Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Ahmad of Wimbledon
Main Page: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my name is attached to Amendment 1A. I wish to reinforce what has been said by my noble friend Lady Northover. The regulations that the Minister will have powers to impose through Clause 1 will have far-reaching consequences on “designated persons”, “prescribed persons” and “involved persons”, as affected individuals or entities are variously referred to throughout the Bill. Therefore, it is only right that the power to create a regulation should entail a more onerous thought process than consideration by the “appropriate Minister”. I agree that “compelling reasons” would be a more fitting foundation for making such momentous decisions.
My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. A small point was made about what I said in my opening remarks at Second Reading about the Bill being technical. Maybe I should defend that by saying that every Bill is technical in some way and perhaps that was what I was alluding to. But I thank the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for whom I have great affection, for highlighting that point, and we live and learn through our experiences at the Dispatch Box and in the House.
As I said at Second Reading, this is a Bill that we need to get right—a point that was acknowledged by all noble Lords who have spoken. I stated that right from the outset, as I do again today, at the start of Committee. That is why I will put on record my immense thanks to noble Lords from all sides of the House who have engaged very constructively on this important Bill. I assure noble Lords that that will continue to be the case as the Bill progresses through your Lordships’ House. I thank all noble Lords—in particular the noble Lord, Lord Lennie—for recognising why we require this legislation.
After we leave the European Union we will need the Bill to ensure that we can continue to impose, amend and lift sanctions, and change our anti-money laundering framework. As noble Lords know, sanctions form part of the range of foreign policy tools that we can use in response to threats such as terrorism to the UK and UK interests. The Government fully recognise that sanctions are not to be used lightly—I assure noble Lords of that fact—and impose significant restrictions on individuals and entities. They should be imposed only after careful consideration of the political context, the desired impact and, of course, the potential risks. The Government also believe strongly that sanctions are a tool for changing unacceptable or threatening behaviour. They should not be used punitively as a substitute for criminal justice measures. A good recent example of the value of sanctions is the way that they encouraged Iran to accept constraints on its nuclear programme.
Perhaps I may ask the Minister a question to address a lack of clarity. A moment ago, he basically said that one of the checks would be that either or both Houses of Parliament could vote against the SI brought forward by the affirmative procedure. The last time I was in this House and we on these Benches sought to do so with an SI, the consequence was a review on removing the powers of the House of Lords to act under such circumstances. Indeed, I have frequently heard language suggesting that to vote against an SI is a complete overreach of powers. Is this a change in the Government’s position? Is there any way in which this could be enshrined? It is rather fundamental to the discussions we will have not just today but on future occasions.
As the noble Baroness will know, I have stated the position as it is. Of course it is within the powers of both Houses to vote against—that is the whole point of having statutory instruments that are presented to both Houses. This is not just about the House of Lords; I mentioned the House of Commons as well.
Can I just confirm that the Government’s response to any such move would be exactly as we saw before? That is an important piece of information for this House to know. I believe that that is what the Minister has just confirmed.
I have stated that the position is as it is now. I know the noble Baroness is seeking to develop arguments that we have had on a previous occasion, but what I have stated is the position as it exists. The noble Baroness talked about it being enshrined in law. Currently, that is how affirmative instruments and statutory instruments work. I am sure she is fully cognisant of that fact.
The noble Lord, Lord Lennie, said that the amendment would not inhibit the Government in any way. But as I was saying—to give further explanation and clarity, if I may—changing “appropriate” to “necessary” would effectively force the Government to use sanctions only as a last resort. Let me assure noble Lords that by saying that I do not mean that sanctions are never our first option. It is important that the Government of the day have some flexibility in deciding when and how sanctions should be deployed. We would not want to find ourselves in a situation where we could not use sanctions in the early stages of a crisis and instead had to allow it to escalate until the necessity of sanctions could be demonstrated.
Moreover, sanctions work best when agreed multilaterally. To be required to demonstrate that other options have been exhausted and sanctions are therefore necessary would leave the UK more constrained than our allies and international partners in our ability to agree and deploy sanctions. It would be a high bar to meet, especially in cases where we may wish to impose sanctions as part of a multilateral agreement with allies in areas where there is no direct risk to UK citizens or direct impact on UK interests. Too high a bar could prevent the UK acting in these areas. This could not only reduce the ability of the UK to continue to play a central role in international affairs but reduce the effectiveness of the sanctions measures themselves. For example, financial sanctions against Russia—
I am puzzled by this point. The amendment is concerned, under Clause 1(1), with the circumstances in which regulations may be made, but it does not affect the broad discretion embodied in Clause 1(2), which defines purposes. Clause 1(2) states:
“A purpose is within this subsection if the appropriate Minister … considers”—
so it is a matter entirely for the Minister—
“that carrying out that purpose would”,
for example,
“further a foreign policy objective of the government of the United Kingdom”.
So, as I understand it, my noble and learned friend Lord Judge’s amendment would in no way inhibit the complete discretion of the Minister to decide matters of purpose and to decide what is or is not in the foreign policy objectives of the Government; for example, that sanctions should be imposed, in general terms. All the amendment does is to say that the Minister has to be satisfied that it is necessary to impose these regulations once the foreign policy objective has been determined—and it is to be determined by the Government. With great respect, I do not understand the point that the Minister is making.
The point I was making was about the implication in the current wording of “appropriate”. This is not an open invitation for a Minister to impose sanctions, and the appropriateness of imposing sanctions is qualified in the context in which they must be applied. That was why I referred to the specific section that I did.
I think I have made the point already that the concern would remain. Several noble Lords have referred to the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee. We have received those reports as well, and I assure noble Lords that I am not dismissing them. We are reflecting very carefully on the representations made by both committees because it is important that we respond carefully and after detailed consideration of what is being put forward. As I said right at the start of my remarks, I will reflect very carefully and will very much bear in mind the voices and experience of those who have tabled these amendments. We certainly remain of the thinking that the current wording, with the balances and the qualifications in the context of the legislation as presented, means that this is not an open invitation for a Minister to apply a sanction. However, in the context of the two reports, I will of course look again at the basis on which perhaps we can look to qualify, and provide greater certainty in respect of, the language used.
Amendment 1A, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Sheehan and Lady Northover, would require there to be a “compelling” reason why sanctions are appropriate for the purposes set out under subsection (2), which relates to non-UN sanctions. I agree with the sentiment behind this amendment and note that it reflects a specific recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee. However, adding the requirement for a “compelling” reason might also give rise to some of the difficulties I have already highlighted in respect of the previous amendment.
As I said, we think that in matters of foreign affairs and security policy the Government should have discretion about when it is appropriate to act. This amendment would effectively remove some of that discretion. We also believe that it could restrict our ability to work with international partners to ensure that sanctions are effective. In some cases, sanctions may be more compelling for our international partners than for the UK, but it would undermine the effect of sanctions if we were not able to participate or agree to them being applied multilaterally. I am sure that all noble Lords will recognise that perspective. If the UK was unable to act, this could in turn undermine the UK’s relationships with our international partners.
Amendment 23 deals with a similar issue, but in relation to UN sanctions only. I think there is agreement on all sides of the Committee that it is appropriate that the UK can continue to comply with its international obligations, so I doubt there is much between us on this issue. We think “necessary” would in many cases be acceptable in that place in the Bill. However, we also think it is important that where the UN provides some flexibility about how to implement obligations, the Government should have the flexibility to decide how best to do so. The word “appropriate” provides that flexibility.
It should be noted that the power here is broadly consistent with the equivalent provision in Section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946, which enables Ministers to,
“make such provision as appears to”,
them,
“necessary or expedient for enabling”,
measures in UN Security Council resolutions “to be effectively applied”. It should also be noted that the word “appropriate” does not enable Ministers to do whatever they want. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, referred to the Ahmed case, which I know he knows well. That demonstrated that the courts will take a robust approach to scrutinising the exercise of the Executive’s powers.
