(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is indeed right. Our gods, whoever they are, care about how we treat each other and work together. On the question of whether “prevent” is too weak or has become too divisive, what is often forgotten is that many of the referrals—in fact, almost half now—arise from concerns about the far right. I hope that the noble Lord will feed into the review when it comes.
My Lords, what lessons have the Government learned from the numerous attempts to appoint the chair of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse that will help to ensure that the independent inquiry into Prevent has the trust and confidence of the communities most affected?
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendments 74 and 77 in my name seek to establish a “trusted trader” scheme to enable bladed products to be delivered to home addresses. This is an issue that I raised in Committee. The Bill as drafted prohibits the delivery of bladed objects to residential properties, and there are serious concerns among small and medium-sized knife manufacturers and retailers that this will have a detrimental impact on their businesses.
As more sales move online, consumers expect to be able to receive deliveries directly to their home. I fully support the aims of the Bill but I think this is a legislative sledgehammer that will affect small and medium-sized businesses based in the UK while having little impact on knife crime. There is no evidence that these high-quality knives sold online are being bought with criminal intent; if there were any evidence, it would have already been presented. I think we all accept that if you bought a knife online with criminal intent, you would be creating a very easy evidence trail for the police to follow.
We all want to achieve the objective of the Bill, which is to reduce knife crime, but at the same time we do not want to destroy UK-based businesses. There is a need for greater enforcement of existing legislation prohibiting the sale of knives to under-18s and the carrying of a knife without good reason, and these amendments would enable a trusted trader scheme to come into force. All that I am seeking to achieve is protection for British businesses, whether with the scheme in these amendments, with the scheme suggested last week by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, or with some other form of approved deliverer scheme, which we discussed when we had a very positive meeting last week with the noble Baronesses, Lady Williams of Trafford and Lady Barran, and representatives of the business community from Sheffield—who, in my opinion, put a very convincing case to the Minister—along with the honourable Members for Sheffield Central and Sheffield South East.
I am aware that a trusted trader scheme has been ruled out by the Home Office, which claims that it would add more bureaucracy and would cost businesses to establish, but I point out that the scheme is being suggested by the very businesses that would be affected. I make clear that I am not fixed on any scheme; I just want to find a solution for what I think the Minister accepts is a real issue that could have damaging consequences for British businesses. I know that is not the Government’s intention—in fact, I support their actual intentions—but we have a problem here. I beg to move.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, that this legislation is seriously to the detriment of UK companies versus overseas companies, in that if you order a bladed instrument or knife from an overseas company or website it can be delivered to your home, but if you order one from a UK company it cannot. However, I am not sure the trusted trader scheme that he has outlined in the amendments is the answer. Obviously, overseas companies would not have to be members of a trusted trader scheme and therefore the bureaucracy, expense, fees payable and so forth would still disadvantage UK companies.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for mentioning that I have already suggested a solution to this problem: to extend to UK companies the age-verification scheme at handover on the doorstep, which the Government have set out in the legislation and which currently applies only to overseas companies. I believe that is the solution to this problem, rather than the trusted trader scheme that the noble Lord suggested.
My Lords, I add to this unanimity of voice. I entirely agree with what both noble Lords have said. The scheme that the Bill sets out enables people to buy knives from foreign websites. A lot of the time you will not know that it is foreign website as it will appear to be in the UK and it will deal in sterling; it is just posted from France, the Netherlands or wherever it might be. It comes through the post in an unmarked packet and is delivered to whoever ordered it. We apparently think this is a reasonable thing to do and that people should be allowed to do this. This is a way in which your average 16 year-old can obtain a knife quite legally under the Bill.
