Riot Compensation Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Friday 26th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, for introducing this Bill, which is a welcome reform, so far as it goes, of a very odd area of English law. My interest in the subject derives from having argued a case in the Supreme Court last month on behalf of the London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime resulting from the 2011 riots. The issue was whether the 1886 Act, which this Bill would repeal, permits recovery for consequential losses to the property owner, such as loss of profits and loss of rent. Judgment in that case is awaited. Clause 8 would exclude almost all consequential loss, but I will say no more on that subject.

A bit of history might assist noble Lords. Statutory compensation for riot damages has its origins in the Riot Act 1714, which was enacted to address the widespread riots which occurred on the accession to the throne that year of George I. The 1714 Act made the “hundred”—that is, the local inhabitants—liable for property damage caused by persons who were, as the statute said, and as the 1886 Act repeats, “riotously and tumultuously assembled”. As the noble Lord mentioned, one merit of this Bill is that it will remove such antiquated language. The 1886 Act transferred the liability to local police authorities.

The 1714 Act is the origin of the phrase “reading the Riot Act”, because Section 1 required the local justice of the peace to approach the rioters, as the Act says,

“as near to them as he can safely come”,

and,

“with a loud voice command”,

that, in the words of the statutory proclamation, the King wished them to disperse. If they refused, under the Act, any officer of the law assisting the justice of the peace and other authorities would have no liability for “killing, maiming or hurting” any of the rioters.

The Act also made the local inhabitants liable for any damage to buildings caused by the rioters. The 18th century judgments of Lord Mansfield and other judges explained that the liability of the local inhabitants was designed to encourage them to take action to stop the rioting. That statutory liability has persisted even though, in 1886, the obligation to pay compensation was transferred from local inhabitants to police authorities, which need no inducement to take action against rioters.

The Bill perpetuates an anomaly, because there is no statutory right to compensation in the event of a natural disaster, such as flooding, or in the event of an epidemic. Other public bodies, such as hospitals, have a liability only if negligence can be proved. Under the riot compensation law, the police are liable to pay large sums of compensation whether or not they are at fault. That is particularly striking because the general common-law rule, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court last year in the case of Michael, is that the police generally owe no liability in negligence for failing to prevent serious crime, even if they are at fault. I represented the police forces in that case.

The anomaly is even more strange because the independent Kinghan review, which was conducted on behalf of the Home Office in 2013 to examine the application of the 1886 Act, found that there is no comparable statutory scheme in other countries. Indeed, the anomaly is even worse because the 1886 Act allows insurance companies to claim compensation for sums which they pay out, despite the fact that they have charged premiums to cover the risk. This Bill will perpetuate that right for insurance companies.

The Kinghan review found that many people were concerned that, without this statutory scheme, people might find it difficult to obtain insurance to cover riot damage in some parts of the country, but in this respect Kinghan proceeded on the basis of concern rather than any hard evidence. The Minister may be able to enlighten the House. Is there any hard evidence that this statutory scheme is actually required because people would be unable to obtain insurance against riot damages?

For all these reasons, I am doubtful that we should be perpetuating the legal anomaly of statutory compensation for riot damage. As the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, said, the Bill will limit the compensation to £l million per claimant, but should there be any special right to compensation at all in this area alone?

If Parliament is to retain this statutory scheme, we need to consider the details of its content, and there are some odd features about it. Since 1714, when this statutory scheme was first enacted, the compensation has been confined to property damage. The exclusion of any compensation for personal injuries caused by a rioter is anomalous but is understandable because, in practice, the victim can nowadays claim under the criminal injuries compensation scheme.

However, there is a very important arbitrary distinction in the 1886 Act which is maintained in this Bill in relation to property damage. The statutory compensation is confined to damage to real property—a house or other building—and to any personal property contained within that building. So I am not entitled under the 1886 Act, and I will not be entitled under the Bill, to compensation if a rioter damages my property on the highway. If a rioter comes into my house and smashes my computer, I will be entitled to compensation, but if I am walking home along my street and a rioter grabs and smashes my computer, I have no right to compensation under the Bill. I ask the Minister: why is that?

The Bill extends liability a little way: it will allow for compensation claims for some vehicles on the highway and it will allow compensation for property on land being used for the purposes of a business, but what is the justification for otherwise distinguishing between damage to property done in a building and damage done on the highway? I cannot think of any rationale for such a distinction. There is the same riotous conduct and the same damage. The only possible rationale is a wish to limit the scope of compensation, but the distinction is simply perverse.

I want to mention three other provisions in the Bill. I welcome Clause 1(6) which will exclude compensation for a riot in a prison or similar facility. This provision is necessary to reverse the effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Yarl’s Wood Immigration Ltd. The claimants, who maintained and operated an immigration detention centre under contract with the Home Office, applied for compensation under the 1886 Act after it was destroyed in a riot. The Court of Appeal said that in principle compensation was available under the 1886 Act. The Bill is right to remove any such liability. If a company is responsible for a prison or other secure unit, it should bear responsibility for preventing a riot, and it should not be able to claim compensation if a riot occurs on its watch.

I am concerned about Clause 8(3), which will allow the Secretary of State power to make regulations setting out factors to be taken into account in deciding on claims. These matters should, in principle, be in primary legislation so we can debate them and, if necessary, amend them. I appreciate that detail can be in regulations, but surely the principles should be set out in primary legislation. The 1886 Act is more detailed in this respect. Section 4 expressly states some of the factors to be taken into account: any failure by the claimant to take reasonable precautions to protect their property and any provocation offered by them to the rioters.

Finally, I want to mention Clause 9, which will allow a claimant who is dissatisfied with the award of compensation to have both a right of review, which I understand to mean an internal appeal, and a right to appeal, which I understand to mean a right to take the case to court. Again, the detail is to be left to regulations to be made by the Secretary of State. A point of principle arises. I do not see why a claimant should enjoy a de novo appeal right to a court. The decision on the compensation claim is an administrative decision by a public body, and if the claimant is aggrieved by that decision after a review they should be left to their remedy by way of judicial review requiring them to show that the claim has been assessed by an unfair procedure or in breach of the requirements of the statute or in some arbitrary manner.

I hope at least some of these comments are of value to the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, and to the Minister.

Draft Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 4th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

That is one of the reasons why we have put in place a much stronger, clearer and well-resourced investigatory powers commissioner. That will also give an opportunity for cases to be brought to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. There will be more transparency and openness there for people to take advantage of if they feel that we have got the decision wrong.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can I press the Minister on what the Government intend by judicial authorisation? The Statement that the Minister repeated says that,

“in future, the warrant will not come into force until it has been formally approved by a judge”.

However, in Clause 19 and many other places, the Bill speaks of a judicial review test, which, as has already been explained, is a matter of assessing reasonableness and the formality of procedures. The real question is whether the Government intend that the judge will have the power to countermand the initial decision of the Secretary of State if the judge considers that the warrant is either unnecessary or disproportionate.

[Lord Bates]

We have stated that there is a double lock, and it is just that. Without both the judge and the Secretary of State giving their approval, it simply cannot happen. Some details are being published today in terms of draft codes of practice, and more information will be fleshed out, in co-operation with the Ministry of Justice, the Lord Chief Justice and, crucially of course, the judicial commissioners themselves, as to how this process will work in an effective and speedy way.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judd]

My Lords, not for the first time in my political life, I applauded every word of the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I hope that that does not embarrass him. Thank God for what he said, and I hope his noble friend the Minister listened, because it was a very powerful argument. In talking about his noble friend listening, I want to put on the record that I believe that the Minister we have leading for the Government on this debate does listen. What he has put forward today is an indication of how he listens and how he is prepared to argue in government for what he has heard. I beg him to accept that those of us who want to encourage him to persuade his friends to go still further are not doing this with any sense of hostility but are trying to support him in the pathway he has now chosen to take towards the position that the rest of us find ourselves in.

I hope that I will be forgiven if, just for a moment, I introduce an international perspective of a different kind in this debate. I am sure that I was not alone this morning as I heard and studied the reports of the latest depravity by ISIS. I almost despaired—if humankind is capable of this, what can happen? But then I found myself turning back very strongly to the conviction which I have had, probably tentatively, from a young age that peace, understanding, stability and decency are built in the minds of men and women. It is not therefore a cliché to say that we are in a battle for hearts and minds—we are. Central to that battle for hearts and minds—the powerhouse of it—is higher education and the universities. That is why the arguments that we have been hearing from all sides today have been so important.

I sometimes allow a little element of cynicism to creep into my mind and think that some of the proposals that come forward, not least what originally came forward from the Government here, might almost have been scripted by the highly intelligent, ruthless leaders of movements such as ISIS. This was almost beginning to do exactly what they want us to do in beginning to undermine and limit those things which are central to the fabric of everything that we say we believe in.

