Police: Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, extend my thanks to the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, for securing this short debate, which enables us to consider the valuable and timely report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life on leadership, ethics and accountability in policing. It has been particularly helpful to have heard in this debate from the chair of the committee, the noble Lord, Lord Bew.

The creation of police and crime commissioners and the associated governance arrangements has clearly been the driving force behind the committee’s decision to undertake this report, which is the first one in the committee’s history that has looked specifically at policing. As the report says:

“Trust in the police is vital—from the Chief Constable to the most junior police officer. Police ethics—their honesty, their integrity, their impartiality, their openness—should be beyond reproach … High standards—of both conduct and accountability—also need to be demonstrated by those charged with holding the police to account”.

I believe that, for the overwhelming majority of time, the police achieve the standards required of them —a view supported by the survey undertaken for the committee. However, any straying from those standards must be a cause for concern.

The report does not deal with issues relating to the impact on police officers of cutbacks in staffing, but it would be unrealistic to imagine that poor morale among officers, chief constables and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner in expressing concerns about the impact on effective policing and police numbers of further projected financial cuts, at this of all times, and a Government who have created uncertainty over intended changes in the police funding formula, does anything at all to promote or enhance the kind of culture or standards in policing referred to in the report. I hope that, in considering this report, the Government have taken and will continue to take a look at the impact of their decisions and decision-making on leadership, ethics and accountability in policing.

In his foreword to the report, the noble Lord, Lord Bew, states in respect of police and crime commissioners that there has been evidence of a,

“new impetus in many areas—greater innovation, increased visibility and a greater focus on community engagement and victim support”.

However, he then goes on to say that,

“there is also clear evidence of significant standards risks, including continuing confusion over roles and responsibilities, insufficient challenge and scrutiny of PCCs’ decisions and insufficient redress where a PCC falls below the standards of behaviour that the public expects of a holder of public office”.

A great many, if not all, of the issues referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Bew, were raised and, I would have to say, largely dismissed, by the then coalition Government during discussions on the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. At that time, the Government’s attitude was to get the Bill through as quickly as possible and then hold elections for police and crime commissioners with their very considerable, relatively unchallenged powers, as has already been said, irrespective of how few people might vote in the elections. Detailed considerations on what would be appropriate structures, roles and responsibilities, checks and balances and effective and necessary governance arrangements did not appear to have the same priority.

This report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life forms a basis for a proper discussion of some of these issues, at least where they relate to the role and functions of the committee. I hope that it is an opportunity that the Government either are taking or will take. However, the omens are not all positive. In a parliamentary Written Answer a month ago, in response to a question about the effectiveness of police and crime commissioners, there was no mention of any of the specific issues that had by then been raised in the report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life or, indeed, of any government consideration being given to those issues. Presumably, the Minister will give a government view on the committee’s 20 recommendations —not least, those that seek to address the “significant standards risks” identified by the committee, including a,

“confusion amongst the public and the participants about roles and responsibilities, especially in relation to where operational independence and governance oversight begin and end … a significant absence of a clear process to take action against a PCC whose conduct falls below the standards expected of public office holders, resulting in that behaviour going unchallenged and uncensured … concerns about the robustness of current selection processes for chief officers … PCCs not encountering sufficient constructive challenge or active support in exercising decision making powers … barriers to the effective operation of Police and Crime Panels as scrutinisers including support, resources and the consistency and credibility of representative membership … a lack of timely and accessible information being provided to Police and Crime Panels by PCCs affecting Police and Crime Panels’ ability to scrutinise and support the PCC”,

and,

“potential for high risk conflict of interests in roles jointly appointed by PCCs and Chief Constables … and risks inherent in the combined role of Chief Executive and Monitoring Officer to the PCC”.

Those issues were all raised in the report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life.

It also referred to confusion between and inherent tensions in the current police complaints system and the complaints system attaching to PCCs, and a gap in the expectations of the public in how complaints against PCCs would be resolved, especially when this involves unethical but not criminal behaviour. The Committee concluded that, combined, the factors to which I have just referred also impacted on the ability of police and crime panels to ensure—it is part of their role—

“that decisions of PCCs are tested on behalf of the public on a regular basis.”

Like other noble Lords who have spoken, I look forward to the Government’s response, which I hope will promote rather than shut down further debate, bearing in mind that the current police model is the one the present Home Secretary introduced and presumably felt would work effectively.

