Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 29th November 2017 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

54: Clause 19, page 16, line 15, after “decide” insert “as soon as reasonably practicable”

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury. It is not concerned with lobsters; it is concerned with the duty of the Minister to consider a request to vary or revoke a designation. The Bill contains no provision requiring the Minister to address such a request within any specific time period. I can understand why it would be inappropriate to set any defined time period—how long it takes to address a request to vary or revoke a designation will inevitably depend on the circumstances of the individual case—but the Bill should, I think, contain a more general obligation on the Minister in relation to time. This amendment would require the Minister to decide on a request to revoke or vary,

“as soon as reasonably practicable”.

It is important for the Bill to impose such an obligation because, under Clause 32, read with Clause 33(5), a person who is put on a sanctions list cannot seek a review from the court until the Minister has made the decision on the request to vary or revoke the designation. It would be quite wrong for a person to be listed, with all the adverse consequences that that involves, with no opportunity to complain to a court unless the Minister had an obligation to act with reasonable expedition. In an extreme case, were this amendment to be included in the Bill, the courts would be able to say to the Minister that his or her delays were unacceptable.

I cannot see that a “reasonably practicable” test could be in any way objectionable. I suspect that the Minister will tell the Committee that the amendment is unnecessary because of course Ministers will decide these cases as soon as reasonably practicable. We have heard such assurances repeatedly during this Committee stage. However, I am sure that the Minister understands that in contexts as important as this Bill I prefer to see obligations written into the statute rather than rely on assurances from Ministers, however fair and reasonable they are. I beg to move.

[Baroness Northover]

This seems an eminently reasonable amendment. It almost seems unambitious in its scope—it invites Ministers to answer questions along the lines of “as soon as possible” and “shortly”—but noble Lords are surely right to seek to put something of a common-sense timetable on this, and we support them. The Bill proposes to give such wide and untrammelled powers to Ministers that any moves to qualify them should be welcomed.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for tabling this amendment, and I thank other noble Lords for their contributions. Perhaps I will disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, somewhat by saying that I agree with the substance and constructive nature of the proposal before us. When the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, started talking about “shortly” and so on, I was reminded of my time as the Aviation Minister and the occasion when an announcement on Heathrow Airport was pending—but we got there.

In that mood, let me outline the Government’s position on this amendment. When a request is received from a designated person to vary or revoke their designation, the appropriate Minister should ensure that they make their decision as soon as is reasonably practicable. As sanctions are applied without giving those sanctioned the opportunity to make representations, and because they have serious consequences on the individuals concerned, it is important to ensure that mistakes are rectified swiftly.

As sanctions are intended to change behaviour, it is also important that people should be able to have their designation revoked if they change their behaviour. Clause 19 therefore provides a quicker and less costly option than going to court. It will also have the advantage of keeping unnecessary pressure off the courts and potentially reducing costs to the taxpayer. The reassessment process exists to allow designated persons to seek swift redress when wrongly designated—and I can assure noble Lords that the Government fully intend to act promptly to requests for reassessments.

I shall certainly reflect on the amendment. I have listened carefully to noble Lords, who have made a compelling case for us to look at our position. With the assurance today that we will look at the amendment again—although it is only an assurance at this juncture—I ask the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the Minister. I look forward to hearing from him before Report that the Government are able to move on this matter. He has heard the views that there is no basis for not including this in the Bill. I hope this is the first of many amendments today that he will see the wisdom of. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 54 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

56: Clause 20, page 16, line 43, leave out “3 years” and insert “1 year”

[Lord Pannick]

Again, this amendment is in my name and the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury. It concerns the periodic review provisions in Clause 20. The appropriate Minister is required to consider any designation of a person every three years. That is far too long a period given the gravity of the consequences of designating a person. It is true, as the Minister emphasised at Second Reading, that the listed individual can seek a review under Clause 19, but subsection (2) of that clause provides that once such a request has been made, no further request may be made by the individual unless,

“there is a significant matter which has not previously been considered by the Minister”.

There may well be cases where, although the individual can point to no significant new material, the Minister, on reviewing the matter, may find good reason to vary or revoke the designation. Indeed, the passage of a year without any further material coming to light may justify looking again at whether the listing is appropriate. The three-year period is especially troubling because of the grave consequences of listing for the person concerned and because, as I said in the earlier debate today, you cannot start court proceedings under Clause 32(1)(d), to be read with Clause 33(5), until you have sought a review by the Minister and received a decision on that review.

The Minister will confirm that under the EU system, which this Bill is designed to replace, a periodic review occurs every six months normally but certainly in all cases at least every year. I can see no justification for this Bill to triple the period which can elapse before a review is required. I beg to move.

[Baroness Northover]

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was eagle-eyed as ever, and this issue came up at Second Reading. He now brings forward this amendment with other noble Lords, and we support them.

The point here is that the review period for designations would occur not after one year but only after three. As the Minister said on Second Reading, it could happen earlier, but of course it does not have to. I also note that, on Second Reading, the Minister said that he did not regard the period proposed by the Government as excessive. He did not answer the point that this was a detrimental change from the position should we stay in the EU. I expect that he has now had time to consult on that and—if you like—to recognise that the writing is on the wall and, I hope, to persuade his colleagues that this cannot stand.

There is no reason for the frequency of reviews to change from one year, as now in the EU, to three years. I hope and expect that the Minister will find that this is one straightforward area in which to concede. After all, it has always been said that if we were to leave the EU, no protections or rights of UK citizens would be diminished. This is a case in point.