From that standpoint, I hope that the Government will see the profound dangers of a gigantic own goal and of a victory for the ruthless extremists. This is the time when we have to make absolutely clear that we stand for something totally different. The central powerhouse of that is thought, analysis and creative intelligence, and the workplace for that is the universities of our society. It is not just what course should be done, what is acceptable or what lecture is not acceptable; it is the whole atmosphere and ethos of the place. Anything that undermines that destroys something that is an absolute lodestar of the things we say we believe in.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 14A, to which the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, spoke. I very much welcome Amendment 15D, tabled by the Minister, which goes a very long way to addressing the concerns that were expressed around the House in Committee and have been expressed again here today. It puts on the face of the Bill that these new Prevent duties for universities are to be read and understood alongside their duties to protect freedom of speech—and, indeed, that particular regard must be given to free speech.

Some noble Lords have expressed concern today about a lack of clarity, but free speech is not absolute, even in universities. It has to be balanced against other considerations; the balance must depend on the particular circumstances, and the guidance will be of particular importance in this regard. All the more welcome, therefore, is the amendment that we will discuss in a later group that ensures that the guidance must be approved by a positive resolution of both Houses.

I most respectfully do not agree with my former tutor, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, that Amendment 15D will make no difference to the law of the land. I would expect the courts to say, reading the new clause as part of the Bill, that the Part 5 duties must not unreasonably or unnecessarily restrict or impede the performance of the universities’ core function, which is and remains to promote academic inquiry.

I have two questions for the Minister concerning his Amendment 15D. The first arises out of the fact that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and me refers both to freedom of expression and academic freedom. The Minister’s amendment does not mention academic freedom. Can the Minister confirm—I hope he can give a positive response to this—that it is unnecessary expressly to mention academic freedom in his amendment, because in the context of a university, academic freedom is implicit in the very notion of securing freedom of expression? That would be my understanding, but I would very much welcome his reassurance on that.

Secondly, there are limits to the scope of the Minister’s Amendment 15D, because it incorporates the duty of freedom of expression in relation to three aspects of Part 5 of the Bill. New subsection (2) applies freedom of expression to the duty of universities under Clause 25(1). New subsection (3) applies this freedom of expression duty to the role of the Secretary of the State in issuing guidance under Clause 28 and the role of the Secretary of State when considering whether to issue directions under Clause 29.

However, there are two important aspects of the Part 5 scheme to which this new clause on freedom of expression does not appear to apply. One is the duty of universities under Clause 28(2) to “have regard” to the guidance, and the other concerns the duties of monitoring authorities under Clause 30. The freedom of expression duty applies to neither of those important matters, and I am concerned about that. So this is my second question. Will the Minister tell us—he might be unable or unwilling to answer today, but I would very much welcome an answer before Third Reading on Monday—whether there is a reason why his new freedom of expression clause, which I welcome, does not apply to Clause 28(2), the duty of universities to have regard to the guidance, or Clause 30, the duty of monitoring authorities? Would he please look at the matter before Third Reading to consider whether it might be better to include those matters also within this new provision?

[Baroness Brinton]

I have attached my name to Amendment 14C, and rather than repeat the points made by my noble friend Lady Sharp of Guildford, I will say just that I endorse them. I will make a comment and then ask my noble friend the Minister a question on his Amendment 15D—which, as many other noble Lords have said this evening, takes us some way forward. I am grateful to the Minister and his civil servants for coming back with a proposal that means that we can actually discuss some of the boundaries—and therein lies my question. This relates to guidance: in particular, we discussed in Committee the revisions of the guidance to some of the very specific duties about checking presentations and making sure that people had been trained in specified authorities.

I have a more fundamental question about paragraph 50 in the current guidance, which I do not believe was proposed to be amended. It says that,

“universities must take seriously their responsibility to exclude those promoting extremist views that support or are conducive to terrorism”.

It is the phrase, “their responsibility to exclude”, that I want to focus on.

I am not sure that the qualifying statement,

“that support or are conducive to terrorism”,

is sufficiently clear as to provide reassurance. It is already illegal to directly or indirectly encourage others to commit terrorist acts, and universities are obliged to exclude those who do so. Beyond this, it is not clear which views should be understood to be conducive to terrorism. Non-violent extremism is not generally unlawful, and the Prevent strategy defines extremism as,

“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values”.

These values and concepts include those that are rightly the subject of debate and consideration in universities. It is not appropriate for universities to be required to exclude those who lawfully oppose them.

In a letter to the Times on Monday, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills stated that the Bill,

“addresses terrorism and not extremism”,

which he described as, “a highly subjective concept”. I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that the Secretary of State’s comments will be fully reflected in future versions of the guidance; and that universities will not be required to exclude from campuses those who, while acting within the law, advocate views that are classed as extreme.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, this would be a safeguard without substance. What is required here is that a person is given a summary of the reasons for suspicion. The noble Baronesses who have spoken in support of the amendment have said that the summary obviously could not include the full intelligence, and quite rightly so. Presumably, the summary of the reasons will be, “There may be intelligence which suggests that”, which is hardly a reason that will satisfy anyone and seems essentially to be pointless. Surely the fact that someone is told that this is being done under Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act is all the summary of reasons that will ever be given. Dressing it up by saying, “You are being provided with a summary of the reasons: namely, that you are thought to be a person to whom Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act applies”, does not provide much of a safeguard. Is this not just gesture politics?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this is not gesture politics. There are many areas of the law where an obligation to provide a gist of the reason is imposed precisely in order to try to achieve a compromise between the duty of fairness and the demands of security. In these areas of the law, providing a gist does give individuals the substance of the allegations against them. In this context, the constable can exercise the relevant power only if he or she has reasonable grounds to suspect. In general, the constable must be able to provide at the least a summary of the reasons why they have reasonable grounds.

I understand the point that there may be security reasons why the constable is either unable, or is concerned that he or she may be unable, to provide even a summary. I wonder whether the Minister might consider, prior to Third Reading next week, coming back with a revised amendment that would impose the obligation set out in the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but subject to an exception—if the constable believes that there are or may be security reasons not to provide the summary. In the context of the exercise of a power as serious in its implications as this—that is, seizing someone’s passport—surely there ought to be an obligation, at the time when the power is exercised, to tell the individual why it is being exercised.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, following on from what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just said, it may be possible to add to the amendment the words, “or in the case of emergency”.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall start by mentioning that I, too, serve on the Joint Committee on Human Rights—I am afraid that a whole flurry of us are getting involved in this debate. There certainly was a real consensus within the Joint Committee that applying this duty to universities would be detrimental to freedom of speech. We have been most concerned about it. One of the things that I think we have all now acknowledged is that freedom of speech is an absolute value to higher education. To interfere with that or to create a chilling effect is something that we should step back from. I endorse entirely all that has been said by others on this subject and want to add one or two things.

I have acted for a number of people involved in failure to fulfil their responsibilities in the criminal field, where they have not informed on those who seemed to be involved in terrorist activity. The duty to inform is real. The universities are very conscious of it, as are the student bodies. The concern that seems to be at the base of this—and which the public would want to see being at the base of this—is that, if you were to hear that people are planning and plotting things, there is a responsibility to do something about it. That already exists in law. It is the further steps that are involved in this that worry people.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and others, I am involved in higher education, and I have been for some time. I too am the head of an Oxford college. Oxford University senior administrators have written to heads of house, such as Lord Macdonald and me, expressing their concern about this part of the legislation. This is partly because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said, it is almost impossible for us to oversee it sensibly. For example, in Oxford it would be hard to count the number of meetings that take place in any one week across the college structure and the whole of the university. I cannot imagine what the numbers might be. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and I talked about the possibility of doing a review to see what the number was. We are certainly talking about hundreds. The same would be true in Cambridge and in universities around the country. The autonomy of student unions to invite their speakers quite independently of the governance of the university must not be forgotten.

I speak from my experience as a lawyer who has acted in the criminal courts in this field during the Irish Troubles, but most particularly in recent years around the recent phase of terrorism. I acted in the case that came to be known as the Crevice trial; the fertiliser bomb plot. I acted in the transatlantic bomb plot where seven young men were put on trial for trying to blow up aeroplanes. I have acted for a number of the different wives of men involved in terrorism in relation to their duty to report. I have acted for a boy who was groomed while he was on the internet in his bedroom in his parents’ house. I have acted for those who were involved in trying to dispose of evidence in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings in relation to 27 July 2005. So I have acted in a whole series of these cases and I can honestly say that my experience is that these are not people who were radicalised in universities.

Radicalisation does not go on in universities. By and large I am talking about young men and it is about friendships and networks of friendship where people learn from each other and pass books and material to each other. It is not about closing down what happens in universities. It is really about what happens in our communities. So the work that is already going on in communities is probably the stuff that needs to be strengthened. All I urge is take a look at the real evidence of this. It is not enough to tick a box and say, “Some of these boys went to university, some of them were on access courses”. Many of our young around the country are going to university, but these boys were not radicalised because they were university students, in the way in which we think of university students. I see noble Lords nodding. That really has not been the case.

