Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Baroness Lawlor

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group. I am a research director at Politeia, a think tank that has commissioned a great deal of work from lawyers and academics, including on this subject, but I speak in my own capacity as a historian. I associate myself with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, and the right reverend Prelate, who reminded us that we are part of a whole society and not just one person against another.

I support these amendments because they aim to tighten this Private Member’s Bill and prevent it being unsafe by prohibiting inducement to assisted suicide by those who, for whatever reason—we have heard about the reasons—seek to induce, encourage, advise or influence another to take his or her own life. My Amendment 57A would prohibit someone from planting the idea in the person’s head and getting them to consider suicide as an acceptable or even necessary course of action, so inducing them to choose an assisted suicide, which he or she might not otherwise have considered as an option. Given that the planting of such an idea could be done in a number of ways, directly or indirectly, under the Bill as it stands, and given the gravity and irrevocability of the decision to end your own life, the safeguard is needed.

Let me illustrate this with a possible conversation between someone suffering from cancer, whose diagnosis indicates that he or she has no more than six months to live and is in a state of shock and misery and depressed at the idea that nothing can be done, and a relative, friend or person such as a doctor, social carer, social services provider or someone else in a professional position. The person talks about the diagnosis and their feelings to the other party, who might reply: “Have you considered an assisted death?”, “I know someone who didn’t want to go through with the whole thing until the bitter end, and the doctor was very supportive” or “Others find it very helpful to plan an assisted death; it’s straightforward and can all be prepared for. The family can be with you at the time and you just doze off”. None of these possibilities is ruled out by the Bill as it stands—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

What is the difference between that conversation and the conversation that happens every day, in tragic personal circumstances, where the relative or friend says to the dying person, “Have you considered giving up your chemotherapy”?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for the intervention but, if he will permit me, I would like to finish. We can imagine many different sorts of conversation. If noble Lords would like to hear more examples, I am sure they will ask for them.

None of these possibilities is ruled out by the Bill as it stands. They would not be considered an instance of coercion or pressure. Nor will it be possible when this Bill becomes law to investigate with due legal process whether someone has been instrumental in inducing a person to assisted suicide, provided they are covered by the terms of the Bill. Clause 34 outlaws dishonesty, coercion and pressure, and Clause 35 the destruction of documentation or the falsification of what purports to be a declaration, but the Bill does not address other means of inducing someone to opt for assisted dying. Under Clause 32, criminal liability for providing assistance will be removed from the Suicide Act 1961; as will civil liability under Clause 33, which stipulates that

“providing assistance to a person to end their own life in accordance with this Act”

or assisting a person to end their life while performing a function under the Act does not of itself give rise to any civil liability.

Moreover, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009—the duty to investigate certain deaths—will be amended so that the reference to unnatural deaths does not include a death caused by the self-administration by the deceased of an approved substance within the meaning of this Bill. Similar changes will be made in respect of arrangements for medical certificates under the new regulations and for Schedule 1 on suspension of investigations. These changes mean that there will be no effective way of investigating improper behaviour after an assisted death has taken place. The Bill already, in effect, recognises this problem by making absence of coercion and pressure a condition for eligibility for someone to be given assistance to die under its provisions. It opens the possibility to object to an assisted suicide going forward on the grounds that the person about to die has been coerced or pressured.

Furthermore, Clause 10(2) gives the first doctor—the co-ordinating doctor—the duty of ascertaining that the person concerned has not been coerced or pressured. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and others who have great professional experience in looking after people with terminal and other grave illnesses how difficult it is to establish coercion. It is often very difficult to establish coercion. It is true that the Bill wants to establish coercion—or so it alleges—but, as has been argued, the grounds are too narrowly defined.

A person in a poor mental state, because of their terminal diagnosis, is especially likely to be open to suggestions from other people, especially figures of authority such as their doctor, or their own family, whom they want to believe are thinking only of them. If we want to be sure that the decision to have assistance to die is genuinely their own, it is not enough just to rule out coercion or pressure. We need also to outlaw subtler, more insidious, but no less effective forms of persuasion. There is a danger that, if the Bill includes, as it does now, just a prohibition on coercion and pressure, the inference will be drawn that any form of encouragement or inducement, so long as it is not coercion or pressure, is allowed. Surely that is not what the proponents of the Bill would want.

The noble and learned Lord the sponsor and his co-sponsor are putting forward the Bill under the banner of giving dying people more choice over what happens to them, and providing greater freedom. Surely, in pure consistency with this underlying purpose, they must be intent on ensuring that the irrevocable choice a person makes to undergo assisted suicide is genuinely that person’s free choice, and therefore must support the amendment I am proposing, and indeed the amendments that others are proposing.

I hope that we can go even further. If my amendment is adopted, a further provision could be added to Clause 10(2), making it the duty of the co-ordinating doctor to ascertain not just that there was not coercion or pressure but that the idea of assisted suicide was not suggested to the person by another party.