We are imposing much more stringent arrangements on our own internet traders, which will appear exactly the same to customers. All it means is that we will be disadvantaging our own traders to the advantage of overseas traders and we are not achieving anything in terms of safety. I absolutely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said. I support the aims of the Bill. We want to prevent knives getting into the hands of people under 18. Let us have an effective way of doing it that does not disadvantage our own people. Several alternatives have been offered. I very much hope my noble friend will indicate that she is prepared to pick up one of them.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for these amendments. I am particularly grateful to him and the Sheffield knife manufacturers for coming to meet me the other week for what I thought was a very helpful and constructive meeting.
We are returning to something we debated in Committee: whether trusted traders should be exempt from the prohibition in the Bill of arranging delivery of bladed products to residential premises or a locker. When we considered these amendments previously, I said that test purchases continue to show that a significant number of online sellers fail to undertake adequate checks to ensure that knives are not sold to under-18s. The most recent test purchases of online retailers, conducted in late 2018, showed that 42% of the retailers sampled failed the test and sold knives to persons under 18.
As the noble Lord has explained, his amendments seek to address this problem by saying that where we know someone is a responsible retailer they should be able to continue to send their products to a person’s home address or a locker. This would apply only to the dispatch of bladed products under Clause 18 and not to the sending of corrosive products to a residential premise under Clause 3—presumably on the basis that the noble Lord is content that corrosives should not be sent to a person’s home.
These amendments would transfer the responsibility for complying with the legislation, and for ensuring that all sales are handled properly, from the seller to the Government. They would do this by requiring the Government to set out the details of the proposed trusted trader scheme, which would then allow for the delivery of bladed products to residential premises. A trusted trader scheme would require sellers to demonstrate that their age-verification systems and procedures, from the point when they receive the order to the point that their designated delivery company hands the item over, are robust and that they can guarantee that the knife will not be handed over to a person under 18.
The Government are not persuaded, in the light of the results of recent test purchase operations, that sellers can provide such reassurance in a systematic and consistent way. Only by requiring age verification at the point where the item is physically handed to a person at a dedicated collection point is it possible to guarantee that a bladed product will not be handed over to a person under 18. Setting up, administering and overseeing a trusted trader scheme would create a further burden on the Government or local authorities, with inevitable cost implications. Simply being part of a scheme, or being in possession of a seal of approval as a trusted trader, does not guarantee compliance with the conditions of the scheme. Many of us know this to our cost, having hired a plumber or builder accredited by a trusted trader scheme. Such a scheme would impose regulatory burdens on participating businesses. In addition, it would need to be administered by an independent regulatory body or by local authorities, albeit with the expectation that participating businesses would be required to meet the cost of running it.
I hope that I have provided a clear explanation of why the Government do not consider that the noble Lord’s amendments would provide the necessary assurance that young people under 18 cannot get hold of knives using online sellers. In coming to this view, I have reflected on the recent helpful meeting with Sheffield knife retailers—which I am very grateful to the noble Lord for arranging—in which something was said about Amazon’s view on the issues this amendment raises. He knows that I cannot promise anything, and we are yet to have a definitive statement on it, but I hope that this being the case, he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, could she just qualify what she said about the test purchase results? Was this a failure in age verification at the point of purchase or at the point of handover?
The noble Baroness also talked about a burden on the Government to design an age verification scheme, but is that not exactly what this Bill does with knives that are bought overseas and that are handed over at residential premises?
Thirdly, could the Minister again tell me why age verification at handover point is likely to be better than age verification on the doorstep?
Such a scheme would impose an additional burden. The noble Lord talks about other burdens; I am not denying that there will be burdens on various people from the introduction of whatever scheme comes in, but this would very much pass on that burden to local government.
As I understand it, the failures in online test purchases have lain at the point of sale.
My Lords, I have some sympathy with the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, on this issue but again suggest that the answer is to have a system of age verification at handover, as there is for overseas sellers.
On the issue of whether a business is carried out at a residential address, the Government accept that overseas companies cannot be expected to know whether that is the case. Again, UK companies are being disadvantaged compared with overseas companies.
