(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of concerns expressed by the Professional Footballers’ Association about violent incidents at football matches; and what consideration they are giving to strengthening (1) stewarding, (2) policing, and (3) other legal powers, to protect professional footballers and football club staff.
My Lords, the safety of everyone at sporting events is of paramount importance to His Majesty’s Government. Stewards play an integral role in ensuring that safety, and the Sports Grounds Safety Authority is working to improve the quality of stewarding at football matches. The police and courts have a wide range of powers to protect footballers and club staff, including the use of football banning orders, which can now be applied to a wider range of offences thanks to recent changes made by the Government.
My Lords, this year’s EFL play-off semi-finals and final provided huge drama. The FA Cup had the first ever Manchester derby and the fastest ever cup final goal. However, despite multiple announcements in advance of full time, pitch invasions by fans were commonplace, putting players, staff and officials at risk. I have raised football disorder several times at the Dispatch Box. While I accept that Ministers alone cannot solve this, we need signs of progress. I remind the Minister that we are bidding, with Ireland, to hold the 2028 Euro championships. Will the Minister commit to using his off season productively to meet governing bodies and clubs to identify possible ways forward?
It is an offence under Section 4 of the Football (Offences) Act 1991 for a person at a designated football match to go on to the playing area. Anyone found guilty of unlawfully doing so can be fined or can have a court preventive football banning order imposed on them. As I say, we have strengthened the football banning orders, and we keep these important matters under review. My department commissioned the Sports Grounds Safety Authority to conduct research into the long-term sustainability of stewarding. It is now working with football’s governing bodies and others to identify the challenges that it identified in its research. It has refined guidance and issued fact sheets to the football authorities. We keep these matters under review, including, as the noble Lord rightly reminds us, as we pursue our bid for Euro 2028.
My Lords, I declare my interest as the chair of the Football Regulatory Authority. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is right: throughout the season, commentators and pundits rightly condemn pitch invasions. However, somehow, at the end of the season, when it is the fans of teams who have secured promotion—or, in Everton’s case, fortuitously avoided relegation—streaming on to the pitch, those same commentators and pundits think it is a wonderful thing. It is actually very dangerous for players, match officials, stewards and the spectators themselves. Would my noble friend the Minister take note of the FA’s consistent work in this area and take this as an open invitation for him and anybody from his department to meet with me or anybody else at the FA to discuss these matters further?
I congratulate my noble friend on his recent appointment. I am sure my right honourable friend the Sports Minister would be very glad to speak to him. He will be a great impartial referee for football, even if he has strong views on certain teams. As I say, unlawful entry on to the playing area is already an offence. Even in exuberant moments of celebration, that should not be happening. It is not always possible to keep spectators off the pitch in moments of high celebration. Stewards and police make every effort to prevent it happening. Of course, the police investigate these incidents after the event as well to make sure people are prosecuted where appropriate.
My Lords, will the Minister agree that one of the ways of solving this is to make sure that the culture within the fan groups accepts that there will be consequences to attacking or going over the fence? Will the Government encourage football to make sure that, if fans behave like this, there will be a penalty for their club and the individuals, to encourage those around them to restrain them if necessary, or at least to deter them in some way? The fans can police themselves.
Of course, the vast majority of fans want to go to and enjoy football matches safely; it is only a minority who sometimes seek to spoil that. The Government have worked with authorities across football to help to co-ordinate action in this area. We welcome the additional measures that have been introduced. The FA, the Premier League and the English Football League announced tougher sanctions, including automatic reporting to the police for anyone participating in anti-social or criminal behaviour, increased use of sniffer dogs and club bans for anyone who enters the pitch or uses pyrotechnics. The noble Lord is right: there is a role for fans and clubs themselves to help to maintain order and an enjoyable day out.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a lifelong supporter of the greatest team in south-east London, known to its supporters as “Charlton nil”. Can the Government encourage the football authorities to get the players to set an example on the field and not challenge authority in a way that only encourages hooliganism?
I mentioned some of the football authorities with which we work closely, and we also work closely with the Professional Footballers’ Association, which represents the safety of players. This was part of a round-table discussion that we held recently about fan disorder at football matches. My right honourable friend the Sports Minister recently sent a joint letter, with the chief executive of the Professional Footballers’ Association, to the authorities to remind all clubs of their duties with regard to player welfare and the maintenance of good order.
My Lords, I have attended a great number of football matches, and I see what appears to be an inconsistency in various clubs’ attention and response to individuals running on to the pitch—they are probably the most dangerous individuals, because they have a contempt. I have an interest in Carlisle United, and we have a policy that, if someone comes on to the pitch, we exclude and ban them. Will the Minister consult every club in the Football League to make sure that they take the same strong action against individuals?
The noble Lord makes an important point, and, yes, we work with clubs of all tiers and sizes across the country to look at this issue. The policing of football matches is an operational decision for local police forces—the local police commander will make a risk assessment and deploy resources accordingly. That is of course right, but we and the police speak regularly to clubs of all sizes about these issues.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Clark. Part of the answer is mainly in the hands of the clubs: even when there are mass invasions of pitches, they usually have CCTV of the pitch, and they often have images of their members, which is the only way they can buy tickets. The only question is whether they investigate to discover who these people are and then give them a penalty. The most effective penalty for most football fans is to exclude them from the ground via a season ticket. I am afraid that there is no incentive for the club to do that if it ends up with an empty ground or less revenue, so the regulators have a role to play with the clubs to ensure that these investigations happen, even when one can understand the emotion of the moment and why it happens. But there ought to be a consequence for it—perhaps the Minister will agree.
I certainly agree with the noble Lord, who speaks with great authority. There is an important role for clubs, fans and the police in all of this. As I say, after the event, police investigations follow up using CCTV and other things, as the noble Lord mentioned. While the Sports Minister was in Istanbul for the Champions League final, he took the opportunity to meet Chief Constable Mark Roberts, the head of the UK football policing unit—I hope that reassures the noble Lord that we are in constant contact with the police on this issue.
My Lords, the Minister has rightly referred to the excellent work of the Sports Grounds Safety Authority, which is, of course, operated from his department. Can he give an assurance that, instead of the rather hand-to-mouth funding arrangements with which the SGSA operates at present, he will be able to give longer-term funding so that it is able to do even better work than he has described? In particular, can funds be provided for sports grounds outside the professional game, such as non-league football, stadiums that stage women’s matches and so on? I declare an interest as vice-president of the National League.
The question of budgets and resources is one for the authority and my right honourable friend the Sports Minister to discuss. I will certainly pass on the point made by the noble Lord, but as I say, they have taken action following the review which we commissioned to issue guidance and fact sheets to clubs on some of the action that can be taken to help the situation.
My Lords, could the Minister tell us what arrangements he is making to ensure that football clubs pay the proper costs of policing the matches, both inside and outside the grounds, particularly those clubs that are perhaps less assiduous in making sure their fans behave?
This is a long-standing matter on which we are in discussion with the police, the Home Office and clubs themselves. I will take the point made by the noble Lord back to my right honourable friend the Sports Minister and make sure it is heard again.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs noble Lords will recall from the earlier debate on this issue, His Majesty’s Government take tackling violence against women and girls extremely seriously. This is why we have ensured that the Bill provides vital protections for women and girls, so that they can express themselves freely online without fear of harassment or abuse.
As noble Lords know, the Bill places strong duties on providers regarding illegal content. The Bill takes an approach which protects all users, but the framework accounts for the fact that some offences can disproportionately affect certain people. To that end, we have already listed several priority offences in Schedule 7 that we know disproportionately affect women and girls. These include sexual exploitation, intimate image abuse— including so-called revenge pornography—and extreme pornography.
In addition, I want to be clear that the Bill will also cover content which intentionally encourages priority offences, an issue that was raised as a concern in our previous debate. Paragraph 33 of Schedule 7 has the effect that inchoate offences of encouraging or assisting a priority offence are themselves to be treated as priority offences under the Bill. As a result, for example, where there is content that intentionally or knowingly encourages harassment online, services will have proactive duties in relation to this content.
Furthermore, the Bill will soon—as I mentioned earlier—introduce new intimate image abuse offences to tackle behaviour, such as the sharing of deep-fake images. These new offences will be listed as priority offences, as is already the case for the current revenge pornography offence under Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. These offences are a major milestone for protecting women and girls, and will be introduced to the Bill as soon as possible. They will sit alongside the Bill’s other criminal provisions, such as its offences on cyberflashing, false communications and threatening communications.
Although I appreciate the intention behind Amendments 269 and 270 and look forward to hearing the arguments made by the noble Lords who will speak to them, I remain concerned by the approach suggested to change Clause 167 to a consent-based model rather than the current intent-based approach. We are confident that the offence, as drafted, captures acts of cyberflashing, including when supposedly done “for a joke”—which, of course, it certainly is not. This is because the focus of the offence as drafted remains firmly on the perpetrator’s abhorrent behaviour and not on the actions of the victim, as would happen with a consent-based approach.
I join all those who have sent our best wishes to the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, for a speedy recovery. I am grateful that noble Lords were able to take forward her points in this debate.
As I said at the outset, protecting women and girls online is an objective of this Bill, which is reflected by the number of priority offences we have included that disproportionately affect women and girls. This includes the addition of the controlling or coercive behaviour offence, and I am grateful for the support from across the Committee for that amendment. This, in addition to the new cyberflashing offence and other criminal law reforms, demonstrates our continued commitment to increase the safety of women and girls online.
The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Berridge and the noble Baronesses, Lady Featherstone and Lady Gohir, relate to cyberflashing. The new cyberflashing offence, alongside the package of offences in this Bill, will bring significant benefit for women and girls across the UK, too many of whom have been subjected to the distressing behaviour that noble Lords have spoken about in this debate. We share the aim of noble Lords who have spoken in favour of those amendments to ensure that this offence is effective at stopping this behaviour.
Regarding Amendments 269 and 270, I want to reassure your Lordships that the intent-based approach in Clause 167 has been tested extensively both by the Law Commission and subsequently by His Majesty’s Government. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is correct that we do not automatically agree with what it says, but we do take the commission’s expert views very seriously. The Crown Prosecution Service has stated that it has no concerns about using the offence that has been drafted to bring perpetrators to justice. Indeed, it strongly supported the inclusion of the “sexual gratification” element, which would, according to the Crown Prosecution Service, enable it to prosecute this offence more effectively.
The offence will capture many instances of cyberflashing, such as where pictures are sent to strangers via AirDrop in a crowded railway carriage. I agree with the points noble Lords raised about the settings and the simple technological change that, at an operator level, could make a big difference here. We are well aware of the concern set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, that an intent-based approach may let perpetrators off the hook if they send images supposedly for a laugh. We do not accept that view. The courts will, in the normal way, consider all the evidence to determine whether the elements of the offence have been made out. It is of course never on the victim to have to prove the perpetrator’s intention; it is for the police to investigate alleged offences and for the Crown Prosecution Service to establish the perpetrator’s intention in court.
I draw noble Lords’ attention to the inclusion of the word “humiliation” in Clause 167. This will catch many supposedly joke motives, since the perverted form of humour in these instances is often derived from the victim’s humiliation, alarm or distress. This offence has been crafted following calls, including by victims’ groups, to include an intention to cause the victim humiliation.
My noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes said she was unable to attend the briefing we organised with the Law Commission so, for the benefit of those who were not able to join, let me reassure noble Lords that Clause 167 is based on the offence proposed by the Law Commission, which held an extensive public consultation with victims, the police, prosecutors and academics, and was drafted following further engagement with the police and the Crown Prosecution Service.
The Law Commission, as Professor Lewis set out in that briefing for your Lordships, did consider a consent-based approach, and its final report highlights the significant concerns expressed by respondents to its consultation. A consent-based offence, as the commission found, would result in overcriminalisation, capturing behaviour that does not warrant criminal sanction. For example, as Professor Lewis outlined at the meeting, it could capture a patient sending their doctor an image of their genitals for medical reasons. I take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, just made interrogating that. The commission found that it would also criminalise misjudged attempts at intimacy where there was, for example, no genuine intention to cause harm or upset. It has looked at these issues.
Requiring a specific intent is not new and is taken in line with other non-contact sexual offences, including “in person” flashing—the offence of exposure. The police and Crown Prosecution Service are very familiar with these offences and with the evidence that is needed in court to prove the required intent. Crucially an offence based on a lack of consent would shift the focus away from the actions and intentions of the perpetrator to the victim and what they may or may not have done. This would be likely to result in a victim’s previous sexual or private behaviour being interrogated in open court. We do not want victims of this behaviour to be put under that sort of pressure. We want the focus to be fully on the perpetrator’s actions and intentions. The provisions in the Bill have been carefully targeted to protect victims from the intrusive and disturbing behaviour that noble Lords have set out, not to subject them to an unnecessary and distressing interrogation of their private lives.
Changing the consent test to reasonable belief that the defendant would have consented, in order to avoid criminalisation, would not work. Applying this test would mean that it would be much easier for genuinely harmful and culpable cyberflashing to escape conviction. For example, it would make it easier for a defendant to make an excuse, such as claiming that they reasonably believed that a person had consented to see a picture because they were on a particular dating app or, as was discussed in the briefing with the Law Commission, claiming that the victim had smiled back at them in a meaningful way on a train. They are not, perhaps, strong defences, but they are not—I am sure—ones that noble Lords would want to encourage through the drafting of this amendment. We are confident that an intent approach is the most appropriate way to frame this offence and that it ensures that the criminal law is workable, so that we can bring perpetrators to justice.
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister in his flow. Just to go back a little bit, the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, attempted to resolve the questions about where it was legitimate for material of the nature that he has been describing to be circulated. Would be accept that that approach has some merit? If so, then I go on to ask: is the decision still to go with intent rather than content for reasons other than relating to that particular point?
I am sorry, I was slightly distracted by noises off. Would the noble Lord mind repeating his question?
It is a very narrow point, but it is important in terms of the overall approach that we are taking on this. The Minister very accurately described the reasons that the Law Commission came up with for moving back to an intent-based rather than content-based approach. I wanted to ask him to check whether the wording in the amendment that we signed up to, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone—ably introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and spoken to by many people around the Chamber—would cover off those points where there is legitimate reason for this material to be circulated. I used an unfortunate phrase that I will not repeat. Are the Government happy to accept that it is possible to get around that objection by the Law Commission by making legitimate those particular explicit reasons for those pictures being circulated? I make that point only to get an admission at the Dispatch Box that the Government could get round the issue that has been mentioned, but they are still deciding to go for an intent-based approach for other reasons, which the Minister has just adumbrated and which I accept are genuine.
In brief, we think the Law Commission has it right—
If the Minister could write to me on the point once he has had advice, or perhaps inspiration from the Box, that would be very helpful.
I will certainly do so. It requires flicking through a number of amendments and cross-referencing them with provisions in the Bill. I will certainly do that in slower time and respond.
We think that the Law Commission, which looked at all these issues, including, I think, the questions put by the noble Lord, has done that well. We were satisfied with it. I thought its briefing with Professor Penney Lewis was useful in exploring those issues. We are confident that the offence as drafted is the appropriate one.
My noble friend Lady Morgan and others asked why both the Law Commission and the Government are taking a different approach in relation to intimate image abuse and to cyberflashing. We are taking action to criminalise both, but the Law Commission recommended different approaches in how to criminalise that behaviour to take into account the different actions of the perpetrator in each scenario. Sharing an intimate image of a person without their consent is ipso facto wrongful, as it is a violation of their bodily privacy and sexual autonomy. Sending a genital image is not ipso facto wrongful, as it does not always constitute a sexual intrusion, so greater additional culpability is required for that offence. To give an example, sending a photograph of a naked protestor, even without the consent of the recipient, is not always harmful. Although levels of harm resulting from behaviours may be the same and cause the same levels of stress, the criminal law must consider whether the perpetrator’s behaviour was sufficiently culpable for an offence to have been committed. That is why we think the intent approach is best for cyberflashing but have taken a different approach in relation to intimate image abuse.
I thank my noble friend for that explanation, which is very helpful and there is a lot in his reply so far that we will have to bottom out. Is he able to shed any light at all on when we might see the drafting of the intimate image abuse wording because that would be helpful in resolving some of the issues we have been debating?
I cannot give a precise date. The Committee knows the dates for this Committee are a moveable feast, but we have been having fruitful discussions on some of the issues we have already discussed—we had one yesterday with my noble friend. I appreciate the point she is making about wanting to see the drafting in good time before Report so that we can have a well thought through debate on it. I will certainly reiterate that to the usual channels and to others.
Amendment 271 additionally seeks to require companies in scope to provide systems which enable users to report incidents of cyberflashing to platforms. Clauses 16 and 26 already require companies to set up systems and processes which allow users easily to report illegal content, and this will include cyberflashing. This amendment therefore duplicates the existing requirement set out in the Bill. Amendment 271 also requires in scope companies to report cyberflashing content to the Crown Prosecution Service. The Bill does not place requirements on in scope companies to report discovery of illegal content online, other than in the instances of child exploitation and abuse, reflecting the seriousness of that crime and the less subjective nature of the content that is being reported in those scenarios.
The Bill, which has been developed in consultation with our partners in law enforcement, aims to prevent and reduce the proliferation of illegal content and activity in the first place and the resulting harm this causes to so many. While the Bill does not place any specific responsibilities on policing, our policing partners are considering how best to respond to the growing threat of online offences, as my noble friend Lady Morgan noted, in relation to the publication last week of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment on Violence Against Women and Girls. Policing partners will be working closely with Ofcom to explore the operational impact of the Bill and make sure it is protecting women and girls in the way we all want it to.
I hope that helps noble Lords on the issues set out in these amendments. I am grateful for the support for the government amendment in my name and hope that noble Lords will be content not to move theirs at this juncture.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been a grim but important debate to open the Committee’s proceedings today. As my noble friend Lady Harding of Winscombe and others have set out, some of the issues and materials about which we are talking are abhorrent indeed. I join other noble Lords in thanking my noble friend Lord Harlech for his vigilance and consideration for those who are watching our proceedings today, to allow us to talk about them in the way that we must in order to tackle them, but to ensure that we do so sensitively. I thank noble Lords for the way they have done that.
I pay tribute also to those who work in this dark corner of the internet to tackle these harms. I am pleased to reassure noble Lords that the Bill has been designed in a way that responds to emerging and new technologies that may pose a risk of harm. In our previous debates, we have touched on explicitly naming certain technologies and user groups or making aspects of the legislation more specific. However, one key reason why the Government have been resistant to such specificity is to ensure that the legislation remains flexible and future-proofed.
The Bill has been designed to be technology-neutral in order to capture new services that may arise in this rapidly evolving sector. It confers duties on any service that enables users to interact with each other, as well as search services, meaning that any new internet service that enables user interaction will be caught by it.
Amendment 125, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron—whose watchful eye I certainly feel on me even as she takes a rare but well-earned break today—seeks to ensure that machine-generated content, virtual reality content and augmented reality content are regulated content under the Bill. I am happy to confirm to her and to my noble friend Lady Harding who moved the amendment on her behalf that the Bill is designed to regulate providers of user-to-user services, regardless of the specific technologies they use to deliver their service, including virtual reality and augmented reality content. This is because any service that allows its users to encounter content generated, uploaded or shared by other users is in scope unless exempt. “Content” is defined very broadly in Clause 207(1) as
“anything communicated by means of an internet service”.
This includes virtual or augmented reality. The Bill’s duties therefore cover all user-generated content present on the service, regardless of the form this content takes, including virtual reality and augmented reality content. To state it plainly: platforms that allow such content—for example, the metaverse—are firmly in scope of the Bill.