I go back to my concern about the chilling effect, which has been described by others. There is also the deterioration of trust effect, which is very important in the relationships between those who teach and those who learn. The other thing is that I spend time with the students in my college. I have them in regularly to gatherings. I do a regular meeting with sets of 12 at a time. We have discussions; they talk about all these things that are being described, some of them by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. They debate things such as, “Is democracy so wonderful, when it is bought wholesale by donations to political parties and where the small people do not get a voice? Is it right that religion can be denigrated?”. They want to debate things such as, “What is the point at which people are entitled to take up arms?”. I remember when I was president of SOAS, the School of Oriental and African Studies, there would be incredibly vital debates and arguments about the circumstances in which someone was entitled, as Mandela was in his time, to take up arms against the state. When is it appropriate? That is how young people learn about the nature of our society. It is where they learn and hear the counter arguments to some of the things that they feel seem so obvious to them.

This is not, by and large, where your radicalised young person is giving voice to his views. That is happening in the café down the road. It is happening in the kebab shop. It is happening in people’s rooms, but it is not happening in the universities in the way that somehow is imagined by this part of the legislation. I urge against it and ask that the bit about universities is taken out, because we are interfering with one of the most important freedoms that should be protected in our society.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Oxford is well represented today. I declare an interest as a fellow of All Souls College. I find this a genuinely difficult issue. I am supportive of the Government’s general objectives in Part 5; far more supportive, I think, than some of the speakers who have addressed noble Lords this afternoon, particularly in the earlier debate.

It seems to me that the starting point has to be that there is a disturbingly large number of people out there who are prepared to take violent action for ideological and religious reasons. There is an even more disturbingly large number of people who are prepared to encourage or to condone such violence. For me, the most shocking part of the appalling events in Paris were not the attacks on the journalists and the kosher supermarket by deranged Islamists, it was that a minute’s silence for the victims was unenforceable in many French schools, because of sympathy for the murderers and their supposed cause from students and, presumably, their families. This demonstrates, I think, that in France there is an alarming failure to understand the basic principles of a liberal democracy; a democracy which protects the freedom of religion—rightly so—of those who refuse to recognise the basic rights of others.

My starting point is that the Government are rightly determined to prevent such developments here; developments which breed religion-inspired violence. Having said that, I share the concerns which have been expressed this afternoon about the impact of these provisions on freedom of expression and academic freedom in universities. My concern is very similar to that of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. It is that the duty which the Bill will impose is very difficult to reconcile with the very idea of a university whose primary role is to encourage academic debate and dissent. I think that a code which can be enforced by legally binding directions is far too blunt an instrument in the context of a lecture hall or a seminar room. If you try to wear a policeman’s hat and an academic gown at the same time, you are unlikely, I think, to perform either task adequately.

The Minister’s helpful letter to noble Lords on this issue makes the point that academic freedom is not absolute, even in a university. The Minister is absolutely right: the law already restrains freedom of speech, in universities as elsewhere, through the law of defamation, restrictions on threatening or abusive words or behaviour, and prohibitions on support for proscribed organisations. Universities have no exemption in that context, but this Bill would impose duties that are far more extensive and far more destructive of basic academic freedom than anything which is contained in current law.

I would prefer universities to be excluded from Part 5, but would be much reassured on this difficult subject if the Government would support Amendment 105, in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister of Burtersett, Lady O’Loan, Lady Buscombe and Lady Sharp of Guildford, or something like it. Their amendment would write into the Bill the protection for freedom of speech currently contained, as your Lordships have heard, in Section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986. I note that, in the Minister’s letter to noble Lords, he says that the duty under the Bill,

“is in no way designed to cut across the importance of free and open debate”,

particularly in universities. Good, I am very pleased to hear that. But then let the Bill say so expressly, to provide reassurance to the many good people in universities and elsewhere who are very concerned, and rightly so, about this issue.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely support the points that have been made by all noble Lords who have spoken in favour of these amendments. I have a rather particular point to make about wording, which I do as a former chancellor of the University of Strathclyde, which of course is in Scotland.

Clause 41(1) makes it clear that Part 5 of the Bill applies to Scotland as well as to England and Wales—it does not apply to Northern Ireland, as the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, said. However, this gives rise to a problem about drafting. One has to be absolutely sure when one refers to legislation—as, for example, Amendment 105 does, along with Amendment 108 and others—that the legislation referred to applies to Scotland as well as to England and Wales. The problem with Amendment 105—which I entirely support in principle—is that Section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 applies only to England and Wales, and does not apply to Scotland. The right to freedom of speech, and all the points that have been made in favour of the exercise of freedom of speech and about the difficulties of enforcing measures of the kind that we are talking about and so on and so forth, have just as much power and effect north of the border as they do in England and Wales. If Amendment 105 were to be agreed with the form of words which it has at the moment, it would create difficulties north of the border. That could be cured very easily by simply taking out the reference to,

“the duty in section 43(1)”,

of the 1986 Act, and substituting the words “the need to ensure that freedom of speech is maintained”. Freedom of speech in Scotland is deeply ingrained in the law of the country by, for example, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. One of the features of the 1986 Act is that it was passed some years before the Human Rights Act 1998 was enacted. Nowadays, you look to the convention rights in the Human Rights Act to see whether you have a right that you wish to assert. It is certainly true that Section 43 goes rather further and is quite detailed about the nature of the duty, but I have searched as best I can through the legislation in Scotland and, so far as I can see, there is no equivalent provision in either the education Acts or the university Acts in Scotland, which cover the same field.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that your Lordships will see that, far from encroaching on the ability of colleges and universities to ensure academic freedom, the Prevent duty will sit comfortably alongside that duty and others. It will ensure that all these institutions take seriously their obligations to ensure that people are not radicalised on campus.

[Lord Pannick]

If the intention is that the Prevent duty should, as the Minister just told the House, sit alongside academic freedom and freedom of expression in universities, why not say so on the face of the Bill, so that it is absolutely clear?

[Lord Bates]

That is in my next paragraph, if the noble Lord will let me come to it.

However, I can equally understand the trepidation of many in your Lordships’ House, and I have heard the strength of feeling on this matter. On that basis, I will commit to considering this matter further, and to discussing it with my ministerial colleagues, before Report, in order to identify whether it would be possible to provide some additional comfort to noble Lords, and to the education sector itself.

This has been a very wide debate, with some 20 speakers. Many have made very specific points and asked very specific questions. I am conscious that this is the second group of amendments within six weeks to cover Prevent, but—

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

118D: Before Clause 36, insert the following new Clause—
“Independent reviewer of terrorism legislation
In section 36 of the Terrorism Act 2006, for subsection (1) substitute—“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person to review and report on the operation, effectiveness and implications of—
(a) counter-terrorism legislation; and (b) any other legislation or power to the extent that they are applied for counter-terrorist purposes.(1A) “Counter-terrorism legislation” in subsection (1) means—
(a) the terrorism Act 2000,(b) the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,(c) Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006,(d) the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008,(e) the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010,(f) the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011,(g) Part 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, and(h) Parts 1 and 2 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.””

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this amendment stands in my name—

[Lord Bates]

I apologise to the Committee and to the noble Lord, but I thought that it might be helpful to him if I put on the record some comments on his amendment, which the Government have carefully considered. I hope that that might be helpful to the noble Lord.

[Lord Pannick]

I move this amendment formally.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, it is getting late. I am very grateful to the noble Lord for moving this amendment and for raising this very important issue.

The two amendments before us are slightly different in wording but are designed for the same purpose. Both amendments would insert a new clause into the Bill which would amend the statutory remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and, in some respects, would amend the reporting arrangements for those Acts falling within his remit.

I am aware that the essence of these amendments reflects a recommendation made by David Anderson in his last annual report on the operation of the Terrorism Acts, and echoed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report on the Bill. It is, however, right that the Government think carefully before making what would be very significant changes to a long-standing and highly effective oversight role. The primary purpose of the independent reviewer role is to provide assurance to the public on the operation of UK counterterrorism legislation. It is important that we do not dilute this core function and that there is clarity about what is subject to the independent reviewer’s oversight.

Nevertheless, I can see that there is some force to the argument that it is a little perverse that while the independent reviewer is able, and obliged, to look at certain Acts of counterterrorism legislation, other equally relevant pieces of counterterrorism legislation are outside his remit. The Government have reflected on this issue, and will continue to do so in the light of this evening’s debate, to consider whether it might be possible to make some changes on Report to address this concern. Were we to expand the independent reviewer’s remit, it would, of course, raise questions about the capacity of the independent reviewer. Even someone with such a voracious appetite for work as David Anderson has limits. In part, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, which we are coming on to, is designed to increase the support and capacity of the independent reviewer. I will give further thought to whether it would be appropriate to give him greater flexibility to set his own work programme and concentrate on those areas which he believes are most deserving of scrutiny or most topical.