I do not know whether the noble Duke can explain why Amendment 75 talks about a product that,
“is for an agricultural or forestry management purpose”,
Amendment 80,
“exclusively designed for an agricultural or forestry management purpose”,
Amendment 83,
“specifically to be used for agricultural or forestry management purposes”,
and if those differences are deliberate and explicable.
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, as he raises valid points. Again, we do not want anything in the Bill that disadvantages UK business.
It comes back to the noble Baroness’s point about consultation. In developing the guidance, we must and will engage with business and organisations such as the BRC. The intention is that it will be developed with them. We could have a circular argument here about whether things should be directly specified in the Bill or how helpful the guidance will be in helping retailers and the criminal justice system, but guidance generally will help the Government keep pace with developments.
Amendment 86 is similar to Amendment 81 and again seeks to require the Secretary of State to issue guidance. We have already debated government Amendment 106, which will enable the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Justice Department to issue statutory guidance on certain parts of the Bill, including those dealing with offences of remote sale and delivery of knives. We intend that there should be guidance to retailers on what items are prohibited from dispatch to residential premises or a locker under Clause 18. I think the government amendment is adequate to cover this.
I apologise for persisting but the Minister referred to table knives being excluded from this prohibition. The table knife that I was given to eat my roast beef with in a restaurant yesterday could cause serious harm to an individual by cutting. Is it or is it not therefore a table knife? This will inevitably lead to a decision by major retailers such as John Lewis not to deliver any knife of any description to residential premises for fear, as the Minister said, that if there is a prosecution the supplier will have to provide a defence in court to the offence. Not many suppliers will be prepared to take that risk.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lucas for returning us to this difficult issue about what we do in relation to overseas sellers of knives. Noble Lords will recall that the issue is that while we can place requirements, such as those under Clause 18, on remote sellers based in the UK, we cannot do the same in relation to overseas sellers. This is because we cannot practically take extraterritorial jurisdiction over sellers based abroad. We have tried to address this through the provisions in Clause 21. These provisions make it an offence for delivery companies in the UK, which are operating under specific arrangements to deliver bladed articles on behalf of overseas sellers, to deliver those articles into the hands of a person under the age of 18.
We accept that this is not the complete answer to the problem because overseas sellers can simply send the items unmarked through the international mail. This is exactly the situation that my noble friend’s amendment seeks to address. It would provide a power to confiscate bladed articles that are sent from overseas to a UK residential address and which are, first, not subject to specific arrangements between the delivery company in the UK and the overseas seller and, secondly, not labelled to show that age must be verified on delivery.
Although it is not clear from the amendment, the power is presumably to be exercised by Border Force because the amendments refer to detecting the articles in transit from overseas. The amendment would mean, in effect, that only bladed articles sold overseas which are subject to specific delivery arrangements in the UK would be allowed. I can therefore sympathise with the intention behind this amendment.
However, there are a number of problems with the amendment. At present, Border Force can seize two types of bladed articles. It can seize weapons prohibited under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, such as zombie knives and death stars, and Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, which covers flick knives and gravity knives, because the importation of these weapons is banned. It can also seize any weapon which it believes is evidence in relation to a criminal offence.
This amendment would mean that Border Force would have a power to seize items which are not prohibited by law and where they are not evidence in relation to a criminal offence. This would mean that a wide range of items which are going to a residential address in the UK from overseas could be seized and handed to the police to be destroyed. The amendment is not limited to overseas sales, so it would mean that bladed articles sent from a relative overseas to someone in the UK could also be seized. It would mean that someone bringing back a bladed article from their holiday, such as a souvenir, could have it seized or that a fencer returning from a competition overseas with their swords could have them confiscated by Border Force. It would mean that articles which have been legally sold overseas and legally bought by someone in the UK could be seized.
