed Eurojust regulation unless other significant changes are made to the proposed regulation. In other words, is it the connection with the EPPO proposal that is the showstopper for the Government or are there other aspects of the proposed Eurojust regulation that the Government also regard as a showstopper as far as opting in to the regulation is concerned?
The Government should be able to answer that question in general terms since they are not disclosing their negotiating position on what significant changes would be required as, under their stance in the House of Commons, they do not intend to opt in to negotiations anyway on the proposed Eurojust regulation. What the question does—if the Minister will give a straight answer—is indicate whether the Government’s relative enthusiasm for Eurojust is greater than their dislike of the proposed new regulation as it stands minus any interweave between Eurojust and the EPPO, or whether the Government’s dislike of the proposed new Eurojust regulations minus the interaction with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is still such that if there is no significant change in the regulation in line with their position, they are prepared to accept no longer being a full participating member of Eurojust.
The view of your Lordships’ European Union Committee is that were it not for the provisions governing Eurojust’s interaction with the EPPO, the argument in favour of the UK opting into the negotiations would be clear and the committee would have no hesitation in recommending that the UK opt in. The committee’s view is that the Government’s key issues with the text could be dealt with during the proposal’s negotiation, but they recognise that the Eurojust proposal has not been brought forward in a vacuum but is closely associated with the Government’s policy towards the EPPO proposal. However, as has already been said, there will be changes in relation to the EPPO proposals since those proposals have been given what I think is known as a yellow card as a result of decisions by a not inconsiderable number of member states’ national Parliaments, which means that the Commission is now required to review its position.
The European Union Committee considers that the non-participation in the EPPO by other member states in addition to the UK, will inevitably mean that the contentious aspects of the proposal dealing with the reform of Eurojust will be subject to negotiations in the Council, and that the United Kingdom ought not to miss out on such negotiations. The committee takes the view that if the UK Government decide not to opt in to this regulation they will not be at the table for the important discussions addressing the position of those states wishing to co-operate within Eurojust but who choose not to participate in the EPPO. The committee says that it could not advocate such a course of action.
Referring to the Government’s position that they value the work of Eurojust, the committee says that it cannot foresee a situation whereby in practical terms the UK would be allowed to remain a full participating member of Eurojust operating under defunct or superseded legislation that they have decided to opt back in to, while the other participating member states co-operate under the new proposal once it is agreed. The European Union Committee has therefore recommended that the UK opt in to the negotiations on the proposed Eurojust regulations. Its report points out that the Director of Public Prosecutions said that the UK’s involvement in Eurojust provides many benefits and in his view represents good value for money, and that the Lord Advocate said that he would be concerned if the UK left Eurojust.
In his letter to the chairman of the European Union Committee, the Minister in the other place said that the Government would take an active part in the negotiations to protect the national interest, and also on the EPPO. The Government, he said, would also continue to challenge the Commission’s evidence base and justification for bringing forward the Eurojust proposals at this time. In addition, the Minister said that the Government would oppose any changes that would reduce the influence of member state representatives over the functioning of Eurojust, and seek confirmation that the opinions of Eurojust acting as a college are non-binding on member states.
(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been a lengthy but interesting debate in which there have been many powerful contributions based on direct first-hand knowledge and experience of specific issues and areas which the Bill seeks to address, not least from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in his considered and eloquent maiden speech. We wait with interest to hear on a later occasion, as indicated by the noble Lord, which aspects of the Bill he regards with less enthusiasm.
During this debate, many doubts and reservations have been raised about specific aspects of the Bill, and these will no doubt be pursued in Committee and on Report. The Bill is either wide-ranging or a dog’s breakfast, depending on one’s overall view of it. The Government have tried to give this possible Pandora’s box of a Bill a theme in a bid to generate an appearance of cohesion to their proposals. That theme appears to be putting victims first. That can certainly be an objective, but surely the overriding purpose of a Bill such as this should be to reduce the number of victims.
There is much in the Bill that we support. We support the new criminal offence for possessing a firearm with intent to supply. We support the initiative on a new College of Policing, which will afford an opportunity to provide training and to set standards. We also support in principle the police pay and negotiation proposals and the Police Remuneration Review Body. The Minister referred to the Armed Forces Pay Review Body as a favourable comparison. Interestingly and perhaps wisely, he did not quote the body for the Commons, IPSA, as being in that category as well. We support extending the powers of the Independent Police Complaints Commission to oversight of private contractors and staff employed by police authorities—a measure proposed by the Opposition last year.
The measures on forced marriage have cross-party support. We also welcome the measures on sexual harm prevention notices, although there will be issues that need to be discussed regarding the detail.
We support giving immigration officers some additional powers in the light of the nature of terrorism that we have at the moment, but once again the detail of how and in what circumstances the proposed measures will be implemented, their nature and how far they go will need to be considered carefully.
We support the principle of community remedy under Part 6. We strongly believe that restorative justice and community resolutions should be used when dealing with anti-social behaviour, although the Government will need to be rather clearer about exactly what they intend should happen in practice and what resources are going to be made available.
We will want to look at the proposed changes in the powers of police community support officers. That applies as well to the changes for police and crime commissioners, for whom the Bill seems to be trying to provide additional work. We will look at the clauses on witness protection measures and victim services but we, like others in your Lordships’ House, have concerns about their fragmentation through commissioning by police commissioners and the impact that that will have on national commissioning and standards.
We welcome the measures against dog attacks in the home. However, on dog control notices, there is the significant question of whether the measures in the Bill are sufficient to address the problem with which we are faced. The Government say that they are, but the Committee in the other place described the proposals as “woefully inadequate”. Dog control notices would ensure the muzzling of dogs in places which the public access, the neutering of dogs and the owner and dog having to attend and complete training courses.
