Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Northover
Main Page: Baroness Northover (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Northover's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is a probing amendment concerning the territorial application of sanctions regulations. The amendment will make it automatic that the sanctions imposed would apply to bodies incorporated or constituted in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or the British Overseas Territories. This is not because they are favourite places to hide away from tax regimes—although they are—but because they are dependent on the UK in terms of foreign and defence policy matters. For sanctions to have an effect, they have to have an international dimension. Currently determined by the UN or the EU, they require co-operation and co-ordination between and across nations. It is surely a matter of good policy to seek to put our own house in order first—which this amendment would help to do.
The Bill currently proposes that its sanction provisions “may” be applied to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or the British Overseas Territories by use of an Order in Council, which I understand is a Privy Council matter. I am not a member of the Privy Council and I do not know how it operates. I do not understand in detail how it works, and I am not sure whether such orders are always granted, whether there is ever a debate about them, whether they can be challenged or whether there is delay built into the process. This amendment would make it clear that, as far as sanctions are concerned, the UK will have a consistent application of the law. We would welcome the Government’s views on that.
My Lords, I support the amendment. It is useful to have more precise definitions within the Bill, and it seems that the amendment seeks to tighten up the subsections which relate to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the British Overseas Territories, so that instead of a Minister being able by an Order in Council to add these areas, they are included in primary legislation. It makes sense to clarify that now and in primary legislation in this way to ensure that those whom the UK wishes to sanction cannot evade that sanction by association with these areas. If the UK is to leave the EU, it makes sense to tighten in this way.
The Minister will know that there is a meeting today of the Joint Ministerial Council at the Foreign Office with the overseas territories. Perhaps he could assure us that they would be content to be clearly within the same sanctions regime. I know that they will be less keen on aligning themselves with the UK on anti-money laundering measures; we will of course come to that later.
I also flag to the Minister that, in addition, the Law Society emphasises that guidance should be given on the terms in Clause 17, as well as those in Sections 2, 10, 15 and 46. It points out that in Clause 17 it is unclear whether the UK sanctions regime would apply,
“where UK currency is used, where a non-UK subsidiary of a UK company is involved, or where a UK person on the board of a non-UK company is present when a decision is taken in breach of the UK sanctions regime”.
It suggests that Clause 17 should be renamed “UK nexus” as its current subject matter does not deal sufficiently with “Extra-territorial application”.
It seems that further clarity is required on such issues. Clearly, it would be useful if stakeholders were properly consulted to assess the impact of the scope of application of the UK sanctions regime, simply to identify any unintended consequences. Clearly, intended consequences are fine. So this is a complicated area, but I hope that the Minister will take on board this advice.
My Lords, I note the nature of the amendment and the final provisions in the Bill in Clause 51(3). I was at one stage a Minister with responsibility for the Crown dependencies, so I am acutely conscious of the particular constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies. As I understand it, we do not normally legislate without their express consent. I wonder whether that is why the Bill is framed as it is. However, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on this.
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury. It is not concerned with lobsters; it is concerned with the duty of the Minister to consider a request to vary or revoke a designation. The Bill contains no provision requiring the Minister to address such a request within any specific time period. I can understand why it would be inappropriate to set any defined time period—how long it takes to address a request to vary or revoke a designation will inevitably depend on the circumstances of the individual case—but the Bill should, I think, contain a more general obligation on the Minister in relation to time. This amendment would require the Minister to decide on a request to revoke or vary,
“as soon as reasonably practicable”.
It is important for the Bill to impose such an obligation because, under Clause 32, read with Clause 33(5), a person who is put on a sanctions list cannot seek a review from the court until the Minister has made the decision on the request to vary or revoke the designation. It would be quite wrong for a person to be listed, with all the adverse consequences that that involves, with no opportunity to complain to a court unless the Minister had an obligation to act with reasonable expedition. In an extreme case, were this amendment to be included in the Bill, the courts would be able to say to the Minister that his or her delays were unacceptable.
