(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames has outlined, our Amendment 16 in this group calls for a review of the impacts of Part 1of the Bill. Why is such a review needed? The Explanatory Notes to the Bill describe its purpose as being to better protect the public from terrorism, effectively by two main means: ensuring that serious and dangerous terrorist offenders spend longer in custody, and supporting their disengagement from extremism and their rehabilitation.
I am pleased to note there is no longer any pretence that longer sentences act as a deterrent to terrorist offenders. There was no such claim from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, either, when he introduced the Bill to this House on Second Reading. That will save some time.
The two premises on which the Bill is based appear to be these: that the public are better protected from terrorists if terrorist offenders are in prison longer; and that a range of tailored interventions while they are in prison will lead to their disengagement from extremism and their rehabilitation. In short, the longer they are in prison, the less likely they are to pose a threat to the public and the more time is available to deradicalise and rehabilitate them.
The first and most obvious problem with the first premise is that you cannot detain every suspected terrorist for the rest of their lives, despite the Government’s attempts in this Bill to achieve exactly that for some terrorist offenders. With an increasing number of exceptions were this Bill to be passed unamended, you cannot normally lock up suspected terrorists indefinitely or so curtail their freedoms as to effectively deprive them of their liberty indefinitely. We will come to the indefinite deprivation of liberty without charge or trial when we come to the changes to the terrorism prevention and investigation measures.
The Government’s current Prevent strategy, at paragraph 3.5, says that
“radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.”
Such propagandists exist in our prisons. The Government’s argument that the longer someone is in prison, the more time there is to support their disengagement and rehabilitation can also work against their deradicalisation and rehabilitation.
First, it provides more time for them to be radicalised, or further radicalised, by propagandists in prison. There is clear evidence that this is happening. On 25 January, the Times reports the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, as saying that there was an increasing “drumbeat” of links between prison and terror attacks, with offenders not being properly punished for owning radical material, preaching extremism and inciting violence. The Times notes that the man given a whole life sentence last month for murdering three men in a park in Reading in a terror attack last year was befriended by a radical preacher while serving an earlier prison sentence. Secondly, if these vulnerable people believe that the sanctions imposed on them are disproportionate, or that the system that led to their imprisonment was unfair, the ideology promulgated by these propagandists is made to appear even more attractive and compelling.
No one would argue against a proportionate sentence of imprisonment for someone convicted in a court of law of a terrorist offence, as my noble friend Lord Marks has just said, or that, for a limited time, a suspected terrorist who is believed to present a real and immediate threat should not have their liberty to carry out a terrorist attack prevented while evidence is gathered upon which to base a trial in a court of law. However, paragraph 3.6 of the same Prevent strategy says:
“There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.”
Disproportionately long sentences of imprisonment and indefinite deprivation of liberty without charge or trial would reinforce this rejection of our cohesive, integrated, multifaith society and parliamentary democracy. They would undermine any sense of belonging to this country and any support for our core values. Indeed, they begin to call into question some of our core values.
What evidence is there that it is easier to develop a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values while someone is in prison, compared with when they are on licence in the community? The Times article I quoted previously reports the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation as saying that encouraging and inciting terrorism were being
“successfully combated in the community”,
unlike the failure to address these issues in prison. Although he is to conduct a review of what is happening in prisons, it appears to be limited to examining how terrorism is detected, disrupted and prosecuted behind bars and whether improvements can be made, rather than the comprehensive review called for in our amendment.
For all these reasons, there is serious doubt whether Part 1 of the Bill will achieve what the Government intend by it; therefore, our Amendment 16 is necessary. Other amendments in this group call for a review of the financial impact of the Bill and the impact on the prison population, both of which could hamper the effectiveness of any deradicalisation or rehabilitation strategy and any attempt to prevent radicalisation or further radicalisation in prison. Reviews are called for on the specific impact of the Bill in Northern Ireland and on the National Probation Service, and we support these amendments as well.
My Lords, we have had a wide-ranging introduction to this group from both the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Paddick. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said in his introduction, the amendments in this group call for a series of reviews of different aspects of the system. He expressed his misgivings and uncertainty that the system as it currently operates is succeeding and concluded his remarks by saying that a more sophisticated approach is needed.
Amendment 16 is the first amendment regarding the independent review of provisions, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has spoken. The second in the group, Amendment 34 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, is concerned with the financial impact of the changes. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a financial impact assessment of the Act within three years of it coming into force, and this would include the financial impact of extended sentences, extended licence periods, and any additional staffing resources needed as a result of the Act.
Amendment 36 in my name calls for a capacity impact assessment. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish an assessment of the capacity of the system as a whole. In their 2016 White Paper, Prison Safety and Reform, the then Government committed to £1.3 billion to create 10,000 new prison places by 2020 and to renovate the existing estate. The 2020 target was later changed to 2022; so far, only 206 new prison places have been built, with 3,360 under construction. The main reasons for those failures and delays were the delays in agreeing and receiving funding to build new prisons. This meant that the construction work began later than planned. In addition, HMPPS was not able to close all prisons and replace them with new ones, due to high demand, which meant it received less money from the sales of old prisons.
Amendment 38, also in my name, proposes a review of the legislation as it affects Northern Ireland. All measures in the Bill as they pertain to Northern Ireland would be reviewed annually with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive; a report would also have to be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament. This would ensure that the Government worked constructively with the Ministry of Justice and Northern Ireland Executive, and that all the Bill’s implications were subject to regular review through the prism of Northern Ireland.
Amendment 39 proposes a review of the National Probation Service. This would require the Government to commission and publish a review of the impact of the Bill on the National Probation Service within 18 months of it coming into force. The review would have to consider, among other things, the level of probation support offered to offenders, as well as the number of specialist staff employed by the National Probation Service, and their skills.
I have received some briefing material from Napo—formerly the National Association of Probation Officers —which makes the point that the probation service is in crisis and that many of the offender management teams are struggling to maintain a balance between experienced staff and newly qualified staff. It is not uncommon to find teams in the community where the most experienced officer has only two to three years of post-qualification experience. As recruitment increases, as it is projected to increase, the pressure on the frontline staff will grow, with more probation officers being moved into management and training roles to support the trainees. The point made by Napo is that a properly remunerated and supported expansion of the probation service is needed to face the challenges ahead.
I am relatively new to these debates, but I remember making the point at Second Reading about the importance of rehearsing these arguments each time we make these types of orders. These orders are some of the most intrusive that we have in our country. Young people listening to these debates need to be convinced regularly of how important these orders are and that they are proportionate and protect our liberties.
In her introduction, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, drew a parallel with the group; there are obvious parallels between the legal tests in the previous group and the length of the TPIMs that we have been discussing in this group. Interestingly, in responding to the previous group, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, talked about a reduction in the measures within TPIMs as they progress in time. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to expand on that when he winds up the debate.
As I am now used to, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has given a balanced view. He has put forward another compromise, although I sense that the Liberal Democrats and perhaps my own party, the Labour Party, are less convinced by this type of compromise, but nevertheless he has set one out in his amendments. I thought that he put an interesting challenge to the Minister, who is a former special adviser in the Home Office. I do not think that it was a rhetorical challenge, but I would be interested to know the noble Lord’s response. Would he have felt comfortable about recommending a discharge to an indefinite TPIM when he was in that role? It would be a difficult thing for a Minister or a special adviser to do. If the orders had a natural time limit, that would not put people in such a difficult and invidious position.
The other point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was that excessive zeal can be counterproductive. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, also made the point when he drew an interesting parallel with the IPP regime and the importance of not taking away hope from people who are subject to orders, whether they be for imprisonment or a form of effectively indefinite house arrest. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, summed up these arrangements very well. He quoted the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who I remember well in the House, when he drew parallels with internment. In fact, I may have been here when he made that speech. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also quoted Jonathan Hall extensively when he said that there should at the very least be an upper limit to the time that a TPIM can be in place without a further court order.
For all these reasons, the amendments as put forward by the other speakers in this group are worthy of our support.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate on this group. Amendment 29, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would require the Home Secretary to secure the permission of the court before signing a TPIM extension notice. We do not think that that is a necessary amendment to the Bill. To demonstrate why, it might be helpful to the Committee if I explain first the process by which the Home Secretary considers whether a TPIM notice should be extended, a process that will remain in place after the removal of the time limit as proposed by the Bill. I hope that that provides some reassurance to the Committee both about the thorough consideration which goes into whether the continuation of a TPIM is necessary and about the robust judicial oversight that is already built into the process.
At this stage, I should say in response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which I was certainly hoping to treat as rhetorical but which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, rightly picked on, these are rightly not matters in which special advisers are involved. They are questions for the Secretary of State and Ministers.
When extending a TPIM, the Home Secretary will consider the Security Service’s assessment as to whether it remains necessary. It is true that significant weight is placed on the professionalism and expertise of the Security Service, but the process is not simply a tick box exercise. The Home Office routinely challenges the Security Service’s assessments to ensure that they are robust. The scrutiny is demonstrated by the public comments which have been made by successive former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, who, for instance, have noted that through the quarterly TPIM review group meetings all TPIM notices in force are reassessed, including whether the measures imposed or the TPIM notice itself are necessary and proportionate, and what the exit strategy is for the notice.
If the Home Secretary considers that the extension of a TPIM notice is necessary, she will then consider whether the current measures remain necessary and proportionate to restrict the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, or whether any of them need varying. To address the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, this can be in the form of a removal, a relaxation, or further restrictions.
This might be a good point to talk a little more about rehabilitation. To answer the question that the noble Baroness asked about whether somebody who has been subject to a TPIM could theoretically be subject to another, yes, they could, although that would have to rely on a separate national security case or evidence of terrorism-related activity. TPIMs are not designed as a tool of punishment; they are a tool of prevention and rehabilitation. Part of them involves encouraging subjects to attend what are known as desistence and disengagement programmes to assist with their rehabilitation and to turn them away from behaviour that leads them to be subjects of concern.
Decisions to extend a TPIM notice are not taken lightly but are based on detailed assessments by the Security Service and counterterrorism policing’s experience of managing the subject. The assessment that the Security Service provides will not only be based on the original national security case put forward for the imposition of the TPIM; it will also include the intelligence, both covert and overt, gathered over the course of the preceding 12 months. This could include evidence of further terrorism-related activity or non-compliance that does not reach the criminal threshold or which cannot be exhibited in open court. When extending a TPIM notice, the TPIM subject is invited to make representations before a decision is made. These are put before the Home Secretary.
As I outlined in our debate on the previous group, the 2011 Act established robust judicial oversight of the TPIM process. I will set out what that means. I hope to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on some of the existing safeguards. The court will consider at a permission hearing whether the Home Secretary’s initial decision to impose a TPIM was “obviously flawed” and will overturn a notice or its measures where that is the case. This is known as a Section 9 hearing. If I understand the amendment, this is a process that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord would like to see replicated when a notice is extended beyond a second year.
Section 16 of the TPIM Act provides an appeal route for TPIM subjects to challenge any refusal to vary their notice or to extend it, in addition to the Section 9 hearing. The in-built appeal route available through Section 16 makes it difficult to see in practice what the amendment would achieve in establishing an additional safeguard beyond that.