Secondly, the amendment assumes that there is some way of detecting such articles. Not all items coming into the UK are scanned, so unless Border Force happens to come across bladed articles as part of routine searches, they are unlikely to be detected. Even if such items were detected, Border Force would need to ascertain whether they were being sent to a residential address. For example, it would need to decide whether 12 High Street is a residential or business address. Finally, it would need to establish whether they were subject to specific arrangements between a delivery company and the overseas seller. It would then have to have arrangements for handing the articles to the police for destruction. This would all have significant resource implications for Border Force. It is for all these reasons that I am afraid I cannot support my noble friend’s amendment. I hope that in these circumstances he will withdraw it.
Before the Minister sits down, will she explain why the Government cannot exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign websites when they are doing exactly that when it comes to online pornography on overseas websites? In that case the BBFC, acting on behalf of the Government, gets in touch with the online pornography website and threatens them that unless and until they have approved age verification on their sites, BBFC will instruct UK internet service providers to block access to those websites from the UK. Why cannot a similar system be used to block overseas companies which are known to be selling prohibited weapons to the UK?
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is absolutely correct, as Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act provides. In her response, the Minister said that the sender would not know whether they were sending to a residential address. A UK business has exactly the same problem, yet she was using this to justify blocking UK sales. I do not see how she can apply one rule to UK companies and another to foreign companies. We need to be even-handed.
As I understand it, we cannot. We have had the example of pornography. The system I am referring to relates to online sales. Am I right in thinking that the system referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, relates to streaming? He will correct me if I am wrong.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. These are paid-for websites. People are paying for a service—there is an exchange. There is another option—I am grateful to the Minister for reminding me. Most financial transactions involving foreign websites are processed by UK credit card companies and so forth. The other way of ensuring that these transactions do not take place even though the company is beyond the UK’s jurisdiction is to ask UK card companies not to process payments to those particular companies. That is the second string to the BBFC bow in order to stop under-18s in the UK from, effectively, buying pornography from overseas websites. Similarly, the Government could put pressure on UK card companies to not process payments to overseas companies which are selling prohibited weapons to under-18s in the UK.
The noble Lord will agree that not all their sales would be of prohibited items.
To assist the Minister further, I can assure her that there are more websites worldwide providing pornography than there are providing offensive weapons, yet that has not prevented the Government taking action.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his intervention. I was not making a glib comment about a trawl; regarding the examples of card companies and delivery companies, we are taking action where we can, but I acknowledge, as I have all the way through the Bill, that we are trying to find the right balance. It is not absolutely perfect, but we are using everything in our armoury to help us guard against the sale of knives to those aged under 18.
My Lords, Amendment 91, tabled in my name and with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to place on the face of the Bill a provision to exempt the kirpan from the provisions relating to the possession of offences weapons under the Criminal Justice Act 1988. I raised this issue in Committee, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, for meeting me and a number of other noble Lords from all sides of the House, along with representatives of the Sikh community, including the noble Lord, Lord Singh. It was very much appreciated by everybody present.
There is no question but that the Sikh community is fully behind the intention of the Bill to tighten the law on offensive weapons. We are all appalled by the toll that knife crime is taking on young lives; even today we are seeing more tragic events on the news. The Government have responded to the very reasonable requests of the Sikh community on an issue in the Commons, but my intention with this amendment is to go further. The noble Lord, Lord Singh, raised the issue at Second Reading, and I supported him. It came up again in Committee, and many noble Lords spoke then.
For practising Sikhs, observance of their faith requires adherence to the “five Ks”, one of which is to wear a kirpan. Larger kirpans are used on many religious occasions, such as Sikh wedding ceremonies. I think it is fair to say that noble Lords in all parties, and on the Cross Benches, would be concerned if restrictions in this Bill had unintended consequences for the Sikh community as they observe and practise their faith, or caused upset or concern when a member of the community used a kirpan for ceremonial, sporting or historical reasons. The status quo is not adequate, as it provides a defence of religious reasons only if a person is charged with a criminal offence. It does not cover other reasons such as ceremonial, historical or sporting events, where kirpans are offered as gifts to dignitaries.