I give your Lordships a very clear assurance that the Government will consider these points extremely carefully, and very urgently, and I hope that we may be able to find some way to meet the points which these amendments seek to address. I invite the noble Lord to reflect on those comments.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. That is extremely helpful. Of course I have no intention of pressing the amendment. I look forward to hearing what he says next week on Report. I ask him to reflect not only on the recommendation of the Joint Committee that the remit of the independent reviewer should be expanded but also, as the Minister mentioned, the other part of the Joint Committee recommendation—paragraph 7.8 of their report—that the Government should make available to the independent reviewer resources necessary to perform his task effectively. In particular, David Anderson has explained that it would help considerably if he were assisted by a security-cleared junior counsel. That seems a very good idea to me. I do not think that the provision of such assistance would need statutory authority, but I hope that the Minister can reflect on that. Other noble Lords may wish to intervene in relation to this debate.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am glad to hear what the Minister has said. Reference has been made to the Work Programme. My amendment extended beyond the remit to the question of the frequency of reporting, which is a point that the current independent reviewer raised. Less frequent reporting on some matters will free up time to focus on others, responding of course to the current situation. There is also the question of specific statutory powers for access to classified information and to gather information. He has said that he has not had a problem but that he feels that it would be appropriate for the matter to be dealt with in statute. I wanted to ask that those points be among those that the Government are considering and, like others, I look forward to seeing the amendment on Report.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I will add a few words of support for what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend. I feel very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for taking the initiative in this group of amendments. David Anderson has set out very clearly and correctly the additional support that he needs and the programme of work that it would be in the public interest to have in his hands. The Minister seems to agree, provisionally at least, with David Anderson’s representations as articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in particular, and I feel that we can now await next week with some confidence.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 118D withdrawn.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

I have an amendment in this group. It may be a miserable little amendment suitably to be looked at at 11.20 pm. It says simply that any regulations under the clause should be by way of affirmative resolution.

Perhaps I may say something a little more widely about the group. When I looked at Clause 36, the first question that came to my mind was: what is it for? You do not get very much out of the wording. It seeks to provide advice and assistance to the independent reviewer. Why and for what purpose? Then we look at what the regulations are to contain. They may include provision about,

“particular things that the board may or must do”.

This lack of clarification about the purpose of the clause is reflected in the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

I was quite interested in Amendment 118F because it contains provisions which I think would have shocked to the core the Home Secretary in the previous Government—the thought that these wide-sounding provisions should be given to a board. On the other hand, my noble friend stresses that this should be about privacy and civil liberty concerns. I think that if it were about privacy and civil liberty concerns, we would understand a little more about it. However, as it is, the lack of clarity about what it is for means that we are about to have the anvil dropped from a large height by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile. I trust that we will hear a little more in clarification from the noble Lord in reply.

[Lord Pannick]

From a modest height, I am very concerned that Clause 36 will undermine the essential role of the independent reviewer. The current holder of the post, David Anderson, and his predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, have achieved a remarkable degree of success. They have commanded the confidence of the public and of the NGOs that have expertise in this area. They have also commanded the confidence of the intelligence services and the Government. To command the confidence and, indeed, the respect of all these different constituencies is a deeply impressive achievement. However, that confidence and respect have necessarily depended on the personal independence, integrity and judgment of those who have performed this role. The job cannot be done by a committee. The clause is silent on whether the independent reviewer will share all the secret information with the board. If so, there is a real danger that he will not, in practice, be given such free access to confidential information in the future. If he is not to share the information with the board, I cannot see how it can do much to advise and assist him.

My other concern is that Mr Anderson, as has already been mentioned, has limited time to devote to the primary task of reviewing counterterrorism legislation. The very last thing that he needs is a committee structure that will inevitably use up his finite time which would be far better spent on the front line on essential activities of reviewing the operation of the relevant legislation. For all the reasons that have already been given and for these reasons, Clause 36, certainly in its current form, is a very bad idea. I hope that the Government will fundamentally reconsider it in the limited time before Report next Wednesday.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I absolutely agree with what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the reasoning behind what he said. However, I recognise that the Government are determined to pass something like Clause 36. In looking at Clause 36(1), if there is to be some kind of board to provide advice and assistance to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, then so be it. But the only part of Clause 36 that has been really thought through is subsection (1), which merely gives the power to establish the board. It is important to be fair to the Minister and to recognise that the Government are not setting up the board by this provision, which enables the creation of regulations only if such regulations are made to set up the board.

I have a few issues that need to briefly be considered before we deal with the principal question of whether the clause should remain in its present form. I absolutely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that the title is inappropriate. If the title were appropriate, Mr Anderson, surely, would be retitled the Privacy and Civil Liberties Reviewer. But of course Mr Anderson would not accept that because that is not what he is. It is completely illogical to have an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and a board assisting him entitled the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, whose prime aims are neither privacy nor civil liberties. I beseech the Minister, who is a sensible, realistic and charming man—if I may say so—to recognise that what is in the tin should be described accurately on the tin. Many who are involved in this field of work have been perplexed by this title; apparently it has some attraction to advertising and branding people.

I would like to hear my noble friend say that yes, the Government do want to have a board, albeit possibly under another title, and that it can be formed—that is, regulations could form it. But I ask my noble friend to recognise that a great deal of work is still to be done. That work cannot be done while this Bill is before this Session of Parliament. I ask him to recognise that the work will take many months and possibly even longer. It may be that the regulations will never be made because we have not yet reached the point at which we are ready to describe a board that would have some utility in the life of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.

Perhaps I may close my evening here with a couple of words of Latin. I would say to my noble friend: please, festina lente.

Child Abuse Inquiry

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 22nd January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

On the last point, of course there is nothing in the delays which we are experiencing with the inquiry which should for one moment stop the prosecution or investigation of these heinous crimes. That should not occur. We now recognise that all three options must have a statutory element, and without doubt the inquiry will have that. Regarding the funding which is available, I have mentioned some special funding. We are also working with the Department of Health and the Department for Communities and Local Government to see what additional support can be provided, particularly for those who will be invited to come forward to give evidence to the inquiry.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, have the Government considered that the difficulty in getting this inquiry off the ground is due to its size? Surely nobody could sensibly conduct an inquiry with terms of reference requiring consideration of the extent to which state and non-state institutions have failed in their duty of care since 1970. That is an impossible task, and it is surely not surprising that no competent person is able to perform it. I must say to the Minister that if an inquiry of that sort ever did start, the inevitable delays in conducting it would make Sir John Chilcot look like a chairman in a hurry.

[Lord Bates]

I very much hope that that is not the case. I have to say that in most cases the pressure that we have been under was to extend the terms of reference still wider. I totally understand the noble Lord’s point that the inquiry needs to be sharp and focused, and to get to the heart of the matter. The chair who is appointed to the panel therefore has an incredible responsibility to provide that clarity of focus and speed of deliberation so that we get the answers quickly.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, I do not understand the two-year period contained in these amendments. The issue which we are dealing with and which is covered in this clause is, unfortunately, going to last for more than two years. Does the Minister agree that having a two-year sunset clause—even if there were to be a sunset clause at all—would send out a completely incorrect message to those who are minded to go abroad and participate in jihad? We have to show some enduring determination over this issue.

My second concern is that these amendments are too prescriptive for the work of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Can the Minister confirm that the independent reviewer is able to look at all provisions relating to counterterrorism legislation? Surely it is right that the independent reviewer should be able to focus on those issues which are revealed during the course of a given year as causing concern and report on those, rather than being required to report on too many specific issues? We heard at Second Reading that the current independent reviewer is doing something like 180 days per year. When I started as independent reviewer in 2001, just after 9/11, I was doing 40 days per year. By the time I finished, in early 2011, I was doing 140 days per year. Prioritising the independent reviewer’s work should surely be left to that person.

My final point is this. A great deal of respect has rightly been paid to the current independent reviewer. If the independent reviewer highlights a provision that is not working, surely that is at least as powerful as any sunset clause ever could be?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I will not comment on the independent reviewer because, as I understand it, we are not dealing with Amendment 3. We will come to that. I support Amendment 2 and Amendment 55, which are in this group.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will say if I am wrong, but my understanding of the reason for having a sunset clause with a particular period of time is that there are concerns, which I think are understandable, that the new powers for seizure of passports and for temporary exclusion may raise problems about the practicalities and consequences of these powers. It therefore seems entirely appropriate that, after a period of time, Parliament should take a hard look again at the impact of these powers and consider whether or not they are justifiable and having beneficial consequences. I am satisfied that it is right and appropriate to introduce these powers at this time. However, along with many others, I would be reassured about the diminution in civil liberties which is involved if we stated on the face of the Bill that Parliament will look again at this matter after a defined period. If two years is too short, then we can make it three or four years.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My noble friend Lord Carlile has already referred to the fact that the independent reviewer can, does and did look at far more than is spelled out in statute. My inclination would be to spell that out, but to spell out that the independent reviewer’s powers extend to all terrorism legislation. I have half a clause drafted to that effect for later in Committee stage. That does not mean to say, as these amendments suggest, that that should necessarily be annual. It may need to be done more than annually. Some legislation—I think it is the asset-freezing legislation—requires quarterly reports. As time goes on, subject to the eventual decision about a sunset clause, it may be not so necessary to report as frequently. Perhaps more importantly, I would prefer that a report was not subject to commissioning by the Home Secretary. A future Home Secretary might decide not to commission a report, and we can all see where that might go.