I cannot see that a “reasonably practicable” test could be in any way objectionable. I suspect that the Minister will tell the Committee that the amendment is unnecessary because of course Ministers will decide these cases as soon as reasonably practicable. We have heard such assurances repeatedly during this Committee stage. However, I am sure that the Minister understands that in contexts as important as this Bill I prefer to see obligations written into the statute rather than rely on assurances from Ministers, however fair and reasonable they are. I beg to move.
This seems an eminently reasonable amendment. It almost seems unambitious in its scope—it invites Ministers to answer questions along the lines of “as soon as possible” and “shortly”—but noble Lords are surely right to seek to put something of a common-sense timetable on this, and we support them. The Bill proposes to give such wide and untrammelled powers to Ministers that any moves to qualify them should be welcomed.
As the noble Lord said, I have added my name to this amendment, and I have done so for a very good reason, which is that it is about an important matter of procedural fairness and should be included in the Bill. It is not unreasonable to say that there should be a judgment about the actions of a Minister in terms of timeframes. As we have understood in this House on many occasions, the summer can often be extended into the autumn without the blink of an eyelid.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was eagle-eyed as ever, and this issue came up at Second Reading. He now brings forward this amendment with other noble Lords, and we support them.
The point here is that the review period for designations would occur not after one year but only after three. As the Minister said on Second Reading, it could happen earlier, but of course it does not have to. I also note that, on Second Reading, the Minister said that he did not regard the period proposed by the Government as excessive. He did not answer the point that this was a detrimental change from the position should we stay in the EU. I expect that he has now had time to consult on that and—if you like—to recognise that the writing is on the wall and, I hope, to persuade his colleagues that this cannot stand.
There is no reason for the frequency of reviews to change from one year, as now in the EU, to three years. I hope and expect that the Minister will find that this is one straightforward area in which to concede. After all, it has always been said that if we were to leave the EU, no protections or rights of UK citizens would be diminished. This is a case in point.
I raise one other issue, which I think has been flagged to the Bill team. This is, again, from the Law Society. It is concerned that UK courts should have the jurisdiction to hear wrongful listings in the case of UN listed persons. It points out that the Bill does not require or permit a UK court to quash a wrongful listing for a person who is UN listed and can only ask the Government to use their best endeavours to secure a de-listing in the UN. It recommends that the Bill directly transpose into UK law—
I am sorry to interrupt, but that is the specific subject of Amendment 62, to which we are coming. I do not wish to inhibit the noble Baroness, but she may wish to be aware of that.
I did not spot that point. In that case, I will wait until we get to it. I hope that the Bill team will have taken it on board, both from the amendment submitted in the noble Lord’s name and, indeed, from what we sent through.
My Lords, I had thought of saying something but while the Minister, unlike Richard III, is in the giving mood, I do not want to discourage him.
In the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill, it is mentioned that sanctions apply to about 2,000 people. That does not seem a huge number of people where one might need to make this kind of assessment.
I am not quite sure what the noble Baroness’s question is.
The Minister was saying that this was very onerous. I am aware that there is discussion elsewhere in the Bill of immigration status conflicting with those who have had sanctions imposed upon them. Obviously, when one is dealing with immigration status, one is dealing with very many people, but the point made in the Explanatory Notes is that one is not dealing with a large number of people here or a large number of sanctions provisions.
I think I understand the noble Baroness’s question, but, notwithstanding the issue of numbers alone, Clause 20 lays out a process which the Government perceive to be more efficient than that currently adopted by the EU.
My Lords, when we had discussions with the Minister prior to Second Reading and just after, the review of the regulations cropped up on a few occasions, the justification being that some of these new powers and regulations would not be subject to primary legislation. In those discussions, I asked, if you are reviewing in government, who tests and scrutinises that review? This is the first Brexit Bill and we have heard on many occasions that Brexit is an opportunity, or an obligation, to bring powers back to the United Kingdom. If that is the case—I do not necessarily agree—and the Minister supports it, this is an opportunity for him to support the principles of these amendments, which are about ensuring that powers taken by the Executive are subject to proper scrutiny, and that the Executive are held to account by Parliament.