I raise one other issue, which I think has been flagged to the Bill team. This is, again, from the Law Society. It is concerned that UK courts should have the jurisdiction to hear wrongful listings in the case of UN listed persons. It points out that the Bill does not require or permit a UK court to quash a wrongful listing for a person who is UN listed and can only ask the Government to use their best endeavours to secure a de-listing in the UN. It recommends that the Bill directly transpose into UK law—

[Lord Pannick]

I am sorry to interrupt, but that is the specific subject of Amendment 62, to which we are coming. I do not wish to inhibit the noble Baroness, but she may wish to be aware of that.

[Baroness Northover]

I did not spot that point. In that case, I will wait until we get to it. I hope that the Bill team will have taken it on board, both from the amendment submitted in the noble Lord’s name and, indeed, from what we sent through.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I think I understand the noble Baroness’s question, but, notwithstanding the issue of numbers alone, Clause 20 lays out a process which the Government perceive to be more efficient than that currently adopted by the EU.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. It is disappointing. I am not persuaded. As the noble Baroness pointed out, a limited number of people are involved here, and surely the time and the resources are justified by the significance of the sanctions imposed. It is right and proper that sanctions of such significance should be reviewed more often than every three years.

The Minister says that the individual can seek a review, which is right, but the individual can do so only if there is a significant matter known to the individual not previously considered by the Minister. There may well be material in the files available to the Government which is not known to the individual. The Minister says that the individual can go to court, but it is the same under the EU system: you can go to court but the whole point of the Bill is to encourage court procedures as a last resort.

The Minister’s other point was that there is a sanctions review every year, but as I understand it—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that is not a review of individual cases but a review of the structure of the system, so for my part I do not see that that adds to the debate.

I will reflect on what the Minister has said, and I hope that he will reflect on this debate before Report, but we may well come back to this on Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 56 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

62: Clause 32, page 23, line 16, at end insert—
“( ) For the avoidance of doubt, in relation to a decision under subsection (1)(c) above, the court has power to set aside the designation if satisfied that it is in breach of the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.”

[Lord Pannick]

This amendment is in my name and the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord McNally. It is concerned with persons who are designated in this country because they have been placed on the UN sanctions list. It raises a very troubling rule-of-law issue, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, referred in one of our earlier debates this afternoon.

Clause 21(2) and (4) provide that a person who is designated here because they are on a UN list may request the Secretary of State to use best endeavours to secure that their name is removed from the UN sanctions list. My concern is that what Clause 32 means —and indeed is intended to mean—is that, in relation to such a case, a court in this country has no power other than to overturn a decision of the Secretary of State not to use such best endeavours, and to ask the Secretary of State to use best endeavours at the UN. What the Bill appears to deny the person concerned is the right to say to the court: “I have been listed in this country—designated in this country—because I am on a UN list. But I am on a UN list as a result of procedural unfairness, as they have never told me why I am listed, or as a result of a substantive defect. There is no basis whatever for my listing, therefore the court in this country should quash the domestic designation”.

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I have listened very carefully to the noble Lord, but I hope equally that he has listened carefully to my response, and I hope he is minded to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the Minister. I have listened carefully, but I am not persuaded. The Minister is telling the Committee that however strong the individual’s case that his or her designation is unfair as a matter of procedure and substance, there is nothing that the English courts can do except ask the Secretary of State to use best endeavours at the United Nations, which the Secretary of State may already have done. What happens if the UN’s response is that it will maintain the designation and the English court is still satisfied that there is no basis for including this person on the list? There may be no evidence that justifies it; it may be a rank breach of fairness.

I am not satisfied, as I said, that we should subcontract these matters to the United Nations. I can well understand that the English court would be very slow to form the view that it should take the step of quashing the domestic designation when the United Nations has imposed internationally such a designation, but I cannot accept that the English court should be left without power to do so if it believes that injustice has been done, given the grave consequences for the individual concerned. I will reflect further on this, and I hope the Minister will reflect further before Report. If not, we will need to return to what, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, is a simple matter but also a fundamental matter of the rule of law. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 62 withdrawn.

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[Lord Collins of Highbury]

My Lords, this group of amendments is focused on a subject matter that we repeatedly return to: namely, parliamentary accountability and scrutiny of the actions of the Executive. I want to focus primarily on how we enable Parliament to do the job of scrutiny. Amendments 65 and 68, in particular, are designed to ensure that there is relevant information in relation to actions to revoke or introduce regulations. I know that the Minister will say that because regulations will be placed before Parliament there will be a scrutiny function there—but I think more than that is needed. We say that an affirmative decision is required, and also that the reasons should be clearly stated and set out in a written memorandum by the appropriate Minister. So the theme that we are returning to, and focusing on, is enabling Parliament to scrutinise, and giving it the tools to do that job.

There is a power under Clause 35 for an appropriate Minister to suspend regulations “for a specified period” —no period being specified, of course, because that is subject to regulations. I keep coming back to the fact that, in the exercise of powers, it is important to put certain principles on the face of the Bill. We would insert a requirement for the time period to be put in. We must understand that the power of the Executive to suspend regulations or other sanctions has the potential to cause compliance uncertainty for business. There could be uncertainty about when and on what terms a sanction may be reimposed, or whether it could be revoked entirely.

The purpose of the amendment is to create more certainty for all those involved, and by doing so to introduce more effective compliance with sanctions. Considering the aims of those sanctions, that is very important. The persons or entities that are subject to suspended sanctions may still be affected by reputational stigma. It is important, in terms of procedural fairness, that these issues should be properly addressed.