The Bill also ensures that machine-generated content on user-to-user services created by automated tools or machine bots will be regulated by the Bill where appropriate. Specifically, Clause 49(4)(b) means that machine-generated content is regulated unless the bot or automated tool producing the content is controlled by the provider of the service. This approach ensures that the Bill covers scenarios such as malicious bots on a social media platform abusing users, or when users share content produced by new tools, such as ChatGPT, while excluding functions such as customer service chatbots which are low risk. Content generated by an artificial intelligence bot and then placed by a user on a regulated service will be regulated by the Bill. Content generated by an AI bot which interacts with user-generated content, such as bots on Twitter, will be regulated by the Bill. A bot that is controlled by the service provider, such as a customer service chatbot, is out of scope; as I have said, that is low risk and regulation would therefore be disproportionate. Search services using AI-powered features will be in scope of the search duties.
The Government recognise the need to act both to unlock the opportunities and to address the potential risks of this technology. Our AI regulation White Paper sets out the principles for the responsible development of AI in the UK. These principles, such as safety and accountability, are at the heart of our approach to ensuring the responsible development and use of artificial intelligence. We are creating a horizon-scanning function and a central risk function which will enable the Government to monitor future risks.
The Bill does not distinguish between the format of content present on a service. Any service that allows its users to encounter content generated, uploaded or shared by other users is in scope unless exempt, regardless of the format of that content. This includes virtual and augmented reality material. Platforms that allow such content, such as the metaverse, are firmly in scope of the Bill and must take the required steps to protect their users from harm. I hope that gives the clarity that my noble friend and others were seeking and reassurance that the intent of Amendment 125 is satisfied.
The Bill will require companies to take proactive steps to tackle all forms of online child sexual abuse, including grooming, live streaming, child sexual abuse material and prohibited images of children. If AI-generated content amounts to a child’s sexual exploitation or abuse offence in the Bill, it will be subject to the illegal content duties. Regulated providers will need to take steps to remove this content. We will shortly bring forward, and have the opportunity to debate in Committee, a government amendment to address concerns relating to the sending of intimate images. This will cover the non-consensual sharing of manufactured images—more commonly known as deepfakes. The possession and distribution of altered images that appear to be indecent photographs of children is ready covered by the indecent images of children offences, which are very serious offences with robust punishment in law.
Will the review also cover an understanding of what has been happening in criminal cases where, in some of the examples that have been described, people have tried to take online activity to court? We will at that point understand whether the judges believe that existing offences cover some of these novel forms of activity. I hope the review will also extend not just to what Ofcom does as a regulator but to understand what the courts are doing in terms of the definitions of criminal activity and whether they are being effective in the new online spaces.
I believe it will. Certainly, both government and Parliament will take into account judgments in the court on this Bill and in related areas of law, and will, I am sure, want to respond.
It is not just the judgments of the courts; it is about how the criminal law as a very basic point has been framed. I invite my noble friend the Minister to please meet with the Dawes Centre, because it is about future crime. We could end up with a situation in which more and more violence, particularly against women and girls, is being committed in this space, and although it may be that the Bill has made it regulated, it may not fall within the province of the criminal law. That would be a very difficult situation for our law to end up in. Can my noble friend the Minister please meet with the Dawes Centre to talk about that point?
I am happy to reassure my noble friend that the director of the Dawes Centre for Future Crime sits on the Home Office’s Science Advisory Council, whose work is very usefully fed into the work being done at the Home Office. Colleagues at the Ministry of Justice keep criminal law under constant review, in light of research by such bodies and what we see in the courts and society. I hope that reassures my noble friend that the points she raised, which are covered by organisations such as the Dawes Centre, are very much in the mind of government.
The noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, explained very effectively the nuances of how behaviour translates to the virtual world. He is right that we will need to keep both offences and the framework under review. My noble friend Lady Berridge asked a good and clear question, to which I am afraid I do not have a similarly concise answer. I can reassure her that generated child sexual abuse and exploitation material is certainly illegal, but she asked about sexual harassment via a haptic suit; that would depend on the specific circumstances. I hope she will allow me to respond in writing, at greater length and more helpfully, to the very good question she asked.
Under Clause 56, Ofcom will also be required to undertake periodic reviews into the incidence and severity of content that is harmful to children on the in-scope services, and to recommend to the Secretary of State any appropriate changes to regulations based on its findings. Clause 141 also requires Ofcom to carry out research into users’ experiences of regulated services, which will likely include experiences of services such as the metaverse and other online spaces that allow user interaction. Under Clause 147, Ofcom may also publish reports on other online safety matters.
The questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, about international engagement are best addressed in a group covering regulatory co-operation, which I hope we will reach later today. I can tell him that we have introduced a new information-sharing gateway for the purpose of sharing information with overseas regulators, to ensure that Ofcom can collaborate effectively with its international counterparts. That builds on existing arrangements for sharing information that underpin Ofcom’s existing regulatory regimes.
The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, relate to providers’ judgments about when content produced by bots is illegal content, or a fraudulent advertisement, under the Bill. Clause 170 sets out that providers will need to take into account all reasonably available relevant information about content when making a judgment about its illegality. As we discussed in the group about illegal content, providers will need to treat content as illegal when this information gives reasonable grounds for inferring that an offence was committed. Content produced by bots is in scope of providers’ duties under the Bill. This includes the illegal content duties, and the same principles for assessing illegal content will apply to bot-produced content. Rather than drawing inferences about the conduct and intent of the user who generated the content, the Bill specifies that providers should consider the conduct and the intent of the person who can be assumed to have controlled the bot at the point it created the content in question.
The noble Lord’s amendment would set out that providers could make judgments about whether bot-produced content is illegal, either by reference to the conduct or mental state of the person who owns the bot or, alternatively, by reference to the person who controls it. As he set out in his explanatory statement and outlined in his speech, I understand he has brought this forward because he is concerned that providers will sometimes not be able to identify the controller of a bot, and that this will impede providers’ duties to take action against illegal content produced by them. Even when the provider does not know the identity of the person controlling the bot, however, in many cases there will still be evidence from which providers can draw inferences about the conduct and intent of that person, so we are satisfied that the current drafting of the Bill ensures that providers will be able to make a judgment on illegality.
My concern is also whether or not the bot is out of control. Can the Minister clarify that issue?
It depends on what the noble Lord means by “out of control” and what content the bot is producing. If he does not mind, this may be an issue which we should go through in technical detail and have a more free-flowing conservation with examples that we can work through.
This is a very interesting discussion; the noble Lord, Lord Knight, has hit on something really important. When somebody does an activity that we believe is criminal, we can interrogate them and ask how they came to do it and got to the conclusion that they did. The difficulty is that those of us who are not super-techy do not understand how you can interrogate a bot or an AI which appears to be out of control on how it got to the conclusion that it did. It may be drawing from lots of different places and there may be ownership of lots of different sources of information. I wonder whether that is why we are finding how this will be monitored in future so concerning. I am reassured that the noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, is nodding; does the Minister concur that this may be a looming problem for us?
I certainly concur that we should discuss the issue in greater detail. I am very happy to do so with the noble Lord, the noble Baroness and others who want to do so, along with officials. If we can bring some worked examples of what “in control” and “out of control” bots may be, that would be helpful.
I hope the points I have set out in relation to the other issues raised in this group and the amendments before us are satisfactory to noble Lords and that they will at this point be content not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to a thought-provoking and, I suspect, longer debate than we had anticipated. At Second Reading, I think we were all taken aback when this issue was opened up by my noble friend Lord Sarfraz; once again, we are realising that this requires really careful thought. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his also quite long and thoughtful response to this debate.
I feel that I owe the Committee a small apology. I am very conscious that I talked in quite graphic detail at the beginning when there were still children in the Gallery. I hope that I did not cause any harm, but it shows how serious this is that we have all had to think so carefully about what we have been saying—only in words, without any images. We should not underestimate how much this has demonstrated the importance of our debates.
On the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, I am a huge enthusiast, like the noble Lord, Lord Knight, for the wonders of the tech world and what it can bring. We are managing the balance in this Bill to make sure that this country can continue to benefit from and lead the opportunities of tech while recognising its real and genuine harms. I suggest that today’s debate has demonstrated the potential harm that the digital world can bring.
I listened carefully—as I am certain the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has been doing in the digital world—to my noble friend’s words. I am encouraged by what he has put on the record on Amendment 125, but there are some specific issues that it would be helpful for us to talk about, as he alluded to, after this debate and before Report. Let me highlight a couple of those.
First, I do not really understand the technical difference between a customer service bot and other bots. I am slightly worried that we are defining in the specific one type of bot that would not be captured by this Bill. I suspect that there might be others in future. We must think carefully through whether we are getting too much into the specifics of the technology and not general enough in making sure we capture where it could go. That is one example.
Secondly, as my noble friend Lady Berridge would say, I am not sure that we have got to the bottom of whether this Bill, coupled with the existing body of criminal law, will really enable law enforcement officers to progress the cases as they see fit and protect vulnerable women—and men—in the digital world. I very much hope we can extend the conversation there. We perhaps risk getting too close to the technical specifics if we are thinking about whether a haptic suit is in or out of scope of the Bill; I am certain that there will be other technologies that we have not even thought about yet that we will want to make sure that the Bill can capture.
I very much welcome the spirit in which this debate has been held. When I said that I would do this for the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, I did not realise quite what a huge debate we were opening up, but I thank everyone who has contributed and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been miscellany, indeed. We must be making progress if we are picking up amendments such as these. I thank noble Lords who have spoken to the amendments and the issues covered in them.
I turn first to Amendment 185A brought to us by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, which seeks to add duties on online marketplaces to limit children’s access to the sale of knives, and proactively to identify and remove listings which appear to encourage the sale of knives for the purposes of violence or self-harm. Tackling knife crime is a priority for His Majesty’s Government; we are determined to crack down on this violent scourge, which is devastating our communities. I hope that he will forgive me for not drawing on the case he mentioned, as it is still sub judice. However, I certainly take the point he makes; we are all too aware of cases like it up and down the country. I received an email recently from Amanda and Stuart Stephens, whose son, Olly, was murdered by two boys, one of whom was armed with a knife. All these cases are very much in our minds as we debate the Bill.
Let me try to reassure them and the noble Lord as well as other Members of the Committee that the Bill, through its existing duties and other laws on the statute book, already achieves what the noble Lord seeks with his amendment. The sale of offensive weapons and of knives to people under the age of 18 are criminal offences. Any online retailer which directly sells these prohibited items can already be held criminally liable. Once in force, the Bill will ensure that technology platforms, including online marketplaces, prevent third parties from using their platform to sell offensive weapons or knives to people under the age of 18. The Bill lists both these offences as priority offences, meaning that user-to-user services, including online marketplaces, will have a statutory obligation proactively to prevent these offences taking place on their services.
I am sorry to interrupt. The Minister has twice given a positive response, but he limited it to child sexual exploitation; he did not mention terrorism, which is in fact the bigger issue. Could he confirm that it is both?
Yes, and as I say, I am happy to talk with the noble Lord about this in greater detail. Under the Bill, category 1 companies will have a new duty to safeguard all journalistic content on their platform, which includes citizen journalism. But I will have to take all these points forward with him in our further discussions.
My noble friend Lord Bethell is not here to move his Amendment 220D, which would allow Ofcom to designate online safety regulatory duties under this legislation to other bodies. We have previously discussed a similar issue relating to the Internet Watch Foundation, so I shall not repeat the points that we have already made.
On the amendments on supposedly gendered language in relation to Ofcom advisory committees in Clauses 139 and 155, I appreciate the intention to make it clear that a person of either sex should be able to perform the role of chairman. The Bill uses the term “chairman” to be consistent with the terminology in the Office of Communications Act 2002, and we are confident that this will have no bearing on Ofcom’s decision-making on who will chair the advisory committees that it must establish, just as, I am sure, the noble Lord’s Amendment 56 does not seek to be restrictive about who might be an “ombudsman”.
I appreciate the intention of Amendment 262 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. It is indeed vital that the review reflects the experience of young people. Clause 159 provides for a review to be undertaken by the Secretary of State, and published and laid before Parliament, to assess the effectiveness of the regulatory framework. There is nothing in the existing legislation that would preclude seeking the views of young people either as part of an advisory group or in other ways. Moreover, the Secretary of State is required to consult Ofcom and other persons she considers appropriate. In relation to young people specifically, it may be that a number of different approaches will be effective—for example, consulting experts or representative groups on children’s experiences online. That could include people of all ages. The regulatory framework is designed to protect all users online, and it is right that we take into account the full spectrum of views from people who experience harms, whatever their age and background, through a consultation process that balances all their interests.
Amendment 268AA from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, relates to reporting requirements for online abuse and harassment, including where this is racially motivated—an issue we have discussed in Questions and particularly in relation to sport. His amendment would place an additional requirement on all service providers, even those not in scope of the Bill. The Bill’s scope extends only to user-to-user and search services. It has been designed in this way to tackle the risk of harm to users where it is highest. Bringing additional companies in scope would dilute the efforts of the legislation in this important regard.
Clauses 16 and 26 already require companies to set up systems and processes that allow users easily to report illegal content, including illegal online abuse and harassment. This amendment would therefore duplicate this existing requirement. It also seeks to create an additional requirement for companies to report illegal online abuse and harassment to the Crown Prosecution Service. The Bill does not place requirements on in-scope companies to report their investigations into crimes that occur online, other than child exploitation and abuse. This is because the Bill aims to prevent and reduce the proliferation of illegal material and the resulting harm it causes to so many. Additionally, Ofcom will be able to require companies to report on the incidence of illegal content on their platforms in its transparency reports, as well as the steps they are taking to tackle that content.
I hope that reassures the noble Lord that the Bill intends to address the problems he has outlined and those explored in the exchange with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. With that, I hope that noble Lords will support the government amendments in this group and be satisfied not to press theirs at this point.
My Lords, I listened very carefully to the Minister’s response to both my amendments. He has gone some way to satisfying my concerns. I listened carefully to the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and noble Lords on the Lib Dem Benches. I am obviously content to withdraw my amendment.
I do not quite agree with the Minister’s point about dilution on the last amendment—I see it as strengthening —but I accept that the amendments themselves slightly stretch the purport of this element of the legislation. I shall review the Minister’s comments and I suspect that I shall be satisfied with what he said.
I am grateful to noble Lords for helping us to reach our target for the first time in this Committee, especially to do so in a way which has given us a good debate on which to send us off into the Whitson Recess. I am off to the Isle of Skye, so I will make a special detour to Balmacara in honour of the noble Lord.
The noble Lord does not believe anything that I say at this Dispatch Box, but I will send a postcard.
As noble Lords are by now well aware, all services in scope of the Bill, regardless of their size, will be required to take action against illegal content and all services likely to be accessed by children must put in place protections for children. Companies designated as category 1 providers have significant additional duties. These include the overarching transparency, accountability and freedom of expression duties, as well as duties on content of democratic importance, news publishers’ content, journalistic content and fraudulent advertising. It is right to put such duties only on the largest platforms with features enabling the greatest reach, as they have the most significant influence over public discourse online.
I turn first to Amendment 192 in the name of my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes and Amendment 192A from the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, which are designed to widen category 1 definitions to include services that pose a risk of harm, regardless of their number of users. Following removal of the legal but harmful provisions in another place, the Bill no longer includes the concept of risk of harm in Category 1 designation. As we set out, it would not be right for the Government to define what legal content it considers harmful to adults, and it follows that it would not be appropriate for the Government to categorise providers and to require them to carry out duties based on this definition.
In addition, requiring all companies to comply with the full range of Category 1 duties would pose a disproportionate burden on services which do not exert the same influence over public discourse online. I appreciate the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, with regard to regulatory burden. There is a practical element to this as well. Services, particularly smaller ones, have finite resources. Imposing additional duties on them would divert them from complying with their illegal and child safety duties, which address the most serious online harms. We do not want to weaken their ability to tackle criminal activity or to protect children.
As we discussed in detail in a previous debate, the Bill tackles suicide and self-harm content in a number of ways. The most robust protections in the Bill are for children, while those for adults strike a balance between adults being protected from illegal content and given more choice over what legal content they see. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked why we do not start with the highest risk rather than thinking about the largest services, but we do. We start with the most severe harms—illegal activity and harm to children. We are focusing on the topics of greatest risk and then, for other categories, allowing adults to make decisions about the content with which they interact online.
A number of noble Lords referred to suicide websites and fora. We are concerned about the widespread availability of content online which promotes and advertises methods of suicide and self-harm, which can be easily accessed by young or vulnerable people. Under the Bill, where suicide and self-harm websites host user-generated content, they will be in scope of the legislation. These sites will need proactively to prevent users from being exposed to priority illegal content, including content which encourages or assists suicide under the terms of the Suicide Act 1961. Additionally, it is an offence under Section 4(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 for a website to offer to sell controlled drugs to consumers in England and Wales. Posting advice on how to obtain such drugs in England and Wales is also likely to be an offence, regardless of where the person providing the advice is located.
The Bill also limits the availability of such content by placing illegal content duties on search services, including harmful content which affects children or where this content is shared on user-to-user services. This will play a key role in reducing traffic that directs people to websites which encourage or assist suicide, and reduce the likelihood of users encountering such content. The noble Baroness, Lady Bull, asked about starvation. Encouraging people to starve themselves or not to take prescribed medication will be covered.
Amendment 194 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, seeks to ensure that Ofcom can designate companies as category 1, 2A or 2B on a provisional basis, when it considers that they are likely to meet the relevant thresholds. This would mean that the relevant duties can be applied to them, pending a full assessment by Ofcom. The Government recognise the concern highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Allan, about the rapid pace of change in the technology sector and how that can make it challenging to keep the register of the largest and most influential services up to date. I assure noble Lords that the Bill addresses this with a duty which the Government introduced during the Bill’s recommittal in another place. This duty, at Clause 88, requires Ofcom proactively to identify and publish a list of companies which are close to category 1 thresholds. This will reduce any delays in Ofcom adding additional obligations on companies which grow rapidly, or which introduce new high-risk features. It will also ensure that the regime remains agile and adaptable to emerging threats.
Platforms with the largest reach and greatest influence over public discourse will be designated as category 1. The Bill sets out a clear process for determining category 1 providers, based on thresholds relating to these criteria, which will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. The process has been designed to ensure that it is transparent and evidence-based. We expect the main social media platforms and possibly some others to be designated as category 1 services, but we do not wish to prejudge the process set out above by indicating which specific services are likely to be designated, as I have set out on previous groups.
The amendment would enable Ofcom to place new duties on companies without due process. Under the approach that we take in the Bill, Ofcom can designate companies as belonging to each category based only on an objective assessment of evidence against thresholds approved by Parliament. The Government’s approach also provides greater certainty for companies, as is proposed in this amendment. We have heard concerns in previous debates about when companies will have the certainty of knowing their category designation. These amendments would introduce continuous uncertainty and subjectivity into the designation process and would give Ofcom significant discretion over which companies should be subject to which duties. That would create a very uncertain operating environment for businesses and could reduce the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business.
I hope that explains why we are not taken by these amendments but, in the spirit of the Whitsun Recess, I will certainly think about them on the train as I head north. I am very happy to discuss them with noble Lords and others between now and our return.
Before the Minister sits down, he did let slip that he was going on the sleeper, so I do not think that there will be much thinking going on—although I did not sleep a wink the last time I went, so I am sure that he will have plenty of time.
I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, will want to come in—but could he repeat that again? Risk assessment drives us, but the risk assessment for a company that will not be regarded as a category 1 provider because it does not meet categorisation thresholds means that, even though it is higher risk than perhaps even some of the category 1 companies, it will not be subject to the requirements to pick up the particular issues raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, and their concerns for those issues, which are clearly social harms, will not really be considered on a par.
In the response I gave, I said that we are making the risk assessment that the riskiest behaviour is illegal content and content which presents a harm to children. That is the assessment and the approach taken in the Bill. In relation to other content which is legal and for adults to choose how they encounter it, there are protections in the Bill to enforce terms of service and empower users to curate their own experience online, but that assessment is made by adult users within the law.
I thank all noble Lords who spoke in this short but important debate. As we heard, some issues relating to risk and harm have been returned to and will no doubt be again, and we note the impact of the absence of legal but harmful as a concept. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, said, I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, was very sad that she could not be here this afternoon due to another engagement.