Amendment 59 sets out the details and asks: how do we do that job? What are we measuring? But if there are issues and the Minister says, “I cannot have this list because there are things in it that may be subject to national security, or other things that cannot be disclosed”—the Government seem to have a habit of not disclosing information to Parliament on matters relating to Brexit—I would be more than willing to consider those concerns and take them into account. Obviously, if there are issues with the list then the minimum standard that I am arguing for is Amendment 58. I do not think it unreasonable that if the Government are taking these powers, we should be able to hold them to account in any possible review. I know the Minister will say that regulations are subject to consideration by Parliament, et cetera, et cetera, but that is not the scrutiny we want to see here. I hope that if the noble Lord is able to continue in his giving mood, he can give us some positive words about how Parliament will be able to hold the Executive to account.
My Lords, these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Collins, helpfully make much clearer the commitments that Ministers must make to review the regulations they have put in place, giving a time by which this must happen and more detail on what they should include. They would, indeed, as the noble Lord has indicated, make these reviews more transparent and accountable and we are happy to support them.
My Lords, they say that generosity defines the spirit of a person, so perhaps I can be slightly more generous than noble Lords may perceive. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, is quite correct: we have talked about this issue, and sanctions, we all accept, can be an effective tool of foreign policy and national security, but I also accept that they can have serious implications, not only for those directly designated but also for businesses and charities operating in particular areas.
Foreign policy priorities can change frequently. It is therefore important that Ministers regularly revisit the decision to apply sanctions regimes to political problems and security challenges, and also consider carefully whether the sanctions are having the intended purpose, whether there are unintended consequences and what adjustments might be needed to achieve the desired effect.
Clause 26 therefore requires the Government to carry out a political review of its sanctions every year. The EU also carries out annual reviews of its sanctions regimes. The purpose here is to consider whether the sanctions should continue unchanged or be amended. If there is a published outcome, it is simply confirmation that the legal Acts have been renewed or amended. We have in mind a similar model for the UK; the annual review would be mainly an internal policy exercise, rather than a report for external publication. If the Government decided as a result to amend the sanctions regulations, this would involve a process of parliamentary scrutiny through which we would set out the rationale. Of course, the Government would always respond to Parliamentary Questions about specific areas of policy through the usual channels.
That said, I have listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and we are looking at the amendment specifically. I will reflect on the proposal in that regard. He made the helpful suggestion that, between Committee and Report, we meet again to work out some of the perhaps necessary parameters. I know he appreciates national security issues and other such issues. I hope, with the assurance that we will reflect on his proposal, the noble Lord is minded to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 62 is partly in the name of my noble friend Lord McNally. I knew he would not be able to be here, and he sends his apologies for that. I have to say that I read the amendment and the clause a number of times and it seemed to me that the amendment tightened and clarified the clause. What I failed to spot, as a non-lawyer, was what lay underneath it. I am extremely glad that the issue I raised earlier has been so effectively explained by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I again express support from these Benches for what he has said.
My Lords, if I heard the Minister correctly, he compared the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to Oliver Twist asking for more. I wonder, having heard the noble Lord, whether the Minister would agree that Oliver Twist had right and justice on his side.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, is once again trying to help the Government, and I appreciate his efforts. He seeks to put a very useful time limit on how long a so-called “specified period” in Clause 35 might be, and his Amendment 64 proposes a further time limitation. We will come back to Clause 35 when we discuss the next group of amendments and I shall address that clause as a whole shortly.
Amendment 65 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Collins, seeks to check the wider and unspecified powers on the revocation of sanctions that the Government seem to want to grant themselves in Clause 38. We do not want to see wide and untrammelled powers in either the setting or the revoking of sanctions. The noble Lord is right to seek to address this.