I suspect that a considerable amount of time will be taken discussing the anti-social behaviour proposals. We all deplore anti-social behaviour and the impact that it can have. However, we do not regard the proposed changes to the anti-social behaviour order regime or the developments on the injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance—IPNAs—as helpful or a forward move. The Government assert but have yet to produce the hard evidence that anti-social behaviour orders have not been an effective solution and claim, once again without hard evidence, that the lack of criminal sanction in future under this Bill will not weaken but rather strengthen the ability to tackle anti-social behaviour. It was, after all, the Minister who told us in his opening speech that crime had been falling—falling, he could have added, each year since ASBOs were introduced.
We will need to look at what will be regarded as behaviour capable of causing nuisance or annoyance. Some people seem to find the decisions of a referee at a football match annoying, and it is not unknown for some landowners to regard walkers on a footpath through one of their fields as a nuisance. I assume that the Government will say that at least the first example is a ridiculous one and would not come within the terms of the wording in the Bill. But I am not so sure about the Government’s view on the second example and that those responsible will interpret the wording in the Bill and the associated guidance in a sensible manner.
Different people will interpret generalised or ambiguous wording in a different way. There does seem to be a clear message being given by the change in the criteria from behaviour causing, or being likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress, as at present for an anti-social behaviour order, to behaviour causing nuisance or annoyance for the new IPNA, and in the change in the burden of proof from beyond reasonable doubt to balance of probabilities. That message is surely that the Government want much more behaviour—some would say including normal behaviour of many young people—to be liable to be caught under the terms of the IPNA with a much lower threshold necessary to establish and prove the case. That is a message that could result in IPNAs being issued, metaphorically speaking, like confetti for little or no meaningful effect.
We will also want to be clear about the possible consequences of a breach of an IPNA. I appreciate that the Government made some amendments on Report in the Commons, which mean that the ability to exclude a person from his or her own home will be available across all tenures and not just to the social housing sector. I am not sure that this principle applies in other circumstances. It appears that for those living in rented housing a breach of an IPNA could result in eviction. If that is the case, could the situation then arise that a family in rented housing could be evicted following a breach of an IPNA by one member of the family on the basis that the conduct of that individual was making life intolerable for nearby neighbours living in owner-occupied property, but that if a family next door who owned their own home also had one member of the family who had breached an IPNA, and the conduct of that individual was making life intolerable for nearby neighbours living in rented housing, they would not be evicted? Perhaps the Minister could say whether that could or could not be the case under the breach of an IPNA clause in the Bill. If it could happen, could he say whether the Government do or do not believe that these clauses potentially treat some sections of the community rather differently from others for the same offence? The same issue would appear to arise in connection with possible eviction for those in rented housing who have been convicted of an offence at and during a riot, wherever that involvement might have taken place. The Government say they want to put resources into sorting out the problems that overwhelm so-called problem families. I am not sure that that objective will be assisted if the ultimate effect of the IPNA proposals in this Bill proves to be that more such families end up on the streets.
We have received from the Government a copy of the draft guidance for front-line professionals on the proposed reforms of anti-social behaviour powers in this Bill. It is 65 pages long and, in places at least, appears to be strong on verbiage and weak on clarity. It bears all the hallmarks of having being written by a committee lacking unanimity of view. However, at this stage, I am willing to accept that during the passage of this Bill the Minister may be able to convince us all that this is a document free of ambiguity and in essence is not so ambiguous that it basically hands over to others the job of trying to interpret what this Bill actually means.
I may have misunderstood, for example, the wording on injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance. If I have I am sure the Minister will put me right. I would hate to think that he is as uncertain as I am about the exact meaning of parts of this Bill, since this Bill is his baby. Page 24 states:
“Anyone seeking to apply for an IPNA must have evidence … that the respondent has engaged in, or is threatening to engage in, conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to another person. They will also need to satisfy the court that it is just and convenient to grant the injunction”.
Later, the same page states that,
“in deciding what constitutes ‘nuisance or annoyance’, applicants must be mindful that this route should not”—
and “should not” is in bold—
“be used to stop reasonable, trivial or benign behaviours that have not caused, and are not likely to cause, harm to victims or communities”.
If one of the tests that the guidance indicates is that behaviours must have caused or be likely to cause harm to victims or communities, then why does the Bill not refer to causing harm and clearly define it—causing harassment, alarm or distress, for example—rather than simply referring to conduct causing nuisance or annoyance? There is a difference between causing nuisance and annoyance and causing harm. Which is correct: the Home Office Bill, the Home Office guidance or neither? Are the Government simply passing the buck for sorting that out to someone else, whether they be sitting in a court or working outside one?
There are a number of other issues we will want to discuss as the Bill goes through this House. These include measures to tackle covert policing, protection of people from assaults at work, reductions in the potential for gun use and reductions in domestic violence. We will also want to discuss the issue of legal highs and reducing their availability in our communities, and the redefinition of the compensation test for those who have been wrongly convicted.
The important issue of extradition was dealt with in a rush towards the end of the proceedings in the House of Commons. One government MP, lamenting this, said:
“Of course, the House of Lords is stuffed full of experts—lawyers and others who are au fait with the issues—and I am sure that there will be proper scrutiny in the other place”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/13; col. 697.]
That is probably one expectation that we can meet, including whether the proposals are fair and just, will actually deliver the declared objectives and not also have some potential unintended consequences.