The group is focused primarily on parliamentary scrutiny and enabling Parliament to do that job effectively, and I have also put my name to Amendment 72, to Clause 44. I look forward to the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on that. In my opinion that clause gives the Executive an overwhelming power, which the Minister will have to give very good reasons for retaining. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, mentioned Amendment 72, which is in my name and his, and in those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. It concerns Clause 44(2), which is a very broad Henry VIII clause. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, repeatedly argued during earlier debates in this Committee and elsewhere, we should not be giving Ministers powers to amend primary legislation without very strong justification. Clause 44(2) would allow Ministers to take action,

“amending, repealing or revoking enactments”,

including primary legislation,

“(whenever passed or made)”.

It contains no limitations on those powers. For my part, I cannot see any justification for including such extensive powers in the Bill. I strongly suspect that such a provision is included simply because it may turn out to be useful at some time in the future. We in this House are seeing too regularly provisions of this sort and we ought to take a stand against the conferral of such sovereignty on Ministers.

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[Baroness Sheehan (LD)]

I am a little intrepid in saying this as I am not a lawyer or a constitutional expert but this seems to be a Bill that, from a layman’s point of view, lets the Government give themselves great powers through the way it designates individuals, connecting persons through descriptions, through definitions of involved people and through clauses that give powers to amend. These include Clause 39, which gives power to amend all of Part 1 so as to authorise additional sanctions, and Clause 44(2), which gives sweeping Henry VIII powers to amend, repeal and revoke amendments and enactments. To me, this seems like Jekyll and Hyde legislation. You think you are getting one thing, yet there is every ability within the proposed Act to change itself into something quite different.

I was quite concerned in last week’s debate, when my noble friend Lady Bowles talked about how Acts could be used for unintended purposes. I recall the case of Maya Evans, who read out the names of 97 British soldiers during the remembrance ceremony at the Cenotaph in 2005. Although it was a very innocuous statement that she was making—she was protesting against Britain being taken into the Iraq war; she felt that it was illegal—she was arrested and was the first person in the UK to be convicted under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. Also in the same year—I might embarrass the Labour Benches here—Walter Wolfgang was forcibly removed from the Labour Party conference. Again, he wanted to protest about the Iraq war, and shouted out “Nonsense!” and “That’s a lie!” during a speech made from the conference platform by Jack Straw. He was ejected and was stopped from re-entering the conference hall by a police officer citing the Terrorism Act.

From my point of view as a lay person, I am fully supportive of the well-informed noble Lords here who are leading the charge to make sure that the Bill does what it says on the tin and does not turn into a Jekyll and Hyde Bill.

[Lord Pannick]

Whether I am well informed or not, can the Minister confirm that in his response on Amendment 72 he gave a reassurance to the Committee that these powers would be used only when necessary? That was the word he used on more than one occasion. He will remember an earlier debate we had in this Committee on whether that word should be written into an earlier clause. If with the aid of parliamentary draftsmen “necessary” could be written in to confine the use of that power, it would mitigate substantially my concern about Clause 44(2); I speak only for myself. Perhaps the Minister and the Bill team could reflect on that before Report.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

To pick up on that final point, of course we will. I confirm that I used “necessary”. As regards the intervention from the noble Baroness, perhaps I did not quite follow her whole argument—various rules were in play—but I got the general principle that she was in support of the powers that are being conferred. As I said right at the beginning, laying it out in quite a lot of detail, I totally accept the point about the Henry VIII powers—the use of secondary legislation rather than primary legislation—which we have debated several times. Certainly, from our perspective as the Government—that is true not only of ourselves but of previous Governments as well—there is a point in principle that we try to strike a balance. Therefore I am listening carefully. On the specific point that the noble Lord made at the end, I will take that back and see how it can be adapted.

I am in reflective mode, as several noble Lords have noted during some of the earlier debates in Committee. However, on this group of amendments, I hope that after the explanation I have given the noble Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

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Debate on whether Clause 39 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, have joined with me in objecting to Clause 39, which would allow the Minister to authorise prohibitions or requirements of kinds additional to those set out in Chapter 1. So the Minister, by regulations, would have power to add to financial, immigration, trade, aircraft and shipping sanctions, and sanctions for the purposes of implementing UN sanctions.

If additional types of sanctions are to be added to Chapter 1 and they are not new types of UN sanctions—which is already covered by Clause 7—surely that should be done by primary legislation so that Parliament has the same opportunity to debate and amend the proposals as it does with the clauses of this Bill. These are vital matters to add new types of sanctions to this legislation.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on this clause. I am hearing the message loud and clear, but in doing so I need to pick up on a few points as to the motive and the intent behind the clause. I appreciate the clarification by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, of the Government’s motives. I will not comment on his description of lawyers; it would be entirely inappropriate for me to do so. However, he makes a valid point about the explanation and it is appropriate to explain the Government’s intention behind the clause.

The clause will allow the UK to make amendments to the Bill, as noble Lords have mentioned, to allow for the imposition of new and unforeseen sanction measures, a point well made by my noble friend Lord Faulks. The power is confined to new types of sanctions and cannot be used to alter the purposes for which sanctions can be imposed. I should explain what I mean by new types of sanctions. Common types of sanction include asset freezes, travel bans, arms embargos and prohibitions on aviation and maritime transport. These are included in the Bill. However, the international community sometimes finds it necessary to develop and deploy new types of sanctions. Indeed, a recent example is the UN sanctions imposed in respect of North Korea. That resolution requires that UN member states do not grant work permits to North Koreans save where the UN agrees, in advance, on a case-by-case basis. Prior to the UN’s putting in place that sanction, such a sanction did not exist. There may be times in the future when a currently unforeseen type of sanction would again be appropriate.