In addition to the Section 9 hearing and the Section 16 appeal process, the TPIM Act also requires the Home Secretary to keep under regular review the ongoing necessity of a TPIM notice under Section 11. This responsibility is also taken seriously. It is why the Home Office runs the quarterly TPIM review groups, where all TPIM subjects are discussed, including the notices to which they are subject and whether these remain proportionate and necessary.
I turn to Amendment 30, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I thank him for outlining it. His amendment would amend the 2011 Act so that a TPIM notice can be extended on “one or more” occasions if the conditions in Section 3 of that Act continue to be met. Currently, a TPIM notice can be extended only once and therefore has a maximum duration of two years. However, we respectfully disagree with the noble Lord on the need for his amendment. It would prevent a TPIM notice being renewed for as long as it is necessary for the purposes of public protection. Instead, it would set a new upper limit of four years. While we disagree with the noble Lord’s amendment, I should say at the outset that we support its principle in so far as it recognises that there are circumstances where it may be necessary to impose a TPIM beyond the current two-year limit, which the Government contend is too short.
There are several policy and operational justifications for Clause 38. First, experience has shown that there are TPIM subjects who pose an enduring risk beyond the two-year limit. This has meant that a new TPIM has had to be imposed after reaching the current limit and, as a consequence, a dangerous cliff edge has been created while the individual is at large in the community without the appropriate risk management tools in place before a new TPIM can be imposed. That has happened on more than one occasion. ACC Tim Jacques spoke to this risk when he gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee in another place.
My Lords, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, we believe that the existing TPIMs are sufficient and are at the limits of what a country that has a reputation for upholding human rights should tolerate. The extension proposed in Clause 40 would extend the requirement to remain at or within a specified residence from “overnight” to what could amount to total house arrest. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said, that is a requirement to remain at or within the specified residence between any hours. “As are specified” is yet another step too far, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger said.
On Amendment 31, I commend the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Bach, for their relentless attempts to get police and crime commissioners more involved in operational policing decisions, including operations that may have national security implications. I accept that stop and search may be considered controversial, but it does not involve issues of national security of this nature, and I am not convinced that their amendment is necessary or desirable in this case.
My Lords, we have had two different debates in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, moved that Clause 40 should not stand part of the Bill, and I can do no better than the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and his three questions, which I thought were very apposite and to the point. I will listen with interest to the Minister’s answers to those three questions.
My noble friends Lord Hunt and Lord Bach then spoke to their Amendment 31. As we have heard, the gist of the amendment is to formalise a relationship between the Secretary of State, PCCs and local chief constables to give more direct input by PCCs. In the words of my noble friend Lord Bach, PCCs are responsible for the “totality of policing” in their area. As we have heard, they are already involved in controversial matters such as stop and search and covert activities. Of course, I support my noble friends in trying to give the PCCs more formal involvement in TPIMs in their own areas.
I look forward to my noble friend Lord Bach playing a greater part in the proceedings of our House. He has for many years brought great insight into his many roles on the Front Bench, and occasionally on the Back Benches, but he will improve that even further when he comes back as a PCC. He may, of course, have to do extra time; we wait to see. I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say, and I will support my noble friends.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As some have remarked, Amendment 31 might have as easily sat in the previous group as this one. I turn first to that amendment, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of King’s Heath and Lord Bach. It aims to increase the oversight that local policing bodies, including police and crime commissioners, have of TPIM notices in their area. It would require the Home Secretary to notify the relevant local policing body when a TPIM notice is imposed in their area, and when a TPIM is withdrawn, ends or is relocated, so that it no longer falls within their area. It would also require the local policing body to provide six-monthly reports to the Home Secretary, which could include recommendations regarding variations to the TPIM and its continued necessity.
Because of the operational nature of the amendment and the impact that it would have on existing processes, officials at the Home Office have consulted colleagues in Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters on it, and they support our view that it is not needed in the Bill. Engagement with police forces is already an integral part of the TPIM regime. The Home Office works very closely with CT policing, both nationally via CTPHQ and with regional CT units, before a TPIM is imposed and during its lifetime, including regular engagement at quarterly TPIM review group meetings chaired by the Home Office. This well-established process ensures that TPIMs are imposed only following engagement with, and ultimately the consent of, the relevant local police force. This existing practice also means that local community impact assessments are kept up to date, which supports the effective and efficient management of the TPIM subject by the Home Office and operational partners.
Given the current close working relationship that we have with operational partners in the ongoing management of a TPIM subject, there is no need for the local policing body to produce six-monthly reports; review meetings are already in any event held at more regular intervals than the amendment would require reports to be written, and those meetings already consider the types of issue that the amendment is seeking to ensure are included in any report. The amendment would also distort existing roles and responsibilities; it would be inappropriate for the relevant local policing body or police and crime commissioner to put recommendations for varying a TPIM or its continued necessity directly to the Home Secretary. Those judgments are, quite rightly, led by the Home Office in conjunction with the Security Service, which makes fully informed recommendations based on its expert assessment of national security risk. Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I think the examples that noble Lords gave of stop and search and other decisions are in a different category from the imposition of a TPIM.
It is vital that TPIM oversight and management processes protect the highly classified information that flows through a TPIM regime, including the details of the TPIM subject and the underlying national security case against them. The Government, CTPHQ and the Security Service are concerned about how the amendment could work in practice with regard to sharing and disclosure of such highly sensitive information. The close working relationships already in place and well-tested processes on information-sharing between the Home Office, CT policing and the Security Service make it unnecessary.
I turn to Clause 40, which amends the existing overnight residence measure in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act to strengthen the ability of the Home Secretary to specify certain hours when a TPIM subject must remain at a specified residence. Taken literally, the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, would remove Clause 40 from the Bill altogether and prevent several operational benefits from being realised. That is why the Government cannot support it.
Having a residence measure at our disposal is vital in managing an individual of national security concern and the risk that they pose to the public. That has long been the case, but our engagement with operational partners has established that the existing overnight measure could and should be improved to allow for greater flexibility in the way in which it can be imposed—specifically, by introducing a requirement for a TPIM subject to remain within his or her residence at specific times during the day, as well as overnight, when this is assessed as necessary and proportionate to manage the risk that they pose. The updated residence measure that Clause 40 introduces will allow the Home Secretary to specify a period that could be longer than overnight or spilt into varying segments throughout a 24-hour period, if considered necessary.
My Lords, I have nothing of substance to add to the comments of the previous two speakers, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I, too, was going to raise the point made by the noble Lord about the right to silence of someone who is subject to a TPIM, as they are not convicted of an offence. The noble Baroness adequately covered the other points, so I have nothing more to add.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and brevity in this group so that we can make as much progress as possible. All these amendments are in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Clause 41 provides for the addition of a polygraph measure into Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011. Doing that will, in circumstances where it is assessed to be necessary and proportionate, help our operational partners to assess an individual’s compliance with his or her TPIM notice and support the decision-making on whether variations to the notice are required. That could include relaxations as well as restrictions.
As with all TPIM measures, polygraphs will not be mandatory for all TPIM subjects. I should like to reassure the Committee that we anticipate this measure being used sparingly, in a targeted and proportionate manner. Operational partners will consider its utility in relation to each TPIM subject on a case-by-case basis and make a recommendation to the Home Office for its imposition where appropriate.
By way of example, the results of a polygraph test may indicate that a TPIM subject is meeting someone whom he or she is prohibited from seeing for national security reasons at a particular location. While any findings from the polygraph test will be considered in the round by operational partners—that is, without an overreliance on the test findings and considered against other available information—the findings could inform a recommendation for the TPIM measures to be varied to restrict the subject from frequenting that specific location. The results could also be used to inform an assessment of whether a subject’s engagement with rehabilitation programmes under the TPIM notice is genuine.
We recognise that the prospect of polygraph testing understandably creates questions about the way in which information gleaned from tests may be used. That is precisely why we have taken steps to ensure that the wording of the clause is clear on that issue. The polygraph testing should only be carried out with a view to monitoring the individual’s compliance with other specified TPIM measures and assessing whether any variation of their measures is necessary. We have also specified that such information cannot be used in evidence against the individual in any criminal proceedings.
To further reassure the Committee of the steps that we are taking to ensure that this addition is both proportionate and considered, the clause sets out that the new measure will not be used unless and until the Home Office introduces regulations to make provision for the conduct of the polygraph sessions. Those regulations are likely to include detail, for example, on the qualifications and experience needed by polygraph operators and how records of the polygraph sessions should be kept, thereby ensuring transparency on how this measure will be applied in practice. The regulations would be laid before Parliament for scrutiny in the usual manner.
As with all other measures contained in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, this measure will not be imposed unless the Home Secretary reasonably considers it necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. It is important that we harness available technology and provide our operational partners with the tools necessary to protect the public, and that is what the clause will do.
Turning our attention to Amendment 30C, as I have set out, Clause 41 adds the new polygraph measure to the list of available measures in Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act. Following Royal Assent, if the polygraph measures are imposed, a TPIM subject will be required to undertake a polygraph test. Failure to do so would, to answer the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, be a breach of the TPIM measure. We appreciate the spirit in which the amendment has been tabled, but we respectfully disagree about the necessity of it. Condition D in Section 3(4) of the TPIM Act 2011 requires,
“that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual”
under a TPIM notice. In addition, Section 12(1)(c) of the TPIM Act requires,
“the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the variation is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.”
Therefore, all the measures imposed under a TPIM notice and any subsequent variation must be considered to be necessary for those purposes.
My Lords, our Amendment 30E relates to subjecting the subject of a TPIM to drug testing for class A and class B drugs only, at a police station by a constable only. I have rather different questions from those of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. The question I cannot find an answer to—and I cannot think of one myself—is, “Why?” One might cynically argue that a suspected terrorist high on cannabis might be too chilled out to conduct a terrorist attack; conversely, if the Government fear a suspected terrorist might do something stupid, for example being emboldened under the influence of a class A or class B drug, why not test for alcohol?
Bearing in mind the restrictions on the subject’s movements and communications and on who they can associate with, where do the Government think the subject of a TPIM will get his supply of class A or class B drugs? Indeed, if the subject is taking class A or class B drugs, under the noses of the police or security services, does this not raise questions about what else he might be getting his hands on, such as explosives? In short, what is the point, other than placing further restrictions, being even more intrusive and making the subject’s life even more difficult?
My Lords, I have nothing to add to the points made by the previous two speakers.
My Lords, through Clause 42 we are adding a new measure to the list of available measures in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011. If it is imposed, a TPIM subject would be required to submit to a drug test and provide a relevant sample.
Operational experience has shown that, in certain circumstances, drug use can exacerbate the risk of a subject engaging in terrorism-related activity. This new measure will support operational partners to mitigate this risk by confirming suspected drug use through a mandatory drug test and, where necessary, mandating attendance at rehabilitation programmes. They will want to follow up the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about where those drugs were obtained.
We consider this amendment unnecessary because the TPIM Act already contains robust safeguards regarding the imposition of all measures on TPIM subjects. Section 3 of the TPIM Act requires that at the point that a TPIM is first imposed the Home Secretary must reasonably consider that the TPIM notice and the measures specified within it are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. Section 12 of the TPIM Act also requires that variations of measures specified in an existing TPIM notice, which would include the imposition of a drug testing measure, cannot be made unless the Home Secretary reasonably considers that the variation is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.