The Government’s proposals on anti-social behaviour in particular will need to be backed up by adequate and appropriate resources, both human and financial, if anything is to be achieved. Other proposals will also depend on proper resourcing being provided. Bearing in mind the cuts that have been made in a number of key areas, such as weakening the DNA provisions, reducing CCTV, reducing police numbers, reducing community safety budgets, leaving local authorities financially less able to maintain youth services, and now, it appears, the potential undermining of the Secured by Design standards, to which my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey has drawn attention, we will want to find out from the Government as we consider the Bill in detail whether their proposals are simply words or whether the necessary resources and powers will be provided—and, if so, in what form and to what level—to deliver the claimed objectives for the many changes set out in the Bill.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeI thank the Minister for his explanation of the terms and purpose this order. As he said, the rules relating to the retention of DNA samples by the police were changed under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 in the light of a European Court of Human Rights judgment. On this side, we felt that the changes pushed through by the Government went further than necessary. Currently, if a person is convicted, their DNA can be held indefinitely, except in a few specific types of case. Under the provisions of the 2012 Act that come into force at the end of this month, people arrested for, or charged with, qualifying offences but not convicted may have their DNA and fingerprints retained for a specified period. Those of people arrested but not charged may be retained for three years if the Biometrics Commissioner agrees. In the case of those charged, they will be retained automatically for three years. As the Minister said, qualifying offences are the more serious ones, which are mainly sexual and violent. As I understand it, the order ensures that offences under previous legislation that has now been repealed are included, so that biometric information can be taken where appropriate. The order provides also for those additional offences to be designated as qualifying offences, which addresses the issue of how long the biometric information can be retained. As the Minister said, the order adds further offences to the list of qualifying offences.
The issue that I will raise regards the actions that the Government may have been taking or not taking prior to the coming into force of the 2012 Act. It appears that police forces were told last year to start deleting DNA samples in order to comply with the provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 that relate to the circumstances under which, and the length of time for which, such samples can be retained after this month when the provisions of the Act come into effect. However, the Government do not appear to have put into effect any interim arrangements to cover the fact that the appeals arrangements to the Biometrics Commissioner that the police can use when they do not think that it is appropriate to delete a sample in accordance with the provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 were not in place, and do not come into effect until the end of this month.
Likewise, the arrangements for when the police feel that national security will be an issue if a DNA sample is deleted and so make their own determination not to delete such a sample do not come into effect until the end of this month. It appears that no interim arrangements were made to cover this situation, bearing in mind that the police were told last year to start deleting samples in accordance with the pending legislative requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act. Under the 2012 Act, the police can make such a determination, which must then be reviewed by the Biometrics Commissioner. However, the powers of the commissioner do not come into effect until 31 October this year.
Apparently, the police have already deleted hundreds of thousands of DNA profiles and samples. A figure of 600,000 was mentioned. Why were they told to do so when the DNA retention arrangements were not in place? Or did Ministers have informal arrangements in place under which they would make a decision on whether the police could retain a DNA sample for longer than the time provided for in the 2012 Act, pending the coming into being of the Biometrics Commissioner and his or her statutory powers? Did Ministers make informal arrangements to address national security considerations by allowing the police to retain samples for longer than the time provided for under the 2012 Act, under which they would have to be deleted to comply with the terms of the Act and its provisions, which would take effect from 31 October 2013? As I understand it, the powers of the police to make their own determination in such cases, subject to review by the Biometrics Commissioner, do not come into effect until 31 October of this year.
When the order was discussed in the House of Commons last week, the Home Office Minister responding was asked if there were any examples of the police not being able to keep DNA samples when they wanted to. He replied that,
“the process for the implementation of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 … has been worked through closely with the police and other partners”,
and that he was,
“unaware of cases in which the police have expressed a desire to apply in this way. Indeed, the police clearly have the right from 31 October to make such an application to the Biometrics Commissioner”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 9/10/13; col. 8.]
I am not sure whether the answer to the question of whether there were any examples of the police not being able to keep DNA samples when they wanted to is yes or no, but it is to be hoped that the Minister will be able to throw some light on it since I am asking the same question of him.
The other interesting part of the reply from the Commons Minister was the statement that from 31 October the police clearly have the right to make such an application to the Biometrics Commissioner. That rather accepts that they do not have such a right until 31 October, which is precisely the point I am raising; namely, how have the police, faced with being told last year to start deleting DNA samples that cannot be retained when the terms of the Act come into force at the end of this month, been able to apply since last year for the retention or extended retention of samples which they deem it necessary to keep but which cannot be retained under the terms of the 2012 Act when it comes into force at the end of the month and when the procedure for enabling such applications to be pursued through the Biometrics Commissioner under the provisions of the Act do not come into effect until the end of the month? The effect of the Government’s actions appears to be that, for example, the police have been unable to retain or even apply to retain the DNA of someone arrested but not charged with serious offences such as rape, the sexual assault of a child or manslaughter since at least December 2012, and this government-created loophole lasts until the end of this month.
The Government had pledged that the police would be able to apply to the Biometrics Commissioner to retain DNA if, for instance, the victim is under the age of 18 or,
“the retention of the material is necessary to assist in the prevention or detection of crime”.
However, the mechanism for such appeals has not yet been brought into being by the Home Office, and rather than allowing the police to hold these data until the legislation has been implemented, the DNA records are apparently being deleted. Will the Minister indicate at what level within the Home Office the decision to proceed with the deletion of DNA records for those arrested but not charged with a qualifying offence was discussed and then made? Will he say how many police forces have ignored the demands to delete DNA samples in the interim period prior to the coming into force of the relevant provisions of the 2012 Act? Further, how many DNA records have been deleted, and what impact has this had on policing capability? Alternatively, will the Minister indicate that there is no truth at all in the matters I have raised? As regards the Home Office e-mail published by the Times as stating: “This record”—of someone arrested but not charged with rape—“will have been deleted as a part of the legacy deletions for stage 1a. As the individual was NFA’d and for legacy data, forces cannot apply to the Biometrics Commissioner for an extension, this will only happen from 31 October 2013”, will he indicate whether that was incorrect or was addressing a completely different and unrelated issue?
These are potentially quite significant issues around what has been happening during the interim period between the end of last year and the coming into force of the provisions of the Act. I accept that what I am saying may not be correct, but it is an issue that we on this side have raised before in the other place, and we do not seem to have had very specific answers to address our concerns. I hope that the Minister may be able to do so when he comes to reply.