I have already alluded to the fact that we have received the reports of both the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee. I put it on record that we will consider both committees’ recommendations very carefully. I have also listened carefully to the contributions during the course of this short debate, and I am sure we will explore the issues further as we scrutinise the Bill in Committee.
It says here, “I hope I have been able to convince noble Lords”, but, from looking around the Chamber, I think that would be a rather hopeful word to use at this juncture. Perhaps I have provided noble Lords with a degree of reassurance with some of the explanations that I have given about the context in which the sanctions would apply, but I respect and understand that there would be a need for continued parliamentary scrutiny and for ensuring, as I am sure all noble Lords appreciate, that the UK continues to comply with international law and maintains a leading role in international affairs after the UK’s exit from the EU.
As I said, we will continue to consider very carefully the recommendations of the two committees, and I am sure we will return to this issue in discussion with noble Lords. Again, there are important issues of discussion here. Both in the course of the Committee stage of the Bill and in the meetings that we are having beyond the Chamber, I am sure we will reach a means of moving forward constructively on this basis. The ultimate purpose and objectives of the sanctions regime are something that I know all noble Lords respect. Based on that, I hope the noble Lords will be minded at this juncture to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am pleased to hear the Minister confirm that this House has the power to vote down statutory instruments. Indeed, if the Government continued to pursue policy goals through secondary legislation, that procedure would become much more widely used than it has been in the past without the suggestion that the British constitution was being undermined.
The Minister has said that these powers have been taken in the pursuit of Foreign Office goals. A memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, dated 19 October last, was sent to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Paragraph 52 says, under the heading “Justification for taking the powers”:
“The Government therefore considers it necessary and appropriate to provide framework powers that enable detailed sanctions regimes to be set out in secondary legislation”.
If the justification for taking the powers must be necessary and appropriate, why is the same test not to be applied to the exercise of those powers?
I thank the noble Lord for his late but important contribution. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I was stating the position as is, regarding the context in which both Houses of Parliament can vote on statutory instruments. In the case of your Lordships’ House, it is clearly laid out in the Companion as well. Let us also put this into context: if a sanctions regime were being proposed and it were voted down in both Houses, the sanction itself would fall and would not apply. The context is not something that can be ignored. In the context of the second question, the noble Lord—
May I ask for a clarification? The Minister just said the context could not be ignored. Is his conclusion that it is inappropriate for a statutory instrument related to sanctions ever to be voted down by either House? Is that the conclusion that we are to draw from his comment?
Perhaps I can read into what the noble Baroness seeks on this occasion. This is not an issue about both Houses or affirmative instruments. The position I have given is not the Government’s position; it is the position as it stands now. If she needs further elaboration, I respectfully refer her to the House of Lords Companion.
To return to the noble Lord’s final question, if I may, I will write on the specific issue that he raised for the purpose of clarity for all Members of your Lordships’ House.
The noble Lord said that my intervention was late. This is Committee, and the advantage of Committee is that Members may reply to the Minister after he has made his contribution.
As ever, as I said, we live and learn. The noble Lord is of course right in this context: during Committee, any noble Lord can speak and intervene as appropriate.
If I am allowed to speak, the reality is that neither House rejects subordinate legislation, even if it includes a provision which everybody thinks is lousy, because if you try to do that, the whole instrument falls, and there may be 77 regulations within it with which you agree. Our processes do not in reality admit of proper challenge to secondary legislation. But that is a battle for another occasion, perhaps when we come to Henry VIII.
I respectfully suggest to the Minister that the word “necessary” does not mean the same as “last resort”. If, when deciding whether to exercise these powers, he believed that he was acting in order to implement a treaty obligation or in accordance with a necessary stage in our foreign policy, that would be amply covered by the word “necessary”.
I was going to say that I will allow the Minister to reflect—that is very generous of me; the Minister is allowed as much time as he likes. What I meant was that when he has had time to reflect, I shall reflect on his reflections and return to the issue on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank my noble friend for his intervention and wholeheartedly agree that actions speak louder than words. However, at this stage, we are discussing how we can ensure the effective scrutiny of these powers. What are we measuring them against? That is important. Earlier, noble Lords said that we could not just rely on the words used. We all admire the Minister’s good intentions but this issue concerns the future. I place on record that the next Labour Government will put human rights centre stage in all their actions. We will certainly take up my noble friend’s point but that is not what we debating. I do not want to make an election manifesto call just yet but I want the Minister to consider the mechanisms that can be included in the Bill to enable us properly to measure the use of executive power.
My Lords, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, I was allowing for any noble Lords to speak, but of course we will continue to debate these issues. To pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, to whom I listened carefully, it is fair to say that sometimes we can be critical within the Chamber, whoever is in power or in opposition. One thing I have seen in my short time as a Foreign Office Minister but also as a Minister for Human Rights, whether at the UN, in Geneva or travelling around the world—irrespective of which Government of whatever colour has led our great country—is that not only do we see respect for human rights as being at the heart and centre of what we do but many around the world respect the UK for it and hold it up as a beacon. I assure the Committee that the Government do not take their human rights responsibilities lightly. My noble friend Lord Faulks alluded to the fact that not just here but in other places, in different parts of legislation, we ensure adherence to that. In this regard I am proud that, whether at the Human Rights Council, as we have recently seen, through various universal periodical reviews that are taking place with countries, or on quite specific issues, whether human rights on freedom of religion or belief, the protection of LGBT communities, or on gender equality and ensuring that women’s rights are represented, throughout my life the UK has been a bastion and a beacon for human rights. That should and will remain a cornerstone of British foreign policy in years to come.
I thank noble Lords for their amendments. It is right that we again emphasise that we should look carefully at the purposes for which sanction regulations may be created. It may be helpful if I say something about the purposes set out in Clause 1(2). These are designed to cover situations and purposes where the UK is not implementing a UN or other international obligation. The list of purposes has been designed to ensure that we can continue to implement sanctions for the full range of purposes for which we use them now as part of the European Union. The EU is able to adopt sanctions for any purposes of its common foreign and security policy. The reference to “foreign policy objectives” in Clause 1(2) seeks to provide the same type of scope when the UK has left the European Union. This is why the amendment tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Northover and Lady Sheehan, would, as my noble friend Lord Faulks highlighted, potentially restrict our options. It seeks to remove the ability to impose sanctions to,
“further a foreign policy objective of”,
the UK.
I appreciate and accept that Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6 aim to define UK national security and foreign policy objectives in more specific terms. I have little difficulty with the language as such. However, we may risk missing important objectives of UK national and foreign policy that might justify the use of sanctions in the future. For example, this may limit our ability to act with our international partners in the future to tackle serious threats to the national interest.
Noble Lords may recall that in 2015 the Government published a national security strategy, which provides a clear overview of Her Majesty’s Government’s objectives in the national security sphere. The practice has been to update this strategy every five years, as this can act as an indication of some of the purposes of sanctions as set out in the Bill. I assure noble Lords that the Government will not have unlimited discretion. As I set out in the previous debate, the Bill contains a number of checks and balances on the Government’s action, including scrutiny by Parliament and court challenges.
On the additional purposes that have been suggested, I note that these reflect our current practice. For example, preventing grave breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law are already among the purposes of UN sanctions against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and EU sanctions against Iran. I am satisfied that we would continue to impose such sanctions based on the purposes of the Bill as drafted, and that is certainly our intention.
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has contributed to this mini debate. In some ways, I was surprisingly unreassured by what the Minister said; I was expecting to be much more reassured than I am. I was struck by the difference in his language. He mentioned that the EU uses sanctions for “foreign and security policy”, but the Bill talks only about “foreign policy”, which is a much more restricted meaning. He mentioned Iran, but it was the nuclear programme and the threat of it that led to sanctions, which is about security rather than foreign policy per se.