The status quo provides a defence only if a person is charged. My amendment will provide an exemption for the possession of a kirpan. It will provide a specific reference in the law, which Sikhs have been calling for. Sikhs are members of a law-abiding community that makes a wonderful contribution to the United Kingdom. The community still faces difficulties in workplaces, education and leisure with the issue of kirpans. This amendment will provide great assistance to Sikhs and will educate all of us about the kirpan. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment, which I fully support. One of the Minister’s main arguments against granting exemption to the Sikh community was that the Government could not single out one particular community—the Sikhs—for an exemption. In that case, I ask the Minister: what other communities have made representations to the Home Office for exemption under the Act?
My Lords, we return to the argument that the Bill is full of unnecessary new legislation that has clearly not been thought through and which is already adequately covered by existing legislation. The Bill is being used simply to send a message that the Government are taking the issues of knife crime and corrosive liquids seriously, instead of investing in those things that really make a difference, such as youth services and community policing.
In Committee I raised the fact that the offence of affray was almost identical to the proposed changes to the existing offences of threatening with an article with a blade, a pointed article or an offensive weapon. Section 1A(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 states that:
“A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an offensive weapon with him or her in a public place … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the weapon, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”.
Subsection (2) says:
“For the purposes of this section physical harm is serious if it amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861”.
Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states:
“A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an article to which this section applies with him or her in a public place or on school premises … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the article, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”.
Again, serious physical harm means grievous bodily harm under the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
The main differences proposed by the Bill concern the nature of the risk, which is changed from,
“immediate risk of serious physical harm”—
GBH—
to the person threatened, to a much wider definition of,
“a reasonable person (“B”) who was exposed to the same threat as A”,
that is, the person being threatened,
“would think that there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B”,
that is, the reasonable person.
So we go from an immediate risk of GBH to the person being threatened to a much vaguer concept of a reasonable person—is that a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner—thinking that there was an immediate risk of physical harm. Does that mean common assault, ABH or GBH?
In Committee, the Minister and I engaged in an intellectual and legalistic argument over the technical differences between the offence of affray—in Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986—and the proposed new offences. That section states:
“A person is guilty of affray if he uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”.
So in affray we have,
“uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another”,
instead of,
“unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person”.
In affray we have,
“his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”,
instead of,
“a reasonable person (“B”) who was exposed to the same threat as A would think there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B”.
Can the Minister really tell the House that there is a practical difference between a “person of reasonable firmness” fearing for their personal safety and a “reasonable person” thinking there was an immediate risk of physical harm? I would be grateful for an example. Indeed, the affray definition does not rely on the extremely vague concept of a “reasonable person” but instead refers to,
“a person of reasonable firmness”—
not a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner but what we are really talking about: a person of reasonable firmness.
This legislation also adds further education premises to school premises in the 1988 offence, but affray can be committed in private as well as in public, so all premises are covered. Therefore, the only substantive difference between affray and the new offences is the maximum sentence on indictment: three years for affray and four years for the 1988 offence. This amendment addresses the one outstanding issue by increasing the maximum penalty for affray to four years for an offence in which a corrosive substance or bladed article has been used. I beg to move.
My Lords, this amendment returns, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just said, to an issue that he raised in Committee about the differences between the revised offence of threatening with an offensive weapon in public in Clause 29 of the Bill and the offence of affray under Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986. I wrote to him on this matter on 21 February. I will try to clarify the difference to your Lordships’ satisfaction and give an example of how it will work in practice. The difference between the two offences is not simply a matter of different maximum penalties, as Amendment 94 implies.
