Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Report stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I need some guidance. Today’s list indicates that in this group are contained the government amendments to Clauses 55 and 56, which are the amendments relating to marriage and civil partnership. Today’s list also indicates, in the next group, that we have already debated my opposition and that of other noble Lords to Clauses 55 and 56. I am very happy to delay my comments on Clauses 55 and 56 until the Minister deals with them, but I thought I should just mention where we are.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

If I may help advance this, our understanding is that the Clauses 55 and 56 stand-part debates are the subject of group 6. I do not know whether that is the Minister’s understanding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I associate myself with those remarks. I stayed late, expecting to debate the question of the marriage of long-term prisoners, and was a bit concerned to see that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, appeared to be described as “already debated”, which I do not think it can possibly have been.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will try to help once again, because I have in front of me a copy of the groupings that were sent out. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Meston, are absolutely right that some of the consequential government amendments have been put into group 5, but group 6 certainly includes—as we were told by the Government Whips’ Office—Amendment 165ZDA and Amendment 156ZI, which is the prisoner marriage substantive stand-part amendment. If we could proceed, that would be most convenient.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very happy to proceed on the basis that group 6 will deal with these matters.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the careful way in which he has opened this debate. No one who considers the recent attacks at London Bridge and Streatham High Road can fail to understand the Government’s concern to prevent further such events. At Fishmongers’ Hall on 29 November, Usman Khan, released at the end of 2018 after serving eight years of a 16-year sentence, brutally killed two people and injured three others near London Bridge, ironically and cynically while attending an event on prisoner rehabilitation. On 2 February, just over three weeks ago, on Streatham High Road, Sudesh Amman, released less than a fortnight earlier after serving half of his three and one-third year sentence for possessing and disseminating terrorist documents, stabbed two innocent members of the public.

So it is not surprising that public attention has focused on the fact that these two terrorist offenders had been so recently released from prison at the time of their offences and that the Government are clearly committed to preventing a recurrence of such offences by recently released offenders. And there is much in this Bill that we welcome. For example, it is clear to us that the Parole Board should be involved in assessing whether prisoners can be safely released before their early release on licence.

But there are two aspects of the Bill which cause us particular concern. First, the Bill alters release dates and defers release from prison for all offenders to whom it relates but contains or presages no new measures to improve the chances of deradicalising and rehabilitating such offenders. Secondly, the Bill offends against the common-law principle of retrospectivity: new criminal legislation should not have the effect of increasing the length of a prison sentence imposed on an offender who was sentenced before the new legislation was passed. By “length of the prison sentence” I include the time the offender is statutorily bound to spend in prison.

Taking the first point on rehabilitation and deradicalisation, it is worth noting that the Bill affects all offenders within its ambit, not only those who present a particular danger. For all those offenders, it reduces their time on licence when, for many, it is time spent under supervision, on licence after release, that offers the best chance of deradicalisation and rehabilitation.

We know that the probation service is in crisis, underresourced and demoralised, but we should aim to have an improved and well-resourced probation service with more time to work with prisoners following release, not less. Furthermore, there is real concern that spending longer in prison risks further radicalising not only those terrorist offenders but others they meet in prison. Only last Wednesday, the Times devoted its lead article and its first leader to radicalisation in prisons, and in particular a jihadist knife attack on prison staff by a prisoner in HMP Winchester who was there for non-terrorist offences. As the leader writer put it:

“Prisons are not only failing to deradicalise terrorists; in some cases they risk creating them.”


At Second Reading in the House of Commons, Theresa May, with all her experience, pointed out that the Lord Chancellor and the Government were

“absolutely right to be addressing the question of the automatic early release of terrorist offenders, but terrorist offenders will still be released at some point. That is why rehabilitation—the work that is done both in prison and when they are out of prison—is so important. There have been many efforts at this over the years, but, as recent incidents have shown, not always with success.”—[Official Report, Commons, 12/2/20; col. 867.]

In 2015, the Lord Chancellor commissioned former prison governor Ian Acheson to write a review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice. He reported in March 2016, making 69 recommendations, including the appointment of

“an independent adviser on counterterrorism in prisons … responsible for an overarching counterextremism strategy”,

special enlightened separation units, as he called them, for high-risk extremists, greater training for staff in cultural and religious traditions, tighter vetting of prison chaplains, tackling extremist literature, a focus on the safe management of Friday prayers to prevent their abuse, improving the speed of response to serious violence within prisons, and more involvement of specialist police from outside.