My Lords, the noble Lord will know that the policy to delete the DNA records of innocent people is something that has been widely welcomed around the House and, indeed, by the Opposition. That work has been going on. It has created a gap which the noble Lord has pointed to; I have to acknowledge that. However, the Government and the police, in considering the management of the issue, have come jointly to the conclusion that there would be no retrospective applications to the Biometrics Commissioner. That is because to have done so would have required police scrutiny of the case file of every innocent person arrested for a qualified offence in the past three years. That is reckoned to be 180,000 case files. This was considered disproportionate to the circumstances which the new legislation is designed to address because, according to our knowledge of those files, it would have identified only a very small number of cases suitable for application to the Biometrics Commissioner. It would have significantly delayed the entire programme to delete innocent people from the databases. I do not think that the Government are seeking to make an apology for that decision, because we consider that Parliament’s wish was that the DNA of innocent people should indeed be deleted from the database.
Was it not also Parliament’s wish that there should be an appeal mechanism in existence before that happens? It does not come in until the end of this month.
Why did the Government not abide by Parliament’s wishes and not bring it in until the appeal mechanism was there, since Parliament wished that there should be one?
Because the deletion of DNA had been agreed by Parliament. The Government have been under considerable timetable pressure on that. As a Minister, I have been very much involved with the deletion of DNA records and that programme was under considerable pressure to be effected. We have had debates in the House on this matter, widely supported by the Opposition.
But was it not agreed by Parliament on the basis that there would be an appeal mechanism in place to which the police could refer cases if they had doubts about deleting them? I understand what the Minister is saying about the Government wanting to implement government policy in the form of legislation, but did that legislation not also provide for an appeal mechanism? That was a fundamental part of it.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, would like to extend my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, for securing this debate. We all have a direct interest in ensuring our national security. Indeed, the protection and security of our citizens is the number one priority for any Government. The Motion refers to the relationship between effective immigration controls and the interests of the security of the United Kingdom. I will largely confine my comments to that specific issue. Although opinions might vary as to what constitutes effective immigration controls, there must be question marks over the effectiveness of the current arrangements when judged against the criteria of their importance to national security and the maintenance of that security.
The issue of national security and, more particularly, border security was referred to in the Government’s 2011-12 Annual Report on the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. The report said:
“Increased use of biometrics in support of asylum, visa and biometric residence permit applications provides tighter border controls to identify those who pose a threat to the UK”.
It went on to say:
“The use of technology and intelligence to check people and goods remains key to tackling the range of border security threats. Improvements in this area … include a continuing increase in coverage of routes and data acquired by e-Borders. Since April 2012, e-Borders acquires 100% of data for non-EEA flights. From 25th July 2012 … airlines required by law to provide data to e-Borders may be denied authority to carry to the UK specified foreign nationals who pose a terrorist threat”.
The annual report also referred to continuing work on the development of the Border Policing Command as part of the National Crime Agency, ahead of the formal creation of the NCA. No doubt if there is anything further of substance to report on this continuing work, the Minister will give us an update when he responds to this debate.
The splitting off of the Border Force from the United Kingdom Border Agency was announced by the Government in March last year. Since then, the performance of the agency appears to have deteriorated, with growing delays in dealing with asylum cases, visas and foreign criminals. Claims that the asylum backlog had been cleared lacked credibility, as the Government had simply written off some 100,000 cases without proper checks.
In March this year, the Government announced further changes to the border agency, splitting up its activities into two entities within the Home Office. What difference, if any, these further changes will make remains to be seen. The reality is that enforcement has got worse, visa delays have got worse and 50% fewer people are refused entry at ports and borders. The number of people absconding through Heathrow passport control has trebled, and the number being caught afterwards has halved. The number of foreign prisoners deported has dropped by 16% and there has also been a big drop in the number of employers being fined for employing illegal workers.
A recent Commons Select Committee report showed that following the Government’s splitting up of the border agency in March last year, there was a 20% increase in the backlog of asylum cases in three months, a 53% increase in the number of asylum cases waiting more than six months compared with the previous year, an increase in delays for some in-country visa applications compared with the previous three months and 59,000 cases not getting even as far as being entered on the database. The committee said that 28,000 visa applications were not processed on time in one three-month period. That means that two-thirds of visa applications were not processed on time.
What of course contributed to the difficulties was the impact and method of the implementation of the Government’s changes. The financial cuts of more than a third will certainly not have enhanced national security, which is an important part of the subject matter of this debate. There is immigration that works for Britain and immigration that does not. We support policies to bring down the pace of migration—particularly low-skilled migration—through stronger controls on people coming to do low-skilled jobs and action against bogus colleges. We need proper training programmes to help the young unemployed get into the sectors that are recruiting most from abroad—programmes such as Care First, which the Government abolished.
More needs to be done to cut illegal immigration. By definition, this can have an adverse impact on national security since the required checks and controls, however technologically advanced, cannot be undertaken. The Government’s net migration target is not targeting the right things. Much of the drop since the election comes because more British citizens are leaving the country and fewer are coming home. Most of the rest is accounted for by falling numbers of foreign students. The Government are targeting university students and entrepreneurs but ignoring illegal immigration, which is of course outside the target. Illegal immigration is getting worse, with fewer people stopped, more absconding, fewer deported and backlogs of information on cases not pursued. Illegal immigration is not exactly being deterred by the continuing exploitation of migrant workers, which also undercuts local workers. Stronger action is needed, which means national minimum wage regulations which can be made to stick, with better enforcement and higher fines, and a register to tackle rogue landlords.
Pulling out of the social chapter and co-operation on policing and justice measures, as the Government appear to want to do, will not make it any easier to manage and control migration, including illegal immigration. No one would wish to suggest for one moment that this Government, or indeed any Government, do not take their national security responsibilities seriously or fail to give this the highest priority. Effective immigration control is one of the building blocks that must be in place to ensure that as much as can reasonably and effectively be done to protect the security of our country and our citizens is being done. However, the reality is that the present arrangements are not as effective as they could and should be or indeed, in fairness, as effective as I imagine the Government want them to be.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in view of the difficulty that I created in the previous debate by sitting down sooner than the Minister expected, perhaps I should say to him that I am not sure that I will take up all my allocated time on this occasion either.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for giving us the opportunity to have this debate and to discuss the report of the inquiry launched by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration. We have heard some powerful and passionate speeches, which I will not even attempt to emulate.