Given that existing requirement, the amendment proposed does not go further than the safeguards already in place. Furthermore, the existing requirements of the TPIM Act, to which I have just referred, apply to all measures rather than being confined solely to the drug testing measure as this amendment has it. For those reasons, we invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, my Amendment 32 would put into legislation a deadline for the Prevent review to be published. The Government commissioned the independent review in January 2019; it has been repeatedly delayed and postponed. The initial statutory deadline of 12 August 2020 will now be missed. The Government say that they intend to have the report by the summer of this year, but they will not commit to putting a date in the Bill. We have long campaigned for a wide-ranging and robust review, which we believe is the right approach. This amendment would reinstate a statutory deadline for the independent Prevent review.
Amendment 33 takes a slightly different approach, which is to put in place a timetable. It would ensure that the Prevent review and any recommendations were laid within 12 months rather than 18 months, as the Bill currently states. This issue has been mentioned a number of times in Committee, and I think I can guess what the Minister is going to say in response to these amendments. Nevertheless, we need to be as confident as we can be that we can get this deadline and have a reasonable timetable, because it is important that we get these things right and that people can consider the effectiveness of the Prevent programme. I beg to move.
My Lords, I pay personal tribute to the stamina and persistence of my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Paddick. I pay tribute also to the Ministers. The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, came off the bench half way through the second half, and my noble friend Lord Paddick put up a high one, which unfortunately he dropped: the clash between the presumption of innocence and the requirement to answer a question in a polygraph, which I raised earlier. I was not satisfied with the answer that I got—that it is appropriate to question somebody after conviction, when they face a further term of imprisonment, without any form of caution. I do not think that our law is that they have to answer.
The Prevent strategy, with its statutory duty for schools, NHS trusts, prisons and local authorities to report concerns, has received much criticism. It is clear that it has not been thought fit for purpose in the Muslim community, which regards it, rightly or wrongly, as discriminatory. A lack of trust leads to a lack of co-operation. Consequently, the Government should accept the burden of completing at the earliest opportunity the review that they have announced. Deadlines have already been passed. I have no wish to go into the appointments that have been made save to wonder to what extent those who are immediately affected by the strategy have been involved.
My Lords, both amendments in this group would add a new statutory deadline for the completion of the independent review of Prevent. I certainly share the Committee’s firm commitment to the success of that independent review. It was clear in this short but important debate that our common objective is for a thorough and effective review to take place—one that will help us to learn how best to safeguard those who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.
However, we must allow the new reviewer sufficient time to conduct such a thorough and effective review. These amendments would limit his options for reasonable flexibility, shorten the timeframe that he is given and put at risk his ability to do his job properly.
As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, the review restarted two weeks ago, on 26 January, with the appointment of William Shawcross as the new independent reviewer. Our aim has been for the review to be completed by no later than August this year, but we will agree the precise timetable with Mr Shawcross shortly. We want to enable him to complete the review as swiftly as possible while affording him the consideration that his important task requires.
Of course, the uncertainties posed by the ongoing pandemic, such as the prospect of further ongoing restrictions on travel and face-to-face meetings, could, self-evidently, have implications for the reviewer, as well as for his team and all those who wish to provide input into the review. I am afraid that we therefore have to consider the potential impact of that on his ability to take evidence, including the vital work of engaging with different parts of the community. As the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Paddick, highlighted, that work is vital, as is, for example, the reviewer witnessing for himself Prevent delivery in action so that he can deliver the thorough and evidence-based review, with practical recommendations for improvement, that we would like.
The Government believe that August this year is achievable, but this is of course dependent on the views of the new reviewer. He is independent, so I cannot speak for him at the Dispatch Box. We therefore recommend that the legislation affords the reviewer flexibility, should he feel that he needs it, to ensure that the valuable work of this review is not undermined. But we certainly hear what all noble Lords have said about the urgency, and I hope that they can hear that we share that. For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, for the rhetorical flourish at the end of his speech, when he said that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, had been asking, “Why?”, on many of the previous groups. In his speech today, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas asked, “When will we get the Prevent review deadline?”
The Minister gave his reasons for putting Mr Shawcross in place. He has been in place for only two weeks and I understand that the Government have had problems in getting this review off the ground. I will not take a partisan view. I do not think that the amendment in my name is better than the one in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but it is important to try to get a realisable date or timetable in the Bill so that the Government are held to that.
I will withdraw my amendment, but we might come back with a similar one at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendments 37 and 40 concern “lone terrorists” and the review of the strategy concerning them. Amendment 37 ensures that the Government will order a judge-led review into the effectiveness of current strategies to deal with lone terrorists, including, but not limited to, current “counter-terrorism policy” and “sentencing policy”. My right honourable friend Nick Thomas-Symonds has called for such a review, following the shocking and tragic incident in Reading on Saturday 20 June 2020, which was the third time in seven months that such devastation caused by a lone attacker has been seen on UK streets.
The review would undertake an assessment of the systemic response needed to address this threat, building on prior research and expertise. It would include an analysis of various public services: probation services, prisons, mental health services, housing providers and local authorities. Professor Ian Acheson, who completed a report for a Conservative Government, said last year:
“Our unsafe prisons provide a fertile breeding ground in which predators, peddling extremist and violent ideologies, can prey upon the vulnerable, creating significant risks to national security and the public at large.”
What steps are the Government taking to put forward a deradicalisation strategy in the prisons?
Amendment 40 looks at MAPPA—multiagency public protection arrangements—and its purpose is to encourage the Government to define which agencies are included within them. I have received a short briefing on this from Napo, and the point that the probation officers make is that the input into the MAPPA arrangements varies according to the individuals one is dealing with: it may be local faith-based groups, housing providers, social services, education providers or substance misuse agencies—a multitude of organisations could be called on to work within the MAPPA system. In this example—and, I have to say, in all examples that I have come across—the system is all about integrated working, and it would be helpful if the Government could offer some perspective on the agencies that they think should be working within the MAPPA system. I beg to move.
My Lords, the lone terrorist poses a particular danger. “We do not understand them,” said the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, earlier this afternoon. By definition, the lone terrorist is not engaged in communications of any nature that could lead to his apprehension through ordinary surveillance methods and techniques. His motivation may be obscure and entirely personal to himself.
Nevertheless, he can cause huge and unexpected damage, as we saw in the London Bridge episode in Fishmongers’ Hall. In that case, the attacker had been released in the belief that he was no longer a danger to the public—yet, without any obvious motivation, he launched himself against those who were trying to help him.
I support Amendment 37, on the basis that public safety demands that we burrow down into the causes and motivations of the lone actor. The threat to public safety is such that the appointment of a judge, with all the powers that a Supreme Court judge has, is very appropriate.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, continues to prove himself doughty in the face of technological challenges, and I am happy to address the question he would have asked in the previous group. He makes a valid point about the much longer timeframe proposed in his amendment, which we debated in that group. As I said, however, because Mr Shawcross is an independent reviewer, I cannot speak for him at the Dispatch Box. We must speak to him and see what he feels is the timeframe he needs. If we are able to have that conversation and he feels able to give a view before Report stage, we will of course come back and report it, but it is for the independent reviewer to make his assessment of how long he needs to do the thorough job required, as I hope the noble Lord will understand.
Turning now to this group, Amendment 37 would require the Home Secretary to commission a new, judge-led review of the effectiveness of the Government’s strategy to deal with lone-actor terrorists. While I welcome the constructive spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, tabled this amendment, I must respectfully disagree over the need to add it to the Bill.
I reassure the noble Lord that a great deal of work is already under way to combat the terrorist threat, including that posed by lone actors. My right honourable friend the Security Minister talked in some detail about this in a speech he gave at RUSI in November last year—particularly the term “lone actor” itself. If the noble Lord has not seen it, it is well worth reading. I would be very happy to provide noble Lords with a copy of that speech if they would like it.
The Government have been clear that we will not hesitate to act where necessary. Following the attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, we brought forward legislation to address flaws in the way terrorist offenders were managed. The legislation we are now debating marks the largest overhaul of terrorist sentencing in decades. It follows on from the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which came into force in February last year. That Act was, as noble Lords will remember, emergency legislation. One of its effects was to prevent around 50 terrorist prisoners being automatically released after serving only half their sentence, by amending their release point to at least two-thirds of their sentence and ensuring they are released only after an assessment by the Parole Board.
Following the attack at Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019, the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary commissioned Jonathan Hall QC to carry out an independent review of the effectiveness of the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements, or MAPPA, when it comes to the management of terrorism, terrorist connections and offenders of terrorism concern in the community. MAPPA is the process through which the police, the Prison Service and the probation service work together and with other agencies—including children’s services, adult social services, health trusts and authorities, and youth offending teams—to protect the public by managing the risks posed by violent and sexual offenders living in the community.
That review found that MAPPA is a well-established process, and Mr Hall did not conclude that wholesale change is necessary. He made a number of recommendations on how the management of terrorists can be improved. In response to the review, the Government will shortly be bringing forward policing and crime legislation implementing a number of his recommendations, including new powers of premises and personal search, and an urgent power of arrest for counterterrorism policing.
This ongoing work builds on the response to the 2017 attacks. Three of the attacks in 2017 were carried out by lone actors, as was the attack in Reading, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, reminds us, which we sadly saw more recently. In 2018, the Government published a strengthened counterterrorism strategy, known as Contest, following operational improvement reviews overseen by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. As part of that strategy we have piloted new multiagency approaches at the local level—in London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester—to enable MI5 and counterterrorism policing to share more information with a broader range of partners, including government departments, the devolved Administrations and local authorities. This has enabled us to identify, mitigate and disrupt threats earlier. Our superb police, and security and intelligence agencies work around the clock to keep us safe: they have disrupted 27 terrorist plots since 2017.
There are now more than 20 government departments and agencies involved in the delivery of Contest, and we have worked to build strong relationships with the private sector, the third sector and the wider public. We will continue to invest in these relationships and drive greater integration, recognising that to reduce the risk of terrorism we need not only a whole-of-Government but a whole-of-society approach. In the context of the wide-ranging work already under way and recently completed, the Government do not consider that the noble Lord’s amendment is needed.
I turn now to Amendment 40. This proposed new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay a report within 12 months of the Bill being passed, defining which agencies are included within MAPPA for the purposes of managing terrorist offenders. The agencies included in MAPPA are already listed in Section 325 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As has been mentioned already, these include criminal justice agencies such as the police and the probation service, as well as other agencies, including mental health services, social services and NHS England. These agencies are placed under a statutory obligation to work together to assess and manage the risk presented by serious offenders.
Moreover, agencies with a legal duty to co-operate with MAPPA must have regard to statutory guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice. This guidance, which also sets out which agencies must co-operate, is publicly available. Agencies that do not have a statutory duty to co-operate with MAPPA are not obliged to engage. There are, however, no barriers in place to prevent this engagement for the purposes of assessing and managing the risks presented by serious offenders. It is our belief that the right agencies already have a duty to co-operate in place, and, as such, they are listed publicly in the Criminal Justice Act.