On 29 January this year, more than two years after his report, Mr Acheson presented a BBC documentary called “The Crisis Inside”, in which he said that he was appalled that his 69 recommendations had been distilled to 11, of which the Government had recommended the implementation of eight. There would be a new directorate but no new independent adviser.

On separation units, planning at this stage was apparently under way. But just three had been recommended, and of those only one had been opened, at HMP Frankland. In the programme Mr Acheson interviewed Fiyaz Mughal, the founder of Faith Matters, who said that the imams relied on by the Government lacked the strength or the skills to mount a credible challenge to the theological base of extremism that motivated the terrorists. He was also clear that the Government’s Healthy Identity Intervention programme was far too easy for prisoners to game and manipulate.

The probation service feels undervalued and largely ignored. It is significant that Usman Khan’s mentor following his release warned the Government of the danger he presented eight months before the London Bridge attack, but no notice was taken of his warning.

We are not handling this crisis well. In the Netherlands, France and Spain, serious terrorist and Islamic extremist prisoners are separated from others, with improvements in prison safety and order, and more chance of targeted counter-radicalisation interventions working. We have 220-odd terrorists in custody and we must do more to reduce the threat from them, all the way from the period before they are taken into custody to the period following their release.

I turn now more briefly to our second concern with retrospectivity. I shall try not to get bogged down in the detailed legal question of whether altering prisoners’ release dates part way through their sentence is a breach of Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The noble and learned Lord repeated the view of the Government that it is not such a breach, but there are many who disagree. However, the question cannot be entirely avoided in this debate. On the question of penalties, Article 7.1 provides:

“Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.”


In the case of Uttley in 2004, the House of Lords considered whether Article 7.1 had been infringed when statutory automatic release at the two-thirds point was changed to release on licence at the same point, because release on licence would involve the imposition of supervision and restrictions on Mr Uttley’s freedom under the terms of the licence. The House decided that the sentence that was “applicable”, to use the terms of the article, was the maximum sentence that could have been passed for the offence for which the defendant was originally convicted. It followed that Article 7.1 would be infringed only if a sentence imposed on a defendant constituted a heavier penalty than that which could have been imposed on him under the law in force when his offence was committed. Since Mr Uttley’s multiple sexual offences included three rapes, for which he could have been sentenced to life imprisonment, and since he was sentenced to only 12 years’ imprisonment, he could not complain that his 12-year sentence was not applicable when his offences were committed. It was also said that altering his release conditions was an act of administration of his sentence, not an increase in that sentence.

However, I would suggest that the decision in Uttley arguably has no application to the changes to the statutory automatic release date proposed in this Bill, because all relevant offenders will spend longer in prison than they were statutorily bound to serve under the terms of the 2003 Act when sentence was passed on them. Furthermore, in a Spanish case in the European Court of Human Rights, Ms Del Río Prada had been sentenced prior to 2000 to a total of more than 3,000 years of imprisonment for serious terrorist offences for the ETA. Under Spanish law, these sentences were subject to a statutory maximum of 30 years. In 2006, the Spanish supreme court decided that remission for work carried out in custody would be deducted not from that 30-year maximum but from the overall sentences, so that her release date was deferred by nine years from 2008 to 2017 and thus she would serve the full 30-year maximum. The Strasbourg court decided that the change in the treatment of remissions had not merely altered the manner of the execution of the penalty but had redefined its scope. Furthermore, when Ms Del Río Prada was sentenced, she was entitled to expect, as a matter of law, that her remissions would be deductible from the 30-year maximum. It followed that there was an infringement of Article 7.1.

For my part, I find it difficult to see how the decision in Uttley could enable this Bill to withstand a challenge under Article 7 on the basis of the Del Río Prada case, where every sentence passed on a relevant offender means that the offender will spend a third longer in prison than he would have done under the 2003 Act. The case of Uttley has been further considered in the UK courts, but I would not wish to predict that the view taken in Uttley could still prevail in Strasbourg.