Police: Officer Offences

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 19th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My noble friend is right to say that it is a matter of public record. What we are trying to do here in the wider sense is to have a central role for the College of Policing, which we have established, to raise standards across a whole raft of areas. It has now introduced a “struck off” list. Some 444 police officers have been struck off, and that is a matter of public record. We have also said that disciplinary hearings need in future to be held in public and to be chaired by an independent, legally qualified individual. These are all steps in the same direction that I think the noble Lord wants to go.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

A recent freedom of information request asked how many officers and PCSOs had been convicted of criminal offences since 2012 and for the total number of serving officers with criminal convictions. What was surprising from the outcome of that FoI request was the number of police forces—nearly half—which declined to provide the information sought on grounds of cost or did not respond at all. Of course, the overwhelming majority of police officers are committed to their job and to serving their community and it is important to place that on the record, but since police and crime commissioners were meant to provide greater police accountability to the public, do not the Government find it surprising that PCCs would not have already obtained for themselves the information sought in the FoI request to which I have referred about their own force, including the policy on recruiting new officers with previous convictions and retaining in the service those convicted of offences while in the force? That clearly could not have been the case in respect of those PCCs for those forces which did not provide the figures sought.

[Lord Bates]

One role of the PCC is to have exactly that conversation with the chief constable in their area and to make sure that they are aware. When I looked into the detail of those freedom of information requests—which, on face, cause me as much distress as I am sure they cause the noble Lord—I found that in many cases, while there was a conviction for a current officer, that was countered by the fact that they were still undergoing gross misconduct procedures or appealing a particular decision. That was one of the reasons why those figures came out, but those conversations should be going on as a routine matter between PCCs and chief constables to maintain public confidence.

Drones: Risks to Passenger Aircraft

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 19th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Geddes (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I do not share the view already expressed that the Minister’s response was positive. The Civil Aviation Authority is warning that drones being flown as high as 2,000 feet are putting passenger aircraft in danger. It has now issued safety guidelines known as the drone code to discourage hobbyists from using their equipment in areas where large aircraft are present. Frankly that seems a pretty tepid response if it reflects the Government’s approach. First, the potential dangers of drones to passenger aircraft have been known for a few years and, secondly, six incidents involving drones at or close to airports were reported between May 2014 and March this year. Do we have to wait for a major incident to occur before meaningful action is taken? How can the potential risk to passenger aircraft be said to have been addressed when there appears to be so little effective control over who can acquire and fly a drone, and where?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I look forward to the day when the noble Lord says I have made a positive remark from this Dispatch Box. That remains a personal ambition. I am sure that that is not the case, I say to the Opposition Chief Whip. The noble Lord is fully aware, I am sure, that the Air Navigation Order 2009 lays out specific measures for operators, covering issues of safety and security. Equally, as I have already said, it is right that we look at this evolving area, particularly over the fact that drones available for leisure activity are more widespread. The noble Lord talked about the negative response. The CAA has launched a particular campaign for small operators, which is entitled You Have Control: Be Safe, Be Legal, which the Government support. I have already alluded to the public dialogue and the consultation that I am sure will yield positive results.

Criminal Justice: Anonymity

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 17th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

This is a very difficult issue. We have historic cases in which very serious allegations were made, and in places such as Rotherham, Manchester and Oxford, there is often a public outcry and a feeling that the police have not taken the claims seriously enough. That has to be balanced against the right to fairness and due process throughout. In the past, child sexual exploitation has far too often been swept under the carpet; it needs to be brought out into the open and reviewed. That is why we set up the inquiry and why we have told the police that they need to investigate all allegations based on their credibility, rather than that of the complainant.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Minister referred to the ACPO guidelines. If I understand them correctly, the guidelines accept that in exceptional circumstances, the police may release the name of a suspect if it is considered to be in the public interest to do so. Also, when a media organisation has already discovered a suspect’s name through investigative journalism and seek confirmation of it, the police are permitted to confirm the name. Do the Government believe that the ACPO guidelines should be amended or reviewed?

[Lord Bates]

The College of Policing guidelines on the relationship with the media are currently under review. A number of the points raised during this Question would merit submission to that review.