I have already mentioned Jonathan Hall’s recent review of MAPPA. On the question of the identity of the agencies involved in MAPPA, he raised no issues. He did, however, raise questions about the way in which MAPPA agencies share information with each other, and the Government have confirmed in our response to his review that we will clarify the position in upcoming legislation to put the matter beyond doubt. We believe, therefore, that since this knowledge is already publicly available and enshrined in legislation, there is no need for this amendment. I hope the noble Lord agrees and that he will be willing to withdraw it.
My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken on this short group of amendments. The Minister offered to send the RUSI speech of his friend, which I would indeed be happy to read. The gist of his comments on Amendment 37 was that a judge-led review is not needed because there are other government reviews currently under way. I hear what he says, but I will reflect on the view he expresses.
On Amendment 40, he listed the statutory bodies that are required to co-operate with MAPPA, but I thought it was interesting that the list he read out was a much shorter list than the one I got from the probation officers, who said it was very important to go wider than the short list he mentioned and include, for example, local faith-based groups, education providers and third sector substance misuse agencies. Those sorts of agencies may well be very useful and informative for the MAPPA system. I hear what the noble Lord says about Jonathan Hall and the plan to help the different MAPPA agencies co-operate with each other, which must be the right way to proceed. I will reflect on what he said, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support both these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has had a long-standing interest in these matters, as he explained to the Committee, and he spoke with great authority, as he usually does. He also explained that he had had recent conversations with the Minister, Victoria Atkins, and I was pleased that he explained that she is taking this problem very seriously.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, gave a very sobering medical explanation of brain damage and brain injury. In my understanding, she said it is a difficult thing to assess, but it is a very real issue. I too got the review of the Disabilities Trust report on Drake Hall from 2016-18, and we have heard a number of the statistics from the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.
One particular statistic that was not repeated, and which I thought was particularly revealing, was that 33% of women with a brain injury sustained their injury before committing their first offence. That shows that brain injury can, and often does, lead to life-changing behaviours, which can and do mean that, disproportion-ately, people with brain injuries end up in prison—both women and men.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, did not actually say that this was a probing amendment, but whether or not it is, I am happy to support it. I hope to hear from the Minister that the Government are taking these sources of injury and changes in behaviour very seriously within the prison estate.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for setting out the case for these amendments, which, as he explained, follow similar suggestions from Chris Bryant MP when the Bill was debated in another place. I am pleased that my honourable friend the Minister for Safeguarding was able to meet Mr Bryant and the noble Lord, and that their discussions were—as the noble Lord said—helpful.
Amendment 155 seeks to introduce screening for acquired brain injury for female victims of domestic abuse within two weeks of a domestic abuse charge being made, including those victims to be protected by a domestic abuse protection order. Amendment 156 seeks to introduce screening for brain injury for all female prisoners within two weeks of starting their sentence, with a subsequent assessment to take place if an injury is found.
I say from the outset that we want to make sure that we provide healthcare and support that meets the specific needs of all victims of domestic abuse, and female offenders too, including those with acquired brain injury. We have carefully considered these amendments, and while we appreciate their overarching intent, we feel that legislating would not be the appropriate course of action. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, set out clearly the clinical difficulties that would be involved if we were to put this in the Bill.
The National Health Service is there to provide appropriate care and treatment for everyone who needs it, based on clinical need. This key principle on which the NHS operates means that anyone who needs a certain diagnostic test based on clinical need should receive it. The healthcare needs of victims of domestic abuse will vary greatly based on their individual circumstances and experiences but, if they need urgent assessment or treatment, they will receive this from the National Health Service.
Moreover, as we have heard throughout the scrutiny of the Bill so far, domestic abuse can manifest itself in many ways, including—as in the group of amendments we have just discussed—through coercive control or financial abuse, and it would be inappropriate to invite victims of these forms of domestic abuse for brain injury screening. That is why we do not consider that testing all female victims of domestic abuse, as this amendment suggests, would be an effective use of NHS resources or provide the personalised care they need.
Nevertheless, we believe that improvements can be made to existing screening processes through non-legislative measures. I will provide some background to that. All people entering prison receive an early health assessment within the first 24 hours. This initial assessment is comprehensive so that their health needs can be identified and addressed at an early stage. It includes a standard requirement to undertake a screening questionnaire for head injury and loss of consciousness, which focuses on issues with memory or concentration. As noble Lords have said, these can be important signs.
We acknowledge that more could be done during this screening process to identify and address specific circumstances where head injury or loss of consciousness has resulted from domestic abuse. I am pleased to say that NHS England and NHS Improvement have confirmed that they would be happy to add further questions to the existing screening tool to ascertain, where an acquired brain injury has been identified, whether that acquired brain injury occurred as a result of physical injury related to domestic abuse, sexual violence or another form of abuse.
The national screening tool is reviewed and updated by NHS England and NHS Improvement on an annual basis to allow for any changes in NICE guidance or any recommendations arising from a coroner’s report to prevent future deaths. To amend the existing screening tool, NHS England and NHS Improvement will need to agree the precise questions to be asked and how these will be reported. I am pleased to say that the initial screening questions on domestic violence and the coding that is required have already been agreed and will be implemented by April this year.
Alongside this, NHS England and NHS Improvement are continuing to work with the Disabilities Trust on a training package for healthcare practitioners to increase effectiveness when supporting people with impaired neurological functioning, either as a result of domestic abuse or for other reasons, and also to support them by providing practical steps to those working with patients and self-help tools for the patients themselves to reduce and overcome the impact of any brain injury.
In so far as Amendment 155 seeks to link screening to the making of a domestic abuse protection order, it is important to recognise that, like other protective orders, these are designed to impose requirements on the perpetrator. They cannot impose requirements on the person to be protected by the order, such as requiring them to undertake a screening for an acquired brain injury.
We will, however, use the statutory guidance to the police to recommend that they refer victims to an independent domestic violence adviser, or another specialist advocate, who will be able to advise victims of their options on a whole range of issues, including healthcare. In addition, we will include information on where to go to seek medical attention in the advice materials provided to victims which we will be producing ready for the pilots of the orders.
I hope that these non-legislative measures reassure the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that we are acting to support women with acquired brain injury and that putting this in the Bill is therefore not necessary. I am glad to repeat our thanks to him and to Mr Bryant for the discussions we have had on this important issue. I hope that the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw his amendment.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that the Committee will allow me to take a moment to thank the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for their very warm words of welcome, which I appreciate.
Amendment 1 is a minor technical amendment that removes references to offences in the Space Industry Act 2018 from Schedule 17A to the Sentencing Code, which deals with serious terrorism offences. References to those offences will instead be inserted, on their commencement, by Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 so that they are dealt with consistently by that Act. I beg to move.
My Lords, I understand from the Minister that this is a minor amendment. I too welcome him to his position. He has been very helpful to me both on this Bill and on the Domestic Abuse Bill, with which we are dealing almost simultaneously. I have a couple of minor questions for him. First, what would happen if this amendment were not put in place? How would that have affected the position, and what could the consequences have been? Secondly, what level of consultation has he done externally to ensure consistency in Sentencing Codes and parliamentary Acts?
My Lords, I am grateful for the words of the noble Lord. To answer his two questions, I say that this is essentially a tidying-up matter because of the different pace of legislation going through Parliament at the moment. The question of what would happen if this amendment were not made is an interesting one. At the very least we would be left with inelegant legislation, and I know from my previous incarnation that inelegant legislation is bad for Parliament but very good for lawyers, so let us try to make it as elegant as we can while we are at it. Much of the consultation on this matter preceded my involvement in this Bill and indeed my introduction to this House, but I am aware that there has been very significant consultation. Of course, if the noble Lord wishes to raise any particular points with me, my door is always open to him.
My Lords, I am always intrigued by the thought processes that must be brought into play in fixing a minimum sentence in a Bill. I would like the Minister to outline what consultation there has been concerning the minimum sentence of 14 years for a young offender between the ages of 18 and 21—a “no-hope sentence”, as my noble friend Lord Marks described it a moment ago, and I completely concur with everything that he said. I cannot imagine that it is a Minister who initially chooses the minimum number of years for imprisonment. Somebody in the Ministry of Justice must have drunk his cup of coffee and plumped for a figure to put in for the Minister to sign off on. I do not suppose he will ever have met a young offender—“Let’s just say 14 years sounds good.”
I want to contrast this with the role of a sentencing judge whose sentencing discretion is not bound by statute. The judge sitting in a serious case of terrorism would not be there if he had not had a lifetime of experience in the criminal courts, developing his instinct and his trained capacity to weigh the seriousness of one case against another. Other experienced practitioners and academics who have studied criminology have provided the judge with sentencing guidelines. They give him a guide to the accepted range and indicate what aggravating or mitigating factors he should have in mind. In addition, the judge will have the benefit of counsel’s submissions and a probation report from an experienced officer that will give him an insight into the background of the defendant. There may also be medical reports and, sometimes, witnesses prepared to speak up on the young man’s behalf.
This clause introduces an arbitrary minimum sentence as the guideline unless there are “exceptional circumstances”. There are no guidelines as to what those exceptional circumstances are: if the past is any guide, we will have to wait for the Court of Appeal to lay them down. The minimum sentence is chosen by a civil servant who, in all probability, has never been inside a court. So we get an arbitrary 14-year minimum sentence and an arbitrary seven years on licence. What is the evidence that this is the correct balance? Who said that? Why cannot a judge be left to do his job?
It seems to me that the only purpose of a minimum sentence is to make a single day’s headlines to the effect that the Government are being tough on crime, and specifically on terrorism. There is no question of looking at the individual who is before the court, and considering his future, his welfare, his rehabilitation or whatever. In putting forward this amendment, my noble friend is testing the rationale for the balance in the Bill, and I look forward to a full exposition from the Minister in due course.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, concluded his remarks by saying that the amendment was “testing the rationale” of these sentences, and that is indeed clearly the case. The first amendment reduces the minimum term in custody and the second increases the period on licence. Both the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Marks, referred to these as “no-hope sentences”. I understand the sentiment they expressed on these extremely long and very serious sentences being given to children—but they are not really no-hope sentences, are they? YOT and, more likely, probation and the Prison Service will have been working with these people for many years to give them hope that, when they get out of prison and are on licence and, eventually, off licence, they can go on to lead a constructive life.
Now this is a very tall hurdle. I understand that; we are dealing with the most serious sentences that one can imagine. Nevertheless, that is the role of probation and it is very important, I would say, for the young person to see that there is hope at the end of the period, because it is far more likely that, if they see that hope, they will engage constructively with people in prison and carry on that constructive intervention when they leave on licence. So I have some questions for the Minister. What assessment has been done of the likelihood of reform of offenders—is there any data on that? Also, what is the number of young offenders now in custody who are likely to be in custody as a result of this legislation? Are there any examples of where longer custodial sentences have helped young people to go on to lead lives in which they no longer offend?