As has already been said, immigrants have benefitted Britain over a great many years. They have come to our shores to help build and develop some of our major companies, as well as sustain our National Health Service and win us Nobel prizes. It is because immigration is important that it needs to be controlled, and its impact needs to be fair for all. We need to build common bonds, including more emphasis on speaking English.
We also need to draw the distinction between immigration that works for Britain and immigration that does not. That is why we support policies to bring down the pace of migration, particularly low-skilled migration, and why we support stronger controls on people coming to do low-skilled jobs.
However, some changes that are made to immigration rules can have unfortunate consequences, and today we are discussing one such change—a significant one. In July last year, as we know, major changes to family-related immigration categories came into effect. With limited exemptions, British citizens or settled persons wishing to sponsor their non-EEA national spouse or partner to join them in the UK must now demonstrate a minimum gross annual income of £18,600, and more if they are also sponsoring dependent children. New foreign spouses or partners must also wait for five years rather than two, as previously, before they become eligible to apply for permanent settlement in the UK. More restrictive eligibility criteria have also been introduced for adult dependent relatives of British citizens who wish to settle in the UK.
Last year the Government anticipated that the change would result in, I believe, up to 17,800 fewer family visas being granted every year, arguing that keeping the bar high for family migration could result in savings to the welfare bill. At the time, we expressed our support for strengthening the family migration rules to protect UK taxpayers and said that if people want to make this country their home, they should contribute and not have a negative impact on public funds. However, we cast doubt on the Government’s approach that focused so much on the sponsor’s salary, and said that there needed to be a fair framework for those who fall in love and build family relationships across borders.
The report from the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration on these new family migration rules, which has just been published, has already been referred to extensively. It highlights the impacts of recent rule changes on ordinary British citizens hoping to build a family in the UK with a non-EEA husband, wife or partner. Among the report’s key findings were that some British citizens and permanent residents in the UK, including people in full-time employment, have been separated from a non-EEA partner, and in some cases their children, as a result of the income requirement.
In addition, some British citizens and permanent residents have been prevented from returning to the UK with their non-EEA partner and any children, again as a result of the income requirement. In some cases the non-EEA partner was the main earner with a medium or high salary, but that could not be counted towards the income requirement under the new rules. On top of all this, the report found that some children, including British children, have been indefinitely separated from a non-EEA parent, once again as a result of the income requirement.
It looks as though the doubts raised about the Government’s approach, which was focused so heavily on the sponsor’s salary, have, unfortunately, been proved right. Among the recommendations made in the all-party group’s report was that the level of the income requirement should be reviewed with a view to minimising any particular impacts on UK sponsors as a result of their region, gender, age or ethnicity, and that family migration rules should ensure that children are supported to live with their parents in the UK where their best interests require this. We certainly see no difficulty in having a review without prejudging what its outcome might be.
I want to raise a specific point about our Armed Forces. As I understand it, the Government have now decided that members of our Armed Forces posted or fighting for our country overseas should not be exempt from the new family migration rules. Perhaps the Minister could explain the thinking behind that decision, as it is in marked contrast to the Government’s decision, announced yesterday, of an exemption for members of our Reserve Armed Forces in respect of the employment tribunal qualifying employment period when pursuing claims for unfair dismissal on the grounds of reserve service.
It remains to be seen what the Government’s response will be to the findings in the report and the recommendations of the inquiry launched by the all-party group. However, it does not look as though the new rules in their present form and the way in which they are being applied are, to put it mildly, doing a great deal to strengthen and enhance family life in what is hardly an insignificant number of instances.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for introducing this debate and express my thanks to all who have participated with their considerable experience and knowledge—which I do not mind admitting is somewhat greater than mine—and not least my noble friend Lady Corston, who explained the work and views of her committee on certain key issues and referred to the code of practice. From current personal experience, I certainly share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, on the difficulty of getting to grips with the detail of this report.
As the Minister said, this is the third annual report to Parliament on the application of Protocols 19 and 21 on the Schengen opt-out and justice and home affairs opt-in respectively. Once again, the reports arise from the previous Government’s commitment in 2008 to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny of the justice and home affairs opt-in, part of which was an undertaking to provide Parliament with and make available for debate an annual report that both looked ahead to the Government’s approach to EU justice and home affairs policy and forthcoming dossiers, including in relation to the opt-in, and provided a retrospective annual report on the UK’s application of the opt-in protocol. Annexe 1 of the report in front of us sets out all the JHA opt-in decisions and Schengen opt-out decisions taken from December 2011 until the end of November 2012. Annexe 2 outlines legislative proposals which are expected to be brought forward in the current year and will require a decision on UK participation under the justice and home affairs opt-in protocol.
One of the legislative proposals mentioned in Annexe 2 is the proposal for a regulation on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Co-operation and Training—Europol—about which, as has already been noted, we had a debate on Monday in the context of the European Union Committee’s report on the UK opt-in to the Europol regulation. At the end of the debate, the House agreed with the committee’s recommendation that the Government should exercise their right to take part in the adoption and application of the proposed regulation. Whether that will have any impact on the Government’s decision remains to be seen, since it is not unknown for internal party considerations to play a part in determining this Government’s approach to any matters European. The Minister told us on Monday that the decision on whether to opt in to the Europol regulation was “finely balanced”. Can he say which of our law enforcement agencies feel that we should not opt in to the regulation?
Annex 2 sets out a number of other proposed measures. Any specific update from the Minister on the situation in respect of some or all of those proposals would be helpful, in particular on whether any decisions have actually been taken. My noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon asked him, in the debate on the Europol regulation on Monday, how many measures were awaiting an opt-in decision by the Government and whether any have been delayed because of the decisions regarding the opt-out, to which reference has already been made.