I will not keep the House much longer. I particularly noted the noble Baroness’s point that there should not be, and is not, a direct relationship between the size of the platform and its ability to cause harm. There is a balance to be struck between the regulatory burden placed on platforms versus the health and well-being of those who are using them. As I have said before, I am not sure that we have always got that particular balance right in the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Allan, was very constructive: it has to be a good thing if we are now beginning to think about the Bill’s implementation, although we have not quite reached the end and I do not want to prejudge any further stages, in the sense that we are now thinking about how this would work. Of course, he is right to say that some of these platforms have no intention of complying with these rules at all. Ofcom and the Government will have to work out what to do about that.
Ultimately, the Government of the day—whoever it might be—will want the powers to be able to say that a small platform is deeply harmful in terms of its content and reach. When the Bill has been passed, there will be pressure at some point in the future on a platform that is broadcasting or distributing or amplifying content that is deeply harmful. Although I will withdraw the amendment today, my noble friend’s offer of further conversations, and more detail on categorisation and of any review of the platforms as categorised as category 1, 2 and beyond, would be very helpful in due course. I beg leave to withdraw.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I regret that my noble friend Lord Lipsey is unable to be here. I wish him and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, well. I also regret that my noble friend Lord Stevenson is not here to wind up this debate and introduce his Amendment 127. Our inability to future-proof these proceedings means that, rather than talking to the next group, I am talking to this one.
I want to make four principal points. First, the principle of press freedom, as discussed by the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Faulks, in particular, is an important one. We do not think that this is the right Bill to reopen those issues. We look forward to the media Bill as the opportunity to discuss these things more fully across the House.
Secondly, I have some concerns about the news publisher exemption. In essence, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, set out, as long as you have a standards code, a complaints process, a UK address and a team of contributors, the exemption applies. That feels a bit loose to me, and it opens up the regime to some abuse. I hear what the noble Baronesses, Lady Gohir and Lady Grey-Thompson, said about how we already see pretty dodgy outfits allowing racist and abusive content to proliferate. I look forward to the Minister’s comments on whether the bar we have at the moment is too low and whether there is some reflection to be done on that.
The third point is on my noble friend Lord Stevenson’s Amendment 127, which essentially says that we should set a threshold around whether complaints are dealt with in a timely manner. In laying that amendment, my noble friend essentially wanted to probe. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is here, so this is a good chance to have him listen to me say that we think that complaints should be dealt with more swiftly and that the organisation that he chairs could do better at dealing with that.
My fourth comment is about comments, particularly after listening to the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, about some of the hateful comment that is hidden away inside the comments that news publishers carry. I was very much struck by what she said in respect of some of the systems of virality that are now being adopted by those platforms. There, I think Amendment 227 is tempting. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, said, and I think I agree that this is better addressed by Parliament.
For me, that just reinforces the need for this Bill, more than any other that I have ever worked on in this place, to have post-legislative scrutiny by Parliament so that we, as a Parliament, can review whether the regime we are setting up is running appropriately. It is such a novel regime, in particular around regulating algorithms and artificial intelligence. It would be an opportunity to see whether, in this case, the systems of virality were creating an amplification of harm away from the editorial function that the news publishers are able to exercise over the comments.
On that basis, and given the hour, I am happy to listen with care to the wise words of the Minister.
My Lords, I join noble Lords who have sent their best wishes to the noble Lords, Lord Lipsey and Lord McNally.
His Majesty’s Government are committed to defending the invaluable role of a free media. We are clear that our online safety legislation must protect the vital role of the press in providing people with reliable and accurate information.
We have included strong protections for news publishers’ and journalistic content in the Bill, which extends to the exemption from the Bill’s safety duties for users’ comments and reviews on news publishers’ sites. This reflects a wider exemption for comments and reviews on provider content more generally. For example, reviews of products on retailers’ sites are also exempt from regulation. This is designed to avoid disproportionate regulatory burden on low-risk services.
Amendment 124 intends to modify that exemption, so that the largest news websites no longer benefit and are subject to the Bill’s regulatory regime. Below-the-line comments are crucial for enabling reader engagement with the news and encouraging public debate, as well as for the sustainability—and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, put it, the accountability—of the news media. We do not consider it proportionate, necessary or compatible with our commitment to press freedom to subject these comment sections to oversight by Ofcom.
We recognise that there can sometimes be unpleasant or abusive below-the-line comments. We have carefully considered the risks of this exemption against the need to protect freedom of speech and media freedoms on matters of public interest. Although comment functions will not be subject to online regulation, I reassure the Members of the Committee who raised concerns about some of the comments which have attracted particular attention that sites hosting such comments can, in some circumstances, be held liable for any illegal content appearing on them, where they have actual knowledge of the content in question and fail to remove it expeditiously.
The strong protections for recognised news publishers in the Bill include exempting their content from the Bill’s safety duties, requiring category 1 platforms to notify recognised news publishers and to offer a right of appeal before removing or moderating any of their content. Clause 50 stipulates the clear criteria that publishers will have to meet to be considered a “recognised news publisher” and to benefit from those protections. When drafting these criteria, the Government have been careful to ensure that established news publishers are captured, while limiting the opportunity for bad actors to qualify.
Amendment 126 seeks to restrict the criteria for recognised news publishers in the Bill, so that only members of an approved regulator within the meaning of Section 42 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 benefit from the protections offered by the Bill. This would create strong incentives for publishers to join specific press regulators. We do not consider this to be compatible with our commitment to a free press. We will repeal existing legislation that could have that effect, specifically Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, through the media Bill, as noble Lords have noted, which has recently been published. Without wanting to make a rod for my own back when we come to that Bill, I agree with my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood that it would be the opportunity to have this debate, if your Lordships so wished.
The current effect of this amendment would be to force all news publishers to join a single press regulator—namely Impress, the only UK regulator which has sought approval by the Press Recognition Panel—if they were to benefit from the exclusion for recognised news publishers. Requiring a publisher to join specific regulators is, in the view of His Majesty’s Government, not only incompatible with protecting press freedom in the UK but unnecessary given the range of detailed criteria which a publisher must meet to qualify for the additional protections, as set out in Clause 50 of the Bill.
As part of our commitment to media freedom, we are committed to independent self-regulation of the press. As I have indicated, Clause 50 stipulates the clear criteria which publishers will have to meet to be considered a “recognised news publisher” and to benefit from the protections in the Bill. One of those criteria is for entities to have policies and procedures for handling and resolving complaints. Amendment 127 from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, adds a requirement that these policies and procedures must cover handling and resolving complaints “in a timely manner”. To include such a requirement will place the responsibility on Ofcom to decide what constitutes “timely”, and, in effect, put it in the position of press regulator. That is not something that we would like. We believe that the criteria set out in Clause 50 are already strong, and we have taken significant care to ensure that established news publishers are captured, while limiting the opportunity for bad actors to benefit.
I turn now to Amendment 227. We recognise that, as legislation comes into force, it will be necessary to ensure that the protections we have put in place for journalistic and news publisher content are effective. We need to ensure that the regulatory framework does not hinder access to such content, particularly in the light of the fact that, in the past, news content has sometimes been removed or made less visible by social media moderators or algorithms for unclear reasons, often at the height of news cycles. That is why we have required Ofcom to produce a specific report, under Clause 144, assessing the impact of the Bill on the availability and treatment of news publisher and journalistic content on category 1 services.
Before the Minister closes his folder and sits down, perhaps I could say that I listened carefully and would just like him to reflect a little more for us on my question of whether the bar is set too low and there is too much wriggle room in the exemption around news publishers. A tighter definition might be something that would benefit the Bill and the improvement of the Bill when we come back to it on Report.
Looking at the length of Clause 50—and I note that the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, made much the same point in his speech—I think the definitions set out in Clause 50 are extensive. Clause 50(1) sets out a number of recognised news publishers, obviously including
“the British Broadcasting Corporation, Sianel Pedwar Cymru”—
self-evidently, as well as
“the holder of a licence under the Broadcasting Act 1990 or 1996”
or
“any other entity which … meets all of the conditions in subsection (2), and … is not an excluded entity”
as set out in subsection (3). Subsection (2) sets out a number of specific criteria which I think capture the recognised news publishers we want to see.
Noble Lords will be aware of the further provisions we have brought forward to make sure that entities that are subject to a sanction are not able to qualify, such as—
I think it is actually quite important that there is—to use the language of the Bill—a risk assessment around the notion that people might game it. I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, made a very good point. People are very inventive and, if you have ever engaged with the people who run some of those big US misinformation sites—let us just call them that—you will know that they have very inventive, very clever people. They will be looking at this legislation and if they figure out that by opening a UK office and ticking all the boxes they will now get some sorts of privileges in terms of distributing their misinformation around the world, they will do it. They will try it, so I certainly think it is worth there being at least some kind of risk assessment against that happening.
In two years’ time we will be able to see whether the bad thing happened, but whether or not it is the Minister having a conversation with Ofcom now, I just think that forewarned is forearmed. We know that that is a possibility and it would be helpful for some work to be done now to make sure that that is not a loophole that none of us want, I think.
I am mindful of the examples the noble Lord gave in his speech. Looking at some of the provisions set out in subsection (2) about a body being
“subject to a standards code”
or having
“policies and procedures for handling and resolving complaints”,
I think on first response that those examples he gave would be covered. But I will certainly take on board the comments he made and those the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, made as well and reflect on them. I hope—
On a final point of clarification, in contrast, I think the exemption may be too narrow, not too broad. With the emergence of blogs and different kinds of news organisations—I think the noble Lord, Lord Allan, described well the complexity of what we have—and some of the grimmer, grosser examples of people who might play the system, does the Minister acknowledge that that might be dealt with by the kind of exemptions that have been used for RT? When somebody is really an extremist representative of, I do not know, ISIS, pretending to be a media organisation, the sensible thing to do would be to exempt them, rather than to overtighten the exemptions, so that new, burgeoning, widely read online publications can have press freedom protection.
I will certainly take on board the points the noble Baroness raises. Hearing representations in both directions on the point would, on first consideration, reassure me that we have it right, but I will certainly take on board the points which the noble Baroness, the noble Lord and others have raised in our debate on this. As the noble Lord, Lord Allan, suggests, I will take the opportunity to discuss it with Ofcom, as we will do on many of the issues which we are discussing in this Committee, to make sure that its views are taken on board before we return to these and other issues on Report.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, who is clearly passionate about this aspect. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, this is one of the most important groups of amendments that we have to debate on the Bill, even though we are on day eight of Committee. As she said, it is about the right assignment of responsibilities, so it is fundamental to the way that the Bill will operate.
My noble friend Lord Allan brilliantly summed up many of the arguments, and he has graphically described the problem of ministerial overreach, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Harding. We on these Benches strongly support the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and those put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. Obviously, there is some difference of emphasis. They each follow the trail of the different committees of which their proposers were members, which is entirely understandable. I recall that the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, was the hinge between the two committees—and brilliantly he did that. I very much hope that, when we come back at the next stage, if the Minister has not moved very far, we will find a way to combine those two strands. I think they are extremely close—many noble Lords have set out where we are on accountability and oversight.
Strangely, we are not trying to get out of the frying pan of the Secretary of State being overbearing and move to where we have no parliamentary oversight. Both the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, are clearly in favour of greater oversight of Ofcom. The question is whether it is oversight of the codes and regulation or of Ofcom itself. I think we can find a way to combine those two strands. In that respect, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox: it is all about making sure that we have the right kind of oversight.
I add my thanks to Carnegie UK. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, set out the arguments, and we have the benefit of the noble Baroness’s letter to the Secretary of State of 30 January, which she mentioned in her speech. They have set out very clearly where speakers in this debate unanimously want to go.
The Government have suggested some compromise on Clause 39. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson said, we have not seen any wording for that, but I think it is highly unlikely that that, by itself, will satisfy the House when we come to Report.
There are many amendments here which deal with the Secretary of State’s powers, but I believe that the key ones are the product of both committees, which is about the Joint Committee. If noble Lords read the Government’s response to our Joint Committee on the draft Bill, they will see that the arguments given by the Government are extremely weak. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, who used the phrase “democratic deficit”. That is exactly what we are not seeking: we are trying to open this out and make sure we have better oversight and accountability. That is the goal of the amendments today. We have heard from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, about the power of lobbying by companies. Equally, we have heard about how the Secretary of State can be overbearing. That is the risk we are trying to avoid. I very much hope that the Minister sees his way to taking on board at least some of whichever set of amendments he prefers.
My Lords, the amendments concern the independence of Ofcom and the role of parliamentary scrutiny. They are therefore indeed an important group, as those things will be vital to the success of the regime that the Bill sets up. Introducing a new, ground-breaking regime means balancing the need for regulatory independence with a transparent system of checks and balances. The Bill therefore gives powers to the Secretary of State comprising a power to direct Ofcom to modify a code of practice, a power to issue a statement of strategic priorities and a power to issue non-binding guidance to the regulator.
These powers are important but not novel; they have precedent in the Communications Act 2003, which allows the Secretary of State to direct Ofcom in respect of its network and spectrum functions, and the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, which allows the Secretary of State to make directions to the Regulator of Social Housing to amend its standards. At the same time, I agree that it is important that we have proportionate safeguards in place for the use of these powers, and I am very happy to continue to have discussions with noble Lords to make sure that we do.
Amendment 110, from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to introduce a lengthier process regarding parliamentary approval of codes of practice, requiring a number of additional steps before they are laid in Parliament. It proposes that each code may not come into force unless accompanied by an impact assessment covering a range of factors. Let me reassure noble Lords that Ofcom is already required to consider these factors; it is bound by the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010 and the Human Rights Act 1998 and must ensure that the regime and the codes of practice are compliant with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. It must also consult experts on matters of equality and human rights when producing its codes.
Amendment 110 also proposes that any designated Select Committee in either House has to report on each code and impact assessment before they can be made. Under the existing process, all codes must already undergo scrutiny by both Houses before coming into effect. The amendment would also introduce a new role for the devolved Administrations. Let me reassure noble Lords that the Government are working closely with them already and will continue to do so over the coming months. As set out in Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998, however, telecommunications and thereby internet law and regulation is a reserved policy area, so input from the devolved Administrations may be more appropriately sought through other means.
Amendments 111, 113, 114, 115, and 117 to 120 seek to restrict or remove the ability of the Secretary of State to issue directions to Ofcom to modify draft codes of practice. Ofcom has great expertise as a regulator, as noble Lords noted in this debate, but there may be situations where a topic outside its remit needs to be reflected in a code of practice. In those situations, it is right for the Government to be able to direct Ofcom to modify a draft code. This could, for example, be to ensure that a code reflects advice from the security services, to which Ofcom does not have access. Indeed, it is particularly important that the Secretary of State be able to direct Ofcom on matters of national security and public safety, where the Government will have access to information which Ofcom will not.
I have, however, heard the concerns raised by many in your Lordships’ House, both today and on previous occasions, that these powers could allow for too much executive control. I can assure your Lordships that His Majesty’s Government are committed to protecting the regulatory independence of Ofcom, which is vital to the success of the framework. With this in mind, we have built a number of safeguards into the use of the powers, to ensure that they do not impinge on regulatory independence and are used only in limited circumstances and for the appropriate reasons.
I have heard the strong feelings expressed that this power must not unduly restrict regulatory independence, and indeed share that feeling. In July, as noble Lords noted, the Government announced our intention to make substantive changes to the power; these changes will make it clear that the power is for use only in exceptional circumstances and will replace the “public policy” wording in Clause 39 with a defined list of reasons for which a direction can be made. I am happy to reiterate that commitment today, and to say that we will be making these changes on Report when, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, rightly said, noble Lords will be able to see the wording and interrogate it properly.
Additionally, in light of the debate we have just had today—
Can my noble friend the Minister clarify what he has just said? When he appeared in front of the Communications and Digital Committee, I think he might have been road-testing some of that language. In the specific words used, he would still have allowed the Secretary of State to direct Ofcom for economic reasons. Is that likely to remain the case? If it is, I feel it will not actually meet what I have heard is the will of the Committee.
When we publish the wording, we will rightly have an opportunity to discuss it before the debate on Report. I will be happy to discuss it with noble Lords then. On the broader points about economic policy, that is a competency of His Majesty’s Government, not an area of focus for Ofcom. If the Government had access to additional information that led them to believe that a code of practice as drafted could have a significant, disproportionate and adverse effect on the livelihoods of the British people or to the broader economy, and if it met the test for exceptional circumstances, taking action via a direction from the Secretary of State could be warranted. I will happily discuss that when my noble friend and others see the wording of the changes we will bring on Report. I am sure we will scrutinise that properly, as we should.
I was about to say that, in addition to the commitment we have already made, in the light of the debate today we will also consider whether transparency about the use of this power could be increased further, while retaining the important need for government oversight of issues that are genuinely beyond Ofcom’s remit. I am conscious that, as my noble friend Lady Stowell politely said, I did not convince her or your Lordships’ committee when I appeared before it with my honourable friend Paul Scully. I am happy to continue our discussions and I hope that we may reach some understanding on this important area.
I am sorry to interrupt, but may I clarify what my noble friend just said? I think he said that, although he is open to increasing the transparency of the procedure, he does not concede a change—from direction to a letter about guidance which Ofcom should take account of. Is he willing to consider that as well?
I am happy to continue to discuss it, and I will say a bit more about the other amendments in this group, but I am not able to say much more at this point. I will happily follow this up in discussion with my noble friend, as I know it is an issue of interest to her and other members of your Lordships’ committee.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked about our international obligations. As noble Lords noted, the Government have recognised the importance of regulatory independence in our work with international partners, such as the Council of Europe’s declaration on the independence of regulators. That is why we are bringing forward the amendments previously announced in another place. Ensuring that powers of direction can be issued only in exceptional circumstances and for a set of reasons defined in the Bill will ensure that the operational independence of Ofcom is not put at risk. That said, we must strike a balance between parliamentary oversight and being able to act quickly where necessary.
Regarding the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady Stowell, which calls for all codes which have been altered by a direction to go through the affirmative procedure, as drafted, the negative procedure is used only if a direction is made to a code of practice relating to terrorism or child sexual exploitation or abuse, for reasons of national security or public safety. It is important that the parliamentary process be proportionate, particularly in cases involving national security or public safety, where a code might need to be amended quickly to protect people from harm. We therefore think that, in these cases, the negative procedure is more appropriate.
On timing, the Government are committed to ensuring that the framework is implemented quickly, and this includes ensuring that the codes of practice are in force. The threshold of exceptional circumstances for the power to direct can lead to a delay only in situations where there would otherwise be significant consequences for national security or public safety, or for the other reasons outlined today.
My noble friend Lord Moylan was not able to be here for the beginning of the debate on this group, but he is here now. Let me say a little about his Amendment 254. Under Clause 153, the Secretary of State can set out a statement of the Government’s strategic priorities in relation to matters of online safety. This power is necessary, as future technological changes are likely to shape online harms, and the Government must be able to state their strategic priorities in relation to them. My noble friend’s amendment would go beyond the existing precedent for the statement of strategic priorities in relation to telecommunications, management of the radio spectrum, and postal services outlined in the Communications Act. The Secretary of State must consult Ofcom and other appropriate persons when preparing this statement. This provides the opportunity for widespread scrutiny of a draft statement before it can be designated through a negative parliamentary procedure. We consider that the negative procedure is appropriate, in line with comparable existing arrangements.
Amendment 257 from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s power to issue guidance to Ofcom about the exercise of its online safety functions. Issuing guidance of this kind, with appropriate safeguards, including consultation and limitations on its frequency, is an important part of future-proofing the regime. New information—for example, resulting from parliamentary scrutiny or technological developments—may require the Government to clarify the intent of the legislation.