My name is, indeed, attached to Amendment 72. The case for this amendment was very cogently argued by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The clause contains one of the wide-ranging Henry VIII powers that we have seen elsewhere in the Bill. I cannot see how this power can stand. Clause 44(2) states:
“Regulations under this Act may make supplemental, incidental, consequential, transitional or saving provision”.
That is a rather wide-ranging description. Therefore, I trust that the Minister has been given enough leeway by his colleagues across government to think again.
I will not add very much, but I am beginning to think that there is a computer in every department which produces a Henry VIII clause at least once in every Bill. That is what we have here. This is not belt and braces; it is belt, braces and Henry VIII’s great big heavy boots. We do not want it.
My Lords, I was rather intrigued by the Minister’s definition of sanctions as being something little more than a gentle nudge. I found myself thinking about—
It is certainly not a gentle nudge. What I was alluding to is that the ultimate purpose behind sanctions is that they should not exist for an indefinite period of time. It is about changing behaviour. As I noted in the example that I gave of Iraq, there are times when we could use these to very good effect to ensure, with people’s behaviour—be they individuals, corporations or, indeed, countries—that sanctions act as an effective, and deterrent, tool.
I am glad to have that further clarification. My eyebrows rather rose at that and I was wondering, speaking of what is benign, what my kids would have made of being sanctioned and having their PlayStations removed. They would not regard that as particularly benign. But, very seriously, it is quite striking how leaders around the world with sanctions on them strive hard to get them lifted, so I am glad to have that clarification.
I propose that Clause 35 does not stand part of the Bill. We have a series of such proposals through the Bill, as the Minister will be aware. We have had a wide-ranging discussion just now. I appreciate the efforts to improve things made by the noble Lord, Lord Collins. However, it still seems to us that this clause remains unacceptable, even if amended in the way that he proposed. That is why we propose that it does not stand part of the Bill.
Just as we wish to ensure that the imposition of sanctions is done in a way which is appropriate, transparent and accountable, so too should be the suspension of sanctions. No one here would wish to see the UK as a harbour for those not wanted elsewhere, but we must not give future Ministers the power to do that either. We feel that these powers are wide and vague, and bearing in mind that the secondary legislation coming down to us will include—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, pointed out last time—many things with which we would no doubt agree, which are then jeopardised should we take the very unusual action of voting down the SI, we need to read the Bill in that light. For example:
“The period begins when a specified condition is met and lasts for so long as the suspending regulations or a specified provision of those regulations has effect”.
That would catch a large number of things. Although the noble Lord, Lord Collins, sought to help the Government regarding the amendment we have just debated, we feel that the Government should think again over the whole clause.
My Lords, with this amendment I return to the principle of “tools for the job” and how we enable Parliament to scrutinise effectively. In the previous group, the Minister spoke quite effectively about the reasons for certain sanctions being introduced and how they sometimes underpin and support much broader foreign policy objectives, and he quoted the Iran situation. I did not think that he found that particularly difficult to do. We know that when sanctions are introduced—I come back to this point—we need political support and commitment for them to be effective. Without proper support, they will not be.
That is why it is important that, when the powers and regulations are introduced, we specify how the sanctions fit into the broader foreign policy objectives and why they are there. I fear that sometimes people jump on the sanctions bandwagon because they cannot think of any other action to achieve particular foreign policy objectives. For example, the struggle for human rights is difficult, and different leverages can be used. I do not necessarily think that sanctions are the first port of call, and I accept that they can be part of a suite of actions.
However, when we introduce sanctions, it is important and incumbent on the Government to set out clearly why they are there and how they fit into their overall foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, when will the sanctions be brought to an end and when will we judge them to have been successful? I have heard in this House on a number of occasions that sanctions have been “successful”. That is measured by whether we have stopped certain trade and a certain activity, not by whether they have achieved the foreign policy objectives set for introducing them, and that is what this amendment seeks to do. Once again, I hope that the Minister is in his listening and giving mode. I beg to move.