This is an important issue. I am glad that it has been raised, and it has been covered quite substantially already this afternoon. I am not convinced that this is quite the way to go about it. We need to look at the comments made by David Anderson on the scope of the role and the balance between its constituent parts, and not pick bits off in individual parts of the Bill.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: these amendments raise a very important subject. For my part, I agree with paragraph 7.8 of the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights that it is absolutely essential that the independent reviewer’s remit is extended to cover all terrorism legislation. I would be quite content to leave it to the independent reviewer to decide when it is appropriate to publish reports. It seems entirely unnecessary and inappropriate to require reports to be published annually.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I agree and I shall seek clarification on that. It may also be the case that the power is triggered when someone on a no-fly list comes in, even though effectively they are not entering UK territory. However, when they arrive in the UK, they have to present their passport and travel documents—and, as I argued in my answer, at that point I would expect any action to be taken. Again, these are very important points and I will check with the authorities on how this will work in practice. It is probably covered in the draft code of practice on the seizure of passports, which is currently out for review. If so, I will certainly make sure that those views are noted as part of the consultation process.

[Lord Pannick]

The answer may be that the powers apply in the case of a person at a port in Great Britain. That is at paragraph 2 of Schedule 1, and “port” is defined in paragraph (1)(8) as including “an airport”. From that, my understanding is that if you are at the airport, whether on the land side or the air side, the power will exist. However, I should be very grateful if the noble Lord could write with the answer to all noble Lords who are interested in this matter.

[Lord Bates]

That seems to be excellent legal advice and I am sure that it is absolutely correct. Certainly we will review it and, if that is not the case, we will write.

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[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, in relation to this group, without I hope stretching anyone’s patience, I will just repeat two questions that I asked at Second Reading, to which I do not think I got an answer. The first question, which may be very daft, is why it is not possible to use powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act to retain passports for up to seven days. Why can those not be used for outward travel? The Minister may not be able to instantly answer that. Secondly, how do you stop a rolling renewal? I gave the analogy of declaring the whole of Greater London a terrorism exclusion zone. How do you stop that just being renewed on a repetitive basis?

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, in relation to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, concerned with the giving of reasons, and in relation to the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I suggest that the answer is the one given by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, from paragraphs 230 to 233. The obligation in the Bill should surely be that there is a duty to give the gist of the reasons. No one would suggest that all detailed reasons must be given, but if someone is told that their passport is being taken away they should be told the essence of the reasons why if this power is to be acceptable and not criticised as obviously unfair. It may be necessary to write in an exception. There may be security reasons why not even the gist can be given. It is fundamental that if you exercise a power of this sort you give the gist of the reasons for doing so.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I wonder if the Minister could consider a concrete and perhaps not too remote example. Let us suppose the authorities in the United States were to send an e-mail to the authorities in this country, saying that X should be stopped; he is passing in transit through the UK and going to Ukraine— for instance—for terrorism purposes. Would that be reasonable grounds for stopping him and removing his passport? I would like the Minister to consider that. There would be no evidence or intelligence in the hands of the British authorities. A reason given to the passenger could, I suppose, be that their country says that their passport must be taken away; but would that be reasonable grounds? Could that possibly be the basis of the decision by the policeman or immigration officer?

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[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

We would obviously like to stop as many as we can from going, but I am reluctant to give the numbers, or even a broad indication of them, today. I will go back and find out how much we would be prepared to discuss numbers or even ranges but I would not like to commit myself now, if that is all right.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, who has been very helpful. He referred, on several occasions, to the draft code of practice and to the consultation, which I understand will finish at the end of this month. The Bill comes back on Report only a week later. Are the Government going to be able to give the House their views on the consultation and what they are minded to do in relation to the code of practice at that stage? It is a very short period of time, but unless we know what the Government’s views are it is going to be very difficult to debate these issues.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 40 would amend paragraph 14 of the schedule which allows the Secretary of State to make “arrangements” during the period in which the documents are retained or thereafter. The amendment seeks to ensure that this covers payment for accommodation and alternative travel arrangements. “Arrangements” could mean a number of things so I hope that my noble friend can explain to the Committee what is envisaged here. I would not want to restrict the Secretary of State in making helpful arrangements, but I would like to understand the term a little better. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am not surprised that the Bill does not include any power for the judicial authority to order payment of compensation. As a matter of administrative law, the lawful exercise of an administrative power, provided it is carried out in good faith, will not normally lead to a right for the claimant to claim damages. One hopes it never happens, in this context or others, but if these powers were to be exercised in bad faith, or if there were some other form of misfeasance in public office, the individual concerned—the victim—would already have a right to claim compensation from the state. Amendment 35 is not necessary to cover cases of bad faith or misfeasance in public office. If it is intended to extend to other cases, I would not support it.

[Lord Hylton]

My Lords, when the noble Lord replies, will he deal with the specific issue of abortive travel costs—flights that have been booked and paid for—and accommodation, which probably means hotel rooms, because the journey cannot be continued?

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, this comes back to the earlier point about whether the various powers in the Bill are proportionate and effective. What is being done to minimise the risk that they are going to exacerbate problems with particular communities? It is not simply a question of whether the powers have been issued improperly. In that case, I hope that compensation would be paid. It is more about when the powers may have been exercised entirely properly but are wrong in the sense that there was a reasonable suspicion, a passport was seized, investigation over a few hours demonstrated that this was completely wrong and the journey was permitted.

Under those circumstances, the person concerned, who had absolutely no malign intent, will have a real sense of grievance which will be reflected among all their friends, relatives and entire community, and which might be disproportionate to what was achieved. That is not the wrong use of the power: it is just the use of the power under circumstances in which it turned out that the intelligence or suspicion was wrong. That would then have a consequence. I appreciate that this could open up a whole mare’s nest of other circumstances in which this issue might arise. However, I hope that the Government have given this some thought because it is the sort of issue which could provoke a sizeable backlash in terms of people’s consideration of how these powers are being used—powers which otherwise people in that community might feel are reasonable.

[Lord Pannick]

The reason why the law does not award damages for the good-faith exercise of administrative powers in circumstances that turn out to be erroneous is because, if you confer a right to damages in those circumstances, you inevitably deter the authorities from taking action in the first place. I think that in this context we would wish to avoid deterring the security services from taking action for which they have at the time reasonable grounds.

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[Baroness Warsi]

I thank my noble friend for introducing these amendments and for the progress that has been made. I also thank him for the incredibly helpful briefing session he held last week. Perhaps he can help me with something that did not come out of that session, if this is the right moment to deal with it. What is the Government’s thinking on the extent of time these orders are intended to apply for? The Minister in the Commons, James Brokenshire, indicated that it was intended that these orders would be in operation potentially for only two or three days. I am not sure whether that is the case and I should like clarification on that point if the Minister here were able to give it today.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I too welcome these amendments, which introduce judicial control. The Government have listened to the Constitution Committee and the independent reviewer. They have also listened to the observations made from all sides of the other place and indeed here at Second Reading.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, raised a concern about paragraph 3(2) in the proposed new schedule set out in government Amendment 44 and the reference to whether the decision is “obviously flawed”. I draw her attention to the fact that its paragraph 5(1) states that:

“In determining a reference under paragraph 3, the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review”.

So my understanding—I would welcome the Minister’s confirmation—is that when the court asks whether the decision itself is obviously flawed, it will apply the principles of judicial review. It will ask whether the decision has been made on a lawful and proportionate basis, for a proper purpose and other matters of that sort, although of course the court will not look at the merits of whether a lawful decision has been made.

There is one other matter to which I draw attention in the schedule being introduced by government Amendment 45. Paragraph 5 of the proposed new schedule expressly confirms that:

“Nothing in paragraphs 2 to 4, or in rules of court … is to be read as requiring the relevant court to act in a manner inconsistent with Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention”.

That is very important indeed and I welcome the fact that the schedule expressly confirms that the court should comply with Article 6. I ask the Minister to tell me if I am wrong, but I am not aware of anything in the Bill which suggests that the courts, in exercising their judicial control powers, should be required to depart from our obligations under the human rights convention, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Bates, has made a statement on the front page of the Bill under Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that in his view the provisions of this Bill,

“are compatible with the Convention rights”.