[Lord Pannick]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but if the new type of sanction is to be imposed because the UN has considered it appropriate, it surely falls within Clause 7.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I are bringing forward Amendments 1 and 23 in relation to Clauses 1 and 7. I will get this out of the way. We are both members of the Constitution Committee. We do not speak for the committee, but we do highlight its recent report on the Bill and we shall rely heavily on it; perhaps we should invite the Committee to spend some time studying it closely.

The second preliminary matter is this. I acknowledge the letter sent by the Minister to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which was copied to me. I acknowledge his kind invitation to see if we could organise a meeting. Unfortunately, for personal family reasons I could not manage those dates, but I will begin by thanking him for his customary courtesy.

At Second Reading I described the Bill as a “bonanza of regulations”. In truth, on reading it again I can still find nothing of true substance in it except regulation-making powers. Clause 1 deals with regulations—and then on and on we go. Let me throw in, just casually, Clauses 14, 35 and 44. Good old Henry VIII comes stumbling in crush all the regulations that have been made and to make any others he wishes. We really should rechristen this Bill the “Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering (Regulation Bulk Buy) Bill”.

Everyone who spoke in the Second Reading debate acknowledged that the asserted objectives were desirable. Compliance with our treaty obligations with the United Nations and other countries is admirable. Arrangements currently exist in this field which at the moment are governed on the basis of EU law; they are part of our law but they have come through to us on the basis of the 1972 Act. No one has yet said that those powers are inadequate, yet the Bill is not simply bringing what I shall describe as EU law into domestic law and preserving it—rather, it goes much further. It vests more far-reaching powers in the Minister to rule by regulation on these issues and, beyond fulfilling our treaty obligations, it throws in powers to deal with terrorism. Terrorism is criminal activity that is already subject to vast tranches of primary legislation, so we are producing a Bill that is bung-full of regulations and nothing else in order to enable our international obligations to be fulfilled—but more so—while at the same time extending these powers to criminal activity that is already governed by statute.

I recognise that legislation by regulation is unavoidable, and that some regulation is inevitable and justifiable. However, in the context I have endeavoured to paint—I could have gone on for hours, but I will not—I remind your Lordships that the Constitution Committee said on this issue:

“Given that the purpose of the Bill is to address the need for domestic powers to impose, amend and revoke sanctions after Brexit, it is important to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards and there is adequate parliamentary scrutiny to make the delegated powers constitutionally acceptable”.


While I have page 4 open, I will draw attention to some of the phrases in different paragraphs, such as “constitutionally inappropriate for Ministers”. The committee recommends,

“this important limitation on ministers’ powers”.

It states:

“Clause 11 raises constitutional concerns”.


Then, on page 5, the committee says that it is,

“concerned about the breadth of the power conferred”,

and,

“deeply concerned that the power in … may be used”.

This is not an emotional reaction by the Constitution Committee; it is simply an examination of the reality of the legislation and a short summary of where it leads us.

In that context, I will make a short point in relation to the proposed amendment: throughout the Bill, should we not proceed on the basis that the greater the apparent imperative to proceed by unconstrained regulation, the greater the corresponding imperative to provide for the fullest possible parliamentary scrutiny, always achieved by careful primary legislation?

Clauses 1 and 7 go to the heart of the Bill. In the remarkable context that I endeavoured to summarise a few minutes ago, I hope to identify the purpose of the amendment. It is utterly simple: I hope it will make these two clauses more attractive. The relevant word in these clauses is “appropriate”. I think we can assume that no Minister would try to make regulations that he or she did not think were appropriate; I think we can also agree that any regulations made consequent on the Act should be an exercise in what is appropriate. However, in this context in the Bill, “appropriate” is far too vague, easily dependent on ministerial discretion and subjective.

If we are to allow powers such as these to be exercised by regulation, the exercise should always be both appropriate and necessary. If it is necessary, it will almost always be simultaneously appropriate; however, if it is only appropriate, it will not always be necessary. Hence the amendment: by strengthening the language of a single word, we will impose a greater responsibility on the Minister—not our present Minister but the Minister to come and Ministers to follow for years yet—and he or she will be less likely to make an ill-judged, mistaken decision about the exercise of these extravagant powers, when simultaneously the opportunity to correct errors is significantly diminished. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I want to add some footnotes to the powerful speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. As your Lordships know, this is the first substantive Bill to be brought forward in this House to address the consequences of Brexit. As the Minister explained at Second Reading, domestic powers are needed to impose sanctions to replace the powers currently enjoyed under EU law. In relation to these amendments, it is important to say—as is repeatedly pointed out—that there is a disturbing irony when a Brexit that is said to be justified by a desire to restore to Parliament powers currently enjoyed in Brussels results in Ministers seeking to confer extensive powers on themselves.

That is a topic to which the House will no doubt return when the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill reaches us, but for today, these amendments seek to identify the unjustifiable breadth of the powers that Ministers seek to confer on themselves in the context of the Bill. I pose this question to the Minister: why should the Committee be satisfied that Ministers should take powers that are unnecessary? That is the question. It is not sufficient that the powers are appropriate; they need to be necessary, because a Minister in this context should not have a power that is unnecessary.

The noble and learned Lord mentioned the report of the Constitution Committee. I also draw attention to the report on the Bill published last Friday by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I draw the Committee’s attention to paragraph 18, which I will quote because it is so powerful. It says:

“As drafted, clause 1(1) allows the Minister to make sanctions regulations where the Minister considers that doing so is ‘appropriate’ to achieve one of the purposes listed in that clause. In the light of the width and significance of the powers, we take the view that the Minister should only have power to make sanctions regulations if doing so is considered ‘necessary’ to achieve the purpose for which they are made”.