Airport Security

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I think I have already answered the question. The British Government have been, continue to be and will in future be engaged with countries and airports across the world to ensure that we address safety concerns. The noble Baroness asked about the situation on the ground in Sharm el-Sheikh, but I am sure she has also been following the fact that the British Government, working together with airlines—I commend their actions in this respect—has already resulted in more than 7,700 UK citizens returning to the UK over the last few days. We continue to work with the Egyptian authorities on the ground and with the airlines, so that all other remaining passengers who wish to return are returned to the UK as soon as possible.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Government said last Thursday in this House:

“We have continuing arrangements with authorities across the world to review aviation security arrangements in airports regularly to ensure that they are meeting required standards”.—[Official Report, 5/11/2015; col. 1805.]

In the light of the last question, when was the last review of the airport at Sharm el-Sheikh, and did it reveal that the security arrangements met the required standards? If it did so, what confidence can we have in these reviews, in the light of the recent apparent outrage and the Government’s no doubt justified decision to suspend UK-operated flights to and from Sharm el-Sheikh? Finally, will future reviews of airports across the world simply look at trying to ensure that existing security arrangements work properly, or will they look at introducing new features to enhance security?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Again, I shall not go into specific details of security arrangements, but the Government, as I am sure that the noble Lord is aware— and as the whole House is aware—continue to work on the ground with the respective sovereign authorities and airlines to ensure that we not only minimise but eradicate the risk and ensure the safety and security of all passengers. We will continue to do so.

Syrian Refugees

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Will the Minister clarify the situation a little more? How many councils in the United Kingdom have finalised agreements, including financial arrangements with the Government, to take 1,000 Syrian refugees before the end of the year under the scheme? How many Syrian refugees are covered by agreements that have already been finalised?

[Lord Bates]

We have issued guidance on this for local authorities. The Prime Minister made the announcement on 7 September and it is up to local authorities to come forward and volunteer to be part of the scheme, and they are coming forward. That is important because they need to make sure that they have the ability, through schools and social care, to do it properly. This is a fast-moving situation. We do not have a number on the specific local authorities, but 140 individuals have arrived since 7 September. The Prime Minister has given a commitment that we will seek to get 1,000 here by Christmas. We will do that, providing we work in partnership with local authorities.

Police Funding

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, the responsibility for the sorry Answer which has just been repeated lies not at the door of officials, but at that of Ministers. The Government’s serious mistake came to light only because of work commissioned by individual police forces which had to pay to get access to data used by the Home Office in the new formula proposals because they are owned by a private company. The Home Office sent a letter dated 5 November to Devon and Cornwall Police acknowledging the error. When did Ministers first know about the statistical error referred to by the noble Lord just now? The funding formula changes are being delayed,

“to give more time to consider their impact”.

For how long, the Minister did not say, so perhaps he can confirm the situation.

So that there is full transparency in considering the impact of any changes, will the Government ensure that any data on which they are basing funding decisions from next year onwards is fully in the public domain, and will they agree to independent oversight of the review in which there is now a lack of confidence? On what basis will police funding be determined for 2016-17 and when will police forces know how much they have been allocated? Finally, will the Government reimburse the costs that forces have already incurred in arguing against and challenging what the Government now admit is an erroneous formula?

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, first, the responsibility lies with Ministers. I have repeated an apology, which as Minister in the Lords I make to this House, for the error. Ministerial responsibility is clear on that.

On the specifics, the letter was sent on 5 November to Devon and Cornwall Police and the first the Policing Minister knew of that was when it was drawn to his attention on Friday 6 November and the decision was taken today, on Monday. The proposal put forward to address this error is that the proposed introduction of the new formula, which was to come into effect in the new financial year—April 2016-17—will now be delayed. The initial plan is that it will be delayed for a year, but at this point we are talking about very soon after. We realise that we have shaken a lot of confidence in the process, and it is very important that we talk to police and crime commissioners, chief constables and others, to make sure that we get this absolutely right.

On the cost issue, that will be looked at as part of the overall review into how this happened, but more importantly, how we move forward with the system that will command the confidence of the police. On the question of when people will know, the comprehensive spending review will report in the Autumn Statement on 27 November, and traditionally the police grant is announced on about 17 December. The specific force allocations will be known on 17 December and the broad envelope will be known on 27 November.

On independent oversight, which is very important, my right honourable friend the Policing Minister has indicated that he will seek independent oversight of the statistical process and the input of data into the system, but again we are genuinely contrite about the error and want to make sure that we get it right.