My Lords, once again the noble Lord, Lord Collins, seeks to assist the Government by ensuring that some of the wide-ranging powers sought by Ministers have a little sunlight shone upon them. We support what the noble Lord has said about making the Minister’s actions more transparent and accountable, but we worry—the noble Lord, Lord Collins, has in some ways made reference to this—about the broad categorisation of foreign policy objectives in defining when sanctions are appropriate.
We discussed this issue on the first day of Committee and, although I realise that the noble Lord has carried over the aims as stated in the Bill, we feel that “foreign policy objectives” is too wide a concept. Clearly, if our foreign policy objective were, say, trade with India and we decided, for some reason, to put sanctions on Pakistan and, as described in the Bill, all those associated with that country—as, again, we debated on our first day in Committee—a large number of law-abiding citizens could potentially be caught up in that. That may be regarded as far-fetched, but we always have to look for unintended consequences, given that unexpected things happen in politics.
As we have said before, it is all very well the Minister potentially quoting the Human Rights Act or the European convention, given that some members of his party have spoken of repealing the first and withdrawing from the second. It is therefore important that we ensure that legislation is watertight. With that caveat, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Collins, for trying to assist us in making Ministers under this Bill more transparent and accountable.
My Lords, just as my noble friend Lord McNally and I opposed Clause 35 standing part of the Bill, so we oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. Of course, this is in many ways a more dangerous clause. While, under Clause 35, we might find ourselves not imposing sanctions which other countries—say, within the EU—were imposing, in this case the Government are apparently happy to secure carte blanche powers for imposing sanctions.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said,
“an appropriate Minister, may by regulations”,
amend this part of the Bill to,
“impose prohibitions or requirements of kinds additional to those for the time being authorised in Chapter 1”.
The Constitution Committee states:
“We do not consider it appropriate for Ministers to have powers as broad as those conferred by Clause 39. In particular, we consider it constitutionally inappropriate for Ministers to have the power, by regulations, to create new forms of sanctions”.
The Delegated Powers Committee states that,
“we do not consider the powers conferred by Clause 39 to be appropriate”.
They explain:
“We do not consider that the FCO’s reasons are sufficient to justify the powers conferred by Clause 39, particularly having regard to the potential width of the powers and the very significant effects on individual rights that amendments made under these powers would be capable of having”.
They also point out, in relation to UN sanctions, that,
“this power is unnecessary for enabling additional sanctions measures to be imposed for the purposes of complying with UN obligations since Clause 7 already has this effect”.
From right across this Chamber and from the Constitution Committee and Delegated Powers Committee comes a clear message, so we join others in opposing that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill.
The width of this power seems extraordinary and constitutionally offensive. As I understand the drafting of the Bill, it is open to a Minister to pass regulations which allow him to identify individuals on whom he can impose a sanction or prohibition that he has invented. What is more, the only restriction on him is that it must be for the purposes set out in Clause 2(1). If the Minister honestly believes that the invention of a new sanction or prohibition is justified by “a foreign policy objective” of the Government—for example, gaining support from one country by attacking its nationals in this country—the power given by Clause 39 would entitle them to invent a new prohibition and impose it by regulations. Furthermore, should any primary legislation stand in the way of a Minister inventing such a new prohibition that he or she believes is designed to promote a foreign policy objective, that primary legislation can be amended to get rid of an objection by the very same regulations under Clause 44(2). That a Minister could do by secondary legislation such a thing—for example, restrict somebody’s spending their own money, prevent them leaving their home, take away their car or stop certain sorts of bank account being used—without primary legislation strikes me as well beyond what any responsible Government would think should be done by secondary legislation. Can the Minister confirm that my analysis of what could theoretically be done is right, and explain why it is appropriate that that be done by secondary legislation?