I hope the Minister will reflect on that advice from that committee, as well as that of the Constitution Committee.

I expect the Minister will respond by seeking to placate the Committee—he is very good at that sort of thing—with reassurances about the Government’s benign intentions in this context. If I may get my retaliation in first, the answer to that contention is given again by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It is in its report published on 28 September this year on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, but it is a general point. At paragraph 10, the report says that the committee judges,

“powers on how they might be used and not just on how the Government indicate that they intend to use them”.

That must be right. That is the approach we should adopt in this Committee.

The noble Lord is, if I may say so, the acceptable face of ministerialism, but who knows the identity of the Minister who will perform this role in a year’s time or five years’ time? I say respectfully to those on the Government Benches that they ought to bear in mind that it may not be a Minister from their party performing this role in a year or five years’ time. It is important to adopt a non-partisan approach to this issue. It is not good enough that the Minister has benign intentions, as I know he has; we have to look at the extent of the powers being given. I strongly support the noble and learned Lord’s amendments.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I have stated that the position is as it is now. I know the noble Baroness is seeking to develop arguments that we have had on a previous occasion, but what I have stated is the position as it exists. The noble Baroness talked about it being enshrined in law. Currently, that is how affirmative instruments and statutory instruments work. I am sure she is fully cognisant of that fact.

The noble Lord, Lord Lennie, said that the amendment would not inhibit the Government in any way. But as I was saying—to give further explanation and clarity, if I may—changing “appropriate” to “necessary” would effectively force the Government to use sanctions only as a last resort. Let me assure noble Lords that by saying that I do not mean that sanctions are never our first option. It is important that the Government of the day have some flexibility in deciding when and how sanctions should be deployed. We would not want to find ourselves in a situation where we could not use sanctions in the early stages of a crisis and instead had to allow it to escalate until the necessity of sanctions could be demonstrated.

Moreover, sanctions work best when agreed multilaterally. To be required to demonstrate that other options have been exhausted and sanctions are therefore necessary would leave the UK more constrained than our allies and international partners in our ability to agree and deploy sanctions. It would be a high bar to meet, especially in cases where we may wish to impose sanctions as part of a multilateral agreement with allies in areas where there is no direct risk to UK citizens or direct impact on UK interests. Too high a bar could prevent the UK acting in these areas. This could not only reduce the ability of the UK to continue to play a central role in international affairs but reduce the effectiveness of the sanctions measures themselves. For example, financial sanctions against Russia—

[Lord Pannick]

I am puzzled by this point. The amendment is concerned, under Clause 1(1), with the circumstances in which regulations may be made, but it does not affect the broad discretion embodied in Clause 1(2), which defines purposes. Clause 1(2) states:

“A purpose is within this subsection if the appropriate Minister … considers”—


so it is a matter entirely for the Minister—

“that carrying out that purpose would”,

for example,

“further a foreign policy objective of the government of the United Kingdom”.

So, as I understand it, my noble and learned friend Lord Judge’s amendment would in no way inhibit the complete discretion of the Minister to decide matters of purpose and to decide what is or is not in the foreign policy objectives of the Government; for example, that sanctions should be imposed, in general terms. All the amendment does is to say that the Minister has to be satisfied that it is necessary to impose these regulations once the foreign policy objective has been determined—and it is to be determined by the Government. With great respect, I do not understand the point that the Minister is making.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The point I was making was about the implication in the current wording of “appropriate”. This is not an open invitation for a Minister to impose sanctions, and the appropriateness of imposing sanctions is qualified in the context in which they must be applied. That was why I referred to the specific section that I did.

I think I have made the point already that the concern would remain. Several noble Lords have referred to the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee. We have received those reports as well, and I assure noble Lords that I am not dismissing them. We are reflecting very carefully on the representations made by both committees because it is important that we respond carefully and after detailed consideration of what is being put forward. As I said right at the start of my remarks, I will reflect very carefully and will very much bear in mind the voices and experience of those who have tabled these amendments. We certainly remain of the thinking that the current wording, with the balances and the qualifications in the context of the legislation as presented, means that this is not an open invitation for a Minister to apply a sanction. However, in the context of the two reports, I will of course look again at the basis on which perhaps we can look to qualify, and provide greater certainty in respect of, the language used.

Amendment 1A, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Sheehan and Lady Northover, would require there to be a “compelling” reason why sanctions are appropriate for the purposes set out under subsection (2), which relates to non-UN sanctions. I agree with the sentiment behind this amendment and note that it reflects a specific recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee. However, adding the requirement for a “compelling” reason might also give rise to some of the difficulties I have already highlighted in respect of the previous amendment.

As I said, we think that in matters of foreign affairs and security policy the Government should have discretion about when it is appropriate to act. This amendment would effectively remove some of that discretion. We also believe that it could restrict our ability to work with international partners to ensure that sanctions are effective. In some cases, sanctions may be more compelling for our international partners than for the UK, but it would undermine the effect of sanctions if we were not able to participate or agree to them being applied multilaterally. I am sure that all noble Lords will recognise that perspective. If the UK was unable to act, this could in turn undermine the UK’s relationships with our international partners.