I suggest to the noble Baroness that foreign policy and security are the primary responsibility of any Government. Of course, security is a key feature of foreign policy, and I also referred to the Government’s national security strategy.
Indeed, security, and not just foreign policy, is a first aim of the whole of government. However, I find myself concerned about the language here and about the scope in the Bill for using this provision. I shall certainly think about this but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group of amendments. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, talked about Rhodesia, and historical context is one of the great values of your Lordships’ House—it always puts things into context.
The specific issue of banks and sanctions against Iraq in 1991 came up. As someone who spent 20 years in that sector and started his career at that time, I remember being acutely aware of those who were opposing the Saddam Hussein regime. It was perhaps used to having more liberal purses and was suddenly subjected to stringent rules based on those that were being applied in-country. Noble Lords have spoken quite rightly about the unintended consequences that lie behind sanctions. However, there are necessary occasions for them in the banking sector. As we have seen, certain banks in certain parts of the world will take a de-risking attitude, which then prevents essential services being performed. However, I will turn to the issue in front of us.
Amendments 8 and 9 make substantially the same points so I will address them together, if I may. First, let me stress again on record that I fully understand the reasoning behind these amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, said, we have spoken about this during Second Reading and outside your Lordships’ Chamber.
It is important that, in imposing and maintaining sanctions, the Government do so with a clear understanding of what the impacts may be, and that there is a focus on minimising potential humanitarian impacts and other unintended consequences. I assure noble Lords that the Government work closely with humanitarian actors and NGOs and take their concerns into account when designing and implementing sanctions.
Last year, it was the United Kingdom that secured amendments to the EU’s Syria sanctions regime to provide an exemption for fuel purchases made in Syria by humanitarian organisations, which is exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Collins, talked about. Noble Lords may also be aware that, in October, after listening to NGOs, Her Majesty’s Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation published specific guidance for the charitable sector on sanctions compliance.
I assure noble Lords that the Bill provides the Government with relevant powers, such as issuing licences to help mitigate any potential impact on the operations of humanitarian organisations. EU case law currently restricts our ability to issue so-called general licences for the humanitarian sector, but the Bill would give us greater flexibility after our exit from the EU. When making and amending future sanctions regulations, the Government would incorporate humanitarian exemptions where appropriate, and these would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
As the amendment makes clear, there are already methodologies for assessing the humanitarian impact of sanctions, which are agreed internationally. These would continue to be applied. To require a humanitarian impact assessment to be published at the domestic level each time sanctions were imposed is something that I remain to be convinced about. It would duplicate the work already done at an international level before sanctions are agreed. It also carries the risk of causing delay, potentially undermining the effectiveness of sanctions.
The amendment tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Northover and Lady Sheehan, would require the impact assessment to be worked up in consultation with stakeholders each time. I fear that that might risk tipping off potential sanctions targets, who could then take evasive action. Again, this could undermine the effectiveness of sanctions.
I assure noble Lords that we will continue to work closely with our NGO partners. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, asked how we were taking that further. We are already working closely with colleagues in DfID on working with NGOs on how we can take the matter forward. The noble Lords, Lord Collins and Lord McNally, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, talked also about the NGOs themselves. I think it might be appropriate if, during the course of Committee and before Report, I make myself available to meet the NGOs to see how we may be able to further tighten up the language in this regard. I hope that following what I have presented to the House about the measures already in place, the noble Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the noble Lord for his response and very much welcome his commitment to meet NGOs so that we can discuss their concerns before we come back to this at Report. In the light of those comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these amendments seek to remove the ability of the Government to create sectoral financial sanctions measures by removing the power to apply certain sanction measures to, as we have heard,
“persons connected with a prescribed country”.
Amendments 10 to 14, 16 and 17 would make this change in Clause 2 while Amendment 19 speaks to Clause 5, Amendment 22 to Clause 6 and Amendment 81 to Clause 50. Amendment 30 to Clause 10 would make a slightly different change in that it would restrict the Government from being able to designate a person on the basis of their involvement with other designated persons. However, the amendments all have a common theme as they deal with the application of sanctions to persons other than those directly designated.
The Government are clear that sectoral financial sanctions remain a vital foreign policy and national security tool to enable us to meet our UN obligations. It is worth emphasising that we already implement these sanctions under both the United Nations and the European Union regimes. For example, sanctions against North Korea restrict that country’s access to certain financial markets in order to restrict its ability to generate funds for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. To do this and to make it work, we have had to impose sanctions on groups of persons—or in extreme cases, on all people—connected in a specified way with the prescribed country. This ensures that the sanctions measures are robust and effective.
We accept that this creates the potential for far-reaching sanctions that bite upon people who themselves have done no wrong, but it remains the case that it is a necessary part of some sanctions regimes. The more broadly sanctions can be drawn, the greater the impact they will have. I accept that it is a sad but necessary side-effect that at times this can affect persons who may not be directly involved with the activities of the target regime. For example, the current restrictions on the transfer of funds to and from North Korea—noble Lords will be aware that there have previously been restrictions on the transfer of funds to and from Iran—will affect people who do not directly support Kim Jong-un’s regime.
The UK, EU and Strasbourg courts have all considered and accepted that the harsh effects on individuals are justified due to the importance of sanctions and the need for them to have broad and deep effects. It was summarised by the European Court of Justice, which stated that,
“any measure imposing sanctions has, by definition, consequences which affect the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business, thereby causing harm to persons who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions. Moreover, the importance of the aims pursued by the regulation at issue is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators”.
This was the Bosphorus case decided in 1996 in relation to sanctions that were placed on the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It has been a settled principle of law for more than 20 years.
If the amendments were accepted, we would be unable to impose these measures. In some cases, they are mandated by resolutions of the UN Security Council, such as the obligations imposed in 2013 to cease business with North Korean banks and financial institutions. We would then be in breach of international law. Another example of a sanctions regime that we would be unable to maintain is the Ukraine sovereignty regime, which aims to restrict Russia from accessing certain financial services. Similar to the North Korea examples I have already given, we would be unable to maintain those financial sanctions if we were unable to impose sanctions on persons connected with Russia, or with persons of a certain description connected with Russia, such as state-owned banks. The clauses must remain if we are to be able to meet our international obligations and work with allies to use sanctions as an effective foreign policy and national security tool.
Clause 10 currently permits us to determine that a person is an “involved person” on the basis of their relationships with other “involved persons”. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, raised this issue; I hope I can briefly explain the significance of it. A person can be designated only when the appropriate Minister has sufficient evidence to have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are involved in the activities targeted by sanctions. For example, if a senior member of a regime is controlling a public body that is developing weapons of mass destruction, they are involved in that activity and can be classified as an “involved person”. Assuming that the appropriate Minister deems it appropriate—and proportionate—to designate them, they can do so.
Clause 10 also enables a person to be an “involved person” if they are owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf of, an “involved person”—for example, as an agent. It goes further and enables a person to be an “involved person” on the basis of their association with other involved people. The key point is that this is often required of us by our international obligations. It is common for a UNSCR to require states to designate not just those involved in a particular activity, but those acting on their behalf or at their direction. Accordingly, we must be able to do that to meet our UN obligations, but it also has three other advantages. First, it enables us to apply sanctions more widely to affect the people around those directly involved, which would further restrict the regime’s ability to act and place further pressure on the regime to change its ways. Secondly, it allows us to designate those people who enable these activities by providing funds and financial services to the regime without direct involvement in the targeted activities. Thirdly, it enables us to apply sanctions across a whole group who share the same aims but are using different methods to achieve them. For example, it would enable us to designate all members of a terrorist group: not only those who are engaging directly in terrorist activity, but those providing funds and logistical support.