I hope that that will give some further reassurance to those who are concerned about these powers.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I welcome the government amendments and I thank the Minister for his explanation of them. I also welcome the Government’s conversion to the principle of judicial oversight in regard to temporary exclusion orders. That is because it has to be said that any measure which seeks to restrict the movements of an individual and restrict their right to return to the country of which they are a citizen is a hugely significant power. I will not go into the other points that have been raised because we have yet to discuss the detail of how the exclusion orders will work, but the noble Baroness said that they would remain in force for two days. My information suggests that they can remain in force for two years from the date they are first imposed.

The Government previously insisted that this was a power for the Home Secretary alone, but that was not a view we could share. Both the Home Secretary and the noble Lord have referred in their comments to judicial review. That was already in place, but judicial oversight is, as we have heard, something that the Constitution Committee referred to and the Joint Committee on Human Rights said would be a necessity. Indeed, from the beginning we have been convinced of the need for parliamentary scrutiny of this aspect of the Bill. At Second Reading in the other place on 2 December, the shadow Home Secretary, my colleague the right honourable Yvette Cooper, rightly pointed out that there is such a judicial process for TPIMs and stated that we would be tabling amendments on judicial oversight. The Home Secretary responded in Committee on 15 December saying that such oversight was not necessary because it was the operation of a royal prerogative in terms of cancelling a passport, and that it was less restrictive than the conditions under TPIMs. The debate continued through to the Report stage, where again we tabled amendments which both the government parties voted against on the explanation from the Minister that there had not been,

“the chance properly to consider the Opposition amendments”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/1/15; col. 208.]

Three weeks has been long enough for noble Lords to consider the Bill, but it was not long enough for Home Office Ministers to consider our amendments. That is why I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord. In the 10 days since it was voted down in the House of Commons, the Government have found time to consider the issues and table amendments. It is a minor point, but I received an e-mail about this last Friday evening, which was a little late. Also, it would have been nice to have had the amendments with that e-mail. Perhaps that could be considered for the future when letters about new amendments are sent out at a late stage.

However, those are minor matters as compared with the fact that the Government have come around, and we greatly welcome that. The case for judicial oversight of this has been clear from the beginning. We understand and appreciate that there are times when a swift application and decision have to be made, but the Government have rightly recognised in their amendments that that should be subject to judicial processes.

Perhaps I may raise a couple of points for clarification. There are some differences between the amendments we tabled at the start of the process and government Amendment 52. First, the new amendment does not require the Secretary of State to set out a draft of the proposed notice in the temporary exclusion order application, unlike subsection (2) of the proposed new clause in our Amendment 54. Why do the Government not think it necessary to set out the draft of the proposed TEO notice, as we propose? Secondly, proposed new subsection (2) provides that the court may, in addition to giving the Secretary of State permission to impose a TEO,

“give directions to the Secretary of State in relation to the measures to be imposed on the individual”,

who is subject to such an order. That is not in the government amendment. There may be good reasons for that, but it would be helpful to know from the noble Lord the reasons for those changes.

We are committed to judicial oversight along with the other measures we have proposed. We have not had total success, although the Minister has agreed to reconsider some of them. These measures should be subject to a sunset clause; that is, a renewal requirement for Parliament to look at them again. We also think that Parliament should be assisted in that consideration. There should be further scrutiny in the form of a report from the independent reviewer and a report on their use from the Home Secretary. All these measures are important, but we are pleased that the Government have accepted the need for judicial oversight. It will not threaten the ability of the Home Secretary to impose a TEO where there is intelligence and evidence to support that measure, as the noble Lord has clarified. However, what judicial oversight does provide is legitimacy and validity to the order. That, I think, will provide the public with greater reassurance when they see these orders being imposed.

We support these amendments, but it would be helpful if the noble Lord could give us an explanation of the differences between our proposals and those set out in the government amendments.

Immigration Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, Lord Taylor, to the Immigration Minister, James Brokenshire, and to the Bill team, who have devoted an enormous amount of time to this difficult issue and have held meetings with noble Lords who are concerned about it. For reasons that I will seek to explain, I think that the Government have made a very substantial concession on this issue in Amendment 18A, following the success of the amendment that I moved on Report.

Before briefly explaining the reasons for taking that view, perhaps I may mention that the original unacceptable clause—it was unacceptable—has been improved only because of a coalition, if that is not now an unacceptable political term, of the Opposition, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, who has worked tirelessly and skilfully on this issue throughout the passage of the Bill through this House, with considerable support from the Cross Benches and a very substantial Liberal Democrat rebellion on Report. I would add that there was support from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, who also voted for the amendment. As a result of that voting decision, the new paragraph added in the House of Commons very substantially reduces the risk of leaving an individual stateless, although I recognise that such an event is still possible if the Secretary of State’s assessment, although reasonable, turns out to be inaccurate for whatever reason.

I have written to the Minister giving him notice of a number of assurances that I seek and which I consider are important to the understanding of the protections which are contained in the new paragraph. The first is this. I understand that the reasonableness of the Secretary of State’s conclusion that another nationality is open to the individual will be open to challenge in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, and that SIAC will have the power to determine whether the Secretary of State does have reasonable grounds for her belief that the individual is able to become a national of another country. I understand from the Minister’s opening remarks that he agrees with that.

The second assurance I seek is this. Does the Minister agree that the material which is relevant to the Secretary of State’s decision on this point—that is, the ability to acquire another nationality—would be very unlikely to be secret? The material would be provided to the applicant’s lawyers so that it could be fully debated in any appeal to SIAC. I would be grateful if he could confirm that.

Thirdly, am I correct in my understanding that the new provision means that the Secretary of State has no power to take away British citizenship if the matter depends on a discretionary judgment by the foreign state? I think that the words in the new paragraph, “able to become”, must mean that the matter is in the hands of the individual, who needs only to apply to the foreign state, pay the relevant fee, provide the relevant documents and show their entitlement. The paragraph does not say “able to apply”. There is good reason to interpret this provision narrowly: namely, to prevent deprivation of British citizenship where it would leave people in limbo, with the risk of statelessness if the foreign country decides not to exercise any discretion in favour of the applicant. I therefore think that this provision means that at the time of deprivation of British citizenship, the individual must have a right to citizenship under the law of the foreign country. Does the Minister agree?

I seek reassurance on a fourth point. I think that the word “able”, which is the word in the new paragraph, must mean that there is no practical impediment to obtaining the foreign citizenship. For example, if there is reason to think that the foreign state will not apply its own laws, or will not do so within a reasonable time, the Secretary of State simply could not remove British citizenship. Does the Minister agree?

Fifthly, the word “able”, as well as general principles of public law must mean that the Secretary of State could not exercise this new power to take away British citizenship where, although the person is entitled to acquire the foreign citizenship, there is good reason for their being unwilling to do so. An obvious example is where the individual is a member of a group that is persecuted in the country concerned. Does the Minister agree that it would be wholly wrong and unlawful for the Secretary of State, if she accepts that those are the facts, nevertheless to go ahead and deprive that person of British citizenship?

Sixthly and finally, I think that the word “able” and the general requirement that the Minister must exercise her power in a reasonable manner must mean that the courts would apply a “reasonable link” test. By that, I mean that the clause could not be applied by reference to an individual’s rights to acquire citizenship in a country with which he or she has no close link other than an entitlement to nationality. For example, surely the Secretary of State could not rely on the entitlement of a Jewish man or woman to citizenship of the state of Israel under the law of return if the individual has no other link with the state of Israel; or rely on a wife’s right to acquire the citizenship of her husband in a country that she has never visited. I have not thought up these examples. I take them from the judgment of Lord Wilson for the Supreme Court in the Al-Jedda case last October, at paragraph 23. Therefore, the sixth question is: does the Minister agree in principle that there must be a “reasonable link” test implicit in this paragraph, so that the clause could not be used in circumstances that would, in the absence of a reasonable link, be wholly unreasonable?

On the basis of my understanding of this clause, this is a substantial and welcome concession by the Government. I hope that the Minister can reassure the House that my views are consistent with the Government’s interpretation, because it is what the Minister says that the courts may look at in future.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and I should declare an interest because, like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I am a member of Blackstone Chambers, the same chambers as Professor Goodwin-Gill. As the House will understand, barristers are not like solicitors: we are not in a firm and are perfectly capable of taking completely different views from some of our colleagues. I have of course read Guy Goodwin-Gill’s opinion and his supplementary opinions but I do not think that they focus on the particular issues, practical and otherwise, with which we are concerned in this debate.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated, the Joint Committee on Human Rights welcomes the concession that has been made. I was one of the rebels—in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—and am personally satisfied, for the reasons that the noble Lord gave, that the concessions obtained in the other House ought to be acceptable and are in accordance both with international law and with the principles of our own constitutional system of government and law. However, I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the questions that he has raised are the right ones, and my support for the Government’s position is dependent on satisfactory assurances being given. It is very important that they are given, because one of the advantages of the Pepper v Hart doctrine is that what is said by the Minister in reply will give guidance about how this important provision is to be interpreted.