Amendment 23 deals with a similar issue, but in relation to UN sanctions only. I think there is agreement on all sides of the Committee that it is appropriate that the UK can continue to comply with its international obligations, so I doubt there is much between us on this issue. We think “necessary” would in many cases be acceptable in that place in the Bill. However, we also think it is important that where the UN provides some flexibility about how to implement obligations, the Government should have the flexibility to decide how best to do so. The word “appropriate” provides that flexibility.

It should be noted that the power here is broadly consistent with the equivalent provision in Section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946, which enables Ministers to,

“make such provision as appears to”,

them,

“necessary or expedient for enabling”,

measures in UN Security Council resolutions “to be effectively applied”. It should also be noted that the word “appropriate” does not enable Ministers to do whatever they want. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, referred to the Ahmed case, which I know he knows well. That demonstrated that the courts will take a robust approach to scrutinising the exercise of the Executive’s powers.

I have already alluded to the fact that we have received the reports of both the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee. I put it on record that we will consider both committees’ recommendations very carefully. I have also listened carefully to the contributions during the course of this short debate, and I am sure we will explore the issues further as we scrutinise the Bill in Committee.

It says here, “I hope I have been able to convince noble Lords”, but, from looking around the Chamber, I think that would be a rather hopeful word to use at this juncture. Perhaps I have provided noble Lords with a degree of reassurance with some of the explanations that I have given about the context in which the sanctions would apply, but I respect and understand that there would be a need for continued parliamentary scrutiny and for ensuring, as I am sure all noble Lords appreciate, that the UK continues to comply with international law and maintains a leading role in international affairs after the UK’s exit from the EU.

As I said, we will continue to consider very carefully the recommendations of the two committees, and I am sure we will return to this issue in discussion with noble Lords. Again, there are important issues of discussion here. Both in the course of the Committee stage of the Bill and in the meetings that we are having beyond the Chamber, I am sure we will reach a means of moving forward constructively on this basis. The ultimate purpose and objectives of the sanctions regime are something that I know all noble Lords respect. Based on that, I hope the noble Lords will be minded at this juncture to withdraw the amendment.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister said in his opening remarks that this is a “technical Bill”. However, it raises a number of constitutional issues and concerns which flow from the fact that the imposition of sanctions on an individual has a very adverse impact on the person designated, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, rightly said. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the Supreme Court case of Ahmed, in which he was a member of the Appellate Committee. He rightly said in that case that an order freezing the assets of an individual makes such persons,

“effectively prisoners of the state”.

He added that these orders are,

“intrusive to a high degree”,

and have an adverse effect on not just the individual but members of their family.

My first concern is that the Bill states, at Clause 10(2)(b) and Clause 11(2)(b), that if there are “reasonable grounds to suspect”, then the question for the Minister is whether it is “appropriate” to designate. The current legal test applied by the courts here and in the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, in part by reference to the European Convention on Human Rights, is to ask whether designation is proportionate in all the circumstances, including the impact on the individual. Can the Minister say whether the Government accept that a proportionality test will continue to be applied under the Bill? If so, will the Government accept that it would be highly desirable for this to be stated in the Bill?

My second concern is that Clause 11 allows for designation of persons by description. Currently, EU law requires that persons or entities must be expressly named if sanctions are to be applied. That is for a very good, practical reason. For a person to be designated other than by reference to their name will inevitably cause uncertainty not just for the persons concerned but for those who have to apply these provisions-in particular, banks required to freeze the assets of persons who are designated. Will the Minister comment on these problems which will inevitably arise if persons are designated by description?

My third concern is that Clause 2(1) will allow for financial sanctions to be imposed not just on designated persons but also on persons,

“connected with a prescribed country”.

Clause 50(4) will allow the Minister to make regulations specifying the relevant connection. Can the Minister explain why sanctions should be imposed on a person simply because they are connected to a specified country as opposed to misconduct by that person or their personal responsibility for the decisions of a repressive regime or a regime which otherwise justifies a sanctions border?

My fourth concern is procedural fairness. I think the Minister accepted in his helpful opening remarks that one of the vital safeguards in this context is the right of the individual to know the case against them and to have the opportunity to answer it. The European Court of Justice has recognised that procedural rights are vital to the integrity of any sanctions regime. The Minister said that the Bill contains “robust” provisions to protect procedural rights. In fact, the Bill contains very little indeed on the subject of procedural fairness. I well understand that a person cannot be told anything before listing occurs, as there will be too great a risk that funds may be dissipated, but once listing has occurred, the individual must have a right to be told why listing is taking place and by reference to what evidence so that he or she has a fair opportunity to respond—subject, of course, as the Minister mentioned, to retention by the state of security-sensitive details, but even then the individual must be told the essence of the case against him or her, as the case law requires.

It is striking that this Bill does not include any provisions setting out such a basic requirement of fairness at the stage after a designation order is made—neither a detailed code nor even a statement of principle to be developed in secondary legislation. There is only a requirement of disclosure if and when a case comes to court; that is, Clause 34(1), which refers to Sections 66 to 68 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and which incorporates the special advocate procedure for sensitive material. Even then, there is no recognition that individuals must be told the essence of the case against them.

I would like to see a duty to disclose at the earlier stage; that is, when or soon after the designation is made. The reason why it is essential that the individual is told at least the essence of the case against them at the designation stage is that you cannot start court proceedings under Clause 32(1)(d), read with Clause 33(5), until you have sought a review by the Minister and received a decision on that review from the Minister. That may take months—one hopes that it will be speedier than that, but, being realistic, it is bound to take time. There are no requirements on Ministers as to the timetable for conducting reviews. Unless you know the case against you, it is impossible effectively to present your arguments on the review. It is important to have clarity in this area on the face of the Bill, otherwise there will inevitably be litigation—and that litigation will lead to the courts imposing a duty to follow a fair procedure, which is my fourth concern.