However, I prefer to rest this regret Motion on the long-held—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Is the noble Lord aware of the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Abedin v the United Kingdom on 12 November 2019? This dealt with the change to the statutory regime and said:

“Nothing in the Court’s judgment in Del Río Prada”—


which the noble Lord is relying upon—

“called into question the central proposition outlined in Uttley that where the nature and purpose of the measure relate exclusively to a change in the regime for early release, this does not fall part of the ‘penalty’ within the meaning of Article 7”.

Therefore, the complaint was dismissed. That case would suggest that there is no basis for a complaint about this Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am familiar with the case of Abedin. I do not accept, however, that that involves or considers the position here, where the length of time spent in custody is changed by statute from the automatic release that prevailed under the 2003 Act to the prohibition on release before the two-thirds point that would prevail once this Act was passed. Abedin did not answer that point. It concerned the mechanism for release; it did not concern the overall time that was necessary by statute to be spent in custody. That is the answer to the direct point of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the ECHR jurisprudence.

I was saying that I prefer to rest this regret Motion on the traditional common-law principle against retrospectivity. When we debated before the recess the Sentencing (Pre-consolidation Amendments) Bill, the noble and learned Lord rightly described the Bill as ensuring that it did not,

“contravene the general common law presumption against retroactivity.”—[Official Report, 11/2/20; col. 2253.]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, described the principle as being,

“that the convicted person is not dealt with by the imposition of a penalty of any kind that is more onerous than that which applied when the offence was committed.”—[Official Report, 11/2/20; col. 2249.]

The penalty that applied when the 2003 Act was being applied meant automatic release at the one-half point. This Bill requires consideration of—not automatic —release only at the two-thirds point. That is one-third longer, and that is the point that I make. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, expressed anxieties on this point during the course of that debate, and I share them.

My concern, therefore, is simply that an offender convicted before this Bill is statutorily entitled to release at one half, under an automatic response. If this Bill is passed unamended, his release will be deferred until after the two-thirds point, and then only on a Parole Board assessment.

At Second Reading in the House of Commons, the Lord Chancellor tried to argue that this does not mean that the Bill will change retrospectively the sentence imposed by the court:

“Release arrangements are part of the administration of a sentence, and the overall penalty remains unchanged.”


That is the point made on Abedin by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. A little later, however, the Lord Chancellor rather gave the game away in abandoning this position when he said:

“The justification for this emergency, retrospective legislation—out of the ordinary though I accept it is—is to prevent the automatic release of terrorist defenders in the coming weeks and months.”—[Official Report, Commons, 12/2/20; col. 872.]


Indeed, the noble and learned Lord today, in opening this debate, accepted that the Bill had retrospective effect but argued that it did not offend against Article 7.1. The Bill is retrospective, whatever the position under Article 7.1, and I do not believe that the Government have made a strong, evidence-based case for retrospection.

I will add only this. To impose apparent injustice on serving prisoners risks their being less amenable to rehabilitation, more resentful of their having their time in custody increased, and so more dangerous on release then they might otherwise have been. Significantly, the impact assessment at page 2 recognises both this risk and the risk to rehabilitation in the Bill, saying:

“A later release date and reduced (or no) licence period could disrupt offenders’ and family relationships and reduce opportunities for rehabilitation in the community, this would be more severe for young offenders and children convicted of terrorist offences. Additionally, there is a risk of prisoner frustration, disengagement or unrest at changing release arrangements, though there is little evidence to support how prisoners will actually react, and reaction is likely to vary from prisoner to prisoner.”


I fear that we abandon long-established principles at our peril. The peril is worse still when we legislate in a rush. We have amendments down in Committee seeking a review after a year of the operation of this legislation. We regard such a review as extremely important to consider its functioning when we have been denied, as we have, proper scrutiny at this stage. It is our intention to press those amendments in Committee. I beg to move.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 2nd July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I wish simply to join in the unanimous praise and gratitude for the Government’s acceptance of those amendments that they have accepted, and their tabling of these amendments today. The Online Procedure Rules are intended to introduce a new and simplified procedure. We were concerned to ensure that litigants who were going to find it difficult to use that procedure, particularly in so far as it was a digital procedure and they would not be using paper means to conduct proceedings, should not be excluded by difficulty from approaching the procedure and should have afforded to them the kind of assistance they would need to handle litigation, without the need for lawyers, under the Online Procedure Rules.