I very much welcome the shift that has occurred and the fact that it has occurred because of pressure from across the whole House and not simply from one party. I do not agree with the position now being taken by Her Majesty’s Opposition—unless it is a probing position. If they were to press their difference of opinion to a vote, I would support the Government.

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I wind up by saying that those who threaten this country’s security put us all at risk. This Government will take all necessary steps to protect the public. This proposal will strengthen the Home Secretary’s powers to ensure that very dangerous individuals can be excluded from the privileges attached to citizenship if it is in the public interest to do so. The Government’s revised proposal—it is very much a revised proposal, based on listening to noble Lords’ contributions in this House—will enable the Home Secretary to deprive in a very limited number of cases. It will apply only to those who are naturalised, not those who are British by birth or those who register acquired citizenships under the provisions of the 1981 Act, as those provide for children who acquire British citizenship. It will apply only in very serious cases of people whose conduct—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, mentioned this—is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, and only when the Home Secretary has reasonable grounds to believe that under the laws of a country or territory an individual is able to become a national of that country or territory. This is not about arbitrarily depriving people of their citizenship. It is a targeted policy to be used sparingly against very dangerous individuals who have brought the action upon themselves by terrorist-related acts. This amendment aligns us more closely with those international commitments as set out in the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961 and the declaration that the UK made in ratifying that convention in 1966. I hope that noble Lords will approve the Commons amendments.

[Lord Pannick]

If I understand him correctly, the Minister is saying that the application of this clause will depend upon the particular facts of the particular case. Can I ask him whether, among the relevant facts that the Secretary of State will take into account in deciding whether to apply this clause, and how it should apply, she will consider whether the individual has any link with the country concerned other than the ability to apply for nationality, and whether the relevant facts will also include whether the individual has a good reason for not wanting to apply for nationality in that country—for example, because of persecution?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I certainly can confirm to the noble Lord that one of the factors that has to be borne in mind by a Home Secretary considering these matters is the question of possible persecution. I assure the noble Lord on that in relation to the specific case that he mentioned and on the relevance of all factors that may impinge on a decision, which would include the ability of the person to acquire nationality in another country. They will be considered fully by the Home Secretary in all respects. The noble Lord asked about whether the person had an association and so on would be considered. I am sure that these are the sorts of things that the Home Secretary will have to consider in considering whether to exercise the powers in this clause. I am grateful to the noble Lord. He has been a great encouragement in the initial meetings that we had when we discussed these issues. Incidentally, the House should know that we are very much at the position that was suggested by a number of noble Lords right at the beginning; I am pleased that I have been able to satisfy some of the learned opinion that has been available to us here in the House.

Immigration Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 7th April 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

56: Clause 64, page 51, line 29, leave out subsections (1) and (2) and insert—
“(1) A committee of members of both Houses of Parliament shall be established to consider and report on whether section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (deprivation of citizenship) should be amended to enable the Secretary of State to deprive a person of their citizenship status if—
(a) the citizenship status results from the person’s naturalisation, and(b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is conducive to the public good because the person, while having that citizenship status, has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, any of the Islands, or any British overseas territory, even if to do so would have the effect of making a person stateless. (2) The committee shall consist of six members of the House of Lords nominated by the Chairman of Committees, and six members of the House of Commons nominated by the Speaker of the House of Commons, to be appointed on the passing of this Act to serve for the duration of the present Parliament.
(3) Any casual vacancy occurring by reason of the death, resignation or incapacity of a member of the committee shall be filled by the nomination of a member by the Chairman of Committees or the Speaker of the House of Commons, as the case may be.
(4) The quorum of the committee shall be two members of each House and the committee shall be entitled to sit and to transact business whether Parliament be sitting or not, and notwithstanding a vacancy in the membership of the committee.
(5) Subject to the above provisions, the committee may regulate its own procedure.”

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this amendment stands in my name and in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, has asked me to express his apologies to the House for his absence abroad today.

Clause 64 would give the Home Secretary power to decide that British citizenship obtained by naturalisation should be removed for reasons of the public good, even if the result would be to render the person stateless. Amendment 56 would establish a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament to consider all aspects of the Government’s proposal and report back. Parliament could then take an informed view on whether the benefits, if any, of the Government’s proposal outweighed any detriments. A Joint Committee is required because Clause 64 was added to the Bill very late in the passage of the Bill through the other place—that is, 24 hours before Report and Third Reading on 30 January, so there was no pre-legislative scrutiny of this proposal, no consultation and no opportunity for consideration by the Public Bill Committee of the other place. The absence of pre-legislative scrutiny and proper consultation is especially unfortunate in a context such as this. The Home Secretary said, in introducing this clause in the Commons on 30 January:

“Depriving people of their citizenship is a serious matter. It is one of the most serious sanctions a state can take against a person and it is therefore not an issue that I take lightly”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/1/14; col. 1038.]

The need for proper scrutiny by a Joint Committee is not an abstract matter. The implications of Clause 64 raise matters of real concern on which there is very limited information, as the debates in Committee in your Lordships’ House demonstrated. Many questions were posed in Committee as to how this proposed power would work and what its consequences would be. A Joint Committee will need to consider the practical implications and the international implications of implementing this power. As discussed in Committee, there are real concerns that the proposed measure would do little to protect the national interest and may be counterproductive. It is difficult to understand what would be achieved by taking away the citizenship of a person resident here. It may be more difficult to remove them from this country as other countries would be less willing to accept them without a passport.

In his letter dated 4 April—which I and other Peers received and for which I thank the noble Lord—the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, emphasised, rightly, that we are concerned in this clause with dangerous individuals, individuals who pose, as he said, a serious national security risk to the United Kingdom. There is no dispute about that. The question is how the exercise of a right to remove British citizenship would assist in protecting us against such individuals. The noble Lord said in his letter that the Home Secretary is concerned to prevent such people from travelling abroad using a British passport to participate in terrorist training activities. However, the Secretary of State already has power to withdraw a British passport from dangerous individuals for precisely such a reason without stripping them of their nationality and making them stateless. The noble Lord, Lord Taylor, made a Written Ministerial Statement on this very subject to the House on 25 April of last year.

In practice, it seems likely that a deprivation of citizenship would normally occur while the individual is out of this country. However, that raises a concern that other countries may well say that the individual was allowed in only by reason of the fact that they were travelling on a British passport, and now that that status has been removed and the person has no other nationality, we, the United Kingdom, can have them back. Your Lordships may have seen the advice of Professor Guy Goodwin-Gill, professor of international refugee law at Oxford University, that in those circumstances this country would have an international law obligation to the other state to readmit that individual, however objectionable their conduct.

The Joint Committee will also want to consider whether the benefits, if any, of the proposed new power justify the adverse international implications. This country played a leading international role in the drafting of the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. We have done much since then to encourage other nations to refrain from inflicting on their citizens what Lord Wilson, in the Al-Jedda case in the Supreme Court last year, described as “the evil of statelessness”. There are, regrettably, all too many dictators around the world who are willing to use the creation of statelessness as a weapon against opponents and we should do nothing to suggest that such conduct is acceptable.

The Government have now, very late in the passage of the Bill, brought forward their own amendment to provide for post-legislative scrutiny, and the Minister will speak to that. However, the noble Lord’s Amendment 56A does not say who will conduct this post-legislative scrutiny or indeed require that they are even independent of the Home Office. The noble Lord’s amendment allows for information in the scrutiny report not to be published. In any event—this is the crucial point—the Government’s Amendment 56A does not meet my concern because proper consideration of the implications of this proposed power to render people stateless is required before legislation is enacted and not afterwards.

Given the absence of pre-legislative scrutiny, the late stage at which Clause 64 was added to the Bill and the lack of clarity as to how this power will operate and with what consequences, we should refer it to a Joint Committee so that Parliament can be properly informed on these difficult and important issues. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Pitkeathley)]

I must tell your Lordships that if Amendment 56 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 56ZA to 56ZD inclusive for reasons of pre-emption.

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In conclusion—I think noble Lords will want to move to a conclusion on this matter—this power is very narrowly drawn and is aimed at addressing a real and current threat posed by a small number of individuals. I hope noble Lords realise that the Government are committed to taking proportionate action to protect the public and removing the privileges of British citizenship from those who abuse it. In light of those points, I hope noble Lords will support the government amendment and agree not to press the other amendments that we have discussed in this group.

[Lord Pannick]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, particularly the Minister, whose door has been open throughout the passage of the Bill to all noble Lords concerned about particular clauses. He has given a characteristically full and helpful response to the amendments.

In his first intervention in this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, said that he recognises the importance of scrutiny at the earliest opportunity and that Amendment 56A therefore allows for a report one year after the passage of the Bill. The earliest opportunity for scrutiny is before we confer this power on the Secretary of State, not after we confer this power on the Secretary of State. The Minister then said that the place for proper scrutiny was in this House, not in a Joint Committee. But for this House to do its job properly depends on adequate pre-legislative scrutiny so that we have the information adequately to assess the implications of Clause 64. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and to other noble Lords, for identifying a large number of questions that the Joint Committee no doubt will wish to consider.