My Lords, it is a privilege to stand and answer points made by the noble Lords who have spoken. I first acknowledge their great experience and wisdom in the field, and the evident compassion that underpinned their observations to the Committee. I know that at least two of them have had the experience that I have of acting for a very young person charged with a crime of the greatest magnitude and severity. I can tell from the way in which their questions were framed that they are aware of the extreme sadness at the loss of potential that the advocate finds when acting for a person in such a position. I hope that noble Lords appreciate that I am fully aware, from the perspective of legislation, of the awkwardness and difficulties attendant upon arriving at an appropriate sentence for these most serious of crimes.
[Inaudible]—is in relation to the necessity for the judge at trial to have full discretion in passing sentence. I do not wish to repeat that, but I will add a particular comment. When a judge is faced with a provision such as this, he has to define those circumstances which influence him. He has to set out in his sentencing remarks precisely what factors influence him. Things have moved very considerably over the decades away from the swift disposal of a defendant by a judge with very little comment. What he says is important not just for the defendant to understand why he is being sentenced in that way but of course, if there should be any appeal on sentence, for the Court of Appeal to understand precisely what it was at the time that the judge had in mind. “Exceptional” circumstances is too great an imposition on the judge’s discretion and I believe that my noble friend’s proposal that it should be “significant” is right.
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Thomas, have explained their thinking behind the amendment to replace “exceptional” with “significant” to give more discretion to the judge. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said, in any event a judge will explain the reason for finding exceptional or significant reasons for reducing a sentence.
My questions are for the Minister. What does he believe are exceptional circumstances, and what exceptional circumstances would justify a lesser sentence? In what circumstances would such lesser sentences be appropriate?
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, explained, this amendment seeks to amend and change the circumstances in which a sentencing court could impose less than the 14-year minimum term for a discretionary life sentence imposed in a serious terrorism case by changing the circumstances from “exceptional” to “significant”. I respectfully agree with the noble Lord that the logic of his amendment would also apply to Clause 4. However, I respectfully disagree over whether such an amendment is appropriate.
The purpose of Clause 11 is to ensure a consistency of approach when sentencing those convicted of serious terrorism offences. It would not be appropriate for a court to be able to impose a life sentence with a lower minimum term for a serious terrorism offence other than where there are exceptional circumstances. If the circumstances of the offence and offending are such that the court imposes a life sentence, and unless there are exceptional circumstances, there should be no possibility of the offender being released earlier than someone given a serious terrorism sentence. That is what Clause 11 achieves.
By contrast, the amendment would remove that consistency, so that the court could consider a wider range of circumstances when setting the minimum term in a discretionary life sentence than when doing so for a serious terrorism sentence, although all other circumstances would be the same. While I accept that there is a distinction, in that the prisoner serving a life sentence may be considered for release only after the minimum term is served, it would be unprincipled for him or her to be released earlier than a counterpart serving a serious terrorism sentence.
A number of questions were asked about “exceptional circumstances”. That is a principle already established in sentencing legislation. It is used, for example, in connection with minimum terms that can apply to certain firearm offences. I must respectfully decline the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for a Minister to gloss from the Dispatch Box what “exceptional circumstances” might or might not be. It is a phrase used elsewhere in statute and known in law. Those are straightforward English words and it would not be appropriate or even helpful for me to gloss them on my feet at the Dispatch Box.
By contrast, I respectfully point out to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that as far as my research has indicated—I am happy to be corrected if I am wrong—there is no existing “significant circumstances” principle in sentencing legislation. Therefore, if accepted, the amendment would create an entirely new test, which in our view is unwarranted and likely to lead to litigation, which cannot be in our interests as parliamentarians in passing this Bill.
As far as the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is concerned on judicial discretion, we are really talking about the extent of the judicial discretion and whether the test should be “exceptional” or “significant” circumstances. The question is not to the existence but to the extent of judicial discretion. As part of the Government’s recent White Paper, A Smarter Approach to Sentencing, we have committed to changing the criteria for other minimum terms for repeat offences to reduce the occasions on which the court may depart from the minimum custodial length.
For those reasons, I do not consider the amendment to be necessary or appropriate, and I respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.
My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to his first Bill. In my limited contact with him, I think that he is more than a match for the challenge the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, alluded to. I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, in his assessment of the current dangers of longer prison sentences in the absence of an effective programme of deradicalisation and rehabilitation. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, also mentioned the comments of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. His concerns seem to chime with the concerns of all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I do not share the faith that noble Lords have in polygraph testing, for the reasons explained earlier by Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee rightly expressed concerns that prisons continue to be incubators, hothouses, or academies of crime—use which term you will—for crime generally, as well as places where vulnerable inmates are radicalised, whether by right wing extremists or by others. If ever there was evidence of the need for these amendments, it is what the Government describe as the
“range of tailored interventions available”—[Official Report, 21/9/20; col. 1650]
to the perpetrators of the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham atrocities, that were designed to deradicalise and rehabilitate them while they were in prison. Unless and until the deradicalisation and rehabilitation of offenders is effectively applied to those sentenced under Part 1 of the Bill, and its impact is assessed, there is a real danger that the longer these terrorist offenders spend in prison, the greater the threat they pose to the safety of the public—whether by radicalising others in prison or directly upon their release. I intend to expand on these statements and the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, which I agree with, when we come to the group beginning with Amendment 16.
My Lords, my Amendment 35 is in this group. I agreed with everything my noble friend Lord Hunt said when he introduced his amendment. My amendment is different in detail, but the overall approach is the same—that is, to have a realistic and timed review of the various approaches to the Prevent programme which the Government is embarking upon.
I got an interesting briefing on this debate from the probation officers’ trade union, Napo. It made a couple of points, which I will repeat. It said that in the offender management and custody model, it indicates that a high-risk offender should get one hour of individual contact per month with a probation officer. A probation office’s staff have a minimum of 70 clients, so it is impossible for them to meet that requirement. The central point that Napo made in the briefing was that, when one reviews approaches and puts down procedures, the reviews need to result in practical change on the ground, otherwise they are destined to be repeated without effective change.
I was very interested to hear the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who was a very effective Minister. He talked about his experience in that role. He also, interestingly, talked about the status of prisoners when they are in prison. I occasionally visit prisons, and I have visited Belmarsh on a couple of occasions. Belmarsh is a prison within a prison and there is undoubtedly status for the people on the inside prison; you can tell it from the tone of voice of the prison officers when they talk about the facility they are involved in managing. There is status to be gained through the way you are treated while in prison. I unfortunately know that to be true through friends of friends whose children have ended up in prison. There is a status to be gained within prison, which sometimes young men cannot have when they are outside prison.
I welcome the review of terrorism legislation by Mr Hall. I also note that it is Mr William Shawcross who has been appointed to review the Prevent programme, and I know he has extensive experience on this matter. The purpose of both these amendments is to tease out the progress and practical changes which the Government hope to make through reviewing the Prevent programme.
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their amendments, which bring us to a very important set of issues. I discern that the Committee is united in believing that data is necessary in order that we might, as much as possible, develop and devise schemes by which deradicalisation can be accomplished. The Government do not think that a new strategy for rehabilitation and disengagement nor a review of the current delivery is beneficial at this time. However, to reassure noble Lords, I want to briefly set out the important work being done in prisons and probation to turn terrorist offenders away from extremism so that they can be released safely. The Government have a clear strategy for rehabilitation programmes for terrorist offenders. The important work in prison and probation here delivers against the Contest strategy, which was recently refreshed and published. Since then, significant work has been done to strengthen our approach to rehabilitation and disengagement of terrorism offenders. This strategy applies to all terrorism offenders, not only those who will receive the new serious terrorism sentence or be subject to the changes made by Part 1 of the Bill.
My Lords, by coincidence I am once again following the noble Lord, Lord Naseby. I would remind him that there have been high-risk periods before. His words reminded me of the Brighton bomb case, in which I took a part. The person I represented had been involved in a bombing campaign that covered some 28 seaside resorts, and the Brighton bomb case was the final one. When I look at Clause 31, I reflect on that case, because that clause, like the other clauses we are dealing with, is the one which says that there should be no parole for terrorism offences committed in Northern Ireland. In the Brighton bomb case, those who were convicted and sent to prison within weeks of the Belfast agreement were returned to Northern Ireland to serve out their sentences there—and within a very short time they were released. We have faced problems like this before.
The benefits of a two-thirds release system have been outlined by previous speakers: they encourage people to behave while in prison and to engage in deradicalisation and rehabilitation courses. That is done to persuade the Parole Board that the individual is safe to be released—to advance by hope and decrease hopelessness, as my noble friend Lord Marks put it. The Parole Board ought to have a role in this, and I was impressed by the views expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that perhaps the Parole Board should at least have a role in advising on the conditions of release as opposed to the governor taking on the role, as is being proposed.
There are dangers in automatic release at the end of a sentence. No doubt the full sentence has been completed, but the automatic release at the end of that time without any Parole Board involvement is a danger, as my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, have argued. I do not think that the solutions that have been developed and put into the Bill are necessarily the right ones, so I support my noble friend in his attempt to have these clauses removed.
My Lords, we have had interesting debates on both this and the previous group. In closing the previous group, the Minister said that the proposed lack of involvement of the probation service in this particular group of prisoners was a consequence of the sentencing structure and was not a reflection on the Parole Board itself. I understand the point he has made, but what has been said repeatedly on both groups is that there is expertise in the Parole Board. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer asked whether there were two elements here. One is the possibility of early release, while the second is a point raised again just now by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about the conditions of release for a prisoner who has served their whole term. I do not understand why that level of expertise should not be accessed when considering these types of prisoners.
I shall make a couple of other brief points which are different from those which have been made by other noble Lords. They arise from briefings that I have had from the trade unions. The Prison Officers’ Association believes that removing hope from prisoners puts its staff at risk. It is a point that the association makes repeatedly and is an important one to feed into this debate. The second point has been made by the National Association of Probation Officers—that is that the workload of probation staff working on the ground in prisons is so high that they are not managing to deliver to their required standards. They are being allocated around 70 prisoners each. I understand that the Minister has talked about these various programmes, and I know that we are talking about a very extreme group of prisoners. Nevertheless there is the practical working position of prison officers, probation staff and others in prisons to consider in trying to make these institutions work and to reduce recidivism when prisoners are released.
Even so, both the group of amendments we are speaking to now and the previous group illustrate the potential for changing the Bill to bring the Parole Board back in. That would reduce the potential risk to the public.
My Lords, the Committee will appreciate that there is a significant overlap between this and the previous group. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and indeed no other participant in this debate, will regard it as discourteous if on some occasions I take as read, as it were, points that I made in the previous debate. If the Committee finds it helpful, I propose to say a few words about each of the clauses and schedules to which objection has been taken and then come back to address some of the particular points raised by participants in the debate.
My Lords, I will be very brief on this amendment. The two previous groups have been groups of substance, and serious questions have been asked about the way forward. The amendment in my name would create provisions for a review of whether the removal of the Parole Board from considering certain types of terrorist offences leads to bad behaviour. That is a central point in many ways in the last two groups, but it has also been mentioned as an issue in many of the amendments that we have discussed today. I beg to move.
My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to our House. It is brave of him to start his parliamentary career in your Lordships’ House by going up against so many noble and learned Lords. It is going to be absolutely fascinating watching that.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for bringing this amendment. I wish I had signed it, because it is very good. It is about whether we want to rehabilitate prisoners and bring them back into society or just want them to rot away and hope they disappear.