There is one other issue I would like to raise from what was said on Monday. If memory serves me right, it was the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, who referred to a European surveillance order in which the Government do not have an opt-in or opt-out. They have simply failed to implement a piece of European legislation that they agreed to and which came into force throughout the European Union in December last year. What is the Government’s position on that order, which provides the possibility for someone who is subject to a European arrest warrant to be bailed in their own country?
The Government have sought to argue in this report that decisions taken in relation to the JHA opt-in and Schengen opt-out protocols are separate from the 2014 opt-out decision under Protocol 36 to the European Union treaties. However, that argument does not really hold water. As was pointed out in Monday’s debate, if the measure is a police and criminal justice measure that was adopted before the Lisbon treaty entered into force in 2009, deciding to opt in to that measure or a variation of it, or deciding not to opt in to a variation of it but to seek to influence it from the outside, would be completely nullified if we then decided to opt out of all those measures under Protocol 36. Perhaps the Minister will tell us which of the measures on which decisions were made to opt in between 1 December 2011 and 30 November 2012 as set out in Annexe 1 of the annual report would cease to apply to the UK if we made an opt-out decision under Protocol 36. Likewise, if we decided to opt in to all the proposals in Annex 2, or not opt in but seek to influence them from the outside, which of those measures would cease to apply to the UK if we made an opt-out decision under Protocol 36? If the Government decided to opt out under Protocol 36, no one knows which measures, including the European arrest warrant, we could subsequently get agreement to opt back in to or, if we could, on what basis or terms. All 130 measures were agreed by unanimity under a system where the UK had the veto, and not a single one of them was foisted on the UK against our will.
The noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, referred to the Europol regulation. I know it is only two days after the Minister was asked about it on Monday, but can he now clarify the Government’s position, including when the debate on the government Motion on the decision on the Europol regulation, postponed from today, will take place?
I shall conclude with a few specific questions on the report. On page 26, the Government have not opted out of parts of Schengen, such as the Schengen information system second generation. I understand that we will be connected in the fourth quarter of 2014. If we exercise the block opt-out, we will be leaving all pre-Lisbon parts of the Schengen acquis. What does that mean as far as the decision not to opt out of the Schengen information system second generation is concerned? On page 6, reference is made to the directive on the protection of the financial interests of the EU against fraud by means of criminal law. The report says that the Treasury will provide an update as soon as possible. If that has not already happened, when is it likely to happen?
Page 10 refers to the trade agreement between the EU and Colombia and Peru. I am genuinely not entirely sure what the current position is. Has that agreement been concluded? Was there an undertaking, as has been suggested to me, by the Government that there would be a vote in both Houses on the trade agreement between the EU and Colombia and Peru? Page 13 refers to passenger name record sharing with the USA to which the Minister referred in his opening comments. How is that operating and how effective is it proving to be? Page 16 refers to the asylum and migration fund. How would this be affected if we exercised the blanket opt-out? How much of an effect would an opt-out have on the UKBA’s resettlement activities?
Finally, page 23 refers to the confiscation of the proceeds of crime in the EU; once again, the Minister referred to this issue in his opening speech. Have any problems arisen subsequently as a result of not opting in? I appreciate that the Minister is unlikely to have all the information immediately to hand to respond to my detailed points; I mean that—I would be amazed if he did. However, I would nevertheless appreciate a response at not too late a stage.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, like so many other speakers, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, and his colleagues for the work they have undertaken in producing this informative and thoughtful report. Migration and mobility is an issue that sometimes arouses heat and passion and not much else. However, as one would expect, the approach of this report to the issue is calm and measured.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, spoke about the four pillars of the global approach to migration and mobility and stressed the significance for addressing migration of improving the economies of the source countries outside Europe. He also drew attention to the fact that most irregular migrants in Europe are visa over-stayers. The Government have given their written responses to the recommendations in the report. During the course of this debate, questions have been raised about those responses, and one response in particular, including by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, in opening the debate and introducing the report. It is of course for the Minister to respond to points made about the Government’s responses. It took the Government a couple of months to respond to the committee’s recommendations. It is a pity that it has taken just under twice that time since then to have this debate, although I noted the view of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that the delay might well be an example of every cloud having a silver lining in terms of topicality.
Our nation has benefited over a great many years from the contribution of immigrants, whether through building some of our major companies or, as has already been pointed out, sustaining our National Health Service and winning us Noble prizes. In a globalised economy, the importance of immigration will certainly not diminish, but it needs to be controlled and its impact needs to be fair for all. Diversity makes our country stronger, but we need to build common bonds, including more emphasis on speaking English and effective integration policies and approaches for communities. We need effective action to tackle exploitation of migrant workers, which also undercuts local people. That means stronger national minimum wage regulations, more enforcement with heavier penalties, and a register to tackle rogue landlords. Proper training programmes are required to help the young unemployed from the sectors that are recruiting most from abroad and should be doing more to train local people: programmes such as Care First, which the Government abolished.
We accept that the pace of migration, particularly low-skilled migration, has been too fast. We support policies to bring it down, such as stronger controls on people coming to do low-skilled jobs and action against bogus colleges. Pulling out of the Social Chapter and out of co-operation on policing and justice, as the Government appear to want to do, would, however, make it harder to manage European migration. We need proper co-operation with other European countries to make sure that migration is not abused. The new Schengen information system will share information on migrants travelling within the EU and will help to guarantee the authenticity of documents and help to identify illegal residents. So far, it seems that the Government are declining to sign up.
There is immigration that works for Britain and immigration that does not. More needs to be done to cut illegal immigration and more needs to be done, as has been said on umpteen occasions already today, to support universities recruiting international students who contribute to our economy. Legitimate higher education students should not be adversely targeted in government action to bring immigration down.