The Minister also suggested that delay while we wait for a Joint Committee report might somehow be damaging. I find that very difficult to understand. Clause 64 would remove a restriction on creating statelessness, which has been part of our law since 2003. The Minister has not told us how many, if any, cases there are where the Secretary of State would wish to remove nationality on public good grounds but is currently prevented from doing so because it would cause statelessness. In any event, I do not understand—and it is plain from the debates that I am not the only the noble Lord who does not understand—how removing nationality to make a person stateless is going to assist national security by making it easier to control undesirable people or remove them from this country. That is one of the crucial questions that a Joint Committee will need to address.

In any event, a Joint Committee could report by, say, October, and if the Government see fit in the light of such a report, they can bring forward a short Bill in the next Session. The Minister cannot seriously suggest that the Queen’s Speech in June will be so full of material that the Home Secretary will be told in the autumn, in the light of a Joint Committee report, “We’re very sorry, but there’s simply no room to come back to this matter”. Let us be realistic about this issue.

Finally, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, Amendment 56 is a modest amendment. It does not ask this House to take a final view on whether the proposed new power should be conferred on the Home Secretary. What it does is to invite this House rather to ensure that Parliament is fully informed of the benefits, if any, and the detriments, before the law is changed. Given the importance of the subject matter and the difficult questions that continue to exist as to the practical and legal consequences of the conferral and exercise of this new power, I think that that is a step that we should take to require proper pre-legislative scrutiny.

This is a matter of fundamental principle and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Immigration Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 1st April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved so ably by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, who is a colleague on the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I shall simply quote from what the committee said as I think it sums up the case now being made:

“we remain concerned, even after considering the Minister’s explanation of the purpose of the provision, about whether it is compatible with the right of access to court, the principle of equality of arms and the rule of law for the court’s power to consider a new matter to depend on the ‘consent’ of the Secretary of State. We are struck by the fact that the Government could not identify any other similar provisions in other statutory contexts”—

as the noble Baroness has already pointed out—

“which confirms our sense that this provision crosses a line which has not previously been crossed”—

I think that is a very good point—

“in relation to an aspect of a tribunal’s jurisdiction being dependent on the consent of the Minister who is the respondent to the appeal”.

There is a basic principle here about justice being seen to be done. If this provision goes through as it stands, I do not think that justice will be seen to be done. As the noble Baroness said, perhaps the answer is for the Minister to give a commitment to come back at Third Reading with an amendment that is better expressed. However, I hope that the Government are listening and will respond positively to the amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support this amendment, which raises a short but vital issue of principle, which is whether it is consistent with the rule of law for one party to the proceedings to have the power to determine the scope of the jurisdiction of the tribunal before which it appears. So far as I am aware there is no precedent for such provision, for the very good reason that it is objectionable in principle. It should be a matter for the tribunal to apply whatever criteria Parliament thinks appropriate to determine whether the tribunal can hear an appeal that raises new grounds. I simply cannot understand why the Secretary of State does not trust the tribunal to decide on the application of the criteria which Parliament sees fit to lay down. I, too, hope that the Minister will be able to tell the House that, in the light of the concerns expressed this afternoon, the Government will think again on this important matter before Third Reading.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I have the disadvantage of not seeing this matter quite in the way that my colleagues have seen it. This tribunal is an appeal tribunal from a judgment of the decision of the Secretary of State. This clause deals with a situation in which it appears, in the course of the proceedings or perhaps before they start, that there is a new ground of decision that has not as yet been dealt with by the Secretary of State. It is the Secretary of State’s jurisdiction to decide that, and the appeal tribunal’s jurisdiction is to consider appeals that arise from the decision of the Secretary of State. Therefore the essence of this particular procedure appears to be that a new decision is called for from the Secretary of State on a matter which has not been before the Secretary of State previously.

I do not see how that is in any way a breach of principle, but I know from experience long past that the way in which immigration tribunals deal with these matters has been a cause of great difficulty. During my time there were great accumulations of arrears in the immigration tribunals, and all sorts of efforts were made to try to deal with that. One of my successes, which I cherish, was to get money from the Treasury to set up new immigration appeal tribunals in the hope that that would reduce the number of cases waiting. Like all such efforts, that does not seem to have worked, as the list of appeals still seems to be pretty long.

That seems to be the essence of this issue. I agree that there are problems when this sort of thing arises in the course of an appeal on an earlier decision, but the fact that that happens is something which has to be dealt with. One of the difficulties that my noble friend Lady Berridge referred to was that it is often very difficult, in the course of these proceedings, to get in touch with the Home Office representative before the case starts; the case goes ahead without anyone getting in touch with them. That is not a new difficulty, and I suppose that this amendment is intended to deal with it to some extent. There is an underlying difference in principle between the way in which my colleagues look at this and the way I think it is possible to look at it.

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[Lord Pannick]

I wish to make a suggestion. The noble and learned Lord rightly emphasises that the Secretary of State is the primary decision-maker. However, a way forward might be to give the tribunal some power to overturn a decision of the Secretary of State on a matter of this sort if the Secretary of State is acting unreasonably. That would recognise the primary role of the Secretary of State. What is objectionable is that the Secretary of State must give his or her consent in this context.

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[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment to remove Clause 15 from the Bill. A system of internal review is not a substitute for the right of appeal. The right to appeal confers a right to a decision by an independent adjudicator, but it is more than that. There is a public hearing with witnesses and with submissions on both sides. There is a public reasoned decision as a result of the process. I fear that, without independent appeals, the already poor standards of administration in relation to immigration decisions—the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, has referred to the lamentable figures—will get even worse.

I do not think that another layer of internal decision-making through an administrative review can possibly be as effective a mechanism for improving standards and ensuring correct decisions as an independent and public appeal process. I welcome, of course, the Government’s decision to invite the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to review the new administrative review process. This will introduce some independent scrutiny of the process, but the chief inspector is not going to assess the substantive merits of individual cases in the way that the tribunal does.

The Government have emphasised that an individual dissatisfied with the internal review process—and there will be many of them—will have legal redress by way of judicial review. But of course a judicial review, unlike an appeal, is not an assessment of the merits of the case; it is a limited assessment of fair process and of legal errors. In any event, I simply cannot understand any more than the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, why the Government are seeking to push these cases—and there will be many of them—into judicial review when, at the same time, the Lord Chancellor is bringing forward legislative proposals to reduce the number of judicial reviews. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, explained in speaking to the previous amendment, the whole thrust of reform in recent years has, rightly, been to remove immigration cases from judicial review and to have them decided before tribunals.

The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor—like other noble Lords, I am very grateful to him for having meetings and correspondence on these issues—has previously emphasised that administrative review is cheap and quick. He is right, but there is nothing to stop the Home Office introducing a quick, cheap and effective process of administrative review. If it were to do so, no doubt it would find that a very large proportion of appeals would become unnecessary. My objection to the clause is the removal of the right to an independent appeal in cases which are not adequately addressed by a process of administrative review. That is why I oppose Clause 15.

[The Earl of Clancarty (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House for not having spoken before on this Bill. I will be brief. I have put my name to this amendment and want to talk about fairness.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, mentioned, we had an excellent debate on immigration last week in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Steel. Much of that debate was full of individual cases. Someone afterwards said that it was a sad debate because of the frustration felt on all sides of the House for those they knew or knew of who suffered difficulties or injustices as a result of the immigration system or regulations as they currently stand, or as likely from mistakes being made. The large proportion of appeals that succeed is testament to that.

Those who work in the area of our domestic legal process, which has developed over centuries, understand well that the system is not perfect, that it can be improved, that mistakes are made and, more than that, that significant safeguards need to be built in that are, crucially, an open aspect of the system. As a society, we are by and large grown-up and realistic enough to accept that. Surely those principles that currently exist in relation to immigration appeals and have now stood for more than four decades should in the same way be, at the very least, preserved and protected. The Government may baulk at the openness of the tribunal system when so many mistakes are clearly revealed to the public, but if the process is taken back in-house—as it were—as an administrative review, we will lose that openness, independence and accountability that we currently have, as my noble friend Lord Pannick said.

The Government wish to replace the current system with one that will be more complicated and inefficient. In addition to limiting the process, it will fragment it and be desperately unfair for the person concerned because that person would quite rightly—this should be a democratic right—want to hear the entirety of their case presented at a tribunal. I can understand the desire of the Government here. They are under considerable pressure to get immigration right, get a grip on it and put an authoritative stamp on it. However, if that is a spurious authority, which, through lack of independence, institutionalises mistakes—that is what will happen—it will be worthless. Whatever good intentions the Government may have, Clause 15 remains on Report a threat to our fundamental notions of fairness in this country. There is a world of difference between aiming for a perfect system, which is laudable, and attempting to construct in the here and now a system that assumes perfection. If we so significantly limit the right of appeal to tribunals, we will surely set off down the latter, dangerous and misguided, road.