A current example of that would be the EU designation of Bashar al-Assad under the EU’s Syria sanctions regime, which has frozen the assets of Assad in the EU —including the UK—and banned him from entering the EU. However, people associated with him are also designated: leading businesspersons operating in Syria; members of the Syrian armed forces of the rank of colonel, or the equivalent or higher, in post after May 2011; members of the Syrian security and intelligence services in post after May 2011; and members of the regime-affiliated militias. Removing the ability to designate these as “associated persons”, as proposed in Amendment 30, would remove the ability to designate those who have a significant role in threats to peace and security.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, gave a personal example of being connected and made the pertinent point of the definition being very wide: it encompasses many people, even those whose connections are arguably tenuous. As I have already explained, it is necessary to ensure that sanctions are broad and effective. To say that somebody is connected because of a remote family relationship is tenuous. I doubt it would be lawful or stand up to scrutiny in a court, nor would it advance the purpose of the sanctions. However, it is almost impossible to foresee what type of connections will be required in future sanctions regimes, but I do not believe that this one, in terms of the detailed nature of what the noble and learned Lord expressed, would apply.
I have heard and listened very carefully to the concerns, but at the same time I have stated that there are good reasons for casting these powers in the way we have. There will be real difficulties in applying sanctions if they are too restricted. We believe that we have the balance right. With the practical examples I have given, and my interpretation of the Bosphorus case—especially when we bear in mind that power can be exercised only when proportionate and compliant with human rights; any other use would be forbidden by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998—I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be minded to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall withdraw the amendment for now; I may come back to it on Report. However, I do not want the Minister to misunderstand the purpose of my amendment. He has produced a very convincing argument for the need for sanctions to be available and used, and there are compelling cases where they have been used out of absolute necessity. The amendments we are proposing are nothing to do with that. The amendment we are driving at is that, in reality, there is no reason why the word “connection” cannot be defined now, as opposed to leaving it for few months down the road until a Minister gets round to making a definition. I look forward to his reflections on that, and I will reflect on it too.
My Lords, to echo what has been said, the amendment would strengthen the Minister’s hand to act and seeks to address the problem of companies registered in this country with no connection to, business with or purpose in this country other than to evade detection and supply arms to those we regard as rather evil. There is a great difficulty with detection. I am not underestimating problems, particularly evidential ones, but I suspect that the wider the hand of the Minister in this regard, the greater the power of success. There has been some progress in this area recently under other Acts, such as the Bribery Act, but our chance of success in closing down what is simply a hosting arrangement would be greatly enhanced by the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for noble Lords seeking to strengthen the hand of the Minister at the Dispatch Box. I made specific note of that. I understand the reasons for wanting to go down the route of closing down designated companies and companies belonging to a designated person. However, the proposal contained in Amendments 15 and 46, and the supporting proposals in Amendments 78, 79 and 80, raise some concerns and illustrate why it may not be appropriate to accept them.
I remind noble Lords that the Bill aims to put in place the necessary powers to replicate the sanctions regimes that we currently implement as a member state of the European Union and, of course, those we are obligated to implement internationally through the UN. These amendments would go over and above the regimes and the type of sanction that the EU has put in place. It is essentially a new type of sanction and, as such, I urge a degree of caution in approaching this.
Clause 2 is about freezing assets of designated persons and preventing access to the UK’s financial markets. It is not about causing companies to cease to exist. Sanctions are intended to be temporary. That is why we have various reviews of sanction regimes set up and why they are reviewed periodically: their whole essence is to ensure that the target has changed behaviour in the desired manner. Once this change in behaviour has been achieved, sanctions may well be lifted. We do not intend to impose permanent measures that cannot be reversed. I suggest that shutting down a company is pretty irreversible.
This would be a unique power that does not exist at the United Nations or with EU sanctions. Sanctions have always been and will continue to be most effective when implemented multilaterally and with maximum consistency. Before implementing a new type of sanction, we would usually discuss with our partners whether it is effective and whether there is any appetite for it to be taken forward multilaterally. Only in very rare cases would we unilaterally introduce a new type of sanction that has effect within the UK’s jurisdiction only. Unilateral sanctions provisions such as this could also have an uncertain effect and could create difficulties for industry in general.
Dissolving a corporate entity is a permanent measure with far-reaching effects. It would also have an impact on the human rights of the people involved. Dissolving a company owned by a designated person would remove their property. Doing so without compensation would leave the Government open to a potential action for damages by a person alleging breach of their human right to ownership of their property. It is also uncertain where the property owned by the company would go and what effect this would have on the property rights of anybody involved. Accordingly, to do so may be in breach of the human rights convention.
When a company is designated under financial sanctions they will not be able to trade—that is clear—with any person connected to the UK or to any other countries that have joined us in the multilateral sanctions. We therefore feel that these measures are sufficient to ensure that the effects of the financial sanctions are maximised.
The noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, gave a specific example about actions we can take against shell companies that, in her words, may be involved in illicit arms trading. If the arms trade is a breach of trade sanctions we will of course prosecute these companies and their directors for criminal offences using powers in the Bill and the export control order 2000, which she referred to previously.
Given my explanation, the importance of the intent, the fact that we would be creating a totally new type of sanction here and in the context of this not being something that either the UN or the EU currently designate, I hope the noble Baroness will be minded to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the Minister for his reply. He said quite a lot about how we may diverge from the EU, but as I thought Brexit was about diverging from the EU and taking back control, I thought he might have welcomed the powers these amendments would confer on him.
Am I to take it that the Liberal Benches are now suggesting that that is exactly what the Government should be doing?
I am suggesting that the Liberal Benches might wish to take advantage of what the Government have been proposing when it suits our ends. This is such an important issue. We are presented with an opportunity in the Bill to do something about the illicit arms trade and arms brokering. It is a real stain on the UK that so much of that trade is facilitated here. Although I will withdraw the amendment for now, I reserve the right to come back to this issue at a later stage.
My Lords, I do not have much more to add. Obviously, the amendments in this group are probing. I hope the Minister can respond in terms of what the current arrangements are in respect of the circumstances outlined in the amendments and how they may not be necessary. As the noble Baroness said, it is important that we consider all the unintended consequences, as well as our objective of imposing sanctions that are effective.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for raising this important issue. As we discussed earlier, the Government take seriously the impact that sanctions can have on the civilian population of a country and acknowledge the important work of NGOs and other humanitarian organisations in difficult situations.
The amendments would exempt ships or aeroplanes from sanctions if they are being used to transport refugees. While I agree with the principle of the amendments, which I know are well intentioned and seek to assist those who require international protection, in my opinion this is not the right way to achieve the desired effect.
I cited earlier the example of NGOs operating in Syria, where exemptions were granted on fuel access. We need to ensure that NGOs can operate in countries that are subject to sanctions by providing licences and exceptions. The Bill makes it easier—it is not just about having wide powers—by allowing government to draft exceptions and grant general licences aimed specifically at assisting humanitarian activities, including those assisting refugees or displaced persons, which is the intent behind the noble Baroness’s amendment. Of course, these are currently not permitted by EU law.
There are good reasons why broad prohibitions are applied to a country with licences, then used to provide targeted exceptions. That is the right way to move forward on this. If we were to provide a general exception for ships and aeroplanes in these circumstances, it could be subject to abuse and would be impossible to enforce. In extremis, it could help organisations circumvent sanctions. It would also be very difficult to apply in practice. If a person on a ship or aircraft claimed to be a refugee, such a circumstance would seem to engage the exemption proposed by the amendment. However, if it was later determined by the proper authorities and the courts that they were not a refugee, the ship or aircraft would have breached sanctions, as well as that person having circumvented immigration controls.
In many cases, it is impossible to tell whether a person is a refugee until after their claim has been examined and determined. I totally understand the intent behind the amendment, but I am sure the noble Baroness can also understand the difficulty it would pose in respect of a person on a ship or aircraft making such a claim.