Amendments 258 to 260 would require the guidance to be subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament. Currently, Ofcom must be consulted, and any guidance must be laid before Parliament. The Bill does not subject the guidance to a parliamentary procedure because the guidance does not create any statutory requirements, and Ofcom is required only to have had regard to it. We think that remains the right approach.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has made clear his intention to question Clause 156, which grants the Secretary of State the power to direct Ofcom’s media literacy activity only in special circumstances. This ensures that the regulatory framework is equipped to respond to significant future threats—for example, to the health or safety of the public, or to national security. I have already set out, in relation to other amendments, why we think it is right that the Secretary of State can direct Ofcom in these circumstances.
The delegated powers in the Bill are crucial to ensuring that the regulatory regime keeps pace with changes in this area. Amendment 290 from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, would go beyond the existing legislative process for these powers, by potentially providing for additional committees to be, in effect, inserted into the secondary legislative process. Established committees themselves are able to decide whether to scrutinise parts of a regime in more detail, so I do not think they need a Parkinson rule to do that.
Noble Lords have expressed a common desire to see this legislation implemented as swiftly as possible, so I hope they share our wariness of any amendments which could slow that process down. The process as envisaged in this amendment is an open-ended one, which could delay implementation. Of course, however, it is important that Parliament is able to scrutinise the work of the regulator. Like most other regulators, Ofcom is accountable to Parliament on how it exercises its functions. The Secretary of State is required to present its annual report and accounts before both Houses. Ministers from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland must also lay a copy of the report before their respective Parliament or Assembly. Moreover, the officers of Ofcom can be required to appear before Select Committees to answer questions about its operations on an annual basis. Parliament will also have a role in approving a number of aspects of the regulatory framework through its scrutiny of both the primary and secondary legislation. This will include the priority categories for harms and Ofcom’s codes of practice.
More broadly, we want to ensure that this ground-breaking legislation has the impact we intend. Ongoing parliamentary scrutiny of it will be crucial to help to ensure that. There is so much expertise in both Houses, and it has already helped to improve this legislation, through the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, the DCMS Select Committee in another place and, of course, your Lordships’ Communications and Digital Committee.
As my noble friend Lady Stowell said, we must guard against fragmentation and duplication, which we are very mindful of. Although we do not intend to legislate for a new committee—as I set out on previous occasions, including at Second Reading and before the Communications and Digital Committee—we remain happy to discuss possible mechanisms for oversight to ensure that we make best use of the expertise in both Houses of Parliament so that the Bill delivers what we want. With that, I hope that Members of the Committee will be happy to continue the discussions in this area and not press their amendments.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his comprehensive response and for the welcome change in tone and the openness to further debate and discussions. I thank all those who spoke in the debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Harding, was right: we are getting into a routine where we know roughly where our places are and, if we have contributions to make, we make them in the right order and make them comprehensive. We did our bit quite well, but I am afraid that the Minister’s response made me a bit confused. As I said, I welcome the change of tone, the sense of engagement with some of the issues and the ability to meet to discuss ways forward in some of those areas. But he then systematically and rather depressingly shut off just about everything that I thought we were going to discuss. I may be overstating that, so I will read Hansard carefully to make sure that there are still chinks of light in his hitherto impenetrable armour. I really must stop using these metaphors— I thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, had managed to get me off the hook with her question about whether we were an island of concrete rock, and about whether the boat was going to end up in the stormy sea that we were creating. I decided that I could not follow that, so I will not.
We ought to take forward and address three things, which I will briefly go through in the response. One that we did not nail down was the good point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, that we had focused on regulatory structures in the form of set bodies relating—or not relating—to parliamentary procedures and to Ministers and their operations. She pointed out that, actually, the whole system has a possible drag effect that we also need to think about. I note that good point because we probably need a bit of time to think about how that would work in the structures that come forward.
The noble Lord, Lord Allan, said that we are trying to look at the changing of the accountability model. I disagree with the word “changing” because we are not trying to change anything; we have a model that works, but the new factor that we are trying to accommodate is the intensity of interaction and, as we said, the amplification that comes from the internet. I worry that this was not being picked up enough in the Minister’s response, but we will pick it up later and see if we can get through it.
The three points I wanted to make sure of were as follows. Following the line taken by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, one point is on trying to find a proper balance between the independence of the regulator; the Secretary of State’s right, as an elected leader of this aspect of the Government, to make recommendations and proposals to that regulator on how the system can be better; and Parliament’s ability to find a place in that structure, which is still eluding us a little, so we will need to spend more time on it. There is enough there to be reassured that we will find a way of balancing the independence of the regulator and the role of the Secretary of State. It does not need as many mentions in the legislation as it currently has. There is clearly a need for the Secretary of State to be able to issue direction in cases of national security et cetera—but it is the “et cetera” that I worry about: what are these instances? Until they are nailed down and in the Bill, there has to be a question about that.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, set out at the beginning of this debate, the amendments in this group have involved extensive discussions among Members in both Houses of Parliament, who sit on all sides of both Houses. I am very grateful for the way noble Lords and Members in another place have done that. They have had those preliminary discussions so that our discussions in the debate today and in preparation for it could be focused and detailed. I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friends Lord Bethell and Lady Harding, who have been involved in extensive discussions with others and then with us in government. These have been very helpful indeed; they continue, and I am happy to commit to their continuing.
Age-assurance technologies will play an important role in supporting the child safety duties in this Bill. This is why reference is made to them on the face of the Bill—to make it clear that the Government expect these measures to be used for complying with the duties to protect children from harmful content and activity online. Guidance under Clause 48 will already cover pornographic content. While this is not currently set out in the legislation, the Government intend, as noble Lords know, to designate pornographic content as a category of primary priority content which is harmful to children. As I set out to your Lordships’ House during our debate on harms to children, we will amend the Bill on Report to list the categories of primary and primary priority content on the face of the Bill.
I am very grateful to noble Lords for the engagement we have had on some of the points raised in Amendments 142 and 306 in recent weeks. As we have been saying in those discussions, the Government are confident that the Bill already largely achieves the outcomes sought here, either through existing provisions in it or through duties in other legislation, including data protection legislation, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010. That is why we think that re-stating duties on providers which are already set out in the Bill, or repeating duties set out in other legislation, risks causing uncertainty, and why we need to be careful about imposing specific timelines on Ofcom by which it must produce age-assurance guidance. It is essential that we protect Ofcom’s ability robustly to fulfil its consultation duties for the codes of practice. If Ofcom is given insufficient time to fulfil these duties, the risk of legal challenge being successful is increased.
I welcome Ofcom’s recent letter to your Lordships, outlining its implementation road map, which I hope provides some reassurance directly from the regulator on this point. Ofcom will prioritise protecting children from pornography and other harmful content. It intends to publish, this autumn, draft guidance for Part 5 pornography duties and draft codes of practice for Part 3 illegal content duties, including for child sexual exploitation and abuse content. Draft codes of practice for children’s safety duties will follow next summer. These elements of the regime are being prioritised ahead of others, such as the category 1 duties, to reflect the critical importance of protecting children.
Although we believe that the Bill already largely achieves the outcomes sought, we acknowledge the importance of ensuring that there are clear principles for Ofcom to apply when recommending or requiring the use of age-assurance technologies. I am happy to reassure noble Lords that the Government will continue to consider this further and are happy to continue our engagement on this issue, although any amendment must be made in a way that sits alongside existing legislation and within the framework of the Bill.
I turn to Amendments 161 and 183. First, I will take the opportunity to address some confusion about the requirements in Parts 3 and 5 of the Bill. The Bill ensures that companies must prevent children accessing online pornography, regardless of whether it is regulated in Part 3 or Part 5. The Government are absolutely clear on this point; anything less would be unacceptable. The most effective approach to achieving this is to focus on the outcome of preventing children accessing harmful content, which is what the Bill does. If providers do not prevent children accessing harmful content, Ofcom will be able to bring enforcement action against them.
I will address the point raised by my noble friend Lord Bethell about introducing a standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” for age verification for pornography. As my noble friend knows, we think this a legally unsuitable test which would require Ofcom to determine the state of mind of the provider, which would be extremely hard to prove and would therefore risk allowing providers to evade their duties. A clear, objective duty is the best way to ensure that Ofcom can enforce compliance effectively. The Bill sets clear outcomes which Ofcom will be able to take action on if these are not achieved by providers. A provider will be compliant only if it puts in place systems and processes which meet the objective requirements of the child safety duties.
The provisions in the Bill on proportionality are important to ensure that the requirements in the child safety duties are tailored to the size and capacity of providers. Smaller providers or providers with less capacity are still required to meet the child safety duties where their services pose a risk to children. They will need to put in place sufficiently stringent systems and processes that reflect the level of risk on their services and will need to make sure these systems and processes achieve the required outcomes of the child safety duties.
The Government expect companies to use age-verification technologies to prevent children accessing services which pose the highest risk of harm to children, such as online pornography. However, companies may use another approach if it is proportionate to the findings of the child safety risk assessment and a provider’s size and capacity. This is an important element to ensure that the regulatory framework remains risk-based and proportionate.
Age verification may not always be the most appropriate or effective approach for user-to-user companies to comply with their duties. For example, if a user-to-user service such as a social medium does not allow—
I am sorry to interrupt. The Minister said that he would bear in mind proportionality in relation to size and capacity. Is that not exactly the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, was trying to make? In relation to children, why will that be proportionate? A single child being damaged in this way is too much.
The issue was in relation to a provider’s size and capacity; it is an issue of making sure it is effective and enforceable, and proportionate to the size of the service in question. It may also not be the most effective approach for companies to follow to comply with their duties. If there is a company such as a user-to-user service in social media that says it does not allow pornography under its terms of service, measures such as content moderation and user reporting might be more appropriate and effective for protecting children than age verification in those settings. That would allow content to be better detected and taken down, while—
I understand that, but it is an important point to try to get on the record. It is an outcome-based solution that we are looking for, is it not? We are looking for zero activity where risks to children are there. Clearly, if the risk assessment is that there is no risk that children can be on that site, age verification may not be required— I am extending it to make a point—but, if there is a risk, we need to know that the outcome of that process will be zero. That is my point, and I think we should reflect on that.
I am very happy to, and the noble Lord is right that we must be focused on the outcomes here. I am very sympathetic to the desire to make sure that providers are held to the highest standards, to keep children protected from harmful content online.
I know the Minister said that outcomes are detailed in the Bill already; I wonder whether he could just write to us and describe where in the Bill those outcomes are outlined.
I shall happily do that, and will happily continue discussions with my noble friend and others on this point and on the appropriate alternative to the language we have discussed.
On the matter of Ofcom independently auditing age- assurance technologies, which my noble friend also raised, the regulator already has the power to require a company to undertake and pay for a report from a skilled person about a regulated service. This will assist Ofcom in identifying and assessing non-compliance, and will develop its understanding of the risk of failure to comply. We believe that this is therefore already provided for.
I reassure noble Lords that the existing definition of pornographic content in the Bill already captures the same content that Amendment 183ZA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, intends to capture. The definition in the Bill shares the key element of the approach Ofcom is taking for pornography on UK-established video-sharing platforms. This means that the industry will be familiar with this definition and that Ofcom will have experience in regulating content which meets it.
The definition is also aligned with that used in existing legislation. I take on board the point she made about her trawl of the statute book for it, but the definition is aligned elsewhere in statute, such as in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This means that, in interpreting the existing definition in the Bill, the courts may be able to draw on precedent from the criminal context, giving greater certainty about its meaning. The definition of pornography in Part 5 is also consistent with the British Board of Film Classification’s guidelines for the definition of sex works, which is
“works whose primary purpose is sexual arousal or stimulation”
and the BBFC’s definition of R18. We therefore think it is not necessary to refer to BBFC standards in this legislation. Including the definition in the Bill also retains Parliament’s control of the definition, and therefore also which content is subject to the duties in Part 5. That is why we believe that the definition as outlined in the Bill is more straightforward for both service providers and Ofcom to apply.
I turn to Amendments 184 and 185. The Government share the concerns raised in today’s debate about the wider regulation of online pornography. It is important to be clear that extreme pornography, so-called revenge pornography and child sexual exploitation and abuse are already illegal and are listed as priority offences in the Bill. This means that under the illegal content duties, Part 3 providers, which will include some of the most popular commercial pornography services, must take proactive, preventive measures to limit people’s exposure to this criminal content and behaviour.
Does my noble friend the Minister recognise that those laws have been in place for the 30 years of the internet but have not successfully been used to protect the rights of those who find their images wrongly used, particularly those children who have found their images wrongly used in pornographic sites? Does he have any reflections on how that performance could be improved?
I would want to take advice and see some statistics, but I am happy to do that and to respond to my noble friend’s point. I was about to say that my noble friend Lady Jenkin of Kennington asked a number of questions, but she is not here for me to answer them.
I turn to Amendment 232 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam. Because of the rapid development of age-assurance technologies, it is right that they should be carefully assessed to ensure that they are used effectively to achieve the outcomes required. I am therefore sympathetic to the spirit of his amendment, but must say that Ofcom will undertake ongoing research into the effectiveness of age-assurance technologies for its various codes and guidance, which will be published. Moreover, when preparing or updating the codes of practice, including those that refer to age-assurance technologies, Ofcom is required by the Bill to consult a broad range of people and organisations. Parliament will also have the opportunity to scrutinise the codes before they come into effect, including any recommendations regarding age assurance. We do not think, therefore, that a requirement for Ofcom to produce a separate report into age-assurance technologies is a necessary extra burden to impose on the regulator.
In relation to this and all the amendments in this group, as I say, I am happy to carry on the discussions that we have been having with a number of noble Lords, recognising that they speak for a large number of people in your Lordships’ House and beyond. I reiterate my thanks, and the Government’s thanks, to them for the way in which they have been going about that. With that, I encourage them not to press their amendments.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the amendments in this group consider the role of collaboration and consultation in Ofcom’s approach. The proposals range in their intent, and include mandating additional roles for young people in the framework, adding new formal consultation requirements, and creating powers for Ofcom to work with other organisations.
I reassure noble Lords that the Government take these concerns extremely seriously. That is why the Bill already places the voices of experts, users and victims at the heart of the regime it establishes. In fact, the intent of many of the amendments in this group will already be delivered. That includes Ofcom working with others effectively to deliver the legislation, consulting on draft codes of practice, and having the ability to designate specific regulatory functions to other bodies where appropriate. Where we can strengthen the voices of users, victims or experts—without undermining existing processes, reducing the regulator’s independence or causing unacceptable delays—the Government are open to this. That is why I am moving the amendment today. However, as we have heard in previous debates, this is already a complex regulatory framework, and there is a widespread desire for it to be implemented quickly. Therefore, it is right that we guard against creating additional or redundant requirements which could complicate the regime or unduly delay implementation.
I turn to the amendment in my name. As noble Lords know, Ofcom will develop codes of practice setting out recommended measures for companies to fulfil their duties under the Bill. When developing those codes, Ofcom must consult various persons and organisations who have specific knowledge or expertise related to online harms. This process will ensure that the voices of users, experts and others are reflected in the codes, and, in turn, that the codes contain appropriate and effective measures.
One of the most important goals of the Bill, as noble Lords have heard me say many times, is the protection of children. It is also critical that the codes reflect the views of victims of online abuse, as well as the expertise of those who have experience in managing them. Therefore, the government amendment seeks to name the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses, the domestic abuse commissioner and the Children’s Commissioner as statutory consultees under Clause 36(6). Ofcom will be required to consult those commissioners when preparing or amending a code of practice.
Listing these commissioners as statutory consultees will guarantee that the voices of victims and those who are disproportionately affected by online abuse are represented when developing codes of practice. This includes, in particular, women and girls—following on from our debate on the previous group—as well as children and vulnerable adults. This will ensure that Ofcom’s codes propose specific and targeted measures, such as on illegal content and content that is harmful to children, that platforms can take to address abuse effectively. I therefore hope that noble Lords will accept it.
I will say a little about some of the other amendments in this group before noble Lords speak to them. I look forward to hearing how they introduce them.
I appreciate the intent of Amendment 220E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes, to address the seriousness of the issue of child sexual exploitation and abuse online. This amendment would allow Ofcom to designate an expert body to tackle such content. Where appropriate and effective, Section 1(7) of the Communications Act 2003 and Part II of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 provide a route for Ofcom to enter into co-regulatory arrangements under the online safety framework.
There are a number of organisations that could play a role in the future regulatory framework, given their significant experience and expertise on the complex and important issue of tackling online child sexual exploitation and abuse. This includes the Internet Watch Foundation, which plays a pivotal role in the detection and removal of child sexual abuse material and provides vital tools to support its members to detect this abhorrent content.
A key difference from the proposed amendment is that the existing route, following consultation with Ofcom, requires an order to be made by a Minister, under the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994, before Ofcom can authorise a co-regulator to carry out regulatory functions. Allowing Ofcom to do this, without the need for secondary legislation, would allow Ofcom to bypass existing parliamentary scrutiny when contracting out its regulatory functions under the Bill. By contrast, the existing route requires a draft order to be laid before, and approved by, each House of Parliament.
The noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, tabled Amendment 226, which proposes a child user advocacy body. The Government are committed to the interests of child users being represented and protected, but we believe that this is already achieved through the Bill’s existing provisions. There is a wealth of experienced and committed representative groups who are engaged with the regulatory framework. As the regulator, Ofcom will also continue to consult widely with a range of interested parties to ensure that it understands the experience of, and risks affecting, children online. Further placing children’s experiences at the centre of the framework, the Government’s Amendment 98A would name the Children’s Commissioner as a statutory consultee for the codes of practice. The child user advocacy body proposed in the noble Lord’s Amendment 226 may duplicate the Children’s Commissioner’s existing functions, which would create uncertainty, undermining the effectiveness of the Children’s Commissioner’s Office. The Government are confident that the Children’s Commissioner will effectively use her statutory duties and powers to understand children’s experiences of the digital realm.
For the reasons that I have set out, I am confident that children’s voices will be placed at the heart of the regime, with their interests defended and advocated for by the regulator, the Children’s Commissioner, and through ongoing engagement with civil society groups.
Similarly, Amendment 256, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, seeks to require that any Ofcom advisory committees established by direction from the Secretary of State under Clause 155 include at least two young people. Ofcom has considerable experience in setting up committees of this kind. While there is nothing that would preclude committee membership from including at least two young people, predetermining the composition of any committee would not give Ofcom the necessary space and independence to run a transparent process. We feel that candidates should be appointed based on relevant understanding and technical knowledge of the issue in question. Where a board is examining issues with specific relevance to the interests of children, we would expect the committee membership to reflect that appropriately.
I turn to the statement of strategic priorities. As I hope noble Lords will agree, future changes in technology will likely have an impact on the experience people have online, including the nature of online harms. As provided for by Clause 153, the statement of strategic priorities will allow the Secretary of State to set out a statement of the Government’s strategic priorities in relation to online safety. This ensures that the Government can respond to changes in the digital and regulatory landscape at a strategic level. A similar power exists for telecommunications, the management of the radio spectrum, and postal services.
Amendments 251 to 253 seek to place additional requirements on the preparation of a statement before it can be designated. I reassure noble Lords that the existing consultation and parliamentary approval requirements allow for an extensive process before a statement can be designated. These amendments would introduce unnecessary steps and would move beyond the existing precedent in the Communications Act when making such a statement for telecommunications, the management of the radio spectrum, and postal services.
Finally, Amendment 284, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, proposes changes to Clause 171 on Ofcom’s guidance on illegal content judgments. Ofcom is already required to consult persons it considers appropriate before producing or revising the guidance, which could include the groups named in the noble Lord’s amendment. This amendment would oblige Ofcom to run formal public consultations on the illegal content guidance at two different stages: first, at a formative stage in the drafting process, and then before publishing a final version. These consultations would have to be repeated before subsequently amending or updating the guidance in any way. This would impose duplicative, time-consuming requirements on the regulator to consult, which are excessive when looking at other comparable guidance. The proposed consultations under this amendment would ultimately delay the publication of this instrumental guidance.