I am sure noble Lords will know that the new independent reviewer of Prevent has been announced. It is William Shawcross, whom I do not know at all. As somebody who is a critic of Prevent—I have seen the good and the bad in it—I would say that the optics are not good. Having a white man from Eton and Oxford is possibly not the message that this Government should be sending out when you have critics of a programme that could have been fantastic.
I saw one case of a Prevent programme—in Birmingham, I think—where a young man had been recovered, or rehabilitated, from a radical programme. He had been a right-wing activist, but he responded to being found a job and a house. I am not saying it is always this easy, but rehabilitation was based on taking him out of poverty and deprivation. That is something that we do not see enough of.
However, to return to the amendment, it would require the Government to review the situation and report to Parliament, and I support it very strongly.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. First, turning to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, as a fellow layman I thought she gave a good summary of rehabilitation. I see rehabilitation as three things: to have something to do with your time, so either a job or education; to have a roof over your head; and to have stable relationships. Stable relationships are very important in all our lives. The problem we may be dealing with regarding this particular category of prisoners is stable relationships which are not conducive to people not reoffending. Nevertheless, I appreciated the noble Baroness’s contribution.
Both the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Paddick, spoke about the principles of some sort of review. The Times article that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to reminded me of two or three visits I have made to prison gyms over the years. Absolutely invariably, I have been told by the officers who manage the prison gyms that there is never any trouble in a prison gym. That is because the prisoners know that that would be the first privilege they would lose, which they do not want to lose. So prison gyms, from what I have been told, are trouble-free areas.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, gave quite a lengthy answer to my amendment. He described it as potentially counterfactual and impractical. I will have to read properly what he said. However, he slightly mitigated his view on the amendment by saying that he was happy to consider any further submissions I might make. I therefore know there is a potential open door for a later-stage amendment, and with that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my contribution concerns both practicalities and the principle of the courts charge. I remind the House that I sit as a lay magistrate in central London. I agree with everything that has been said by the previous speakers. I shall avoid going over examples already given but shall walk through two simple sentencing exercises that illustrate the points with which we are dealing.
If an offender pleads guilty to a summary offence in a magistrates’ court, a band A fine is given. If he is on average income, that fine will be £150. That is at the discretion of magistrates. In addition, there are CPS costs of £85, the imposition of which is, again, discretionary. After that, there is the government surcharge or the victim surcharge of £20, which is mandatory. Then there is the new courts charge of £150, which is mandatory. The total is £405. In this example, 37% is the fine and 37% is the courts charge.
In the same circumstances, if the offender is on benefits the balance changes. The fine is £40, the CPS cost is £85, the government surcharge is £20 and the courts charge is again £150. The total is £295. In this example the fine for an offender on benefits is 14% of the total figure but the courts charge is half. This is a common type of fine given in the magistrates’ courts. The courts charge is clearly unjust on this consideration alone.
We have heard how unhappy magistrates are and we have heard about the resignations and retirements—and I personally know a couple of magistrates who have retired. However, it is not unusual for magistrates, and I am sure judges as well, to combine competing principles when they make decisions on sentences. We have the principle of totality when we are making a sentence—that is, what is the bottom line? Of course, we have to come up with a total sentence that is fair in all circumstances. But the competing principle is the advice that we get from our justices’ clerks, who are in turn advised by the Justices’ Clerks’ Society, whose advice to us is that we should sentence and then, after the sentence, add in an administrative charge, which is the courts charge. Clearly those two pieces of advice are in contradiction but, in the privacy of the retiring room, magistrates may look at the matters over which they have discretion. I was disturbed to hear about the case in the Independent this morning, where magistrates said that they actually reduced compensation. I believe that that is absolutely wrong, but it is within the power of the magistrates to reduce compensation to reflect the totality of the sentence that they are giving. When the Minister comes to wind up, I am sure that he will remind the House that it is open to magistrates to give an absolute discharge or “one day deemed served”. I and all magistrates in exceptional circumstances use those types of sentences, but it is absolutely wrong to use them as a way in which to circumnavigate the courts charge.
Noble Lords have spoken about the possibility of people changing their plea to guilty to avoid the courts charge. I understand that it is early to get a statistical basis for that, even though a number of anecdotes say that that is what defendants are doing. But it is worth reminding the House of the totality of the situation. We have already heard that the sentence itself can be reduced by up to 30% if somebody pleads guilty at the first opportunity. In addition, the costs asked for by the CPS will be much lower if somebody pleads guilty at the first opportunity, rather than going through trial. Admittedly, this is a discretionary amount, but the amount asked for will be much lower on behalf of the CPS. On top of that, you have the mandatory courts charge, which we have heard so much about, of up to £1,000 for a conviction on an either-way matter in a magistrates’ court. Putting those elements together could encourage people to plead guilty when they believe that they are not guilty.
On the principle of the courts charge it is worth reflecting that, when we debated this matter on the then Criminal Justice and Courts Bill last year, we did not know the level of the courts charge, and the briefings that we received—from the Magistrates’ Association, for example—set the courts charge at the same level as that of the victim surcharge, because they did not know any better at the time. So the debate at that time was on the principle of the courts charge, not the proportionality, because the figure is so much higher than we expected when considering the matter last year.
The Government have always justified this matter by saying that criminals should pay their way, and the previous speakers have accepted that principle, but I am not sure that I do accept it. The court system, right up until last year, was an independent administrator of the law, in which judges, magistrates and jurors had no interest in the outcome of a case, their only duty being to administer the law and come to a just outcome. Surely it is wrong that the court system has a financial interest in the outcome of a trial. I am not for a moment saying that any judge or magistrate would be swayed by that consideration, but from the defendant’s point of view and the public perception there is an institutional, built-in benefit to the court system on the result of a trial. On that alone, I oppose the principle of the courts charge.
There is a bit more to it than that—and I refer to some research sent to me about how people perceive how they are treated in court. It is not merely a question of the legal and constitutional rights that they receive but about what they believe to be the fairness of the whole system. There is growing evidence in America and the UK that if people are convicted and believe that they have been fairly treated, they are more likely to comply with the sentence and the sentence itself is likely to have a better outcome. This is a profound observation, which puts an onus on the court system to treat all parties fairly and an onus on treating convicted offenders in such a way that they think they have had a fair crack of the whip, so that they are more likely to comply with the sentence when it is given.
I urge the Government to bring forward a reconsideration of this matter. It is something which, in my 10 years as a magistrate sitting on the Bench, I have found people feel most strongly about.
My Lords, what we are discussing concerns what happens in magistrates’ courts up and down the country and, from time to time, in the Crown Court, where for reasons that can be good or bad, cases go to be heard. I fear that these regulations indicate that the Government have paid less attention to what they are doing because it concerns magistrates and the cases that come before them, and other cases that are not the most serious. I see no other reason why the Government could come to the conclusion that it is right and proper to do what these regulations seek to do. I suggest that this House should regard justice in the magistrates’ courts as every bit as important as every other court in the land. It is a total disgrace that we should put on to the statute book provisions that have the consequence that magistrates are so appalled about what they are required to do that they feel it necessary to resign. I regard that as shocking, and the only explanation that I can suggest is the one I have given: that insufficient consideration was given to what has been done.
Now that the matter has been brought to the attention of a new Minister of Justice and Lord Chancellor, he should look at it very carefully, as quickly as possible and, as he has been shown to have the courage to do, take his own decision and come to the right conclusion. I wish to put it on the record that I have been very pleased by the general approach of our new Minister of Justice and Lord Chancellor. It seems to me that he considers the facts; he may not always come to the decision I would want him to come to, but he comes to a fresh decision, as required by the circumstances as he sees them. I make no objection to the fact that he may take a different view from that which judges and retired judges would have come to. What is wrong here, though—this is the explanation—is that there was no proper consultation. I believe that if there had been proper consultation that had been objectively considered, these regulations would not have seen the light of day.
(9 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on moving this Regret Motion. I sit as a magistrate in London in the family courts, the youth courts and adult criminal courts and I frequently hear cases where the defendant or applicant is a litigant in person. From the court’s perspective, some litigants in person represent themselves very well. They understand the advice that they receive from the clerks and manage both the legal process and the practical aspects of navigating the court system through to a conclusion that they believe is satisfactory. However, some—I would say many—litigants in person have difficulty understanding the guidance that they are given when in court. They struggle with the whole procedure and, at the end, do not feel that they have been treated justly by the system that they have grappled with.
I want to tell noble Lords an anecdote from about a year ago. It concerns a woman who turned up in court charged with fraud against her employer. She was a litigant in person. She came into court and was correctly identified. The clerk then asked her whether she was guilty or not guilty. Her reply was, “I am guilty but I want to plead not guilty”. When asked to explain herself, she did indeed have a rationale for saying that. She was imminently due to have a medical operation. If she had pleaded guilty she would lose her employment and not be able to have the operation, so she was going to delay the finding of guilt until a trial.
It could be argued that the defendant had told us that she was guilty and that she was planning to commit a further fraud on her employer. But as a court we were limited in the advice that we could give to her other than to advise her of the benefits of a guilty plea. We had 30 other cases to deal with that day. We filled in the necessary forms and the matter was indeed put off for trial. If that lady had had some robust defence advice, she may have decided to plead guilty as she had indeed told us she was guilty. But her right to plead not guilty trumped everything else, resulting in the additional cost of the trial.
The overwhelming point that I want to make is that we see many vulnerable people in courts—people who are not able to represent themselves. There is a concern. The Magistrates’ Association, together with other interested bodies, has tried to judge whether the justice system is functioning properly with this increase in litigants in person. I draw the House’s attention to a survey of magistrates published on 13 January this year. Views were taken before costs came in in February 2014 and again in November 2014 after the increase in litigants in person. The survey shows a noticeable increase in the dissatisfaction expressed by magistrates because they felt that the system was not being as just as it should be.
I understand that there are a lot of surveys, but the current chair of the Magistrates’ Association, Richard Monkhouse, was a statistician in a former life and this is a robust piece of work. I have looked at it myself and I have a scientific background. I hope that the Government will look at these figures carefully because they raise a worrying growth in uncertainty and dissatisfaction with the increase in the number of litigants in person.
A wider point should be made. Other aspects of the legal and court system also feed into the general sense of dissatisfaction and the feeling that the court system as a whole is not properly offering justice to people. We have heard from my noble friend about the imposition of the criminal courts charge. In the family courts, we have had cuts to legal aid and an increase in the costs of drug and alcohol testing, which reduces access to fairness for people. We have had the increase in tribunal fees and cuts to CABs. These are off-topic for the purposes of this debate, but they add to the sense of many vulnerable people feeling that the court system as a whole is not open to them as it should be.
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who brings a rich vein of evidence from his experience as a lay magistrate to your Lordships’ deliberations. I declare the interests of having been a barrister practising criminal law for 45 years and having spent 28 years, until I retired from these roles at the end of last year, as a part-time judge at various levels and, particularly for this debate, as a former president of the Howard League for Penal Reform.