Islam

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 5th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The right reverend Prelate raises a very important issue about education. I think that education is the cornerstone of all progressive societies. The Near Neighbours scheme, for example, run by the Church of England, is a great scheme which brings communities together, irrespective of faith and denomination, to ensure that good and sensible values—the prevailing values; we often talk about British values but ultimately they are the human values we all share—prevail in a modern, progressive Britain.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Minister made reference to a comment by the Prime Minister. Does the Minister accept that the Prime Minister made a comment about sections of the Muslim community quietly condoning extremism, and that that risks causing division and fuelling resentment which will be counterproductive to the Government’s recently published counter-extremism strategy, which quite rightly focuses on building cohesive communities?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I am sure the noble Lord has read the strategy; its foreword is by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is the one leading on this strategy of countering extremism. It is about bringing together people of all communities, of all faiths and none, to ensure that we can tackle extremism in all its ugly guises—whether it is those who seek to hijack a noble religion, as we currently find in the religion of Islam, or those who use race and religion to divide society. We must unite against all such extremism.

Aviation Security

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 5th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier in the Commons. We certainly wish to associate ourselves with the condolences expressed in the Statement to the families of the 224 people who have lost their lives.

The Government have said that they still cannot be certain what caused the loss of the Russian MetroJet aircraft, but that they are reaching the view that a bomb on board is a significant possibility. That view is based on a review of all the information available to the Government, some of which cannot be disclosed. However, even without knowing the evidence, I am sure that the Government’s prompt decision to advise against all but essential travel by air to or from Sharm el-Sheikh airport, with the consequence that all UK-operated flights to and from the airport have been suspended, has been made on the basis of the need to ensure the safety of British citizens.

The Statement referred to working with the airlines to put in place short-term measures, which could include different arrangements for handling luggage. It said that beyond that, the Government are working with the Egyptians and the airlines to put in place long-term sustainable measures to ensure that our flights remain safe. If the airlines and the Government have now concluded that there perhaps ought to be different arrangements for handling luggage, is it being said that the current arrangements for handling luggage and other security issues—at an airport in a country and an area of the world which, as has been known for some time, is not exactly the most secure one could find—are not as appropriate or secure as they should be?

The Statement says that the Government are working with the Egyptians to assess and, where necessary, to improve security at the airport. Are the Government able to say that they and our personnel involved have been and are receiving all the co-operation they need from the Egyptian authorities on this issue?

What about the security arrangements at other airports in Egypt? Are they being reassessed? Are the Government now also looking with the airlines concerned at the security arrangements at airports used by British citizens in all parts of the world where there are current security and stability issues? Will the Minister also say what kind of measures are being considered with the Egyptians and the airlines in the light of the reference in the Statement to putting in place,

“long-term sustainable measures to ensure our flights remain safe”?

What are those long-term sustainable measures?

The Statement says that the Government have not changed the threat level for the resort of Sharm el-Sheikh itself. How was the conclusion reached that there is no threat in the wider Sharm el-Sheikh resort, given that the Government have decided to advise against all but essential travel by air to and from the airport, and to suspend all flights to and from the UK?

The Statement says that the airline community is putting in place interim arrangements for getting British citizens home, who as I understand it total some 20,000. I take it that the reference in the Statement to the hope that flights will leave tomorrow relates to flights leaving Sharm el-Sheikh, rather than leaving to go to that airport. How long do the Government expect it will take to get back home all British citizens who wish to return as soon as possible from Sharm el-Sheikh, rather than stay until their scheduled return date? Do the Government have any target date by which they anticipate that flights from this country to Sharm el-Sheikh will resume?

Finally, will the Minister say what consular support the Government are providing to British citizens in the resort and elsewhere in Egypt? I note that the Minister said, “we also have” consular staff, rather than what is in the written Statement. Given that the Statement says “will also have” consular staff on the ground providing assistance—implying that they are not there at the moment—is consular assistance not yet in fact being provided? If it is, or is going to be, provided through moving staff from other locations in Egypt to Sharm el-Sheikh, will consular assistance still be available to British citizens in other parts of Egypt?

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, we must all add our condolences to and sympathy for the families of those killed in this terrible accident. It is a salutary reminder of the perilous state of the world when terrorism strikes at a place so many British people know from their tourist experiences.