I will listen to what noble Lords have to say when they speak to their amendments, but these are the reasons why, upon first reading, we are unpersuaded by them.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for opening the group. This is a slightly novel procedure: he has rebutted our arguments before we have even had a chance to put them—what is new? I hope he has another speech lined up for the end which accepts some of the arguments we put, to demonstrate that he has listened to all the arguments made in the debate.
I will speak mainly to Amendments 220E and 226, ahead of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron; I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, will be speaking at the end of the group to Amendment 226. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for signing Amendment 220E; I know she feels very strongly about this issue as well.
As the Minister said, this amendment is designed to confirm the IWF’s role as the recognised body for dealing with notice and take-down procedures for child sexual abuse imagery in the UK and to ensure that its long experience and expertise continues to be put to best use. In our view, any delay in establishing the roles and responsibilities of expert organisations such as the IWF in working with Ofcom under the new regulatory regime risks leaving a vacuum in which the risks to children from this hateful form of abuse will only increase. I heard what the Minister said about the parliamentary procedure, but that is a much slower procedure than a designation by Ofcom, so I think that is going to be one of the bones of contention between us.
The Internet Watch Foundation is a co-regulatory body with over 25 years of experience working with the internet industry, law enforcement and government to prevent the uploading of, and to disable public access to, known child sexual abuse, and to secure the removal of indecent images and videos of children from the internet. The organisation has had some considerable success over the last 25 years, despite the problem appearing to be getting worse globally.
In 2022, it succeeded in removing a record 255,000 web pages containing child sexual abuse. It has also amassed a database of more than 1.6 million unique hashes of child sexual abuse material, which has been provided to the internet industry to keep its platforms free from such material. In 2020, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse concluded that, in the UK, the IWF
“sits at the heart of the national response to combating the proliferation of indecent images of children. It is an organisation that deserves to be acknowledged publicly as a vital part of how, and why, comparatively little child sexual abuse material is hosted in the UK”.
I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken to their amendments. Regarding the lead amendment in the group, I take on board what was said about its inevitable pre-emption—something that I know all too well from when the boot is on the other foot in other groups. However, I have listened to the points that were made and will of course respond.
I join the tributes rightly paid by noble Lords to the Internet Watch Foundation. The Government value its work extremely highly and would support the use of its expertise and experience in helping to deliver the aims of the Bill. My noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes is right to say that it is on the front line of this work and to remind us that it encounters some of the most horrific and abhorrent content in the darkest recesses of the internet—something that I know well from my time as an adviser at the Home Office, as well as in this capacity now. Both the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology and the Minister for Safeguarding at the Home Office recently provided a foreword to the foundation’s latest annual report.
Clearly, Ofcom will need a wide variety of relationships with a range of organisations. Ofcom has been in regular contact with the Internet Watch Foundation, recognising its significant role in supporting the objectives of online safety regulation, and is discussing a range of options to make the best use of its expertise. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked what consultation and discussion is being had. We support the continuation of that engagement and are in discussions with the Internet Watch Foundation ourselves to understand how it envisages its role in supporting the regulatory environment. No decisions have been made on the co-regulatory role that other organisations may play. The Government will work with Ofcom to understand where it may be effective and beneficial to delivering the regulatory framework. Careful assessment of the governance, independence and funding of any organisations would be needed if co-designation were to be considered, but officials from the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and the Home Office are in discussion with the IWF in relation to a memorandum of understanding to support ongoing collaboration.
On the designation of regulatory functions, we are satisfied that the powers under the Communications Act and the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act are sufficient, should other bodies be required to deliver specific aspects of the regime, so we do not see a need to amend the Bill in the way the amendments in this group suggest. Those Acts require an order from the Minister in order to designate any functions. The Minister has to consult Ofcom before making the order, and that is the mechanism that was used to appoint the Advertising Standards Authority to regulate broadcast advertising. It remains appropriate for Parliament to scrutinise the delivery of these important regulatory functions; accordingly, such an order cannot be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
The noble Baroness, Lady Merron, dwelt on the decision not to include a child user advocacy body. As I said in my earlier remarks and in relation to other groups, the Bill ensures that children’s voices will be heard and that what they say will be acted on. Ofcom will have statutory duties requiring it to understand the opinions and experiences of users, including children, by consulting widely when developing its codes. Ofcom will also have the flexibility to establish other mechanisms for conducting research about users’ experience. Additionally, the super-complaints process, which we began discussing this afternoon, will make sure that entities, including those that represent the interests of children, will have their voices heard and will help Ofcom recognise and eliminate systemic failings.
We are also naming the Children’s Commissioner as a statutory consultee for Ofcom in developing its codes of practice. A further new child user advocacy body would encroach on the wider statutory functions of the Children’s Commissioner. Both bodies would have similar responsibilities and powers to represent the interests of child users of regulated services, to protect and promote the interests of child users of regulated services, and to be a statutory consultee for the drafting and amendment of Ofcom’s codes of practice.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, when discussing the input of the Children’s Commissioner into the regulatory framework, suggested that it was a here and now issue. She is right: the Children’s Commissioner will represent children’s views to Ofcom in preparing the codes of practice to ensure that they are fully informing the regime, but the commissioner will also have a continuing role, as they will be the statutory consultee on any later amendments to the codes of practice relating to children. That will ensure that they can engage in the ongoing development of the regime and can continue to feed in insights on emerging risks identified through the commissioner’s statutory duty to understand children’s experiences.
The Bill further ensures that new harms and risks to children are proactively identified by requiring that Ofcom make arrangements to undertake research about users’ experiences on regulated services. This will build on the significant amount of research that Ofcom already does, better to understand children’s experience online, particularly their experiences of online harms.
The super-complaints process will enable an eligible entity to make a complaint to Ofcom regarding a provider or providers that cause significant harm or significant adverse impact on users, including children. This will help Ofcom to recognise and eliminate systemic failings, including those relating to children, and will ensure that children’s views and voices continue to inform the regime as it is developed.
The Bill will also require that Ofcom undertake consumer consultation in relation to regulated services. This will, in effect, expand the scope of the Communications Consumer Panel to online safety matters, and will ensure that the needs of users, including children, are at the heart of Ofcom’s regulatory approach.
I draw noble Lords’ attention to the provisions of Clause 141(2), which states that Ofcom must make arrangements to ascertain
“the experiences of United Kingdom users of regulated services”.
That, of course, includes children. I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will be satisfied that the voices of children are indeed being listened to throughout the operation of the Bill. However, we have high regard for the work of the Internet Watch Foundation. I hope that noble Lords will be willing not to press their amendments—after the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asks his question.
My Lords, I am in the slightly strange position of not having moved the amendment, but I want to quickly respond. I was slightly encouraged by what the Minister said about Ofcom having been in regular contact with the IWF. I am not sure that that is mutual; maybe Ofcom thinks it is in good contact with the IWF, but I am not sure the IWF thinks it is in good contact with Ofcom. However, I am encouraged that the Minister at least thinks that that has been the case and that he is encouraging consultation and the continuation of engagement.
If I might follow up that comment, I agree entirely with what the noble Baroness has just said. It is very tricky for an independent charity to have the sort of relationship addressed in some of the language in this debate. Before the Minister completes his comments and sits down again, I ask him: if Ofcom were to negotiate a contracted set of duties with the IWF—indeed, with many other charities or others who are interested in assisting with this important work—could that be done directly by Ofcom, with powers that it already has? I think I am right to say that it would not require parliamentary approval. It is only if we are talking about co-regulation, which again raises other issues, that we would go through a process that requires what sounded like the affirmative procedure—the one that was used, for example, with the Advertising Standards Authority. Is that right?
Yes, I think it is. I am happy to confirm that in writing. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Stowell, who of course is a former chairman of the Charity Commission, for making the point about the charitable status of the foundation. I should clarify that officials from the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and the Home Office are in touch with the IWF about its role.
Speedily moving on, Ofcom is in discussion with the foundation about a memorandum of understanding. I hope that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that they are in reciprocal contact. Obviously, I cannot pre-empt where their discussions are taking them in relation to that MoU, but it is between Ofcom and the foundation. Careful consideration of governance, funding and issues of charity, as my noble friend raised, would have to be thought about if co-designation were being considered.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pity that we have not had the benefit of hearing from the Minister, because a lot of his amendments in this group seem to bear on some of the more generic points made in the very good speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser. I assume he will cover them, but I wonder whether he would at least be prepared to answer any questions people might come back with—not in any aggressive sense; we are not trying to scare the pants off him before he starts. For example, the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, intrigue me.
I used to have responsibility for devolved issues when I worked at No. 10 for a short period. It was a bit of a joke, really. Whenever anything Welsh happened, I was immediately summoned down to Cardiff and hauled over the coals. You knew when you were in trouble when they all stopped speaking English and started speaking Welsh; then, you knew there really was an issue, whereas before I just had to listen, go back and report. In Scotland, nobody came to me anyway, because they knew that the then Prime Minister was a much more interesting person to talk to about these things. They just went to him instead, so I did not really learn very much.
I noticed some issues in the Marshalled List that I had not picked up on when I worked on this before. I do not know whether the Minister wishes to address this—I do not want to delay the Committee too much—but are we saying that to apply a provision in the Bill to the Bailiwick of Guernsey or the Isle of Man, an Order in Council is required to bypass Parliament? Is that a common way of proceeding in these places? I suspect that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, knows much more about this than I do—he shakes his head—but this is a new one on me. Does it mean that this Parliament has no responsibility for how its laws are applied in those territories, or are there other procedures of which we are unaware?
My second point again picks up what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, was saying. Could the Minister go through in some detail the process by which a devolved authority would apply to the Secretary of State—presumably for DSIT—to seek consent for a devolved offence to be included in the Online Safety Bill regime? If this is correct, who grants to what? Does this come to the House as a statutory instrument? Is just the Secretary of State involved, or does it go to the Privy Council? Are there other ways that we are yet to know about? It would be interesting to know.
To echo the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, we probably do need a letter from the Minister, if he ever gets this cleared, setting out exactly how the variation in powers would operate across the four territories. If there are variations, we would like to know about them.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie for her vigilance in this area and for the discussion she had with the Bill team, which they and I found useful. Given the tenor of this short but important debate, I think it may be helpful if we have a meeting for other noble Lords who also want to benefit from discussing some of these things in detail, and particularly to talk about some of the issues the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, just raised. It would be useful for us to talk in detail about general questions on the operation of the law before we look at this again on Report.
In a moment, I will say a bit about the government amendments which stand in my name. I am sure that noble Lords will not be shy in taking the opportunity to interject if questions arise, as they have not been shy on previous groups.
I will start with the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Fraser. Her Amendment 58 seeks to add reference to the Human Rights Act 1998 to Clause 18. That Act places obligations on public authorities to act compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights. It does not place obligations on private individuals and companies, so it would not make sense for such a duty on internet services to refer to the Human Rights Act.
Under that Act, Ofcom has obligations to act in accordance with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As a result, the codes that Ofcom draws up will need to comply with the Article 10 right to freedom of expression. Schedule 4 to the Bill requires Ofcom to ensure that measures which it describes in a code of practice are designed in light of the importance of protecting the right of users’
“freedom of expression within the law”.
Clauses 44(2) and (3) provide that platforms will be treated as complying with their freedom of expression duty if they take the recommended measures that Ofcom sets out in the codes. Platforms will therefore be guided by Ofcom in taking measures to comply with its duties, including safeguards for freedom of expression through codes of practice.
My noble friend’s Amendment 136 seeks to add offences under the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021 to Schedule 7. Public order offences are already listed in Schedule 7 to the Bill, which will apply across the whole United Kingdom. This means that all services in scope will need proactively to tackle content that amounts to an offence under the Public Order Act 1986, regardless of where the content originates or where in the UK it can be accessed.
The priority offences list has been developed with the devolved Administrations, and Clause 194 outlines the parliamentary procedures for updating it. The requirements for consent will be set out in the specific subordinate legislation that may apply to the particular offence being made by the devolved authorities—that is to say, they will be laid down by the enabling statutes that Parliament will have approved.
Amendment 228 seeks to require the inclusion of separate analyses of users’ online experiences in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in Ofcom’s transparency reports. These transparency reports are based on the information requested from category 1, 2A and 2B service providers through transparency reporting. I assure my noble friend that Ofcom is already able to request country-specific information from providers in its transparency reports. The legislation sets out high-level categories of information that category 1, 2A and 2B services may be required to include in their transparency reports. The regulator will set out in a notice the information to be requested from the provider, the format of that information and the manner in which it should be published. If appropriate, Ofcom may request specific information in relation to each country in the UK, such as the number of users encountering illegal content and the incidence of such content.
Ofcom is also required to undertake consultation before producing guidance about transparency reporting. In order to ensure that the framework is proportionate and future-proofed, however, it is vital to allow the regulator sufficient flexibility to request the types of information that it sees as relevant, and for that information to be presented by providers in a manner that Ofcom has deemed to be appropriate.
Similarly, Amendment 225A would require separate analyses of users’ online experiences in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in Ofcom’s research about users’ experiences of regulated services. Clause 141 requires that Ofcom make arrangements to undertake consumer research to ascertain public opinion and the experiences of UK users of regulated services. Ofcom will already be able to undertake this research on a country-specific basis. Indeed, in undertaking its research and reporting duties, as my noble friend alluded to, Ofcom has previously adopted such an approach. For instance, it is required by the Communications Act 2003 to undertake consumer research. While the legislation does not mandate that Ofcom conduct and publish nation-specific research, Ofcom has done so, for instance through its publications Media Nations and Connected Nations. I hope that gives noble Lords some reassurance of its approach in this regard. Ensuring that Ofcom has flexibility in carrying out its research functions will enable us to future-proof the regulatory framework, and will mean that its research activity is efficient, relevant and appropriate.
I will now say a bit about the government amendments standing in my name. I should, in doing so, highlight that I have withdrawn Amendments 304C and 304D, previously in the Marshalled List, which will be replaced with new amendments to ensure that all the communications offences, including the new self-harm offence, have the appropriate territorial extent when they are brought forward. They will be brought forward as soon as possible once the self-harm offence has been tabled.
Amendments 267A, 267B, 267C, 268A, 268B to 268G, 271A to 271D, 304A, 304B and 304E are amendments to Clauses 160, 162, 164 to 166, 168 and 210 and Schedule 14, relating to the extension of the false and threatening communications offences and the associated liability of corporate officers in Clause 166 to Northern Ireland.
This group also includes some technical and consequential amendments to the false and threatening communications offences and technical changes to the Malicious Communications (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. This will minimise overlap between these existing laws and the new false and threatening communications offences in this Bill. Importantly, they mirror the approach taken for England and Wales, providing consistency in the criminal law.
This group also contains technical amendments to update the extent of the epilepsy trolling offence to reflect that it applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Yes, that would be a sensible way to view it. We will work on that and allow noble Lords to see it before they come to talk to us about it.
I put on record that the withdrawal of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act 2017 will be greeted with happiness only should the full schedule of AV and harms be put into the Bill. I must say that because the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, is not in her place. She worked very hard for that piece of legislation.
This has been a very good debate indeed. I have good days and bad days in Committee. Good days are when I feel that the Bill is going to make a difference and things are going to improve and the sun will shine. Bad days are a bit like today, where we have had a couple of groups, and this is one of them, where I am a bit worried about where we are and whether we have enough—I was going to use that terrible word “ammunition” but I do not mean that—of the powers that are necessary in the right place and with the right focus to get us through some of the very difficult questions that come in. I know that bad cases make bad law, but they can also illustrate why the law is not good enough. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, was saying, this is possibly one of the areas we are in.
The speeches in the debate have made the case well and I do not need to go back over it. We have got ourselves into a situation where we want to reduce harm that we see around but do not want to impact freedom of expression. Both of those are so important and we have to hold on to them, but we find ourselves struggling. What do we do about that? We think through what we will end up with this Bill on the statute book and the codes of practice through it. This looks as though it is heading towards the question of whether the terms of service that will be in place will be sufficient and able to restrict the harms we will see affecting people who should not be affected by them. But I recognise that the freedom of expression arguments have won the day and we have to live with that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, mentioned the riskiness of the smaller sites—categories 2A and 2B and the ones that are not even going to be categorised as high as that. Why are we leaving those to cause the damage that they are? There is something not working here in the structure of the Bill and I hope the Minister will be able to provide some information on that when he comes to speak.
Obviously, if we could find a way of expressing the issues that are raised by the measures in these amendments as being illegal in the real world, they would be illegal online as well. That would at least be a solution that we could rely on. Whether it could be policed and serviced is another matter, but it certainly would be there. But we are probably not going to get there, are we? I am not looking at the Minister in any hope but he has a slight downward turn to his lips. I am not sure about this.
How can we approach a legal but harmful issue with the sort of sensitivity that does not make us feel that we have reduced people’s ability to cope with these issues and to engage with them in an adult way? I do not have an answer to that.
Is this another amplification issue or is it deeper and worse than that? Is this just the internet because of its ability to focus on things to keep people engaged, to make people stay online when they should not, to make them reach out and receive material that they ought not to get in a properly regulated world? Is it something that we can deal with because we have a sense of what is moral and appropriate and want to act because society wants us to do it? I do not have a solution to that, and I am interested to hear what the Minister will say, but I think it is something we will need to come back to.
My Lords, like everyone who spoke, I and the Government recognise the tragic consequences of suicide and self-harm, and how so many lives and families have been devastated by it. I am grateful to the noble Baroness and all noble Lords, as well as the bereaved families who campaigned so bravely and for so long to spare others that heartache and to create a safer online environment for everyone. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, who raised these issues in her Private Member’s Bill, on which we had exchanges. My noble friend Lady Morgan is right to raise the case of Frankie Thomas and her parents, and to call that to mind as we debate these issues.
Amendments 96 and 296, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would, in effect, reintroduce the former adult safety duties whereby category 1 companies were required to assess the risk of harm associated with legal content accessed by adults, and to set and enforce terms of service in relation to it. As noble Lords will know, those duties were removed in another place after extensive consideration. Those provisions risked creating incentives for the excessive removal of legal content, which would unduly interfere with adults’ free expression.
However, the new transparency, accountability and freedom of expression duties in Part 4, combined with the illegal and child safety duties in Part 3, will provide a robust approach that will hold companies to account for the way they deal with this content. Under the Part 4 duties, category 1 services will need to have appropriate systems and processes in place to deal with content or activity that is banned or restricted by their terms of service.
Many platforms—such as Twitter, Facebook and TikTok, which the noble Baroness raised—say in their terms of service that they restrict suicide and self-harm content, but they do not always enforce these policies effectively. The Bill will require category 1 companies—the largest platforms—fully to enforce their terms of service for this content, which will be a significant improvement for users’ safety. Where companies allow this content, the user-empowerment duties will give adults tools to limit their exposure to it, if they wish to do so.
The noble Baroness is right to raise the issue of algorithms. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said, amplification lies at the heart of many cases. The Bill will require providers specifically to consider as part of their risk assessments how algorithms could affect children’s and adults’ exposure to illegal content, and content that is harmful to children, on their services. Providers will need to take steps to mitigate and effectively manage any risks, and to consider the design of functionalities, algorithms and other features to meet the illegal content and child safety duties in the Bill.
Following our earlier discussion, we were going to have a response on super-complaints. I am curious to understand whether we had a pattern of complaints—such as those the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others received—about a platform saying, under its terms of service, that it would remove suicide and self-harm content but failing to do so. Does the Minister think that is precisely the kind of thing that could be substantive material for an organisation to bring as a super-complaint to Ofcom?
My initial response is, yes, I think so, but it is the role of Ofcom to look at whether those terms of service are enforced and to act on behalf of internet users. The noble Lord is right to point to the complexity of some marginal cases with which companies have to deal, but the whole framework of the Bill is to make sure that terms of service are being enforced. If they are not, people can turn to Ofcom.