My fifth concern about the Bill is in relation to the periodic review provisions in Clause 20. The appropriate Minister is required to consider any designation of a person every three years. That is far too long a period given the gravity of the consequences of listing a person. In the EU system, the periodic review sometimes occurs every six months, but in all such cases it must occur at least every year. It is true that the listed person can themselves seek a review under Clause 19, but, under Clause 19(2), once such a request has been made,

“no further request may be made … unless … there is a significant matter … not previously … considered”.

There will be cases where although there is no significant new material, the very fact of the passage of time may justify looking again at whether a listing is really appropriate. The three-year period is especially troubling because, as I said, you cannot start court proceedings until you have sought a review by the Minister and received a decision on that review. Will the Minister say why the review period of one year at the most in Europe is being increased to three years, and will he please reconsider the point?

My sixth concern is that the Bill would remove effective remedies for persons listed in the UK in order to implement a UN designation. The current position under EU law is that it is contrary to the rule of law for a UN listing to be implemented without procedural safeguards—that is, supporting evidence, effective judicial review, and the European court has the power to quash an order if it is not proportionate. Under the Bill, Clause 21(2) and (4), the individual would only have a right to request the Secretary of State to use his or her best endeavours to take the matter up at the UN to remove the person’s name. There is a right under Clause 32(1)(c) to seek a court review of the Minister’s decision not to use best endeavours. Can the Minister confirm that I have correctly understood that the intention of the Bill is to deprive the individual on the UN list of the rights that he or she currently has under EU law to obtain from the court, in appropriate cases, a quashing of a listing that derives from the UN?

If that is so, the individual designated in this country as a result of being placed on a UN sanctions list will have much less legal protection than a person who is listed in France or Germany as a result of being placed on the same UN sanctions list. The Minister said in his opening remarks, and he is right, that this country has an international law obligation to implement a UN listing. But can he confirm that, nevertheless, the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg requires the rule of law to be satisfied and has a power to give effective judicial remedies in appropriate such cases?

My seventh and final concern is the very broad delegated powers conferred on Ministers under the Bill, for example under Clause 39. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will address this topic, and I share the views that I know he is going to express. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on these points.

Syria and Iraq: Genocide

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 21st April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, as I have made clear, it is not for politicians to determine whether something is genocide; it is a legal decision. In January, I visited the ICC to discuss these matters, and I have discussed them with the International Criminal Court on previous occasions. I also held round-table discussions with academics and lawyers—they are not mutually exclusive, I know—on these matters. It is important that we make progress on reaching a position where it is possible for the ICC to determine whether it will proceed. In the mean time, there are further discussions going ahead around the international community, and all right-minded people want to be sure that we defeat Daesh.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister said this is not a matter for politicians. Is she aware of Article VIII of the convention on genocide, which says:

“Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide”?

Why will the Government not do that?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

Because, my Lords, it is the Government’s view that, in order to hold out hope to people who have suffered from the violence of Daesh, one has to be reasonably sure of achieving agreement within the United Nations. We are not confident that that agreement currently exists. That is why we want to make progress with discussions. A lot of work is going on with regard to this. The noble Lord will be more aware than others that genocide, which has a very high threshold, is not the only determination available. There is also crimes against humanity. Let us consider how we get the perpetrators and work together on that.

Palestine

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, the noble Lord is right to point out that the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories flouts international law. We have made that clear in the past. We have urged Israel to obey the law and have pointed out that it should withdraw. The position that Israel takes on occupying Palestinian territories makes it more difficult to achieve the two-state solution that we wish to see.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, did the Minister see the report in the Times last week that two Palestinian journalists in Gaza had been arrested and tortured by Hamas because they had written newspaper articles critical of that administration? Can she assure the House that there is no question of recognising a Palestinian state associated with Hamas until basic civil rights are respected?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, we have made it clear that Hamas needs to stop its aggressive actions and sending its rockets into Israel and that the Palestinian Authority needs to take responsibility and control of the administration in Gaza to avoid incidents such as that described by the noble Lord.

Palestine

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 1st June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, we take a lead in giving every encouragement to negotiations that would achieve a two-state solution. Without that, and if there were no agreements, any recognition would mean that there would not be a true Palestinian state. It would be a matter of words, not of reality—and reality is what we need to achieve. The noble Baroness raises an important point about the attitude of Mr Netanyahu after his election. It is crucial that he understands clearly that he must prevent the extension of the illegal settlements. We have made that clear; the Prime Minister has done so. As long as Mr Netanyahu persists in extending those settlements, it makes it more difficult for his friends elsewhere to support him.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, in considering this Question, will the Government have regard to the report published last week by Amnesty International, which describes the policy of executions and torture by the Hamas Administration of their own people?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, I always take great care to look at Amnesty’s reports; I admire the work that it does. The position of this Government is clear: torture is wrong and any death penalty, however it occurs and by whomever it is carried out, is wrong. Priorities for the FCO are to ensure that torture is prevented and that the death penalty is abolished throughout the world. I shall continue on that work myself.