I assure the noble Baroness and the Committee that the system of licences and exceptions currently in the Bill offers the best way to maintain the integrity of sanctions while ensuring that NGOs can provide humanitarian support to refugees and displaced persons. I committed during a previous debate to join the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, in meeting NGOs perhaps to strengthen the narrative behind the exceptions—on how they work and how the current rules would be applied—but I am still minded to ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. I feel that looking to strengthen the communication and availability of current processes to NGOs, as well as their knowledge of them, would be a better way forward.
Amendments 33 and 34 concern Clause 10. Where Clause 10(6) says:
“The regulations may make provision, for the purposes of the regulations, as to the meaning of a person’s”,
we want to replace the word “may” with “must”. We also want to add a final subsection to the end of the clause, as follows:
“( ) The regulations must make provision for the notification of persons designated under subsection (3)(b) to (d), and such notifications must state, to the fullest possible extent consistent with the purpose of the regulations … which person or persons the designation has been made in connection with, and … the nature of the connection identified for the purposes of the designation”.
It is a question, if you are going to designate, of identifying who the person is associated with and what are the reasons for associating with them.
The regulations must make provision for the notification of persons designated on the grounds of indirect involvement in prohibited activities, including the requirement to inform such persons of the specific nature of any activities or other persons they have been designated in connection with. I am not sure how they are to know unless they are advised as to what it is and who it is they have been designated for associating with.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this very brief debate thus far. This clause introduces the power to include designated persons under sanctions regulations and defines the meaning of this term as used in the Bill. It sets out the designated persons, which can include individuals, companies and other entities which have a legal personality, as well as groups and associations. The noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, said that it is so wide that anyone in a particular country who was not designated would be a refugee. That is not the case. In conflict situations—Syria is a prime example—there are members of the opposition, for example. When I was qualifying the status of those who may or may not be “influenced by” or “under the control or direction of”, in a previous debate, that point was made quite clear. The clause will ensure that Governments can, for example, designate particular organisations, and terrorist organisations come to mind in this respect.
The decision to designate an individual or organisation would be made by an appropriate Minister and the Minister would be informed by strategic, tactical and evidentiary advice; so the evidence would need to be there. A decision to designate would also be made where a designation advanced the purposes of a specific sanctions regime, taking into account the political picture and the evidence available. This approach is consistent with EU practice and the practices of our key sanctions partners-for example, the United States and Canada, where the power to designate rests with the Executive. It is for the Executive to use the powers then provided by Parliament as the situation demands.
I fully accept the point that there is a need for appropriate safeguards, and the Bill gives designated persons the right to ask for an administrative reassessment and then bring a challenge in the courts. It also requires annual political and triennial evidentiary reviews. These are, of course, in addition to the Government’s day-to-day accountability to Parliament.
Amendment 33 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Collins and Lord Lennie, would make it necessary to set out what was meant by being,
“owned or controlled directly or indirectly”,
by another person and of being “associated with” another person. I agree that there should be restrictions on designation powers. That is why the Bill allows designation only where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is involved with or connected to an activity set out in the regulations, and that it is appropriate to designate them on that basis. I hope that, with the explanation I have given, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her opposition to Clause 8 standing part of the Bill.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. This clause does indeed seem to be challenging, and I look forward to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, perhaps coming up with some overarching set of protections for the whole Bill which would apply to this as well. The Minister mentioned reviews: we will be coming to reviews later in the Bill, and there are questions around those, so that is not tremendously reassuring. He also mentioned answerability to Parliament. That has the problems that my noble friend Lady Kramer referred to earlier in our initial debates.
My Lords, we are having a bit of a Groundhog Day. Following on from the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Falconer, where did this idea come from? Where has this authority been dreamed up? It clearly risks overzealous action or a meaningless designation. If it is seen to designate the citizens of an entire nation, it is entirely meaningless. That is a real fear and possibility.
If a person is to be designated, they should be designated by name. I think that is common cause. There may be an occasional circumstance when it is simply not possible to identify or get hold of their name through all kinds of investigative methods, but it would be a rarity-it will not be the generality of the application of this law. The difficulty with enforcement for the banks—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, mentioned this—is real and serious and has been referred to before. The Government should identify the source and purpose of this and then rewrite the Bill in line with what is intended rather than what the unintended consequence would be.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for moving his amendment. I know that he has spoken before about the powers that are being given to Ministers in this respect. The amendment seeks to remove the ability of the Government to make designations by description which cover groups of people. It would mean that we could designate individual persons only when we knew their names.
Picking up a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—I hear what he said—I assure the Committee that we will always seek to designate by name wherever possible. We anticipate that the power to designate by description will be rarely used, for reasons that I will set out shortly. But, as I hope to explain to the Committee, it remains a useful tool for the imposition of sanctions. The noble Lord, Lord Lennie, commented just now that some exceptions might apply. That is exactly the kind of exception for which we want to ensure these powers will allow us to apply sanctions.
It is important that this proposal is seen in its proper context. Sectoral sanctions—those aimed at groups or sectors rather than individuals—remain a vital foreign policy and national security tool. The ability to designate by description also enables us to refer to lists of designated persons produced by others, such as the United Nations. To have a single list to look at will reduce the administrative burden upon business. It will also enable us to target particular entities within a given sector: for example, state-owned banks operating in a particular market. Finally, it will enable us to target groups of persons, such as members of a terrorist group—for example, the Hezbollah military wing.
In some cases—they may be few but there will be exceptions—we will not be able to identify all members of a group by name. But it remains important that those members are subjected to sanctions, to prevent them using their funds and assets to commit terrorist crimes. We are also cognisant of the difficulties that this might cause to banks; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, raised this issue. We accept that a designation by description will be harder for them to implement, but I hope that I can offer a few reasons why this power should be retained despite the difficulties that have been highlighted.
First, as I have said, we will always seek to designate by name where we can and this power will be used very rarely. Secondly, when we use this power we will provide as much information as possible to assist institutions, such as banks and other businesses, to carry out their obligations under the sanctions. Thirdly, it may sometimes be necessary to impose these types of sanctions to cover groups of persons where, as I have said, not all the names of members are not known. Fourthly, banks and businesses carry out their own customer assessments and are well placed to carry out their obligations under sanctions. They also have their own compliance procedures, which enable them to identify persons subject to sanctions and can be used to assist them to identify members of a group. For example, if we designate a group of persons acting in a geographical area, the compliance systems can then be used to pick up economic activity in that area and trigger a deeper investigation into the relevant account holders.
If this amendment were to be accepted, we would be unable to impose these kinds of measures in the cases that I have illustrated. This provision needs to remain to ensure that sanctions can be used as an effective tool for not just foreign policy but, importantly, national security. Noble Lords have alluded to the difficulties, which I fully acknowledge, but I hope that I have offered some degree of reassurance in the context of how they might be overcome.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, also mentioned the phrase “connected to” and designation by description in primary legislation. The issue remains that the connections and descriptions can be context-specific. For example, what is applied under counterterrorism sanctions may not be applied under Russian sanctions, hence the proposal to include these definitions as regulations. That said, he also referred again to the reports by the two committees. As I alluded to earlier, we are reflecting on the specific points that they have raised, including the one that the noble and learned Lord raised in the context of this debate. I will return to those points and reflect—
I apologise for not having entered into the debate at an earlier stage but I have been reflecting on what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said about the importance of legislation being specific. I also reflect on the fact that, working in the financial services as I do, I often see names but we are never quite sure who is behind the names. It may therefore be necessary to have a secondary back-up power to address the groups of unspecified people who one thinks are behind those whose names are specified. Much in the spirit of the noble and learned Lord, I suggest to my noble friend that he may wish to reflect on whether there is some way of specifying in the Bill that these are reserved powers, to be used under particular circumstances. That might well reassure those who feel that they are too overarching.