I am sorry to enter the fray again on complaints, but how will anyone know that they have failed in this way if there is no complaints system?
I refer to the meeting my noble friend Lord Camrose offered; we will be able to go through and unpick the issues raised in that group of amendments, rather than looping back to that debate now.
The Minister is going through the structure of the Bill and saying that what is in it is adequate to prevent the kinds of harms to vulnerable adults that we talked about during this debate. Essentially, it is a combination of adherence to terms of service and user-empowerment tools. Is he saying that those two aspects are adequate to prevent the kinds of harms we have talked about?
Yes, they are—with the addition of what I am coming to. In addition to the duty for companies to consider the role of algorithms, which I talked about, Ofcom will have a range of powers at its disposal to help it assess whether providers are fulfilling their duties, including the power to require information from providers about the operation of their algorithms. The regulator will be able to hold senior executives criminally liable if they fail to ensure that their company is providing Ofcom with the information it requests.
However, we must not restrict users’ right to see legal content and speech. These amendments would prescribe specific approaches for companies’ treatment of legal content accessed by adults, which would give the Government undue influence in choosing, on adult users’ behalf, what content they see—
I wanted to give the Minister time to get on to this. Can we now drill down a little on the terms of service issue? If the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is right, are we talking about terms of service having the sort of power the Government suggest in cases where they are category 1 and category 2A but not search? There will be a limit, but an awful lot of other bodies about which we are concerned will not fall into that situation.
Also, I thought we had established, much to our regret, that the terms of service were what they were, and that Ofcom’s powers—I paraphrase to make the point—were those of exposure and transparency, not setting minimum standards. But even if we are talking only about the very large and far-reaching companies, should there not be a power somewhere to engage with that, with a view getting that redress, if the terms of service do not specify it?
The Bill will ensure that companies adhere to their terms of service. If they choose to allow content that is legal but harmful on their services and they tell people that beforehand—and adults are able and empowered to decide what they see online, with the protections of the triple shield—we think that that strikes the right balance. This is at the heart of the whole “legal but harmful” debate in another place, and it is clearly reflected throughout the approach in the Bill and in my responses to all of these groups of amendments. But there are duties to tackle illegal content and to make sure that people know the terms of service for the sites they choose to interact with. If they feel that they are not being adhered to—as they currently are not in relation to suicide and self-harm content on many of the services—users will have the recourse of the regulator to turn to.
I will plant a flag in reference to the new offences, which I know we will come back to again. It is always helpful to look at real-world examples. There is a lot of meme-based self-harm content. Two examples are the Tide Pods challenge—the eating of detergent capsules—and choking games, both of which have been very common and widespread. It would be helpful, ahead of our debate on the new offences, to understand whether they are below or above the threshold of serious self-harm and what the Government’s intention is. There are arguments both ways: obviously, criminalising children for being foolish carries certain consequences, but we also want to stop the spread of the content. So, when we come to that offence, it would be helpful if the Minister could use specific examples, such as the meme-based self-harm content, which is quite common.
I thank the noble Lord for the advance notice to think about that; it is helpful. It is difficult to talk in general terms about this issue, so, if I can, I will give examples that do, and do not, meet the threshold.
The Bill goes even further for children than it does for adults. In addition to the protections from illegal material, the Government have indicated, as I said, that we plan to designate content promoting suicide, self-harm or eating disorders as categories of primary priority content. That means that providers will need to put in place systems designed to prevent children of any age encountering this type of content. Providers will also need specifically to assess the risk of children encountering it. Platforms will no longer be able to recommend such material to children through harmful algorithms. If they do, Ofcom will hold them accountable and will take enforcement action if they break their promises.
It is right that the Bill takes a different approach for children than for adults, but it does not mean that the Bill does not recognise that young adults are at risk or that it does not have protections for them. My noble friend Lady Morgan was right to raise the issue of young adults once they turn 18. The triple shield of protection in the Bill will significantly improve the status quo by protecting adults, including young adults, from illegal suicide content and legal suicide or self-harm content that is prohibited in major platforms’ terms and conditions. Platforms also have strong commercial incentives, as we discussed in previous groups, to address harmful content that the majority of their users do not want to see, such as legal suicide, eating disorder or self-harm content. That is why they currently claim to prohibit it in their terms and conditions, and why we want to make sure that those terms and conditions are transparently and accountably enforced. So, while I sympathise with the intention from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, her amendments raise some wider concerns about mandating how providers should deal with legal material, which would interfere with the careful balance the Bill seeks to strike in ensuring that users are safer online without compromising their right to free expression.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 240, alongside Amendment 225 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, would place new duties on Ofcom in relation to suicide and self-harm content. The Bill already has provisions to provide Ofcom with broad and effective information-gathering powers to understand how this content affects users and how providers are dealing with it. For example, under Clause 147, Ofcom can already publish reports about suicide and self-harm content, and Clauses 68 and 69 empower Ofcom to require the largest providers to publish annual transparency reports.
Ofcom may require those reports to include information on the systems and processes that providers use to deal with illegal suicide or self-harm content, with content that is harmful to children, or with content which providers’ own terms of service prohibit. Those measures sit alongside Ofcom’s extensive information-gathering powers. It will have the ability to access the information it needs to understand how companies are fulfilling their duties, particularly in taking action against this type of content. Furthermore, the Bill is designed to provide Ofcom with the flexibility it needs to respond to harms—including in the areas of suicide, self-harm and eating disorders—as they develop over time, in the way that the noble Baroness envisaged in her remarks about the metaverse and new emerging threats. So we are confident that these provisions will enable Ofcom to assess this type of content and ensure that platforms deal with it appropriately. I hope that this has provided the sufficient reassurance to the noble Baroness for her not to move her amendment.
I asked a number of questions on specific scenarios. If the Minister cannot answer them straight away, perhaps he could write to me. They all rather called for “yes/no” answers.
The noble Baroness threw me off with her subsequent question. She was broadly right, but I will write to her after I refresh my memory about what she said when I look at the Official Report.
My Lords, protecting women and girls is a priority for His Majesty’s Government, at home, on our streets and online. This Bill will provide vital protections for women and girls, ensuring that companies take action to improve their safety online and protect their freedom of expression so that they can continue to play their part online, as well as offline, in our society.
On Amendments 94 and 304, tabled by my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes, I want to be unequivocal: all service providers must understand the systemic risks facing women and girls through their illegal content and child safety risk assessments. They must then put in place measures that manage and mitigate these risks. Ofcom’s codes of practice will set out how companies can comply with their duties in the Bill.
I assure noble Lords that the codes will cover protections against violence against women and girls. In accordance with the safety duties, the codes will set out how companies should tackle illegal content and activity confronting women and girls online. This includes the several crimes that we have listed as priority offences, which we know are predominantly perpetrated against women and girls. The codes will also cover how companies should tackle harmful online behaviour and content towards girls.
Companies will be required to implement systems and processes designed to prevent people encountering priority illegal content and minimise the length of time for which any such content is present. In addition, Ofcom will be required to carry out broad consultation when drafting codes of practice to harness expert opinions on how companies can address the most serious online risks, including those facing women and girls. Many of the examples that noble Lords gave in their speeches are indeed reprehensible. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, talked about rape threats and threats of violence. These, of course, are examples of priority illegal content and companies will have to remove and prevent them.
My noble friend Lady Morgan suggested that the Bill misses out the specific course of conduct that offences in this area can have. Clause 9 contains provisions to ensure that services
“mitigate and manage the risk of the service being used for the commission or facilitation of”
an offence. This would capture patterns of behaviour. In addition, Schedule 7 contains several course of conduct offences, including controlling and coercive behaviour, and harassment. The codes will set out how companies must tackle these offences where this content contributes to a course of conduct that might lead to these offences.
To ensure that women’s and girls’ voices are heard in all this, the Bill will, as the right reverend Prelate noted, make it a statutory requirement for Ofcom to consult the Victims’ Commissioner and the domestic abuse commissioner about the formation of the codes of practice. As outlined, the existing illegal content, child safety and child sexual abuse and exploitation codes will already cover protections for women and girls. Creating a separate code dealing specifically with violence against women and girls would mean transposing or duplicating measures from these in a separate code.
In its recent communication to your Lordships, Ofcom stated that it will be consulting quickly on the draft illegal content and child sexual abuse and exploitation codes, and has been clear that it has already started the preparatory work for these. If Ofcom were required to create a separate code on violence against women and girls this preparatory work would need to be revised, with the inevitable consequence of slowing down the implementation of these vital protections.
An additional stand-alone code would also be duplicative and could cause problems with interpretation and uncertainty for Ofcom and providers. Linked to this, the simpler the approach to the codes, the higher the rates of compliance are likely to be. The more codes there are covering specific single duties, the more complicated it will be for providers, which will have to refer to multiple different codes, and the harder for businesses to put in place the right protections for users. Noble Lords have said repeatedly that this is a complex Bill, and this is an area where I suggest we should not make it more complex still.
As the Bill is currently drafted, Ofcom is able to draft codes in a way that addresses a range of interrelated risks affecting different groups of users, such as people affected in more than one way; a number of noble Lords dealt with that in their contributions. For example, combining the measures that companies can take to tackle illegal content targeting women and girls with the measures they can take to tackle racist abuse online could ensure a more comprehensive and effective approach that recognises the point, which a number of noble Lords made, that people with more than one protected characteristic under the Equality Act may be at compound risk of harm. If the Bill stipulated that Ofcom separate the offences that disproportionately affect women and girls from other offences in Schedule 7, this comprehensive approach to tackling violence against women and girls online could be lost.
Could my noble friend the Minister confirm something? I am getting rather confused by what he is saying. Is it the case that there will be just one mega code of practice to deal with every single problem, or will there be lots of different codes of practice to deal with the problems? I am sure the tech platforms will have sufficient people to be able to deal with them. My understanding is that Ofcom said that, while the Bill might not mandate a code of practice on violence against women and girls, it would in due course be happy to look at it. Is that right, or is my noble friend the Minister saying that Ofcom will never produce a code of practice on violence against women and girls?
It is up to Ofcom to decide how to set the codes out. What I am saying is that the codes deal with specific categories of threat or problem—illegal content, child safety content, child sexual abuse and exploitation—rather than with specific audiences who are affected by these sorts of problems. There is a circularity here in some of the criticism that we are not reflecting the fact that there are compound harms to people affected in more than one way and then saying that we should have a separate code dealing with one particular group of people because of one particular characteristic. We are trying to deal with categories of harm that we know disproportionately affect women and girls but which of course could affect others, as the noble Baroness rightly noted. Amendment 304—
I thank the Minister for giving way. There is a bit of a problem that I would like to raise. I think the Minister is saying that there should not be a code of practice in respect of violence against women and girls. That sounds to me like there will be no code of practice in this one particular area, which seems rather harsh. It also does not tackle the issue on which I thought we were all agreed, even if we do not agree the way forward: namely, that women and girls are disproportionately affected. If it is indeed the case that the Minister feels that way, how does he suggest this is dealt with?
There are no codes designed for Jewish people, Muslim people or people of colour, even though we know that they are disproportionately affected by some of these harms as well. The approach taken is to tackle the problems, which we know disproportionately affect all of those groups of people and many more, by focusing on the harms rather than the recipients of the harm.
Can I check something with my noble friend? This is where the illogicality is. The Government have mandated in the Strategic Policing Requirement that violence against women and girls is a national threat. I do not disagree with him that other groups of people will absolutely suffer abuse and online violence, but the Government themselves have said that violence against women and girls is a national threat. I understand that my noble friend has the speaking notes, the brief and everything else, so I am not sure how far we will get on this tonight, but, given the Home Office stance on it, I think that to say that this is not a specific threat would be a mistake.
With respect, I do not think that that is a perfect comparison. The Strategic Policing Requirement is an operational policing document intended for chief constables and police and crime commissioners in the important work that they do, to make sure they have due regard for national threats as identified by the Home Secretary. It is not something designed for commercial technology companies. The approach we are taking in the Bill is to address harms that can affect all people and which we know disproportionately affect women and girls, and harms that we know disproportionately affect other groups of people as well.
We have made changes to the Bill: the consultation with the Victims’ Commissioner and the domestic abuse commissioner, the introduction of specific offences to deal with cyber-flashing and other sorts of particular harms, which we know disproportionately affect women and girls. We are taking an approach throughout the work of the Bill to reflect those harms and to deal with them. Because of that, respectfully, I do not think we need a specific code of practice for any particular group of people, however large and however disproportionately they are affected. I will say a bit more about our approach. I have said throughout, including at Second Reading, and my right honourable friend the Secretary of State has been very clear in another place as well, that the voices of women and girls have been heard very strongly and have influenced the approach that we have taken in the Bill. I am very happy to keep talking to noble Lords about it, but I do not think that the code my noble friend sets out is the right way to go about solving this issue.
Amendment 304 seeks to adopt the Istanbul convention definition of violence against women and girls. The Government are already compliant with the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, which was ratified last year. However, we are unable to include the convention’s definition of violence against women and girls in the Bill, as it extends to legal content and activity that is not in scope of the Bill as drafted. Using that definition would therefore cause legal uncertainty for companies. It would not be appropriate for the Government to require companies to remove legal content accessed by adults who choose to access it. Instead, as noble Lords know, the Government have brought in new duties to improve services’ transparency and accountability.
Amendment 104 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to require user-to-user services to provide a higher standard of protection for women, girls and vulnerable adults than for other adults. The Bill already places duties on service providers and Ofcom to prioritise responding to content and activity that presents the highest risk of harm to users. This includes users who are particularly affected by online abuse, such as women, girls and vulnerable adults. In overseeing the framework, Ofcom must ensure that there are adequate protections for those who are most vulnerable to harm online. In doing so, Ofcom will be guided by its existing duties under the Communications Act, which requires it to have regard when performing its duties to the
“vulnerability of children and of others whose circumstances appear to OFCOM to put them in need of special protection”.
The Bill also amends Ofcom’s general duties under the Communications Act to require that Ofcom, when carrying out its functions, considers the risks that all members of the public face online, and ensures that they are adequately protected from harm. This will form part of Ofcom’s principal duty and will apply to the way that Ofcom performs all its functions, including when producing codes of practice.
In addition, providers’ illegal content and child safety risk assessment duties, as well as Ofcom’s sectoral risk assessment duties, require them to understand the risk of harm to users on their services. In doing so, they must consider the user base. This will ensure that services identify any specific risks facing women, girls or other vulnerable groups of people.
As I have mentioned, the Bill will require companies to prioritise responding to online activity that poses the greatest risk of harm, including where this is linked to vulnerability. Vulnerability is very broad. The threshold at which somebody may arguably become vulnerable is subjective, context-dependent and maybe temporary. The majority of UK adult users could be defined as vulnerable in particular circumstances. In practice, this would be very challenging for Ofcom to interpret if it were added to the safety objectives in this way. The existing approach allows greater flexibility so that companies and Ofcom can focus on the greatest threats to different groups of people at any given time. This allows the Bill to adapt to and keep pace with changing risk patterns that may affect different groups of people.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, His Majesty’s Government are committed to defending the invaluable role of our free media. We are clear that our online safety legislation must protect the vital role of the press in providing people with reliable and accurate information. That is why this Bill includes strong protections for recognised news publishers. The Bill does not impose new duties on news publishers’ content, which is exempt from the Bill’s safety duties. In addition, the Bill includes strong safeguards for news publisher content, set out in Clause 14. In order to benefit from these protections, publishers will have to meet a set of stringent criteria, set out in Clause 50.
I am aware of concerns in your Lordships’ House and another place that the definition of news publishers is too broad and that these protections could therefore create a loophole to be exploited. That is why the Government are bringing forward amendments to the definition of “recognised news publisher” to ensure that sanctioned entities cannot benefit from these protections. I will shortly explain these protections in detail but I would like to be clear that narrowing the definition any further would pose a critical risk to our commitment to self-regulation of the press. We do not want to create requirements which would in effect put Ofcom in the position of a press regulator. We believe that the criteria set out in Clause 50 are already strong, and we have taken significant care to ensure that established news publishers are captured, while limiting the opportunity for bad actors to benefit.
Government Amendments 126A and 127A propose changes to the criteria for recognised news publishers. These criteria already exclude any entity that is a proscribed organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000 or the purpose of which is to support a proscribed organisation under that Act. We are clear that sanctioned news outlets such as RT, formerly Russia Today, must not benefit from these protections either. The amendments we are tabling today will therefore tighten the recognised news publisher criteria further by excluding entities that have been designated for sanctions imposed by both His Majesty’s Government and the United Nations Security Council. I hope noble Lords will accept these amendments, in order to ensure that content from publishers which pose a security threat to this country cannot benefit from protections designed to defend a free press.
In addition, the Government have also tabled amendments 50B, 50C, 50D, 127B, 127C and 283A, which are aimed at ensuring that the protections for news publishers in Clause 14 are workable and do not have unforeseen consequences for the operation of category 1 services. Clause 14 gives category 1 platforms a duty to notify recognised news publishers and offer a right of appeal before taking action against any of their content or accounts.
Clause 14 sets out the circumstances in which companies must offer news publishers an appeal. As drafted, it states that platforms must offer this before they take down news publisher content, before they restrict users’ access to such content or where they propose to “take any other action” in relation to publisher content. Platforms must also offer an appeal if they propose to take action against a registered news publisher’s account by giving them a warning, suspending or banning them from using a service or in any way restricting their ability to use a service.
These amendments provide greater clarity about what constitutes “taking action” in relation to news publisher content, and therefore when category 1 services must offer an appeal. They make it clear that a platform must offer this before they take down such content, add a warning label or take any other action against content in line with any terms of service that allow or prohibit content. This will ensure that platforms are not required to offer publishers a right of appeal every time they propose to carry out routine content curation and similar routine actions. That would be unworkable for platforms and would be likely to inhibit the effectiveness of the appeal process.
As noble Lords know, the Bill has a strong focus on user empowerment and enabling users to take control of their online experience. The Government have therefore tabled amendments to Clause 52 to ensure that providers are required only to offer publishers a right of appeal in relation to their own moderation decisions, not where a user has voluntarily chosen not to view certain types of content. For example, if a user has epilepsy and has opted not to view photo-sensitive content, platforms will not be required to offer publishers a right of appeal before restricting that content for the user in question.
In addition, to ensure that the Bill maintains strong protections for children, the amendments make it clear that platforms are not required to offer news publishers an appeal before applying warning labels to content viewed by children. The amendments also make it clear that platforms would be in breach of the legislation if they applied warning labels to content encountered by adults without first offering news publishers an appeal, but in order to ensure that the Bill maintains strong protections for children, that does not apply to warning labels on content encountered by children. I beg to move.
My Lords, I welcome the amendments the Government have tabled, but I ask the Minister to clarify the effect of Amendment 50E. I declare an interest as chair of the Communications and Digital Select Committee, which has discussed Amendment 50E and the labelling of content for children with the news media organisations. This is a very technical issue, but from what my noble friend was just saying, it seems that content that would qualify for labelling for child protection purposes, and which therefore does not qualify for a right of appeal before the content is so labelled, is not content that would normally be encountered by adults but might happen to appeal to children. I would like to be clear that we are not giving the platforms scope for adding labels to content that they ought not to be adding labels to. That aside, as I say, I am grateful to my noble friend for these amendments.
My Lords, I am sorry; in my enthusiasm to get this day of Committee off to a swift start, I perhaps rattled through that rather quickly. On Amendment 50E, which my noble friend Lady Stowell asked about, I make clear that platforms will be in breach of their duties if, without applying the protection, they add warning labels to news publishers’ content that they know will be seen by adult users, regardless of whether that content particularly appeals to children.