Real concerns have been expressed by parliamentary committees that government policy is putting at risk the benefits that university students bring to the economy, benefits which it is estimated run to some £8 billion with the potential to more than double in value by 2025. The concerns are that the growth in university students is being held back by government policies and the impression given out by those polices. Figures from the Higher Education Statistics Authority show that the number of non-EU first-year students at UK universities is down from 2010-2011. There is also a drop in postgraduate enrolments. One suspects that these reductions also reflect a drop in market share in this highly competitive field.
The Government’s net migration target is not targeting many of the right things. Well over 50% of the drop since 2010 comes from British citizens: more leaving the country and fewer coming home. Much of the rest is falling numbers of foreign students and entrepreneurs. Yet illegal immigration is outside the target, with fewer people stopped, more absconding, fewer deported and backlogs of information on cases not pursued. On top of that, student visitor visas have increased considerably under this Government, and the independent borders inspectorate has warned that they are open to abuse by bogus students actually coming here to work. Unlike full, tier 4 student visas, these visitor visas are not used by university students and are not counted in the net migration figures. However, I understand that they have increased by 30,000 in just two years.
Things such as illegal immigration and student visitor visas, which are excluded from the net migration figures, appear to be being overlooked by the Government as far as effective action and control are concerned even if they cause serious problems. Everything included in the net migration figures is treated the same, as the Government seek to bring the figure down, even though it is leading to a squeeze on university students to the potential detriment of Britain, and highly skilled global experts and entrepreneurs are adversely affected by the visa delays that deter or hold them back from coming—visa delays which certainly do not impede progress in bringing down the declared net migration figure. The system for legal migration needs addressing as it is subject to significant delays, including doubling visa delays and long waits for businesses, asylum seekers, spouses and families.
In its report the EU Committee says that it considers that flexibility by member states in the operation of the European labour market to legal migration from third countries, particularly in those with skills shortages, could be essential to securing economic growth and competitiveness. The report says that member states should continue to have the right to choose the number of migrants from third countries they wish to admit to their labour markets, depending on their needs. I do not think that that view will be contested, but it highlights the importance of our having fair, coherent and effective policies, processes and procedures for addressing the issues surrounding migration. Those policies, processes and procedures should not, in their application, have some continuing consequences contrary to Britain’s interests and they should address all the relevant issues, not just those aspects of migration and mobility which impact on a net migration target figure that has been set, while effectively ignoring or failing to address equally important aspects of migration and mobility which are not reflected in the net migration target figure. On the basis of those not unreasonable criteria, the Government are still some way short of where they ought to be.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I add my thanks to the Joint Committee for its report on the draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill and express my thanks for the comprehensive and informative speech introducing the report from my noble friend Lord Plant of Highfield.
In a nutshell, the coalition Government decided that they did not like the control orders introduced in the interests of national security by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. They therefore brought in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which replaced control orders with something that was very similar in many respects, namely TPIMs or “control orders-lite”, but which had the key advantage from the Government’s point of view of having a different name.
However, the Government had to recognise that no longer having the full powers under the control orders, as provided for in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, represented a potential threat to national security. As has been said, they were not prepared to address this reality in the original TPIMs Act because politically that would have weakened even further their argument that control orders should cease to exist. Instead they have prepared a separate Bill, the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, which has been the subject of consideration by the Joint Committee, and which the Government would seek to pass through Parliament as emergency legislation providing for additional restrictive measures in an ETPIM if they deemed that the circumstances demanded it.
The Minister will no doubt claim that ETPIMs are not the same as the control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, but frankly there is not a lot of difference. The words of the ACPO representative in giving evidence to the committee have already been quoted but he told the committee that, with ETPIMs,
“essentially we go back to the old control order regime ... the old regime was bedded in, and it worked very well”.
Those were apparently his words.
The Joint Committee gave its firm view on the Government’s approach to the draft Bill when it said:
“We can find no compelling reason for the decision to introduce these measures as a separate Bill at some unspecified time in unspecified circumstances. We find it odd that these measures were not included as an order-making power in the original TPIMs Bill where they could be subjected to fuller scrutiny in the course of normal Parliamentary business … The Government’s position that it will introduce this legislation at some future date in response to some unspecified emergency is an unfortunate and unwelcome decision”.
That issue has already been raised with the Minister, particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
In their response to the Joint Committee report, the Government have replied to the Joint Committee’s proposal for briefing a select group of properly vetted Members on the reasons for introducing this emergency legislation if the Government decided that had become necessary. Can the Minister say whether there has been any firming up of the Government’s position on that point, as set out in paragraph 5 of their response to the Joint Committee report?
The Joint Committee report states that in November last year there were nine people subject to TPIMs. It also quotes the Association of Chief Police Officers representative as telling the Joint Committee that,
“given the resource currently available”,
and the changes made to policing, the police,
“are adequately managing the risk posed by people subject to TPIMs at the moment”.
That is hardly a ringing endorsement of how things are working, bearing in mind that we are talking about people—the subjects of TPIMs—who are a threat to national security. The use of the phrase,
“given the resource currently available”,
suggests that ACPO thinks the resource currently available to undertake the job in the way it feels appropriate and needed is not all it might be. That is followed by the phrase,
“adequately managing the risk posed by people subject to TPIMs at the moment”.
In a Government who feel that schools deemed “satisfactory” by inspectors are not doing as well as they should, one must ask the Minister whether the Government feel that adequately managing the risk is good enough when national security is at stake? Why did the ACPO representative not feel able to say that they were either properly or fully managing the risk? Indeed, why did he not simply say they were managing the risk, without the less than enthusiastic addition of the word “adequately”?
As I understand it, an individual subject to a TPIM absconded at Christmas, allegedly in a black cab, and has not been caught. If that is broadly accurate, and the Minister may tell me otherwise, was that individual under surveillance, and was what happened an example of what is meant by “adequately” managing the risk? Until control orders were replaced by TPIMs, the individual in question had been the subject of a control order, and had been relocated outside London. Under the TPIM, the person was free to move to London, and it now appears he has absconded.