We are particularly grateful for the Government’s acceptance of Amendment 4, which imposes a duty on the Lord Chancellor, as the Minister has explained, to provide assistance or support for digitally excluded people, and these amendments tie in the obligation to have regard to the needs of those people in conducting that litigation. I was particularly concerned about the use of the word “technical” in relation to that assistance, because it seemed to us that that might be unduly restrictive. I am grateful for the excision of that word from the amendments.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister very much, even in relation to a Bill which, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has just said, seeks to reduce the role and importance of lawyers in litigation. I want to add two points. The first is to remind the House that the concerns which the Minister has so satisfactorily addressed arise from the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, under the distinguished chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton. This confirms the value of the committees that serve this House—I am of course a member of that committee—and reinforces the importance of the non-partisan nature of these committees and the value of the work they do.

Secondly, without in any way undermining the sense of unanimity and gratitude to the Minister, I just remind him that there is one contentious issue which goes to the other place. Your Lordships’ House insisted on amendments, against the wishes of the Government, to what are now Clauses 9(4) and 10(3), requiring the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to use his good efforts to ensure a satisfactory resolution of that issue, as well as all the other issues. The Minister’s role in this Bill has been quite exemplary, and he has done a great deal to ensure that it will leave this House in a much better state than when we started it.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have some comments on Amendments 216 and 217 for consideration by the Committee. On Amendment 216, I am doubtful that Section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 needs amendment to add the words “breasts” and “buttocks”. The reason for that is that Section 35(3) already defines a photograph or a film as sexual if,

“it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature”,

or if the,

“content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual”.

The reason why I anticipate that the 2015 Act does not make a photograph of a breast or a buttock necessarily sexual is that it is very easy to think of circumstances in which such a photograph is not sexual by reason of its context. It may be a photograph of your child in a swimming pool with their breast exposed; it may be a photograph of a breast-feeding mother. It may be a beach shot of my family that shows someone in the background wearing a thong. It all depends on the context—and if the context is sexual, the Act already covers it.

Subsection (4) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 217 would create a new criminal offence of promoting, soliciting or profiting from “private photographs and films”. I have no difficulty, of course, with the idea that that should be a criminal offence. I point out that that subsection, however, does not use the word “sexual”. I assume that that is a drafting error; it talks about profiting from “private photographs and films”, but I think it should say “private sexual photographs and films”. Otherwise, it has a very different scope—which I see from the nodding on the Liberal Democrat Benches was not intended.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is plainly right on that—it needs amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful. My only other point on Amendment 217 is one that I think the noble Lord, Lord Marks, accepted in his helpful opening speech. The offence in subsection (4) is committed if the defendant reasonably believes that the photographs or films were “disclosed without consent”. That would be anomalous since the primary offence—the offence committed by the person who discloses private sexual photographs or films—rightly requires the prosecution to prove that the disclosure was without the consent of the individual.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Monday 23rd July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I support what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I added my name to Amendment 69ZC because I was concerned to hear the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland say last Tuesday night, at col. 220, that the Bill would allow the judge to look at intercept evidence in closed proceedings. I had not previously understood that this was the purpose and effect of paragraph 9 of Schedule 2, and that is my fault. However, as a matter of principle it is surely one thing for the Bill to allow the judge in a secret procedure to look at material that is admissible in court but which the state is unwilling to have looked at in open court because of its sensitivity. One understands the purpose of those provisions. It is quite another thing for the state to be allowed to rely in the closed hearing on material that is, in any event, inadmissible in open court.

I had understood the Government’s defence of the closed material procedure to be that the state should not be in a worse position because the evidence on which it wishes to rely cannot be adduced in open court. To allow the state to rely on intercept evidence in the closed procedure—evidence that is inadmissible in open court—would put the state in a better position in a closed material procedure than in an open proceeding, and that cannot be right. Nor can it be a defence of such an arrangement for the Minister to argue, as he did briefly last Tuesday night when we touched on this important issue, that this is what happens in other closed material proceedings. I do not recall the House giving any consideration to this important issue on those occasions. We are now being asked to expand the scope of closed material proceedings very substantially, and I hope that we can now address the issue of principle.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I have been one of those persuaded by the Government of the need for Part 2 of this Bill: that there may indeed be cases in which the injustice of being unable to achieve a determination of the issues in the case outweighs the injustice inherent in having the case tried in part by closed material procedure.