I thank my noble friend for his intervention. He speaks from experience and, as someone who spent 20 years in the financial services sector, I am acutely aware of the challenges presented by the issue of designations. I will of course take his suggestion and reflect upon it. To address particularly the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, this would be the exception. It would not be the norm but would be to cover situations that do occur and have occurred. I have sought in my response to illustrate the circumstances in which that would occur and, based on that, I hope that at this time the noble and learned Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.
Can the Minister explain what the point is of having sanctions if you do not know who they are against? I am looking again at the memorandum to which I referred earlier, which says in paragraph 44:
“Designated persons attract individual sanctions, including asset freezes. Designations are an effective way of coercing or constraining individuals who are directly involved or closely associated with the activity or behaviour targeted by the sanctions. The Government would intend to publish the names of designated persons on a list on its website, and would also notify those persons, where possible, in accordance with clause 1. There are currently around 2000 designated persons under existing sanctions regimes implemented by the UK”.
If that is the purpose of it—to coerce or constrain individuals when you do not know who they are—how can these sanctions be effective in any way?
I suggest to the noble Lord that if there is a person who is not named but is connected to a group on which that sanction is being observed, that would stop them carrying out particular actions. It would ensure that that sanction was effective.
My Lords, it really is not beyond the wit of parliamentary draftsmen to produce primary legislation that says, “Designated by name unless it is impracticable to do so” or “Save exceptionally”. That is not difficult, neither is it difficult for parliamentary counsel to produce for us a Bill which says, “Designated by identifying a group or body”. It is not a problem. I make a fuss about this because we are coming to Clause 16, which will enable a Minister to create offences punishable with 10 years’ imprisonment and define the defences. It will be open to the Minister to say in the regulations: “This is an absolute offence. You, the bank, have dealt with somebody for whom we gave a description. It did not quite fit but you dealt with him”. If we have an absolute offence created, I do not suppose that the bank will go to prison for 10 years. But the whole of this legislation goes together; the Bill needs to be seen in its overall context. I do not think that I should pursue it any further at this stage and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Your name goes on the sanctions list before you are told, so as to avoid the dissipation of your assets, but afterwards you are told that you are now designated, these are the consequences, this is why it is happening, this is what you must not do, this is what you must do and—what is more—you had better know that it is X who has given us this information or that we think you are Igor Judge, but actually there is another Igor Judge who lives in, shall we say, Russia and it is him we are after. That way, you can very rapidly get your review looked at and justice done to you.
My Lords, I agree with the underlying principle of these amendments, which aim to ensure that designated persons are told the reasons why they have been designated and given sight of the evidence on which this designation is based as soon as is practically possible. I reassure noble Lords that I do not believe that these amendments are necessary. As is the case currently, the Government fully intend to inform all designated parties after their designation either directly in writing or, if we do not have an address for them, through the government website. This notification will set out clearly why they have been designated and the clear and transparent channels through which they can challenge their designation via a request for a reassessment of their designation or a legal challenge in the courts. While we intend to inform designated persons of the reason for their designation, as we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Amendment 60 rightly highlights that some evidence may not be suitable for disclosure for national security reasons. In these cases, we would provide a summary of the information.
In short, this amendment would simply codify standards to which the Government are already committed and would in any case be expected to meet by the courts. The courts have already made several findings on the need for disclosure of reasons and evidence in cases of designations, which we think would continue to apply, and the Bill makes no effort to disturb these standards.
However, I have listened very carefully to this short but important debate and in the light of the powerful points put forward and the Constitution Committee’s comments, which the noble and learned Lord did not read out, I will consider further and come back to the House.
In the light of those helpful comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
From these Benches, I concur. I look forward to hearing what the Minister is planning to do in light of the reports from the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee.
My Lords, I agree with the spirit behind the amendments. Targeted sanctions inevitably involve significant impacts on the people affected by them. That reflects the purpose of sanctions, which are about changing behaviour. I shall repeat, as was mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, what I said at Second Reading: I reassure noble Lords that where relevant rights under the European Convention on Human Rights are engaged, we consider that proportionality and the impact on the individual will be part of the decision-making. Under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the appropriate Minister must act in compliance with those convention rights as informed by the Strasbourg case law. We consider that that includes satisfying themselves that the designation is proportionate.
In the response to our consultation published in August, we made clear that our approach to sanctions would be compatible with UK and international law and we would continue to ensure that the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 6(8) and Article 1 of Protocol 1, are upheld when imposing and maintaining human rights and maintaining designation. However, as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998, the requirement to act proportionately applies across a wide range of legislation regardless of whether it is stated explicitly in the legislation. It is also relevant that the Bill contains a range of protections to ensure that designations are used appropriately.
In cases where the UK has chosen to act in an area where the UN is not acting, the affirmative procedure will apply, ensuring that Parliament has a vote. This will provide an opportunity for Parliament also to consider whether the designation powers being taken by the Government are appropriate. Parliament will also have the opportunity to consider the exceptions and licensing arrangements that will apply to a regime, which can allow, for example, the release of frozen funds to meet basic expenses or travel to be authorised for humanitarian reasons. The Bill further provides for an annual review of each sanctions regime against the purpose that it was put in place to achieve, which will involve looking at the current global picture. The Bill also provides opportunities for reassessments and court challenges.
I state all that because it is important for the record. I hope I have been able to provide noble Lords with reassurance. Nevertheless, while this debate has been extremely short, it is a pertinent one based on a word. I will therefore consider with my officials what further reassurances we can give and, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, reflect on the committee reports. For now, though, I am minded to ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
On the basis that the Minister is going to reflect, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is part of the running theme of the Bill. Once again, we wish to know why Ministers need the wide powers that they appear to have through regulations. I do not need to repeat the arguments that were so well put earlier, but I flag the wide powers here once more. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to both amendments in this group, because although referring to different areas—UN lists and International Maritime Organization numbers—I believe that they have some similarities.
For sanctions to be effective, we believe that it is important that the Government act quickly and that the targets of sanctions are easily identifiable. This enables those who are affected by sanctions, including businesses, quickly to work out what they need to do to comply with whatever restrictive measures are put in place.
When a Minister is specifying a ship, they must be confident that they have identified the correct one. There are a variety of ways in which a ship can be identified—using the ship’s name, tonnage, or the country whose flag it flies. I am sure that noble Lords accept that all those details are important. However, they are also changeable. The most reliable way to identify a vessel is by referring to its International Maritime Organization number, which remains with the vessel throughout its lifetime. This is the method used by the UN to specify ships and one that the Government recommend.
The names of those who are on UN lists can be subject to regular changes. As an example, the UN list relating to North Korea has changed five times in the past year. The ability to refer to a UN list, without having to change regulations each time the UN list is amended, would not only be less bureaucratic but would result in less risk of mistakes. I hope that I have underlined the importance of referring to the UN and IMO lists when designating people and specifying ships and that, in the light of that, having provided that clarification, the noble Baroness will be minded to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group and address particularly Amendments 40, 41 and 51 and the requirement for a fast-track process. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, I welcome the Minister’s commitment to meet the NGOs before the next stage of the Bill. It is important to understand that their anxiety is not due to the Minister’s lack of commitment, his intentions or the policy of the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, which has a stated policy of processing licence applications for humanitarian purposes as quickly as possible. However, the NGOs and all the amendments in this group seek to create more certainty because, as the noble Earl mentioned, delays occur and when sanctions are biting hard we are unable to get assistance where it is needed. Humanitarian crises can emerge extremely suddenly and we are most concerned about how the new regime will deal with them. As the noble Earl said, there are plenty of examples of the costs of slow-moving sanctions policy—for example, in Somalia in 2011, where uncertainty about the sanctions regime slowed down the NGOs’ response to the famine in that country. I certainly support the proposal of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for a general licensing exemption. I hope the Minister will come back with some very concrete reassurances after meeting the NGOs, so that there will not simply be his kind words but a declaration in the Bill to ensure that uncertainty is removed.