In a few moments, I shall talk about prison law specifically, but I wanted to address some issues about the generality of this debate, if I may. I agree with the broad thrust of what has been said about the effect of the regulations. However, I want to commend the Lord Chancellor for his willingness to engage with the legal profession, both the Bar and the solicitors, during recent weeks and months. This has been appreciated. Other things could be done than cutting criminal legal aid in the way which has been described.
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on securing this important debate. I will not be talking about the case of Faruk Ali, although I have read the material available on the internet. I propose to talk in more general terms about dealing with autistic people in the criminal justice system. It is indeed a large and difficult subject, and I shall talk about the courts system in particular, of which I have some experience.
In preparing for this debate, I have seen that a lot of guiding material is available published by the House of Lords Library regarding dealing with people with autism. There was a recent article in the Magistrates’ Association magazine about dealing with autistic people in a court setting. If one googles the issue, as I did, there are a lot of comment pieces about the appropriateness of different procedures within the criminal justice system as a whole.
A very important context for today’s debate is the rollout of Liaison and Diversion by the Government to those with mental capacity issues. My understanding is that the objective is that this will be fully rolled out within England and Wales by next year. Liaison and Diversion is where a mental health practitioner is available to the court, so that a hearing may be adjourned for an initial assessment to be done on the spot as to the mental capacity of either victims or the defendant. This has been at the instigation of leadership from my noble friend Lord Bradley and I understand that it has led to a measurable drop in such cases being brought to court in the pilot schemes operating to date.
I want to talk about my own experience as a London magistrate, where I have dealt with defendants who are autistic. I will not go into the details of the case I have in mind; suffice to say that I believe that the court system coped well with the challenges of the trial, in the sense that all the individual elements of dealing with this difficult situation were met. Nevertheless, by the end of the process the autistic defendant was bemused —he did not understand what had happened—and his family felt that they had not been treated fairly.
So what were the elements in place? First, the young man was charged with a sexual assault, so special measures were in place to protect the victim from the attention of the young man or his family. Secondly, an appropriate adult sat with the young man at all times when the case was being conducted. An intermediary was not believed to be required because the young man claimed he had no memory of the incident of which he was accused. We had an expert witness who gave lengthy evidence, having interviewed the young man, and was cross-examined. That was really the burden of the defence case. As the presiding magistrate, I could see that witness support was giving very active support to the family of the young man who was accused. We took regular breaks, as asked for by the defence lawyer; that would be good practice in such cases in any event. Legal aid was available but would not be for this level of charge for most defendants. Incidentally, that was one of the sources of delay.
We convicted the defendant of the sexual assault. As I said, he looked bemused as if he did not understand what had happened. The family made it very plain that they were unhappy with the result. We had no doubt that we had properly convicted the young man. After the trial, I discussed with my colleagues and the court staff what could have been done better. All the individual requirements had been complied with, after all, so what was the problem? It was the delay in the whole process. It had taken a year from the initial incident to when the trial took place. All the people completing their individual elements as part of the process no doubt believed that they had done their job but it added up to a long delay.
It was made plain to the court by the expert witness that delay disproportionately affects people with autism, because they are very likely to have worse memories than other people. This problem was not overcome and was, I believe, the source of the discontent of the young man’s family. We were never going to make them happy with the result but we could at least have made them feel that their son had had a fair trial. I am afraid that I do not think they believed that. My point to the Minister is very simple: all these elements are good and complex but they have to be done quickly, otherwise their benefit gets dissipated and people do not feel that they have had a fair trial.
I will close on one separate, short point regarding Liaison and Diversion. It is on the need to scrutinise whether these diverted cases are properly being diverted. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, will know, there are various pilot schemes in the country and various methods among police forces of recording the way that police forces divert cases. From a courts perspective, it is very important to have a realistic record of those diversions when they come to sentence people who have committed subsequent offences. We have this issue in the youth court, where we do not know which diversions have been done properly. It is potentially the case that we will also have this issue in the adult court if there is not proper recordkeeping of diversions for people with mental capacity issues.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 2 rectifies an ongoing anomaly in the way 17 year-old children are treated by the police. While all other children detained by the police are entitled to a local authority bed, 17 year-olds are not. This means they must be held in a police station. This is one of the remaining areas where 17 year-olds are excluded from the protections available to other children, and it needs to change. I tabled amendments on this matter in Committee and on Report and I will not repeat all the arguments made then, but I would like remind the House briefly why this matter is so important.
Since 2010, three 17 year-old children have taken their own lives after being treated as adults by the police. They were Kesia Leatherbarrow, Eddie Thornber and Joe Lawton. It is worth taking a moment to think about what it means for a child to die in this way, the terrible waste and the pain that it causes those they leave behind. These children are much loved and deeply missed, and I should like to take a moment to read out some brief words of remembrance about each of them. Nick Lawton said of his son, Joe:
“He was a beautiful boy, everyone agreed. Joe was a happy, successful 17 year-old studying for his A-levels. He is missed every moment of every day”.
Eddie Thornber’s mum, Ann, says:
“Eddie was head boy of his school, looking forward to studying in America. We would do anything to make sure Eddie was still with us”.
Martina Brincat Baines, Kesia’s mother, said:
“Kesia was my only daughter. She was beautiful. A funny, lively girl who, despite her mental health issues, was loving and great company, she was so hugely loved and is so hugely missed”.
In Committee and on Report, the Minister explained that a review was looking at the treatment of 17 year-olds in police custody and that the Government wanted to receive and digest its recommendations before acting. However, things have moved on since then. The review has recommended that the law be changed; the Home Office has committed to do so as soon as possible; and recently the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Children published the report of its inquiry on children and the police, and recommended that this change take place. I pay tribute to the chair of that group, the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, for the work of that important inquiry.
There has been much movement forward. Almost 30,000 people have signed a petition requesting that today be the day that this law is changed. I look forward to the Minister’s response and beg to move.
My Lords, I have given the Minister’s office notice of the point that I am about to raise. It is to do with youth anonymity, which is a slightly different point from that made by the noble Earl.
On Report, the Government introduced amendments which are now Clause 77 of the Bill. Those amendments gave lifetime reporting restrictions in criminal proceedings for witnesses and victims under 18. The amendments clearly give the judge discretion to give lifetime anonymity to witnesses and victims. It is also clear from the Government’s amendments that that discretion of the judge does not extend to the accused.
What I would like to know—as I said, I have given notice of my question to the noble Lord’s office—is what the status would be of somebody if they had been found not guilty at trial. Clearly, after they have been found not guilty, they are no longer accused, but they may well still be a witness. Would that discretion of the judge extend to those found not guilty at trial?
My Lords, I commend and congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, on the progress that he appears to have been able to promote, and look forward to hearing the Minister confirm what the noble Earl has said after citing those very poignant cases. It seems that a mistake in the system can now be corrected. For that, although it has come late for the families to whom the noble Earl referred, I think everybody will be grateful. I congratulate the Minister in anticipation of his confirming that the Government have accepted that point. It is entirely to their credit that they have listened to the very strong representations made on that matter.
As to the point raised by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, again, I hope that the Minister will be able to offer him some clarification of the situation along the lines that he has suggested.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the world now knows about the technology used by your Lordships and their Saturday night viewing habits. I associate myself with the remarks that have been made. I was not able to be in the House while the Bill was in Committee. However, I was a bit surprised that, rather than a quite simple but perhaps simplistic amendment which restored what everyone had thought of as the status quo, instead the amendment is around 10 lines in length. Those among your Lordships and from the Government who carried out the drafting have come up with very many lines, which can sometimes prove more difficult than a more straightforward and prescribed amendment.
Having said that, I want to mention the position of defendants. I agree very much with what has been said, and I simply add that not to provide anonymity or reporting restrictions—whatever term you apply, although of course they are not necessarily the same thing—seems to me to undermine the whole purpose of the youth justice system, which is rehabilitation, reintegration, and so on. An enormously important principle is at stake here. The same really applies to the amendment of my noble friend Lord Marks. One cannot separate out the stages. I am sure that there is a sporting analogy for this. Having lost anonymity at that early point before being charged, there is really nothing more that one can sensibly do afterwards to fulfil the spirit of what the Government themselves seem to consider important, even if we would like to have more than the Government’s amendment.
My Lords, my Amendment 123 is largely superfluous in the light of the government amendments. The Standing Committee for Youth Justice has sent to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, I suspect, a briefing which was largely laid out by the noble Earl. He made the point very well about the high threshold test proposed by the Government in their amendments. He summarised that by saying that the new threshold test would be a diminishment of co-operation or evidence through fear on behalf of the witnesses or the victims. The Standing Committee for Youth Justice briefing makes the point that this higher threshold is even higher than that in the Children and Young Persons Act. This is an important point, which I hope that the noble Lord will be able to address.
This is a very difficult area of legislation. In my brief time in the courts, although the law has not changed in the adult courts, in practice what magistrates view as appropriate use of media within a courtroom has changed quite a lot. This is largely at the discretion of the magistrates and district judges involved. I very much hope that the noble Lord will agree that whichever amendments are agreed tonight will be kept under review, because this is such a delicate and difficult matter.
Where I diverge from the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is whether lifetime anonymity should be given to child offenders. The briefing was rather less nuanced than the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. To put it in stark terms, I do not think it reasonable that a young person of 17 and a half should get a lifetime of anonymity, whereas someone who is 18 gets no anonymity if they have committed largely the same offence. If one were to rely on the briefing alone, that is the burden of the argument which is being made. I know that that is not the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile; he presented his case in a more nuanced way. However, I find it troubling that there is potentially a very stark difference in the way that people are treated on either side of the 18 years of age barrier.
I would like to make a further point, which may be a technical one. I noticed that the briefing continually refers to child defendants and not to child offenders, whereas of course all the children about whom we are talking have either pleaded guilty or been found guilty in a court. They are not, in my understanding, child defendants. Having said all that, it is a real issue about the availability of the internet and how that might affect the rehabilitation and reintegration of young offenders into the community.
I conclude with an anecdote, which is not to do with youth. Recently, my wife employed a female offender who was still in prison but on release when she was employed by my wife. It was a wholly positive experience in that the offender worked well and the organisation benefited. However, when my wife searched the internet for the offences that the woman had committed, the information she got was not what she had been told by the offender or the organisation which facilitated the work placement. Nevertheless, I support the Government in their objectives.
My Lords, my amendments in this group, which largely repeat the amendments I put down in Committee, have a simple purpose, which is to permit the court a discretion as to whether or not to impose the criminal courts charge. Because they largely repeat earlier amendments, I will be brief.
Under the new Section 21A proposed in Clause 46, the court has no discretion but to order a person over 18 convicted of an offence that is not excluded by regulations to pay the charge. Since Committee, I have moved towards the Government’s position by suggesting in these amendments that a relevant court must “consider ordering” that the criminal courts charge be paid, so that while they would have a discretion, the courts would receive a clear message that such a charge should be expected in the generality of cases, and the legislation would act as an indication as to how the discretion should generally be exercised.
However, I maintain the general position I took in Committee in suggesting that it would be completely senseless to make an order that a criminal courts charge be paid in every case. There would be many cases heard every day in criminal courts where orders were made and everyone in the court would know that there was not the slightest chance of the charges ever being paid. That would make a nonsense of the provisions, I suggest, and would risk bringing the courts into disrepute. Relying on a later power to remit the charge in such cases is unnecessarily burdensome on the courts and wasteful of everybody’s time.