Gaza

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I thank the Minister for all the work she and the Foreign Secretary are doing to seek to alleviate this truly tragic situation. She referred to a cycle of violence. In addressing this problem, would she agree that it is vitally important not to lose sight of the fundamental point that Hamas is a terrorist group that applauds the killing of Israeli students and which is seeking to kill by missiles as many Israeli civilians as possible? By contrast, the state of Israel pulled out of Gaza and is now trying to protect its population from intolerable missile attacks, which are launched from bases in civilian locations. Israel is doings its best to give warnings. This fundamental distinction between the two parties is symbolised by the actions of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who telephoned the father of the Palestinian boy who was savagely and inexcusably murdered—that is the incident to which the Minister referred—to express the outrage and condolences of the Israeli Government and their people. That action is quite inconceivable from the leaders of Hamas in relation to Israeli citizens.

[Baroness Warsi]

My Lords, I agree that the actions of Hamas in no way add towards bringing this matter to an end. Nor, indeed, do they add to the peace. In fact, the indiscriminate firing of rockets into Israel means this matter is prolonged and made much worse. However, it is important for us to hold on to positive moments, such as the one the noble Lord referred to: the moment when Prime Minister Netanyahu rang the father of the boy who was tragically burnt. We should also hold on to the positive moment when President Abbas said he would give all the support he could to ensure Israel found the kidnappers and killers of the three teenagers. It is important that we hold on to those small positive moments, even in these difficult times.

Palestine

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that progress towards a peace settlement would be enhanced if Hamas were able to secure the release of the three Israeli teenagers who were kidnapped in the West Bank last weekend? Will the Government do all they can to seek to secure that objective?

[Baroness Warsi]

The Government have strongly condemned the abduction of the three Israeli youths in the West Bank. We are deeply concerned about the escalation of violence on the ground, and for the sake of both Israelis and Palestinians I hope that further escalation can be avoided. We are still trying to find details of what is happening on the ground, but of course it has led to escalation, including, tragically, the death of a Palestinian child.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: External Communications

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 30th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

I am not sure that I would go that far, but of course I take the noble Lord’s point that the function of GCHQ is an incredibly important and vital aspect of our national security.

[Lord Pannick]

The Joint Committee on the draft Communications Bill made a number of recommendations for improving and updating the law in this area. Do the Government have any intention of implementing those proposals?

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Lord will be aware that the matter has now passed through two parliamentary committees and it is the Government’s intention to bring the matter back to Parliament. However, at this stage, final proposals have not been drawn up.

European Court of Human Rights: Khodorkovsky Case

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I declare an interest or, more precisely, a brief. For the past five years I have represented Mr Khodorkovsky as his leading counsel in his applications to the European Court of Human Rights, where he is complaining about his two trials, convictions and prison sentences. It would therefore be inappropriate for me to comment at all on the merits of those applications and I will not do so. However, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, for introducing this debate. He has provoked valuable contributions from all noble Lords who have spoken and has given me the opportunity to address certain wider issues.

The first of these is the quite extraordinary delays by the European court in reaching its judgments. Your Lordships know that Mr Khodorkovsky has been detained and then imprisoned by the Russian authorities since October 2003. His first application to the European court was filed in February 2004. It complained about his arrest, his detention, the conditions in which he was detained and a number of other matters. The European court took more than seven years to reach a judgment, which was delivered in May 2011, finding a number of violations of the convention by the Russian authorities.

Mr Khodorkovsky filed a second application in Strasbourg in March 2006, and that one complained about his first trial conviction and sentence, the trial ending in May 2005. The European court will give judgment on that application this Thursday coming, which is more than seven years after the application was lodged in Strasbourg. There is a third application which Mr Khodorkovsky filed in November 2007, and that complains about his second prosecution and subsequent trial, conviction and sentence. The second trial began in March 2009. It ended with a further prison sentence in December 2010. This third Strasbourg application remains pending some five and a half years after it was filed, and indeed it is still in the early stages of consideration by the European court.

The Minister will know that the Strasbourg court regularly criticises national courts for failing to decide cases within a reasonable time, contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Can I ask the Minister whether the Government think that it is satisfactory for the European court itself to take such lengthy periods of time to decide cases, particularly in relation to an applicant who is complaining about his detention and his imprisonment? What representations will the Government make to the Strasbourg court and what steps will the Government take in the Council of Europe urgently to address these delays?

The second point I want to touch on is the record of the Russian Federation in Strasbourg. Last year, in 2012, the Strasbourg court gave 134 substantive judgments in cases concerning the Russian Federation. In 122 of those, it found at least one violation of human rights. Some 36 of the cases concerned breaches of the right to a fair hearing, while 64 cases involved breaches of the right to liberty or security of person. The year 2012 was typical of the appalling human rights record in Strasbourg of the Russian Federation. The Minister will also know that from 2004 until 2010, the Russian Federation, alone among all Council of Europe countries, refused to ratify Protocol 14 to the convention to make the Strasbourg procedures more efficient. What representations are the Government making to the Russian Federation about Russia’s appalling human rights record, and, to echo other noble Lords tonight, what action are we taking in this respect?

There is a third and final point that I want to touch on. The United Kingdom Government have regularly and regrettably reacted to adverse judgments in the European Court of Human Rights with complaints, criticisms, and sometimes years of delay in implementing adverse judgments against this country. The issue of votes for prisoners is the most extreme example but, regrettably, it is not the only one. Earlier this month, the Strasbourg court decided that prisoners serving whole-life tariffs must receive a periodic review of their sentence. The Prime Minister’s spokesman was quoted as saying that the Prime Minister was,

“very, very, very, very disappointed. He profoundly disagrees with the court’s ruling”.

Does the Minister recognise—do the Government recognise—that the prospects of encouraging the Russian Federation to respect judgments of the Strasbourg court and to adhere to basic human rights principles are simply undermined by the Government’s own lack of respect for the judgments of the Strasbourg court?

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, for introducing this debate, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.