The Government have taken what we believe is correct, appropriate, swift and decisive action, because the safety of British citizens is paramount. However, looking at the precise wording of the Statement, I ask the Minister about the level of certainty of the security information. We understand that the security information cannot be made available to all of us here, and nor should it, but we are still interested in the fact that the level of certainty that this was due to a bomb on board is slightly less strong than I would have expected in the Minister’s Statement.

In looking at the long-term experience, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Clearly, for those 20,000 tourists currently waiting to come home from Sharm el-Sheikh, there is a great deal of hope that they will be able to come home very soon, but looking at the long-term issues, there is no certainty in the Minister’s Statement as to how long it will take for normal flights to resume. The Statement refers to “due course”. I am interested in what the Government believe the meaning of that phrase to be.

I, too, was surprised by the reference in the Statement to the threat level in the resort itself not being changed. That is very interesting information, and I would be pleased to hear further detail from the Minister as to why. The obvious concern of the families of tourists currently waiting in the airport and in their hotels in Sharm el-Sheikh is that, by leaving them there, they are in some danger. It is therefore important that they be reassured, if possible, that the level of threat has not changed. Will the Minister explain that in some detail?

On the general implications, as the noble Lord said, Egypt is far from the only trouble spot in the world. Many countries in that region are affected by the same forces. Will the Minister explain the routine processes applied by the Government and by airlines to ensure that security at airports across the world is up to standard? I ask this because those processes have clearly failed in this case. I would value further information on that.

Finally, will UK security specialists, on behalf of the Government or airlines, be located on Egyptian soil in the long term to deal with ongoing threats in that area?

Draft Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 4th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the Commons earlier today on the draft investigatory powers Bill, which the Government intend should receive Royal Assent before the sunset clause in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 comes into effect at the end of next year. An important stage in the consideration of this Bill will be undertaken by the pre-legislative scrutiny committee and its findings will, I am sure, be awaited with considerable interest.

We have also had a number of different reports on this issue in the last few months including from, but by no means only from, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, the Intelligence and Security Committee, and the review convened by the Royal United Services Institute. All three of those reports supported an overall review of the current legislative framework for the use of investigatory powers and the replacement of legislation such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

The Anderson report was commissioned on the basis of an opposition amendment when Parliament was asked to legislate very quickly to introduce the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. We argued then that it was the right time for a thorough review of the existing legal framework to be conducted as we, and others, no longer felt that the current arrangements were fit for purpose. Fast-developing technology and the growing threats we face internationally and domestically have left our fragmented laws behind and made the job of our police and security services, to whom we all owe a considerable debt of gratitude, harder.

We support the Government in their attempt to update the law in this important and sensitive area, particularly since the Statement appears to indicate that the Government have listened to at least some of the concerns that were expressed about the original proposed legislation put forward during the last Parliament. However, we hope that this Statement and the draft legislation does not prove to be a bit like some Budget speeches where it is only afterwards that some of the detail proves to put a rather less acceptable gloss on aspects of some of the changes and measures proposed.

Although it is becoming something of a cliché, the need is to secure the appropriate balance between the requirement to safeguard national security and the safety of our citizens, and the requirement to protect civil liberties and personal privacy, which is surely one of the hallmarks of a democracy compared to a dictatorship. The extent to which the proposals set out in the Statement, and in the draft legislation, achieve that difficult balance is clearly going to be the subject of much discussion during the consideration of the Bill. However, the Statement indicates stronger safeguards than were previously being proposed, including in the important area of judicial authorisation, and it appears as though in broad terms that difficult balance may be about right. We will examine carefully the detail of the Bill and where necessary seek to improve the safeguards to increase the all-important factor of public trust.

The proposals set out today do not of course relate just to national security. They also have relevance to preventing serious and abhorrent crimes and apprehending those who commit them, including murder, major fraud and child sexual exploitation. In that regard, can the Minister confirm that the far-reaching powers of content interception will be used only for the most serious crimes, as applies under RIPA? The Statement indicated that the detailed web browsing of individuals will not be accessible, which we support, but will the Minister set out precisely what internet activity of an individual will be accessible without a warrant?

Clearly, vulnerability of information has gone up the agenda of public concern in light of the attack on TalkTalk. Since data retention and bulk storage were referred to in the Statement, what steps do the Government intend to take to ensure the security of bulk storage of data by public and private bodies?