In being so persuaded, however, I have been one of those who have been extremely reluctant to see such a departure from the principles that normally guide us in civil proceedings. That persuasion has been on the basis that closed material proceedings would be a last resort only and that the decision to hold such proceedings would be taken only on the basis that national security required certain material to be withheld from the public at large and from the excluded party or parties, despite the serious unfairness inherent in that procedure.

However, it would be fundamental that, except for the departures from ordinary procedural law inherent in the withholding of security-sensitive information, the proceedings before the judge would otherwise be ordinary civil proceedings. Moreover, the material before the judge, which he could consider in coming to his conclusion, would be evidence that he or she would ordinarily be able to hear and take into account in ordinary civil proceedings.

If that were not to be the case, and material that would be inadmissible in an ordinary case were to become admissible because the proceedings were held as a CMP, that would set them apart from the ordinary procedural law of the land and create an entirely new security court of a type that many in this House would find both alien and sinister. Furthermore, it would undermine the whole concept of the use of a CMP being a last resort, because the very fact of the CMP would give a party seeking to introduce evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible a litigation advantage. That would make the CMP procedure desirable in itself, irrespective of any considerations of national security. The CMP would then become a parallel and less fair procedure than ordinary civil proceedings in a way quite unintended by those of us who see the need for the Bill.

For those reasons, I support this simple amendment, which makes absolutely clear the position of the admissibility of material considered by the judge. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment and reassure us on this important point in closing.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this interesting debate and for the support that has been expressed on all sides of the House. My answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is that we are dealing with an exceptional Bill which is being brought forward by the coalition Government to deal with a particular short-term political problem. In the light of that, we should think very carefully before we embody on the statute book, as a permanent measure introducing permanent constitutional change, a measure which has at best a short-term political purpose.

I respect the views expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Marks, and by the Minister. I respect their views because they and the Liberal Democrats strongly believe in fixed-term Parliaments as a matter of principle. However, their difficulty is that large numbers of noble Lords on the government Benches do not agree with fixed-term Parliaments as a matter of principle. They are rightly concerned about the constitutional implications of such a measure, as so eloquently expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton and Lord Cormack, in this debate. They are particularly concerned about this matter in the absence of any public consultation on this issue, in the absence of any pre-legislative scrutiny and given the lack of any evidential basis for the new constitutional principles we are about to enact.

The inescapable reality is that the Government and large numbers of noble Lords on the government Benches are supporting the Bill not because they believe in the constitutional principle but because it is part of the coalition agreement, and it is part of the coalition agreement because of the political needs of this coalition Government to remain together for five years. I repeat: I do not deprecate that; it is a perfectly proper political position to adopt as a basis for legislation which applies to this Parliament. However, it is not an acceptable basis for general constitutional change, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has pointed out.

The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, asked whether under the amendments a future Parliament could approve a resolution at any time during that Parliament. The answer is yes, and the reason the amendment is so drafted is that it would be inappropriate to limit the events and the circumstances that may occur during a future Parliament. It is quite possible that a coalition Government might be formed part of the way through a future Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the Minister were concerned about the Parliament Act, but of course a future Parliament could at any time enact primary legislation on this subject.

The Minister asked a fair question—all his questions were fair, of course, but he asked me to address this one in my reply—about how this will work in the future. My belief, my expectation, is that no future Government will want to apply the provisions in this Bill as they are unless there is another coalition Government with similar political demands to this one. I hope and expect that after the next general election, if there is a desire in principle for fixed-term Parliaments, the relevant responsible Government will bring forward new primary legislation that will be based upon proper consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny and in the light of experience.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but what is his answer to my point and to that of the Minister that there should be proper, full parliamentary consideration of primary legislation to amend or appeal this Bill rather than the odd mechanism proposed in his amendments.