As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others noted, we will return to some of the underlying principles later on, but the Government have laid these amendments to clarify category 1 platforms’ duties to protect recognised news publishers’ content. They take some publishers out of scope of the protections and make it clearer that category 1 platforms will have only to offer news publishers an appeal before taking punitive actions against their content.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, asked about how we define “recognised news publisher”. I am conscious that we will debate this more in later groups, but Clause 50 sets out a range of criteria that an organisation must meet to qualify as a recognised news publisher. These include the organisation’s “principal purpose” being the publication of news, it being subject to a “standards code” and its content being “created by different persons”. The protections for organisations are focused on publishers whose primary purpose is reporting on news and current affairs, recognising the importance of that in a democratic society. I am grateful to noble Lords for their support.
What my noble friend said is absolutely fine with me, and I thank him very much for it. It might be worth letting the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, know that Amendment 127 has now been moved to the group that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to. I thought it was worth offering that comfort to the noble Baroness.
My Lords, this debate has demonstrated the diversity of opinion regarding misinformation and disinformation—as the noble Lord said, the Joint Committee gave a lot of thought to this issue—as well as the difficulty of finding the truth of very complex issues while not shutting down legitimate debate. It is therefore important that we legislate in a way that takes a balanced approach to tackling this, keeping people safe online while protecting freedom of expression.
The Government take misinformation and disinformation very seriously. From Covid-19 to Russia’s use of disinformation as a tool in its illegal invasion of Ukraine, it is a pervasive threat, and I pay tribute to the work of my noble friend Lord Bethell and his colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care during the pandemic to counter the cynical and exploitative forces that sought to undermine the heroic effort to get people vaccinated and to escape from the clutches of Covid-19.
We recognise that misinformation and disinformation come in many forms, and the Bill reflects this. Its focus is rightly on tackling the most egregious, illegal forms of misinformation and disinformation, such as content which amounts to the foreign interference offence or which is harmful to children—for instance, that which intersects with named categories of primary priority or priority content.
That is not the only way in which the Bill seeks to tackle it, however. The new terms of service duties for category 1 services will hold companies to account over how they say they treat misinformation and disinformation on their services. However, the Government are not in the business of telling companies what legal content they can and cannot allow online, and the Bill should not and will not prevent adults accessing legal content. In addition, the Bill will establish an advisory committee on misinformation and disinformation to provide advice to Ofcom on how they should be tackled online. Ofcom will be given the tools to understand how effectively misinformation and disinformation are being addressed by platforms through transparency reports and information-gathering powers.
Amendment 52 from the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, seeks to introduce a new duty on platforms in relation to health misinformation and disinformation for adult users, while Amendments 59 and 107 from my noble friend Lord Moylan aim to introduce new proportionality duties for platforms tackling misinformation and disinformation. The Bill already addresses the most egregious types of misinformation and disinformation in a proportionate way that respects freedom of expression by focusing on misinformation and disinformation that are illegal or harmful to children.
I am curious as to what the Bill says about misinformation and disinformation in relation to children. My understanding of primary priority and priority harms is that they concern issues such as self-harm and pornography, but do they say anything specific about misinformation of the kind we have been discussing and whether children will be protected from it?
I am sorry—I am not sure I follow the noble Baroness’s question.
Twice so far in his reply, the Minister has said that this measure will protect children from misinformation and disinformation. I was just curious because I have not seen any sight of that, either in discussions or in the Bill. I was making a distinction regarding harmful content that we know the shape of—for example, pornography and self-harm, which are not, in themselves, misinformation or disinformation of the kind we are discussing now. It is news to me that children are going to be protected from this, and I am delighted, but I was just checking.
Yes, that is what the measure does—for instance, where it intersects with the named categories of primary priority or priority content in the Bill, although that is not the only way the Bill does it. This will be covered by non-designated content that is harmful to children. As we have said, we will bring forward amendments on Report—which is perhaps why the noble Baroness has not seen them in the material in front of us—regarding material harms to children, and they will provide further detail and clarity.
Returning to the advisory committee that the Bill sets up and the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, and my noble friend Lord Moylan, all regulated service providers will be forced to take action against illegal misinformation and disinformation in scope of the Bill. That includes the new false communication offences in the Bill that will capture communications where the sender knows the information to be false but sends it intending to cause harm—for example, hoax cures for a virus such as Covid-19. The noble Baroness is right to say that that is a slightly different approach from the one taken in her amendment, but we think it an appropriate and proportionate response to tackling damaging and illegal misinformation and disinformation. If a platform is likely to be accessed by children, it will have to protect them from encountering misinformation and disinformation content that meets the Bill’s threshold for content that is harmful to children. Again, that is an appropriate and proportionate response.
Turning to the points made by my noble friend Lord Moylan and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, services will also need to have particular regard to freedom of expression when complying with their safety duties. Ofcom will be required to set out steps that providers can take when complying with their safety duties in the codes of practice, including what is proportionate for different providers and how freedom of expression can be protected.
This might be an appropriate moment for me to say—on the back of that—that, although my noble friend explained current government practice, he has not addressed my point on why there should not be an annual report to Parliament that describes what government has done on these various fronts. If the Government regularly meet newspaper publishers to discuss the quality of information in their newspapers, I for one would have entire confidence that the Government were doing so in the public interest, but I would still quite like—I think the Government would agree on this—a report on what was happening, making an exception for national security. That would still be a good thing to do. Will my noble friend explain why we cannot be told?
While I am happy to elaborate on the work of the counter-disinformation unit in the way I just have, the Government cannot share operational details about its work, as that would give malign actors insight into the scope and scale of our capabilities. As my noble friend notes, this is not in the public interest. Moreover, reporting representations made to platforms by the unit would also be unnecessary as this would overlook both the existing processes that govern engagements with external parties and the new protections that are introduced through the Bill.
In the first intervention, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, gave a number of examples, some of which are debatable, contestable facts. Companies may well choose to keep them on their platforms within their terms of service. We have also seen deliberate misinformation and disinformation during the pandemic, including from foreign actors promoting more harmful disinformation. It is right that we take action against this.
I hope that I have given noble Lords some reassurance on the points raised about the amendments in this group. I invite them not to press the amendments.
My Lords, I am most grateful to noble Lords across the Committee for their consideration and for their contributions in this important area. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, both said, this was an area of struggle for the Joint Committee. The debate today shows exactly why that is so, but it is a struggle worth having.
The noble Lord, Lord Bethell, talked about there being a gap in the Bill as it stands. The amendments include the introduction of risk assessments and transparency and, fundamentally, explaining things in a way that people can actually understand. These are all tried and tested methods and can serve only to improve the Bill.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response and consideration of the amendments. I want to take us back to the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. She explained it beautifully—partly in response to the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. This is about tackling a system of amplification of misinformation and disinformation that moves the most marginal of views into the mainstream. It deals with restricting the damage that, as I said earlier, can produce the most dire circumstances. Amplification is the consideration that these amendments seek to tackle.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for his comments, as well as for his amendments. I am sure the noble Lord has reflected that some of the previous amendments he brought before the House somewhat put the proverbial cat among the Committee pigeons. On this occasion, I think the noble Lord has nicely aligned the cats and the pigeons. He has managed to rally us all—with the exception of the Minister—behind these amendments.
My Lords, this has been a good debate. I am glad that a number of noble Lords mentioned Lord Puttnam and the committee that he chaired for your Lordships’ House on democracy and digital technologies. I responded to the debate that we had on that; sadly, it was after he had already retired from your Lordships’ House, but he participated from the steps of the Throne. I am mindful of that report and the lessons learned in it in the context of the debate that we have had today.
We recognise the intent behind the amendments in this group to strengthen the UK’s approach to media literacy in so far as it relates to services that will be regulated by the Bill. Ofcom has a broad duty to promote media literacy under the Communications Act 2003. That is an important responsibility for Ofcom, and it is right that the regulator is able to adapt its approach to support people in meeting the evolving challenges of the digital age.
Amendments 52A and 91 from the noble Lord, Lord Knight, and Amendment 91A from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, seek to introduce duties on in-scope services, requiring them to put in place measures that promote users’ media literacy, while Amendment 98 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Knight, would require Ofcom to issue a code of practice in relation to the new duty proposed in his Amendment 91. While we agree that the industry has a role to play in promoting media literacy, the Government believe that these amendments could lead to unintended, negative consequences.
I shall address the role of the industry and media literacy, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, dwelt on in her remarks. We welcome the programmes that it runs in partnership with online safety experts such as Parent Zone and Internet Matters and hope they continue to thrive, with the added benefit of Ofcom’s recently published evaluation toolkit. However, we believe that platforms can go further to empower and educate their users. That is why media literacy has been included in the Bill’s risk assessment duties, meaning that regulated services will have to consider measures to promote media literacy to their users as part of the risk assessment process. Additionally, through work delivered under its existing media literacy duty, Ofcom is developing a set of best-practice design principles for platform-based media literacy measures. That work will build an evidence base of the most effective measures that platforms can take to build their users’ media literacy.
In response to the noble Baroness’s question, I say: no, platforms will not be able to avoid putting in place protections for children by using media literacy campaigns. Ofcom would be able to use its enforcement powers if a platform was not achieving appropriate safety outcomes. There are a range of ways in which platforms can mitigate risks, of which media literacy is but one, and Ofcom would expect platforms to consider them all in their risk assessments.
Let me say a bit about the unintended consequences we fear might arise from these amendments. First, the resource demands to create a code of practice and then to regulate firms’ compliance with this type of broad duty will place an undue burden on the regulator. It is also unclear how the proposed duties in Amendments 52A, 91 and 91A would interact with Ofcom’s existing media literacy duty. There is a risk, we fear, that these parallel duties could be discharged in conflicting ways. Amendment 91A is exposed to broad interpretation by platforms and could enable them to fulfil the duty in a way that lacked real impact on users’ media literacy.
The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes proposes a duty to promote awareness of financial deception and fraud. The Government are already taking significant action to protect people from online fraud, including through their new fraud strategy and other provisions in this Bill. I know that my noble friends Lord Camrose, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lady Penn met noble Lords to talk about that earlier this week. We believe that measures such as prompts for users before they complete financial transactions sit more logically with financial service providers than with services in scope of this Bill.
Amendment 52A proposes a duty on carriers of journalistic content to promote media literacy to their users. We do not want to risk requiring platforms to act as de facto press regulators, assessing the quality of news publishers’ content. That would not be compatible with our commitment to press freedom. Under its existing media literacy duty, Ofcom is delivering positive work to support people to discern high-quality information online. It is also collaborating with the biggest platforms to design best practice principles for platform-based media literacy measures. It intends to publish these principles this year and will encourage platforms to adopt them.
It is right that Ofcom is given time to understand the benefits of these approaches. The Secretary of State’s post-implementation review will allow the Government and Parliament to establish the effectiveness of Ofcom’s current approach and to reconsider the role of platforms in enhancing users’ media literacy, if appropriate. In the meantime, the Bill introduces new transparency-reporting and information-gathering powers to enhance Ofcom’s visibility of platforms delivery and evaluation of media literacy activities. We would not want to see amendments that would inadvertently dissuade platforms from delivering these activities in favour of less costly and less effective measures.
My noble friend Lord Holmes asked about the Online Media Literacy Strategy, published in July 2021, which set out the Government’s vision for improving media literacy in the country. Alongside the strategy, we have committed to publishing annual action plans each financial year until 2024-25, setting out how we meet the ambition of the strategy. In April 2022 we published the Year 2 Action Plan, which included extending the reach of media literacy education to those who are currently disengaged, in consultation with the media literacy task force—a body of 17 cross-sector experts—expanding our grant funding programme to provide nearly £2.5 million across two years for organisations delivering innovative media literacy activities, and commissioning research to improve our understanding of the challenges faced by the sector. We intend to publish the research later this year, for the benefit of civil society organisations, technology platforms and policymakers.
The noble Lord, Lord Knight, in his Amendment 186, would stipulate that Ofcom must levy fees on regulated firms sufficient to fund the work of third parties involved in supporting it to meet its existing media literacy duties. The Bill already allows Ofcom to levy fees sufficient to fund the annual costs of exercising its online safety functions. This includes its existing media literacy duty as far as it relates to services regulated by this Bill. As such, the Bill already ensures that these media literacy activities, including those that Ofcom chooses to deliver through third parties, can be funded through fees levied on industry.
I turn to Amendments 188, 235, 236, 237 and 238. The Government recognise the intent behind these amendments, which is to help improve the media literacy of the general public. Ofcom already has a statutory duty to promote media literacy with regard to the publication of anything by means of electronic media, including services in scope of the Bill. These amendments propose rather prescriptive objectives, either as part of a new duty for Ofcom or through updating its existing duty. They reflect current challenges in the sector but run the risk of becoming obsolete over time, preventing Ofcom from adapting its work in response to emerging issues.
Ofcom has demonstrated flexibility in its existing duty through its renewed Approach to Online Media Literacy, launched in 2021. This presented an expanded media literacy programme, enabling it to achieve almost all the objectives specified in this group. The Government note the progress that Ofcom has already achieved under its renewed approach in the annual plan it produced last month. The Online Safety Bill strengthens Ofcom’s functions relating to media literacy, which is included in Ofcom’s new transparency-reporting and information-gathering powers, which will give it enhanced oversight of industry activity by enabling it to require regulated services to share or publish information about the work that that they are doing on media literacy.
The noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, asked about the view expressed by the Joint Committee on minimum standards for media literacy training. We agree with the intention behind that, but, because of the broad and varied nature of media literacy, we do not believe that introducing minimum standards is the most effective way of achieving that outcome. Instead, we are focusing efforts on improving the evaluation practices of media literacy initiatives to identify which ones are most effective and to encourage their delivery. Ofcom has undertaken extensive work to produce a comprehensive toolkit to support practitioners to deliver robust evaluations of their programmes. This was published in February this year and has been met with praise from practitioners, including those who received grant funding from the Government’s non-legislative media literacy work programme. The post-implementation review of Ofcom’s online safety regime, which covers its existing media literacy duty in so far as it relates to regulated services, will provide a reasonable point at which to establish the effectiveness of Ofcom’s new work programme, after giving it time to take effect.
Noble Lords talked about the national curriculum and media literacy in schools. Media literacy is indeed a crucial skill for everyone in the digital age. Key media literacy skills are already taught through a number of compulsory subjects in the national curriculum. Digital literacy is included in the computing national curriculum in England, which equips pupils with the knowledge, understanding and skills to use information and communication technology creatively and purposefully. I can reassure noble Lords that people such as Monica are being taught not about historic things like floppy disks but about emerging and present challenges; the computing curriculum ensures that pupils are taught how to design program systems and accomplish goals such as collecting, analysing, evaluating and presenting data.
Does the Minister know how many children are on computing courses?
I do not know, but I shall find out from the Department for Education and write. But those who are on them benefit from a curriculum that includes topics such as programming and algorithms, the responsible and safe use of technology, and other foundational knowledge that may support future study in fields such as artificial intelligence and data science.
This is not the only subject in which media literacy and critical thinking are taught. In citizenship education, pupils are taught about critical thinking and the proper functioning of a democracy. They learn to distinguish fact from opinion, as well as exploring freedom of speech and the role and responsibility of the media in informing and shaping public opinion. As Minister for Arts and Heritage, I will say a bit about subjects such as history, English and other arts subjects, in which pupils learn to ask questions about information, think critically and weigh up arguments, all of which are important skills for media literacy, as well as more broadly.
I am grateful to my noble friends for their amendments in this group, and for the useful debate that we have had. I am grateful also to my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes and the members of her committee who have looked at fraud, and for the work of the Joint Committee which scrutinised the Bill, in earlier form, for its recommendations on strengthening the way it tackles fraud online. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, following those recommendations, the Government have brought in new measures to strengthen the Bill’s provisions to tackle fraudulent activity on in-scope services. I am glad he was somewhat satisfied by that.
All in-scope services will be required to take proactive action to tackle fraud facilitated through user-generated content. In addition, the largest and most popular platforms have a stand-alone duty to prevent fraudulent paid-for advertising appearing on their services. This represents a major step forward in ensuring that internet users are protected from scams, which have serious financial and psychological impacts, as noble Lords noted in our debate. Fully addressing the challenges of paid-for advertising is a wider task than is possible through the Bill alone. Advertising involves a broad range of actors not covered by the current legislative framework, such as advertising intermediaries. I am sympathetic to these concerns and the Government are taking action in this area. Through the online advertising programme, we will deliver a holistic review of the regulatory framework in relation to online advertising. The Government consulted on this work last year and aim to publish a response erelong. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and others noted, there are a number of Bills which look at this work. Earlier this week, there was a meeting hosted by my noble friends Lord Camrose, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lady Penn to try to avoid the cracks opening up between the Bills. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Morgan for attending; I hope it was a useful discussion.
I turn to the amendments tabled by my noble friend. The existing duties on user reporting and user complaints have been designed for user-generated content and search content and are not easily applicable to paid-for advertising. The duties on reporting and complaints mechanisms require platforms to take action in relation to individual complaints, but many in-scope services do not have control over the paid-for advertising on their services. These amendments are therefore difficult to operate for many in-scope services and would create a substantial burden for small businesses. I assure her and other noble Lords that the larger services, which have strong levers over paid-for advertising, will have to ensure that they have processes in place to enable users to report fraudulent advertising.
In reference to transparency reporting, let me assure my noble friend and others that Ofcom can already require information about how companies comply with their fraudulent advertising duties through transparency reports. In addition, Ofcom will also have the power to gather any information it requires for the purpose of exercising its online safety functions. These powers are extensive and will allow Ofcom to assess compliance with the fraudulent advertising duties.
The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, asked about the difficulty of identifying fraudulent advertising. Clauses 170 and 171 give guidance and a duty on Ofcom about providers making a judgment about content, including fraudulent advertising. There will also be a code of practice on fraudulent advertising to provide further guidance on mechanisms to deal with this important issue.
My noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendments 94 and 95 aim to require services to report information relating to fraudulent advertising to UK authorities. I am confident that the Bill’s duties will reduce the prevalence of online fraud, reducing the need for post hoc reporting in this way. If fraud does appear online, there are adequate systems in place for internet users to report this to the police.
People can report a scam to Action Fraud, the national reporting service for fraud and cybercrime. Reports submitted to Action Fraud are considered by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and can assist a police investigation. Additionally, the Advertising Standards Authority has a reporting service for reporting online scam adverts, and those reports are automatically shared with the National Cyber Security Centre.
The online advertising programme, which I mentioned earlier, builds on the Bill’s fraudulent advertising duty and looks at the wider online advertising system. That programme is considering measures to increase accountability and transparency across the supply chain, including proposals for all parties to enhance record keeping and information sharing.
My noble friend Lord Lucas was keen to meet to speak further. I will pass that request to my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, who I think would be the better person to talk to in relation to this on behalf of the Home Office—but I am sure that one of us will be very happy to talk with him.
I look forward to discussing this issue in more detail with my noble friend Lady Morgan and others between now and Report, but I hope that this provides sufficient reassurance on the work that the Government are doing in this Bill and in other ways. I invite my noble friends not to press their amendments.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before we continue this debate, I want to understand why we have changed the system so that we break part way through a group of amendments. I am sorry, but I think this is very poor. It is definitely a retrograde step. Why are we doing it? I have never experienced this before. I have sat here and waited for the amendment I have just spoken to. We have now had a break; it has broken the momentum of that group. It was even worse last week, because we broke for several days half way through the debate on an amendment. This is unheard of in my memory of 25 years in this House. Can my noble friend the Minister explain who made this decision, and how this has changed?
I have not had as long in your Lordships’ House, but this is not unprecedented, in my experience. These decisions are taken by the usual channels; I will certainly feed that back through my noble friend. One of the difficulties, of course, is that because there are no speaking limits on legislation and we do not know how many people want to speak on each amendment, the length of each group can be variable, so I think this is for the easier arrangement of dinner-break business. Also, for the dietary planning of those of us who speak on every group, it is useful to have some certainty, but I do appreciate my noble friend’s point.
Okay; I thank my noble friend for his response. However, I would just say that we never would have broken like that, before 7.30 pm. I will leave it at that, but I will have a word with the usual channels.