Would the noble Lord also say something about the cost of TPIMs? Is it true that a TPIM costs many times more than a control order to enforce? Is up to £18 million per annum per TPIM, a figure mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in his evidence to the committee, anywhere near the mark? If that figure is anywhere near the mark, has it been provided to the Metropolitan Police and does the money appear in their budget?
Enhanced terrorism prevention and investigation measures as provided for in this draft Bill are, as has been said, distinct from TPIMs, with the conditions the Government can impose being more stringent than under a TPIM. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation said that “in most respects” the ETPIM Bill appeared to,
“replicate what was possible and generally imposed under control orders”.
It is intended that ETPIMs are introduced only in exceptional circumstances. It is clear from their response to the report that clarity on what is meant by “exceptional circumstances”—I think that was a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, although she would not have used my words—will not be forthcoming from the Government. However, will the Minister say whether, under the draft Bill and in exceptional circumstances, an ETPIM could be deemed necessary if, at the end of the maximum period of two years for which a TPIM could be enforced, an individual covered by that TPIM was still regarded as a serious threat to national security? In those circumstances, could an ETPIM be imposed under the legislation being taken through Parliament? Would that be deemed “exceptional circumstances”?
I think that I am also right in saying that at least some, if not all, of those covered by TPIMs will cease to be so covered at the beginning of next year because the maximum period for which an individual can be subject to the terms of a TPIM, namely two years, will have come to an end for some, if not all, of those currently covered. What do the Government intend to do when the TPIMs in respect of those individuals cease by law to have effect. Presumably, if the Government no longer considered them a threat, the TPIMs would no longer be effective, so the fact that the TPIMs are still effective suggests that the Government still consider these individuals to be a threat to national security.
Are the Government saying that, by a happy coincidence, these individuals will cease to be a threat to national security on precisely the same day the TPIM ceases by law to have effect? If not, what do the Government intend to do? The Government must have made up their mind what action they would take, or what the options would be when the TPIM expired, when they made the decision that TPIMs in respect of an individual could not be effective for more than two years. If the Government are not prepared to answer that question today, when will they give an answer?
Coming back to what the Government mean when they say that an ETPIM would be introduced only in exceptional circumstances, the government Minister who gave evidence to the Joint Committee identified “multiple attacks” or a “really exceptional incident” as possible triggers for the ETPIMs Bill to be introduced. If that is the case, does it mean that an incident actually has to have occurred, with possible injuries or loss of life, before the emergency Bill would be introduced? Could the ETPIMs Bill be introduced in respect of an individual where there was activity which suggested an incident might be about to be perpetrated, or will we have to wait either until we are sure an incident is about to be perpetrated, or wait for someone to be quite possibly killed or injured in an incident before it was deemed that there were “exceptional circumstances” which justified the Bill being introduced? Apparently the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation told the Joint Committee that there would be no question of imposing an ETPIM on anybody unless the Home Secretary were persuaded that they,
“have been involved in terrorism”,
which could be interpreted as shutting the gate only after the horse has bolted. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify this point and also how, if there are emergency “exceptional circumstances”, there will always be time to go through even a truncated parliamentary process—assuming Parliament was sitting—without putting national security at risk.
Clause 2 of the draft Bill sets out the conditions on which the Secretary of State must satisfy herself before imposing an ETPIM. One of those conditions is that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity, and that some or all of this activity is “new”. The definition of “new” is addressed in the Joint Committee’s report, but it would be helpful if the Minister could give us some examples from a government perspective of what would or would not constitute “new” terrorism-related activity in relation to the conditions on which the Secretary of State must be satisfied before imposing an ETPIM. It could presumably be the ETPIM itself and the conditions attached to it that were preventing the individual concerned from embarking on “new” terrorist-related activity. Could the reference to “new” activity mean that the ETPIM could not be extended or renewed because there was no evidence of new activity even though the reason there was no “new” activity was the existence and conditions already attached to the ETPIM? Perhaps the Minister could respond to this point, and the following comment in the Joint Committee report:
“As such, it is possible that under this legislation, at the end of a maximum two-year period, an allegedly dangerous, radicalised individual will be released without direct restrictions on their behaviour”.
What is the Government’s response to this point in view of the fact that it directly relates to national security?
The Government’s written response to the Joint Committee report did not do justice to all the serious points raised, and questions asked, in the report. My noble friend Lord Plant of Highfield and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, have raised a number of points and questions today, as have I. I hope that all these questions will receive a considered and thoughtful response from the Minister, since the House has a duty to challenge, question and hold to account the Government, in particular on matters that impact on national security.
If the Minister is about to close, is he able to address the question that I asked about what happens to those who are on TPIMs at present? I understand that at least some, if not all, TPIMs will come to an end at the beginning of next year. What is going to happen to them? I asked whether, if those people were still considered a threat to national security, the Government could seek an ETPIM in respect of them or whether they would fail to meet the criteria if they had not committed any “new” terrorist activity. I also asked whether, if someone is subject to an ETPIM, the Government envisage renewing it or extending it in any form because presumably, under their own definition, they could do so only if the individual had committed some “new” terrorist activity while under the EPTIM which, if the EPTIM was being effective, the individual would not have done.
I think that I can answer the noble Lord best by saying that all cases are reviewed properly. I gave a description in response to my noble friend Lady Doocey’s question about the disengagement of subjects from a TPIM order. The future conduct of individuals who have been subject to a TPIM or an ETPIM will be subject to review regarding the nature of the threat that they present to national security. That is how this legislation works in relation to the individuals who are subject to it.
I was going on to say, about the introduction of this draft Bill and the exceptional circumstances that might lead to its presentation to Parliament, that I am sure noble Lords will say that they hope that such circumstances never arise, that this diligent work conducted by noble Lords may not be necessary and that we do not face the exceptional circumstances that would mean that the Government were forced to present the Bill to Parliament. I thank noble Lords.