My Lords, Amendment 39 seeks to enable the procedure by which individuals or entities could apply for licences and exceptions to be included in the regulations. Amendment 40 would require the Government to establish a fast-track process for dealing with requests in respect of exceptions and licences for humanitarian purposes, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, just highlighted.
I would like to make it clear that the consultation on the White Paper raised the need for clear guidance and swift and robust licensing processes. I assure my noble friend Lord Dundee that the Government are committed to a positive reply on both issues. I hope the Committee will be reassured that, given the number of departments involved and the many different derogations, exemptions and grounds for licensing that exist, the relevant application procedures in each sanctions regulation are all contained in guidance. This guidance is publicly accessible to all via various departmental websites. To reproduce them in the regulations themselves would certainly create a substantial administrative burden and greatly lengthen the instruments, so we do not think it is necessary to do that.
On Amendment 40, the variety and complexity of exemptions and licensing arrangements in place means it could also be difficult to establish a single fast-track process that would be straightforward to operate. The Government believe that the criteria for considering the prioritisation for granting licences and exemptions should remain as flexible as possible. We have already committed to dealing with licences as swiftly as possible and we will of course prioritise urgent requests. The fact that a licence is required for humanitarian reasons is something that we already factor into, and will continue to factor into, the time we take to respond to the request. However, I am sure that noble Lords will also acknowledge that humanitarian licences are not the only ones that might require an urgent response. For example, a legal fees licence might be needed to enable an imminent court deadline to be met. To have a fast-track procedure confined to humanitarian licences alone might put these at additional risk by giving priority to a humanitarian needs licence that is not urgent over another request that is. For all these reasons, we do not consider that new requirements need to be added to the sanctions regulations.
I appreciate the sentiment behind Amendment 41, which proposes that a consultation be undertaken for an overarching framework for exceptions and licences. The White Paper consultation on exceptions and licences highlighted the need for good systems and clear guidance when applying exceptions and licensing. We have taken on board the comments of all respondents and replied to them and, as we said in our reply, we intend to design the post-Brexit licensing framework based on these representations. We also intend to consult industry from now until the day we leave the European Union and thereafter, to ensure that the framework allows us to be flexible and has the minimum possible effect on industry while having the maximum effect on the intended targets.
It is also true that an overarching framework for licences might not allow us to take advantage of the flexibility that we currently have for each regime. For example, the licensing grounds for a proliferation regime should be different from those of a misappropriation regime. Different types of sanctions also require different approaches. We currently have centres of expertise on the different types of sanctions, and any move to an overarching framework might put these at risk.
Finally, the Committee will be aware that the moment of leaving the EU is approaching. In that time, after the Bill is enacted, we will need to design the replacement UK regimes. To undertake a consultation exercise on top of that will make it harder to prepare in time. Given that the purpose of this amendment is to ensure good licensing and clear guidance, I hope I have been able to reassure the Committee that we are committed to both.
On the humanitarian exceptions, I have great sympathy with the intention behind Amendment 42; humanitarian, development, reconstruction and peacebuilding agencies need to continue the important work they conduct, often in very difficult circumstances, without fear of unintentionally falling in breach of sanctions. The Government should have the necessary discretion to enable this. The intended effect of this amendment is to make it explicit in the Bill that the types of exceptions that can be granted include,
“humanitarian, development, reconstruction and peace-building agencies”.
However, the addition is unnecessary, as Clause 14(2) as currently drafted allows the Government to create exceptions and issue licenses for activities that are not explicitly listed in Clause 14(2). It is the Government’s intention to use this drafting to create exceptions for a wide range of activities. Humanitarian activities are currently included under existing exceptions and licensing provisions in the sanctions regimes in place, and I assure noble Lords that we intend to continue to include them. Clause 14(6) is an additional clarification of purposes for which exceptions can be created, not an exclusive list. For this reason, accepting the amendment would have no effect on the powers, as they are already contained there and therefore unnecessary.
Clause 14(2)(b) also gives a power to issue general licences. This goes further than the position we currently have under EU law, giving the Government the ability to put in place licensing arrangements for humanitarian purposes, which would enable multiple parties to undertake specified activity without the need for a specific tailored licence. Given that this provision is unnecessary as we already have this power, I hope noble Lords will not press the amendment.
I entirely agree with the intent—although the drafting may need to be looked at—of Amendments 50 and 51, which we understand require the Government to provide guidance about enforcement procedures for sanctions breaches. The need for clear and accessible guidance was highlighted throughout the Government’s consultation on the White Paper. In our response, we said:
“We recognise the call for clear and consistent guidance. Accordingly, the bill would provide for the government to issue guidance on the content and implementation of sanctions. The government is committed to ensuring that this guidance would be of a high standard”.
I am happy to say that the Government have delivered on that promise and have included a provision in the Bill—Clause 36—requiring Ministers to issue guidance about any prohibitions and requirements imposed by sanctions regulations. There will be a mandatory requirement to provide comprehensive guidance for all those affected by sanctions implementation. One strand of the guidance requirement set out in Bill—in Clause 36(2)(b)—explicitly specifies that the guidance may cover,
“the enforcement of the prohibitions and requirements”.
In line with this, we intend to continue to publish guidance on sanctions enforcement.
Clause 36, which we will debate at a later stage, provides for a more comprehensive duty than that specified in the amendment. It has been drafted to allow guidance to be given to all persons in the UK and it enables consultation with sources of expertise as appropriate. For example, we do not expect that the CPS will need to feed into any guidance about how civil monetary penalties are issued in respect of breaches of financial sanctions.
My noble friend Lord Dundee asked specific questions about help for NGOs. I am not sure whether he was in your Lordships’ House when I discussed that matter with the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. We will be meeting NGOs before the next stage of the Bill to discuss how we can better understand and address some of their concerns, but we will continue to issue clear guidance to them. I also assure my noble friend that we will provide speedy and efficient responses to requests for licences. As I have already indicated, under the Bill we can issue general licences, which offer more comfort to banks—which I believe my noble friend specifically mentioned—and give them a greater appetite to assist in these areas.
With that somewhat detailed explanation of where we currently stand on Clause 36, I hope the noble Baroness will be minded to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank everybody, especially the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, for contributing at this late stage of the evening. I welcome that. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Collins, about the need for certainty in the Bill. I noted what the Minister said. It reflects the complexity of Brexit and the energy that it is taking up, even in this area, and I therefore look forward to the meeting with NGOs that he has promised. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the provision for sharing information is vital to ensure that a sanctions regime works in practice. For example, the provision of information by the private sector is essential in monitoring the financial transactions of sanctioned persons. We need this information to ensure effective implementation and compliance with our obligations under the various sanctions regimes, and to ensure robust enforcement when the law is broken.
The information powers contained in the Bill will ensure that sanctions regimes continue to work effectively by requiring people to report relevant information and by authorising the sharing of information. It may be helpful for me to specify those powers. They provide the basis for the Government to monitor compliance with the regulations; to investigate and obtain evidence if they believe that the regulations have been contravened or circumvented; and to share information with third parties to enable co-operation on the development of sanctions and enforcement efforts.
There is already a duty in EU law on all persons in the UK to supply information to the relevant competent authorities. We currently make failure to comply with this duty an offence only in relation to “relevant institutions” in the regulated financial services sector and “relevant businesses or professions”. We could, if we chose, apply this duty more widely. Clause 15 has been drafted widely to enable the duty to be placed on, and the offence of not supplying information on financial sanctions breaches to apply to, all persons in the UK. The extension of this offence to cover everyone who obtains such information in the course of their business would equalise the scope of the offence with the scope of the related duty. This will give the Government the ability to compel production of information to aid the investigation of reported breaches and ensure there is effective redress for not complying with legal obligations. The regulations will safeguard how the information is used, stored and shared. This will be consistent with the Government’s data protection, commercial and banking confidentiality obligations.