My Lords, the range of the amendments in this group indicates the importance of the Government’s approach to user verification and non-verified user duties. The way these duties have been designed seeks to strike a careful balance between empowering adults while safeguarding privacy and anonymity.
Amendments 38, 39, 139 and 140 have been tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan. Amendments 38 and 39 seek to remove subsections (6) and (7) of the non-verified users’ duties. These place a duty on category 1 platforms to give adult users the option of preventing non-verified users interacting with their content, reducing the likelihood that a user sees content from non-verified users. I want to be clear that these duties do not require the removal of legal content from a service and do not impinge on free speech.
In addition, there are already existing duties in the Bill to safeguard legitimate online debate. For example, category 1 services will be required to assess the impact on free expression of their safety policies, including the impact of their user empowerment tools. Removing subsections (6) and (7) of Clause 12 would undermine the Bill’s protection for adult users of category 1 services, especially the most vulnerable. It would be entirely at the service provider’s discretion to offer users the ability to minimise their exposure to anonymous and abusive users, sometimes known as trolls. In addition, instead of mandating that users verify their identity, the Bill gives adults the choice. On that basis, I am confident that the Bill already achieves the effect of Amendment 139.
Amendment 140 seeks to reduce the amount of personal data transacted as part of the verification process. Under subsection (3) of Clause 57, however, providers will be required to explain in their terms of service how the verification process works, empowering users to make an informed choice about whether they wish to verify their identity. In addition, the Bill does not alter the UK’s existing data protection laws, which provide people with specific rights and protections in relation to the processing of their personal data. Ofcom’s guidance in this area will reflect existing laws, ensuring that users’ data is protected where personal data is processed. I hope my noble friend will therefore be reassured that these duties reaffirm the concept of choice and uphold the importance of protecting personal data.
While I am speaking to the questions raised by my noble friend, I turn to those he asked about Wikipedia. I have nothing further to add to the comments I made previously, not least that it is impossible to pre-empt the assessments that will be made of which services fall into which category. Of course, assessments will be made at the time, based on what the services do at the time of the assessment, so if he will forgive me, I will not be drawn on particular services.
To speak in more general terms, category 1 services are those with the largest reach and the greatest influence over public discourse. The Bill sets out a clear process for determining category 1 providers, based on thresholds set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation following advice from Ofcom. That is to ensure that the process is objective and evidence based. To deliver this advice, Ofcom will undertake research into the relationship between how quickly, easily and widely user-generated content is disseminated by that service, the number of users and functionalities it has and other relevant characteristics and factors.
Will my noble friend at least confirm what he said previously: namely, that it is the Government’s view—or at least his view—that Wikipedia will not qualify as a category 1 service? Those were the words I heard him use at the Dispatch Box.
That is my view, on the current state of play, but I cannot pre-empt an assessment made at a point in the future, particularly if services change. I stand by what I said previously, but I hope my noble friend will understand if I do not elaborate further on this, at the risk of undermining the reassurance I might have given him previously.
Amendments 40, 41, 141 and 303 have been tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and, as noble Lords have noted, I have added my name to Amendment 40. I am pleased to say that the Government are content to accept it. The noble Baroness, Lady Merron, should not minimise this, because it involves splitting an infinitive, which I am loath to do. If this is a statement of intent, I have let that one go, in the spirit of consensus. Amendment 40 amends Clause 12(7) to ensure that the tools which will allow adult users to filter out content from non-verified users are effective and I am pleased to add my name to it.
Amendment 41 seeks to make it so that users can see whether another user is verified or not. I am afraid we are not minded to accept it. While I appreciate the intent, forcing users to show whether they are verified or not may have unintended consequences for those who are unable to verify themselves for perfectly legitimate reasons. This risks creating a two-tier system online. Users will still be able to set a preference to reduce their interaction with non-verified users without making this change.
Amendment 141 seeks to prescribe a set of principles and standards in Ofcom’s guidance on user verification. It is, however, important that Ofcom has discretion to determine, in consultation with relevant persons, which principles will have the best outcomes for users, while ensuring compliance with the duties. Further areas of the Bill also address several issues raised in this amendment. For example, all companies in scope will have a specific legal duty to have effective user reporting and redress mechanisms.
Existing laws also ensure that Ofcom’s guidance will reflect high standards. For example, it is a general duty of Ofcom under Section 3 of the Communications Act 2003 to further the interests of consumers, including by promoting competition. This amendment would, in parts, duplicate existing duties and undermine Ofcom’s independence to set standards on areas it deems relevant after consultation with expert groups.
Amendment 303 would add a definition of user identity verification. The definition it proposes would result in users having to display their real name online if they decide to verify themselves. In answer to the noble Baroness’s question, the current requirements do not specify that users must display their real name. The amendment would have potential safety implications for vulnerable users, for example victims and survivors of domestic abuse, whistleblowers and others of whom noble Lords have given examples in their contributions. The proposed definition would also create reliance on official forms of identification. That would be contrary to the existing approach in Clause 57 which specifically sets out that verification need not require such forms of documentation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, talked about paid-for verification schemes. The user identity verification provisions were brought in to ensure that adult users of the largest services can verify their identity if they so wish. These provisions are different from the blue tick schemes and others currently in place, which focus on a user’s status rather than verifying their identity. Clause 57 specifically sets out that providers of category 1 services will be required to offer all adult users the option to verify their identity. Ofcom will provide guidance for user identity verification to assist providers in complying with these duties. In doing so, it will consult groups that represent the interests of vulnerable adult users. In setting out recommendations about user verification, Ofcom must have particular regard to ensuring that providers of category 1 services offer users a form of identity verification that is likely to be available to vulnerable adult users. Ofcom will also be subject to the public sector equality duty, so it will need to take into account the ways in which people with certain characteristics may be affected when it performs this and all its duties under the Bill.
A narrow definition of identity verification could limit the range of measures that service providers might offer their users in the future. Under the current approach, Ofcom will produce and publish guidance on identity verification after consulting those with technical expertise and groups which represent the interests of vulnerable adult users.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. Is the answer to my question that the blue tick and the current Meta system will not be considered as verification under the terms of the Bill? Is that the implication of what he said?
Yes. The blue tick is certainly not identity verification. I will write to confirm on Meta, but they are separate and, as the example of blue ticks and Twitter shows, a changing feast. That is why I am talking in general terms about the approach, so as not to rely too much on examples that are changing even in the course of this Committee.
Government Amendment 43A stands in my name. This clarifies that “non-verified user” refers to users whether they are based in the UK or elsewhere. This ensures that, if a UK user decides he or she no longer wishes to interact with non-verified users, this will apply regardless of where they are based.
Finally, Amendment 106 in the name of my noble friend Lady Buscombe would make an addition to the online safety objectives for regulated user-to-user services. It would amend them to make it clear that one of the Bill’s objectives is to protect people from communications offences committed by anonymous users.
The Bill already imposes duties on services to tackle illegal content. Those duties apply across all areas of a service, including the way it is designed and operated. Platforms will be required to take measures—for instance, changing the design of functionalities, algorithms, and other features such as anonymity—to tackle illegal content.
Ofcom is also required to ensure that user-to-user services are designed and operated to protect people from harm, including with regard to functionalities and other features relating to the operation of their service. This will likely include the use of anonymous accounts to commit offences in the scope of the Bill. My noble friend’s amendment is therefore not needed. I hope she will be satisfied not to press it, along with the other noble Lords who have amendments in this group.
My Lords, I would like to say that that was a rewarding and fulfilling debate in which everyone heard very much what they wanted to hear from my noble friend the Minister. I am afraid I cannot say that. I think it has been one of the most frustrating debates I have been involved in since I came into your Lordships’ House. However, it gave us an opportunity to admire the loftiness of manner that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, brought to dismissing my concerns about Wikipedia—that I was really just overreading the whole thing and that I should not be too bothered with words as they appear in the Bill because the noble Lord thinks that Wikipedia is rather a good thing and why is it not happy with that as a level of assurance?
I would like to think that the Minister had dealt with the matter in the way that I hoped he would, but I do thin, if I may say so, that it is vaguely irresponsible to come to the Dispatch Box and say, “I don’t think Wikipedia will qualify as a category 1 service”, and then refuse to say whether it will or will not and take refuge in the process the Bill sets up, when at least one Member of the House of Lords, and possibly a second in the shape of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would like to know the answer to the question. I see a Minister from the business department sitting on the Front Bench with my noble friend. This is a bit like throwing a hand grenade into a business headquarters, walking away and saying, “It was nothing to do with me”. You have to imagine what the position is like for the business.
We had a very important amendment from my noble friend Lady Buscombe. I think we all sympathise with the type of abuse that she is talking about—not only its personal effects but its deliberate business effects, the deliberate attempt to destroy businesses. I say only that my reading of her Amendment 106 is that it seeks to impose on Ofcom an objective to prevent harm, essentially, arising from offences under Clauses 160 and 162 of the Bill committed by unverified or anonymous users. Surely what she would want to say is that, irrespective of verification and anonymity, one would want action taken against this sort of deliberate attempt to undermine and destroy businesses. While I have every sympathy with her amendment, I am not entirely sure that it relates to the question of anonymity and verification.
Apart from that, there were in a sense two debates going on in parallel in our deliberations. One was to do with anonymity. On that question, I think the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put the matter very well: in the end, you have to come down on one side or the other. My personal view, with some reluctance, is that I have come down on the same side as the Government, the noble Lord and others. I think we should not ban anonymity because there are costs and risks to doing so, however satisfying it would be to be able to expose and sue some of the people who say terrible and untrue things about one another on social media.
The more important debate was not about anonymity as such but about verification. We had the following questions, which I am afraid I do not think were satisfactorily answered. What is verification? What does it mean? Can we define what verification is? Is it too expensive? Implicitly, should it be available for free? Is there an obligation for it to be free or do the paid-for services count, and what happens if they are so expensive that one cannot reasonably afford them? Is it real, in the sense that the verification processes devised by the various platforms genuinely provide verification? Various other questions like that came up but I do not think that any of them was answered.
I hate to say this as it sounds a little harsh about a Government whom I so ardently support, but the truth is that the triple shield, also referred to as a three-legged stool in our debate, was hastily cobbled together to make up for the absence of legal but harmful, but it is wonky; it is not working, it is full of holes and it is not fit for purpose. Whatever the Minister says today, there has to be a rethink before he comes back to discuss these matters at the next stage of the Bill. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lawyers—don’t you love them? How on earth are we supposed to unscramble that at this time of night? It was good to have my kinsman, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, back in our debates. We were remarking only a few days ago that we had not seen enough lawyers in the House in these debates. One appears, and light appears. It is a marvellous experience.
I thank the Committee for listening to my earlier introductory remarks; I hope they helped to untangle some of the issues. The noble Lord, Lord Black, made it clear that the press are happy with what is in the current draft. There could be some changes, and we have heard a number of examples of ways in which one might either top or tail what there is.
There was one question that perhaps he could have come back on, and maybe he will, as I have raised it separately with the department before. I agree with a lot of what he said, but it applies to a lot more than just news publishers. Quality journalism more generally enhances and restores our faith in public services in so many ways. Why is it only the news? Is there a way in which we could broaden that? If there is not this time round, perhaps that is something we need to pick up later.
As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has said, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, made a very strong and clear case for trying to think again about what journalism does in the public realm and making sure that the Bill at least carries that forward, even if it does not deal with some of the issues that he raised.
We have had a number of other good contributions about how to capture some of the good ideas that were flying around in this debate and keep them in the foreground so that the Bill is enhanced. But I think it is time that the Minister gave us his answers.
I join noble Lords who have sent good wishes for a speedy recovery to the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone.
Amendments 46, 47 and 64, in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston, seek to require platforms to assess the risk of, and set terms for, content currently set out in Clause 12. Additionally, the amendments seek to place duties on services to assess risks to freedom of expression resulting from user empowerment tools. Category 1 platforms are already required to assess the impact on free expression of their safety policies, including user empowerment tools; to keep that assessment up to date; to publish it; and to demonstrate the positive steps they have taken in response to the impact assessment in a publicly available statement.
Amendments 48 and 100, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seek to introduce a stand-alone duty on category 1 services to protect freedom of expression, with an accompanying code of practice. Amendments 49, 50, 53A, 61 and 156, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, seek to amend the Bill’s Clause 17 and Clause 18 duties and clarify duties on content of democratic importance.
All in-scope services must already consider and implement safeguards for freedom of expression when fulfilling their duties. Category 1 services will need to be clear what content is acceptable on their services and how they will treat it, including when removing or restricting access to it, and that they will enforce the rules consistently. In setting these terms of service, they must adopt clear policies designed to protect journalistic and democratic content. That will ensure that the most important types of content benefit from additional protections while guarding against the arbitrary removal of any content. Users will be able to access effective appeal mechanisms if content is unfairly removed. That marks a considerable improvement on the status quo.
Requiring all user-to-user services to justify why they are removing or restricting each individual piece of content, as Amendment 53A would do, would be disproportionately burdensome on companies, particularly small and medium-sized ones. It would also duplicate some of the provisions I have previously outlined. Separately, as private entities, service providers have their own freedom of expression rights. This means that platforms are free to decide what content should or should not be on their website, within the bounds of the law. The Bill should not mandate providers to carry or to remove certain types of speech or content. Accordingly, we do not think it would be appropriate to require providers to ensure that free speech is not infringed, as suggested in Amendment 48.
Why would it not be possible for us to try to define what the public interest might be, and not leave it to the platforms to do so?
I ask the noble Viscount to bear with me. I will come on to this a bit later. I do not think it is for category 1 platforms to do so.
We have introduced Clause 15 to reduce the powers that the major technology companies have over what journalism is made available to UK users. Accordingly, Clause 15 requires category 1 providers to set clear terms of service which explain how they take the importance of journalistic content into account when making their moderation decisions. These duties will not stop platforms removing journalistic content. Platforms have the flexibility to set their own journalism policies, but they must enforce them consistently. They will not be able to remove journalistic content arbitrarily. This will ensure that platforms give all users of journalism due process when making content moderation decisions. Amendment 51 would mean that, where platforms subjectively reached a decision that journalism was not conducive to the public good, they would not have to give it due process. Platforms could continue to treat important journalistic content arbitrarily where they decided that this content was not in the public interest of the UK.
In his first remarks on this group the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, engaged with the question of how companies will identify content of democratic importance, which is content that seeks to contribute to democratic political debate in the UK at a national and local level. It will be broad enough to cover all political debates, including grass-roots campaigns and smaller parties. While platforms will have some discretion about what their policies in this area are, the policies will need to ensure that platforms are balancing the importance of protecting democratic content with their safety duties. For example, platforms will need to consider whether the public interest in seeing some types of content outweighs the potential harm it could cause. This will require companies to set out in their terms of service how they will treat different types of content and the systems and processes they have in place to protect such content.
Amendments 57 and 62, in the name of my noble friend Lord Kamall, seek to impose new duties on companies to protect a broader range of users’ rights, as well as to pay particular attention to the freedom of expression of users with protected characteristics. As previously set out, services will have duties to safeguard the freedom of expression of all users, regardless of their characteristics. Moreover, UK providers have existing duties under the Equality Act 2010 not to discriminate against people with characteristics which are protected in that Act. Given the range of rights included in Amendment 57, it is not clear what this would require from service providers in practice, and their relevance to service providers would likely vary between different rights.
Amendment 60, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and Amendment 88, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, probe whether references to privacy law in Clauses 18 and 28 include Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. That convention applies to member states which are signatories. Article 8(1) requires signatories to ensure the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, subject to limited derogations that must be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. The obligations flowing from Article 8 do not apply to individuals or to private companies and it would not make sense for these obligations to be applied in this way, given that states which are signatories will need to decide under Article 8(2) which restrictions on the Article 8(1) right they need to impose. It would not be appropriate or possible for private companies to make decisions on such restrictions.
Providers will, however, need to comply with all UK statutory and common-law provisions relating to privacy, and must therefore implement safeguards for user privacy when meeting their safety duties. More broadly, Ofcom is bound by the Human Rights Act 1998 and must therefore uphold Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights when implementing the Bill’s regime.
It is so complicated that the Minister is almost enticing me to stand up and ask about it. Let us just get that right: the reference to the Article 8 powers exists and applies to those bodies in the UK to which such equivalent legislation applies, so that ties us into Ofcom. Companies cannot be affected by it because it is a public duty, not a private duty, but am I then allowed to walk all the way around the circle? At the end, can Ofcom look back at the companies to establish whether, in Ofcom’s eyes, its requirements in relation to its obligations under Article 8 have or have not taken place? It is a sort of transparent, backward-reflecting view rather than a proactive proposition. That seems a complicated way of saying, “Why don’t you behave in accordance with Article 8?”
Yes, Ofcom, which is bound by it through the Human Rights Act 1998, can ask those questions and make that assessment of the companies, but it would not be right for private companies to be bound by something to which it is not appropriate for companies to be signatories. Ofcom will be looking at these questions but the duty rests on it, as bound by the Human Rights Act.
It is late at night and this is slightly tedious, but in the worst of all possible circumstances, Ofcom would be looking at what happened over the last year in relation to its codes of practice and assertions about a particular company. Ofcom is then in trouble because it has not discharged its Article 8 obligations, so who gets to exercise a whip on whom? Sorry, whips are probably the wrong things to use, but you see where I am coming from. All that is left is for the Secretary of State, but probably it would effectively be Parliament, to say to Ofcom, “You’ve failed”. That does not seem a very satisfactory solution.
Platforms will be guided by Ofcom in taking measures to comply with their duties which are recommended in Ofcom’s codes, and which contain safeguards for privacy, including ones based on the European Convention on Human Rights and the rights therein. Paragraph 10(2)(b) of Schedule 4 requires Ofcom to ensure that measures, which it describes in the code of practice, are designed in light of the importance of protecting the privacy of users. Clause 42(2) and (3) provides that platforms will be treated as complying with the privacy duties set out at Clause 18(2) and Clause 28(2), if they take the recommended measures that Ofcom sets out in the codes.
It worked. In seriousness, we will both consult the record and, if the noble Lord wants more, I am very happy to set it out in writing.
Amendment 63 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seeks to clarify that “freedom of expression” in Clause 18 refers to the
“freedom to impart ideas, opinions or information”,
as referred to in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I think I too have been guilty of using the phrases “freedom of speech” and “freedom of expression” as though they were interchangeable. Freedom of expression, within the law, is intended to encompass all the freedom of expression rights arising from UK law, including under common law. The rights to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights include both the rights to impart ideas, opinions and information, but also the right to receive such ideas, opinions and information. Any revised definition of freedom of expression to be included in the Bill should refer to both aspects of the Article 10 definition, given the importance for both children and adults of receiving information via the internet. We recognise the importance of clarity in relation to the duties set out in Clauses 18 and 28, and we are very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for proposing this amendment, and for the experience he brings to bear on behalf of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House. The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill and the Online Safety Bill serve very different purposes, but I am happy to say that the Bill team and I will consider this amendment closely between now and Report.
Amendments 101, 102, 109, 112, 116, 121, 191 and 220, in the name of my noble friend Lord Moylan, seek to require Ofcom to have special regard to the importance of protecting freedom of expression when exercising its enforcement duties, and when drafting or amending codes of practice or guidance. Ofcom must already ensure that it protects freedom of expression when overseeing the Bill, because it is bound by the Human Rights Act, as I say. It also has specific duties to ensure that it is clear about how it is protecting freedom of expression when exercising its duties, including when developing codes of practice.
My noble friend’s Amendment 294 seeks to remove “psychological” from the definition of harm in the Bill. It is worth being clear that the definition of harm is used in the Bill as part of the illegal and child safety duties. There is no definition of harm, psychological or otherwise, with regard to adults, given that the definition of content which is harmful to adults was removed from the Bill in another place. With regard to children, I agree with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. It is important that psychological harm is captured in the Bill’s child safety duties, given the significant impact that such content can have on young minds.
I invite my noble friend and others not to press their amendments in this group.