Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we recognise the purpose of time limits and we recognise the right to fair trial, but survivors of child sexual abuse should not be barred from justice simply by the passage of time. The difficulty lies, of course, in striking that balance. At the moment, too many claims with merit are rejected at the outset or, more often, not brought at all. Clause 82 is therefore welcome in principle, yet new Section 11ZB(3) then proceeds to undermine it, mandating dismissal if defendants can show “substantial prejudice”—a vague term undefined in the Bill, which, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, may be appealing to defence lawyers. A court already has the power to dismiss a case if it believes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial, so we find it difficult to understand the justification for this extra layer of protection. The inclusion of this provision risks effectively undoing all the good work of the clause. Amendment 289 would close that escape hatch, ensuring that it brings meaningful change. I urge the Government to reconsider in the light of this amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I add my voice to what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The fundamental principle is set out in new Section 11ZB(2): if the defendant cannot have a fair trial, the hearing cannot proceed. The gravity of the allegations and the public interest demand that there be no hearing, notwithstanding the damage that this causes to the unfortunate alleged victim. I entirely agree that new Section 11ZB(3) confuses the position; it introduces uncertain concepts and will inevitably lead to unhelpful litigation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 289, I thank my noble friend Lady Royall, who is not in her place today because she is ill, and Mr Stephen Bernard, both of whom met me recently. We discussed both the impact of the limitation period on victims and survivors of child sexual abuse and their concern over the test of substantial prejudice within this clause. I was moved by what Mr Bernard told me and I thank him for his courage in telling me about what happened to him.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for moving Amendment 289. I hope both my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Lord will be reassured that I fully understand the sentiment behind the amendment. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, for welcoming the general spirit of the clause and for their constructive comments. I make it clear that we absolutely do not want to add additional or unnecessary barriers to stop victims of child sexual abuse from proceeding with their civil claims. So I have asked my officials to look closely at the issues this amendment raises for further consideration, and I aim to provide a further update to your Lordships on Report.

Turning to the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to Clause 82 standing part of the Bill, I think he is well known for being very expert in this area and I pay tribute to that. But Clause 82 implements important recommendations made by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. The noble Lord raised concerns during Second Reading and again during this debate that the reform is unnecessary and would lead to greater uncertainty and litigation, but, with respect, I disagree. The inquiry looked at this in great detail. It found that the limitation period for civil claims itself acted as a deterrent to victims and survivors—just the very fact that it existed. The inquiry also found that it acted as a deterrent irrespective of the existence of the discretion in Section 33, and the inquiry therefore found that Section 33 did not provide sufficient protection for victims and survivors.

The inquiry found that the regime acted as a barrier to claimants at three stages: first, solicitors’ willingness to take on claims, because it can make it really hard for them to find a lawyer to represent them; secondly, the settlement and valuation of claims, because it can lead to victims accepting lower settlements because of uncertainty about the limitation issue; and, thirdly, the hearings themselves in relation to the limitation period, the effect of which on the claimants was described as “intrusive and traumatic”.

I think the noble Lord will find that it was not this Government who said they were not in favour of these recommendations; it was actually the previous Government. This Government accepted the recommendation in February of this year and are satisfied that Clause 82 is necessary and proportionate. The courts are perfectly capable, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, of deciding when a claim is inappropriate or unfair and should not succeed. This Government and my department put victims at the heart of everything we do. This is why we believe that this reform is necessary and important for victims and survivors. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to withdraw his amendment and I hope the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 82.

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[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, like everyone else, I am in favour of all the amendments in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, set out very powerfully and alarmingly the reality of what is happening online. I do not think that I need to go through all the amendments in detail—other noble Lords have done that very well—but I was very struck by what the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said about asking ourselves if this is the normal that we want to live in.

Do we want to allow content that makes child abuse appear acceptable? Surely not. Do we want to see websites trivialise and, indeed, promote incest as some form of entertainment? Surely not. Should we allow tools that enable the nudification of images, which are overwhelmingly used to target women and girls, and which, as we have heard, are being used in schools? Surely not. Instead, do we want to ensure that age and consent are clearly verified, and that consent can be withdrawn at any time? Yes, we do. Do we want to see a parity between what is prohibited offline and what is prohibited online? Surely yes.

That is what this group sets out to do. I hope that the Minister will accept all the amendments in this group to ensure that we have a new normal that we all want to see.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support these amendments. I will make two points that are additional to the powerful factors that have been addressed so far. First, I am very concerned to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, that the Government have not yet responded in full to her review. Can the Minister tell us why that is, given the importance of the subject, and when there will be a full response?

Secondly, although I support the objective of Amendment 314 to apply the same principles to material online as to material offline, I am very doubtful that the way the amendment seeks to achieve this is sensible. The amendment seeks to incorporate into the Bill the definition of “harmful material” found in Section 368E(3)(a) and Section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003. However, those provisions refer simply to the decisions and criteria of the British Board of Film Classification without specifying the criteria applied by that body. The criteria that that body applies, as set out in its guidelines, are helpful, but they are not categorical. For example, the guidelines say:

“Exceptions are most likely in the following areas”,


and the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, helpfully set out the factors that they have regard to.

This is perfectly appropriate in the context of the BBFC, from whose decisions appeals are possible, because the context is the licensing of an R18 video, which, of course, can only be sold in a licensed sex shop. However, we are concerned here with criminal law, which needs to be defined with precision so that people know exactly what cannot be published online. Therefore, we need a revised Amendment 314, which I hope the Government will accept in principle, to set out in specific terms what Parliament is prohibiting online, such as material that depicts conduct in breach of the criminal law and material that depicts or appears to suggest non-consensual sexual conduct. There may well be other categories; let us set them out so that everybody knows what is prohibited online.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will deal with my noble friend’s second point first. There are decisions of the domestic courts here that support the fact that you cannot bring prosecutions for what was the unlawful sexual intercourse offence under Section 6, nor can you even bring a prosecution for sexual assault based on the same facts, because that would transgress the prohibition in Article 7. As regards the time limit, Section 9 of the 2003 Act has no time limitations in it, which is the usual principle of criminal offences in this country, but for this tiny cohort of behaviour—it really is very small—you could not prosecute under Section 9 because of Article 7. Section 6 no longer exists, and you cannot get round it by using Section 9, but it really is a very small number of cases.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I suggest to the noble Baroness that, in addition, these offences are so serious that they would not be prosecuted in the magistrates’ court; they would be indictable offences, would they not?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord is quite correct: this has nothing to do with magistrates’ court time limits. There was a statutory time limit contained within Section 6 of the 1956 Act that said that all prosecutions for offences under Section 6 must be brought within 12 months in any court. It is nothing to do with the time limits in the Magistrates’ Courts Act.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am of course more than happy to write to my noble friend, and it must be my fault I am not explaining this properly. There is no time limit for prosecutions brought under Section 9 generally, unless it refers to particular behaviour—so that would be an offence committed against a girl aged between 13 and 15—that took place before the repeal of the 1956 Act and the bringing into force of the 2003 Act. You could not prosecute that under Section 9 because the time limit has expired for bringing it under Section 6, in the same way that you cannot prosecute for sexual assault for the same behaviour because you cannot bring a prosecution under Section 6. I had better write, because I can see from the puzzled look on my noble friend’s face that I have not explained it very well.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Perhaps the noble Baroness could also include in that letter reference to what is either a decision of the Appellate Committee or the Supreme Court—I think it is the former—which addresses this and explains precisely why those who are alleged to have committed offences before the relevant dates are protected by the 1956 Act and continue to be so.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord has explained it rather better than I did.