The Statement referred to the change of approach on encryption from the possible ban previously mentioned by the Prime Minister, and reference was also made to communication providers and legal duties. Are the Government satisfied that they can make any such legal requirements stick against some of the largest and most popular online names, many of whom have headquarters overseas?

The Statement also referred to the protection of communications for parliamentarians. Will that protection also apply to people communicating with parliamentarians, whether on personal matters or on providing information? What protection arrangements will there be for sources of information used by journalists? The Statement said that, if it were proposed to intercept the communications of a parliamentarian, the Prime Minister would also be consulted. What in this context does “consult” mean? Does it mean that the Prime Minister would have to give his or her agreement?

The Statement also addressed the issue of authorisation, and set out a two-stage process which is clearly intended to address the twin points of accountability to Parliament on the one hand and sufficient independence from the political process on the other in order to build trust—an issue referred to by David Anderson QC in his report. What will be the powers of the judges involved in the authorisation of warrants process in view of the reference in the Statement to a warrant being “formally” approved by a judge, and will judges have to sign off warrants in all cases? Will the information made available to the judge in order to make his or her decision be the same as the information made available to the Home Secretary? Will the criteria against which the judge will make a decision be the same as the criteria against which the Home Secretary makes her decision, or will the judge have a different remit? Who, or what body, will appoint the judges who will be involved in the authorisation of warrants process? How long is it expected to take to go through the double-lock authorisation process outlined in the Statement, and what will happen if there is an emergency requiring immediate authorisation of a warrant?

One of the key themes of the report by David Anderson was that a core objective for the renewal of legislation concerning investigatory powers ought to be public trust from all sections of our community in the use of those powers by government agencies, since public consent to intrusive laws depends on people trusting the authorities to keep them safe and not to spy needlessly on them. That in turn, as David Anderson said in his report, requires knowledge, at least in outline, of what powers are liable to be used, and visible authorisation and oversight mechanisms in which the wider public can have confidence.

The Bill will go through its stages in the Commons before coming to this House. It is, of course, a matter for the other place to determine, but one can only express the hope that a Bill of this importance will have received full and proper consideration before it gets to this House, although I am sure there will be no lack of willingness in this place to make up for any deficiencies in that regard and to ensure that the powers being sought are necessary and proportionate in relation to the issues and potential dangers they are intended to combat and address.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made by the Home Secretary in the other place. Clearly, we would like to be reassured by the Home Secretary’s claim that the draft Bill is not a return to the draft Communications Data Bill 2012, which the Liberal Democrats in the coalition Government quite rightly blocked, and from which this Government now appear to want to distance themselves.

There are some clear and very welcome changes proposed, including judicial authorisation of interception warrants and a promise not to interfere with encryption, but we must look very carefully at the detail of what is being proposed, particularly in relation to what the Home Secretary calls, “internet connection records”. Clearly, there has been a great deal of concern about communications service providers storing everyone’s web browsing history and handing over this information to the police and the security services. While the Home Secretary says that the proposed Bill would not allow that, I will probe very gently whether that is the case, so as to dispel concerns that this is just smoke and mirrors.

Intuitively, the Home Secretary must be right that if the police can use mobile phone data to find an abducted child, they should be able to do so if criminals are now using social media or communication apps instead of cellular data. Our concerns are: first, whether this is technically feasible; secondly, whether it is technically feasible without prohibitive costs to communications service providers; and, thirdly, whether it is possible without the risk of disproportionate intrusion into innocent people’s privacy, whether by the forces of good or by hackers such as those who breached TalkTalk’s security, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned.

Talking to experts, I was told that communications service providers would be unable to tell the police or the security services whether someone had used the internet to communicate, as opposed to just browsing, without storing content. This requires billions of pounds of hardware investment, and even then it may not be possible to tell the difference between browsing and communication. Determined suppliers of applications that enable people to communicate covertly could disguise internet communication as passive browsing, for example. Will the Minister say whether the Government know that it is technically possible for internet service providers to provide a record of the communications services a person has used without a record of every page they have accessed? What would be the cost to communications providers? Has a risk assessment been undertaken of the possibility that, having stored sensitive personal information, that information might be accessed unlawfully?

Finally, in 2005 the police, backed by the then Labour Government, asked for a power to detain terror suspects without charge for up to 90 days—a power that the security services did not ask for and that Parliament, quite rightly, rejected. Will the Minister also confirm whether the requirement to store internet communication records has come from the police alone or from the police and the security services?