These powers provide the basis for the Government to continue monitoring compliance with the regulations and to obtain evidence if they believe that the regulations have been contravened or circumvented. They will also enable the Government to share information with partners to aid their enforcement efforts.
The deletion of two key paragraphs as suggested in Amendment 43 would have a serious impact on the enforcement of UK sanctions. Let me illustrate how. First, powers of entry set out in paragraph (d) are essential for compliance inspectors to check that the terms of general licences have been upheld and that there has been no circumvention of sanctions. These powers are in line with those in the Export Control Order 2008, which were reviewed in 2014 and considered necessary for ensuring compliance with the terms of licences. Without them, authorities would be unable to check that exporters were complying with the terms and conditions of their licences if they were unco-operative.
Secondly, deleting paragraph (e) would completely remove our ability to authorise the sharing of information relating to designated persons. This is essential both for law enforcement purposes and for liaising with international bodies and our foreign partners on compliance and enforcement in individual sanctions cases. It would also have unwanted effects as we would be unable to communicate information to designated persons, them affected by sanctions and the wider UK. We maintain that the powers in paragraphs (d) and (e) ensure continuity with the existing legislation. Both will continue to be needed for sanctions when we leave the EU.
Amendment 44 seeks to ensure that legal professional privilege, or in Scotland the obligation of confidentiality, is upheld. I would like to say first and without any reservation that of course we do, and intend to continue to, respect legal professional privilege, a point made by the noble Lord. This is the position we currently take in all sanctions regulations and we intend to continue to do so. As the Bill does not explicitly authorise the Government to make regulations that remove this privilege, we do not think we would be able to do so if we so desired. Any such cavalier use of the power would surely be struck down by the courts. I hope that I have reassured noble Lords of the Government’s intentions towards legal professional privilege and that any departures from it can and undoubtedly will be the subject of a judicial decision.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 45. I think I understand the intent of this amendment. It is to ensure that persons who do not have ministerial accountability cannot request information from sanctioned persons or use that information. However, the amendment unnecessarily limits the Government’s ability to request information which is vital for ensuring that sanctions can be enforced and implemented in a robust manner. It will increase the workload of Ministers significantly and unnecessarily if they are required to approve every single information request relating to sanctions. It would also cause difficulty where the Minister is not the appropriate authority. For example, shipping and aircraft sanctions will be implemented by bodies outside Whitehall such as the Civil Aviation Authority, harbour authorities, and the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen. Depriving them of the ability to seek and use information will make it harder to implement sanctions and will only assist those who avoid or breach them. This clause allows us to work with industry to ensure that sanctions are effective and that we have all the necessary information and evidence available.
The restriction on who can use the information requested would create difficulties in the use of powers to impose civil monetary penalties for breaches of financial sanctions given to HM Treasury in the Policing and Crime Act 2017. In that law, the relevant Minister is required to personally review penalty decisions imposed by the Treasury; the Minister’s view is independent of Treasury officials. The amendment would place the Minister in the investigatory and decision-making process, and then the review process. This would not be appropriate and would give rise to challenge on appeal on process grounds.
I understand the concerns that the Committee might have about these powers being more widely available, as the noble Baroness mentioned, but I hope I have reassured the Committee that we believe that they are necessary for the effective implementation of sanctions. Moreover, I hope the Committee will also be reassured by the fact that the appropriate Minister cannot make regulations delegating powers which are incompatible with the basic and fundamental rights of people in the UK. Indeed, as noble Lords will know, Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 forbids it. I hope that, with this detailed explanation, the noble Baroness is reassured and will withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister and others. He will know that the deletion of clauses is, as is usual in this place, a challenge to the Minister to come up with something that is more consistent with amendable primary legislation. That is what we are seeking here, along with more specific detail. I have already made reference to the fact that it is difficult to see that the Human Rights Act is necessarily the protection the Minister thinks it might be, but in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I do not want to repeat the comments that have been made. The one thing that I would make clear to the Minister is that he has a wide range of opinion against him on this, not least the Law Society’s own briefing, which raised huge concerns about this clause. The Constitution Committee has been very clear. The Delegated Powers Committee has also raised concerns, even though it says that the Foreign & Commonwealth Office has made “a compelling case” in relation to this.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, referred to the argument that it is impossible or too difficult to create a framework. The Delegated Powers Committee said that,
“the FCO’s reasons provide a compelling case for allowing the creation of criminal offences in sanctions regulations … Trying to set out the offences in primary legislation would risk producing offences and penalties that are defective or disproportionate or both”.
We have heard in the debate that it cannot be beyond the powers of the Minister to come up with a much better answer to this difficulty than the one currently being offered by his department. Even though the Delegated Powers Committee says that there is a compelling case, it thinks that parliamentary scrutiny should be enhanced if these powers are conceded. So I hope that the Minister will give deep thought to this and come back at some stage with a much better and more acceptable option.
My Lords, obviously I have noted the opinions that have been expressed, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said. I see that your Lordships’ Committee is concerned about the new criminal offences. To be clear: these types of offences already exist. People who breach financial, trade, immigration and transport-related sanctions can be convicted for those breaches in the criminal courts. We will continue to legislate on this basis so that breaches of sanctions can continue to be an offence.
We have set safeguards. We have set a cap of 10 years on maximum sentences for breaches of trade sanctions, which is consistent with the Export Control Act; for breaches of financial sanctions the cap is set at seven years, which is consistent with recent changes introduced by the Policing and Crime Act 2017. Coming back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about differentiation between the types of offence, we have lower sentences in respect of information provisions and money laundering regulations.
I hear what noble Lords have said. The purpose behind the sanctions is to replicate the existing legal frameworks for enforcement across the various forms of UK sanctions that will be created by the Bill. For all types of sanctions, Clause 16 includes provision for creating offences and dealing with offences, including defences and the treatment of evidence. It also provides for powers and duties to be vested in persons who assist in the enforcement of any prohibitions. For example, for trade sanctions, Clause 16 enables regulations to apply any provision of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, which provides a full suite of powers for the enforcement of these measures. The clause also enables civil monetary penalties, introduced in the 2017 Act, to continue to be issued for breaches of financial sanctions. It does not extend these to other types of sanctions. It also enables regulations made under the Bill to replicate the current position on maximum terms of imprisonment. I have already referred to that. It contains further powers for deferred prosecution agreements and serious crime prevention orders for all measures in the Bill.
Clause 16 also makes a provision that would enable the UK to extend the existing offence of failing to supply information on financial sanctions breaches. As noble Lords know, there is an existing duty on everyone to supply such information, which will be transposed by the Bill. However, the associated criminal offence for not doing so applies only to relevant institutions in the regulated financial services sector and relevant businesses or professions. The Bill enables the UK to equalise the scope of that duty and offence, as I said earlier, by making it a general offence applicable to everyone.
I assure the Committee that I am listening carefully to the representations being made, in particular those made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. However, we believe that the sanctions enforcement provisions, including criminal and civil penalties, remain proportionate to the scale and nature of sanctions breaches and that they will continue to act as a deterrent. That is the ultimate objective. Although I am sure I will not get a ringing endorsement for—or agreement with—everything I have said, I hope I have outlined where the Government are coming from in drafting Clause 16. Based on my explanation, I hope the noble and learned Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.
The Minister will have heard the voices, including those from behind him on his own Benches. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was right to get up because I knew my best bet was to introduce the amendment briefly and pass it across to him. The Minister will have heard him, too. Something tells me that we will return to this on Report and that various things will happen in between but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.