Furthermore, I am concerned that imposing a charge upon offenders who are already without means and often in serious personal and financial difficulties is likely to reduce their chances of rehabilitation. The outstanding charge may have a significant impact on their ability to secure work and to meet necessary expenses, particularly where they need credit in order to do so and the outstanding charge will impede their obtaining such credit. For those reasons, I suggest that the imposition of a criminal courts charge needs to be discretionary.
I further suggest that it is not sensible to deny the court any discretion as to the level of the charge to be imposed. That is the reason for my Amendment 125D. New Section 21C would require the amount of the charge to be the amount specified in regulations. My amendment would simply make that amount a maximum. There will be cases where offenders of limited means will wish, or at least be prepared, to meet their obligations and pay the charge if they can afford it. I suggest that a sensible way of dealing with such offenders is for the court to set the charge at a level the offenders can afford, rather than charging them the full amount specified in the regulations and forcing them to come back on an application to remit the charge at a later date or, worse, leading them to the position where they do not pay anything. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to my amendments in this group. I support 100% what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said. I moved similar amendments in Committee and the amendments that I am putting forward on Report are by way of a compromise. I regard my position as a fallback position and the position of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, as the primary position on judicial discretion.
My Amendments 125, 126 and 127 would allow the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee to specify the circumstances in which the charge should not be imposed. The idea behind this group of amendments is that it would provide an opportunity for the CPRC to ensure appropriate judicial discretion, while providing greater clarity than a more permissive wording, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is seeking. Of course, the CPRC operates independently of government.
I also thank the Minister’s officials for clarifying to me in the past few days that the court’s charge can be treated the same way as the victim surcharge under Section 135 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, which gives magistrates a general power to order a brief period of detention when a defendant is in default of any fine imposed by the court, particularly when that defendant is homeless and cannot pay. This, as any magistrate or lawyer will know, is a regular occurrence in London magistrates’ courts. This is the only practical way of dealing with this type of case.
I conclude on a wider point, by reiterating some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has made. Notwithstanding the people who are homeless and literally do not have any money in their pockets, there are many other people we regularly see in courts who are on benefits, perhaps because of disabilities. Any additional cost that is given to them will remain unpaid and accrue as a greater debt. Every day of the court’s week, magistrates and judges impose fines where they have discretion and come up with appropriate fines that they believe are realistic. They put in place tough measures, namely collection orders, to recover those fines, so magistrates and judges are well able to exercise discretion, and they should be given the opportunity to do so over the court’s charge.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have had something of a trailer from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and I do not propose to respond in detail at this stage. For the sake of clarity, I might say that these amendments are about determinate sentence prisoners as opposed to indeterminate sentence prisoners, into which category IPP prisoners fall.
My Lords, I want to make one very small point about the Government’s proposals, which is mainly to do with the name “recall adjudicator”. I understand that when a district judge goes to prison and hears cases and then gives an additional period in custody to prisoners who offended while in custody they are referred to as adjudicators. We will have adjudicators turning up at the prison gates, plus recall adjudicators. I wonder whether that is a sensible way to proceed. I raise that as a small point.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his typically clear exposition of the Government’s position—or some of the Government’s position. I thought there were some omissions in how he put matters. He adopted the Candide style of defending the Government, where everything is the best of all possible judicial worlds, but that might be a slightly flawed approach in the circumstances. He did not, for example, deal with the point of the Government’s own estimate of 1,000 extra prison places being required as a result of the changes in category. That was before the Osborn case, which will clearly increase the load further. It may be that the board’s original estimates were on the high side, but there can be no gainsaying the fact that the board would be required to conduct a great many more oral hearings than at present.
There may well be merit in the Government’s proposals for recall adjudicators, but I do not know why the Minister should be so hesitant about reviewing the position in a couple of years. If, indeed, he is confident that the system will work, there would be no problem. If, on the other hand, the system presents problems, it is as well to deal with them before too long a period of time passes. I should have thought that the sunset position in respect of the new organisation would be worth considering. The problem that the Government and the Parole Board face is, of course, the huge number of matters to be dealt with. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, will hopefully be making his contribution to reducing those numbers, shortly, perhaps. We will see what happens.
At the moment, what we seem to end up with is a two-tier system and it is not quite clear to me how the two organisations will be managed. The Parole Board exists as a board. Will the adjudicators, for example, be directly a board or will there be a separate board for that? All of this is up in the air. It is, frankly, not good enough for the Government to say that they have to rush this legislation through because of the Whiston case. That is not the case at all. They could have taken the time to consult, not only with those within the system but with those outside it, and not simply—though necessarily—with the House of Commons and your Lordships’ House, but with other interested parties. None has been given an opportunity to be consulted on a major change of this kind. I do not blame the Minister, but it is regrettable that the Government have acted in this rather typical way under the aegis of the present Lord Chancellor.
I will not divide the House on this matter. We hope that the system works. We would like the Government to consult widely, even now, on how the matters are to be taken forward, and to keep the matter under review. It may be that, for example, the Justice Select Committee will want to look at the operation of the new system after a period. However, that does not excuse the Government for bringing legislation to us at short notice, in a matter as important as this, without allowing for a proper examination. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 6 is an extremely modest amendment. Your Lordships will appreciate that Clause 7(3) permits the Secretary of State to make electronic monitoring conditions compulsory. I spoke on this issue in Committee, arguing that the imposition of an electronic monitoring condition should remain a matter for the court. I argued that the power to impose such a condition on a prisoner’s release on licence was, indeed, a desirable and sensible power, and that such a condition should be imposed where appropriate. However, I also argued that there may be circumstances in which it would be impractical or unnecessary to impose such a condition, for example where an offender was disabled or was to be hospitalised upon release.
In response to my amendment, my noble friend Lord Ahmad said that he was aware of the concerns that physical or mental health issues or possible practical problems might make compulsory electronic monitoring conditions unsuitable. My noble friend also gave, as an example of impracticality, a case where arrangements could not be made for recharging the battery in the tag—he was right to do so and there may be many other examples of impracticality. However, my noble friend contended that there was flexibility in the order-making power under the subsection that would enable these cases to be taken into account. I am concerned about that. My noble friend said that the Secretary of State would be able to,
“provide for cases in which the compulsory condition should not apply”.—[Official Report, 14/7/14; col. 402.]
I regret that I do not read the clause in that way. While there would, under subsection (3)(3)(b), be power to make provision in relation to persons selected on the basis of criteria specified in the order or on a sampling basis, that is not the same as enabling cases to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
The amendment would, quite simply, enable the Secretary of State to incorporate into the order a small element of judicial discretion, whereby, in a given case, a court could decline to make an electronic monitoring condition if it considered it would be unjust, unnecessary or impractical to do so. It would be for the Secretary of State to decide whether to incorporate such provision as I suggest in the order he makes. For that reason, I reiterate that my amendment is modest and limited. It is intended to be helpful. I beg to move.
My Lords, I want to speak in favour of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but to slightly widen the point that he made. It is my understanding that if one gives a suspended sentence when sentencing and includes, as a part of that, a curfew, then the court is obliged to provide that the curfew is tagged. Very often that is appropriate, but not always. I have certainly dealt with cases where it was totally unnecessary to tag the offenders concerned and it just added to the cost of the whole sentence. There should be judicial discretion when giving tagged curfews in suspended sentences.
My Lords, the Bill extends electric monitoring, a procedure which thus far has proved problematic and extremely expensive, when you think of the problems with G4S and I think Serco in the contracts that they had. It extends the principle into new territory—namely, that of prisoners on licence. The policy in that respect has been criticised by the Chief Inspector of Prisons on the grounds that there is little evidence of absconding or committing further offences while prisoners are on licence. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s comments on that. In passing, I hope that he is in a position to deny current rumours that the highly respected chief inspector is unlikely to be reappointed. He has a deserved reputation for the job that he has been carrying out in difficult circumstances for the last few years.
The impact assessment in support of this provision is somewhat feeble. It states:
“Though benefits likely to arise from the increased use of ELM have been identified, we are not able to quantify these benefits at this stage, as ELM is not yet in widespread use in England and Wales. As such, we are unable to calculate impact”.
In other words, this is an impact assessment with no impact whatever. As the following further statement confirms, the number of additional prison places cannot be accurately estimated. Let us reflect on the terrible overcrowding in our prisons now, with a shocking rise in the number of suicides, as we read at the weekend. What is the Government’s estimate of the likely impact of the implication of this new technology, in terms of both cost and of increasing the prison population?
The way in which the Government intend to progress the matter is, as usual, equally unsatisfactory, with the Secretary of State empowered to impose a code of practice without parliamentary scrutiny or approval—hence Amendment 8, which would require such parliamentary approval for the code of practice that the Government envisage. Perhaps the Minister could tell us what is happening about the code. In Committee, the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, who has escaped or is on licence to another department, said that a revised code would be issued to promote transparency in relation to outsourced services. What is happening about this? What consultations have taken place, and with whom? Will there be reports on the outcome of those consultations?
Amendment 7 would make contractors subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act in the same way as public authorities. It seems absurd that, in the world of the Ministry of Justice alone, Her Majesty’s prisons are subject to FOI requirements while private prisons are not. Given that we are talking about encroachments on the liberty of the individual—and they may well be justified in many cases—it is surely necessary to extend the protection of the FOI regime to this area. I should make it clear that we are not against electronic monitoring, as it clearly has a place, but it must be technically effective and cost effective, especially in the light of the previous experience, with the contracts that went so badly awry and led to large sums of money having to be reclaimed from the contractors, and applied sensibly. We have very little to go on at the moment in terms of how the new scheme would work.
(10 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful for the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, to the issue, which I entirely accept is delicate. There can be no doubt that he would discharge the role of juror in an exemplary fashion and to the great benefit of all those who were tried—either in a way that they would want or not.
The respondents to the consultation about the upper age limit were almost equally divided as to whether there should be one, and I do not pretend that it is an easy issue, but the Government’s view was that, notwithstanding the health and vigour of many over the age of 75, an increasing number of people would find it difficult or almost impossible to sit as jurors and would therefore seek to be excused jury service. They might not want to have to go through the process of seeking to be excused jury service. Rather than putting them through the process of applying for excusal, and spending taxpayers’ money dealing with that additional administrative burden, the age limit is set at 75. I do not pretend that there is any precise science behind that, but it reflects a balance of different arguments.
From the point of view of the magistracy, where there is currently retirement at 70, it is the view of the Magistrates’ Association that that is about right and that it should not be increased to 75. The reason for that view is that many defendants who come before the Bench are much younger. Obviously that is true in the youth court, but it is true in the adult court as well. The issue is regularly debated at the Magistrates’ Association, and the view of the association is that 70 should stay as the age of retirement for magistrates.
I am grateful for that intervention. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, makes a good point in the sense that a defendant might feel more confident if there was not such a wide age disparity between him and someone aged, say, over 75. The noble Lord reminds me that the upper age for judges is 70, so it is not unreasonable to restrict jurors to the age of 75.