The offence of affray deals with circumstances where a bystander observes someone threatening another person and where the bystander feels threatened. The offences of threatening with an offensive weapon in public under Section 1A of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and of threatening with an article with a blade or point or offensive weapons under Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1998 deal with circumstances where a person is themselves being threatened. Indeed, in practice it is possible to commit both offences at the same time, as the noble Lord will be aware and as the CPS charging advice sets out. An example would be where someone is holding person A by the throat in the road, screaming and shouting, but also waving a knife around in the air so that person B thinks that the defendant might also come for them—that would be an offence of affray—or someone might start a fight in a pub in such a way that people nearby think that the person might also start on them, as opposed to cases where there is not that perception that a bystander would be affected. Case law examples include driving a car at another occupied vehicle or setting dogs on the police with the words, “Go on! Go on!”—only in case law does such language get used.
Therefore, affray concerns a reasonable bystander who witnesses someone else being threatened and fears for their own personal safety. This is a different test from that under the offences amended by the Bill, which ask whether a reasonable person exposed to the same threat as the victim would think that there is an immediate risk of physical harm to that victim. Under the offences in the Bill it is therefore what a reasonable person in the victim’s shoes would be likely to feel when threatened, rather than whether a person witnessing a threat against someone else also feels threatened. Amendment 94 therefore fails to address the fact that these offences deal with different things. As I have indicated, it is not just about penalties, although I fully accept that I highlighted this as a key difference in Committee. Affray is a public order offence and therefore focuses on the weapon and the threat to the wider public, rather than the impact on the victim. The offences of threatening in public deal with the victim being threatened.
I hope, in the light of this further explanation, that the noble Lord is persuaded that we are not creating unnecessary duplication in the criminal law and, on that basis, will be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. I do not think that it does away with my general comments about the legislation as a whole but on this occasion, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I think we are all agreed that this is an important issue which needs to be debated. As my noble friend said, he is simply moving in his amendment what the Government put in their original legislation, so one would have thought that it would be uncontroversial. My noble friend has read out what the Home Secretary said in the debate at Second Reading in the other place. I think it is legitimate for us to ask the question and be given an answer as to why the Home Secretary has chosen to ignore the advice of the agencies concerned when he withdrew the amendment to the Bill. However, having said that, the Government have promised a consultation on this matter, which is an important statement on their part, and therefore it would be wise not to press the amendment to a vote today.
In the consultation that is to take place, I expect that the agencies quoted by the Home Secretary will want to tell Members of both Houses what their view is of the dangers of these weapons. As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has outlined, officials have given a view about these pretty dreadful weapons. A .50 calibre rifle sounds almost innocuous, but they are basically sniper rifles that can take out a vehicle and human beings at a mile’s distance. These are formidable weapons in war. They are highly prized and valued in conflict given their accuracy and lethality.
I recall as Defence Secretary going to Bosnia and watching Operation Harvest involving members of the Royal Highland Fusiliers in Banja Luka. One of them, with a broad Glasgow accent, came back from one of the houses in the village with a sniper rifle. Since he did not have an interpreter with him, I wondered how he had managed to persuade the individual in the house to hand over such a prized instrument of the conflict. I think it was the nature of his accent that persuaded the inhabitant of the house that he was not a friendly force and they should therefore hand it over. It was regarded as enormously significant that day that he had managed to persuade them to hand over what was regarded as one of the key instruments of the conflict there.
It is quite legitimate for Members of the House to listen to the words of the Home Secretary read out by my noble friend. The Home Secretary said that he based these measures on,
“evidence that we received from intelligence sources, police and other security experts”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/18; col. 918.]
That is pretty all-embracing. This is not just a handful of individuals putting this forward. We are talking here about representatives of 43 police forces in the United Kingdom, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Security Service, GCHQ and the National Crime Agency. Their distilled view and wisdom was that if these weapons were to fall into the hands of criminals or others with malign intent, they would have particularly dangerous effects. The Home Secretary did not underestimate it. He said:
“According to the information that we have, weapons of this type have, sadly, been used in the troubles in Northern Ireland”—
the noble Earl said they had never been used in the United Kingdom, but we are told by the Home Secretary that they have—
“and, according to intelligence provided by police and security services, have been possessed by criminals who have clearly intended to use them”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/18; col. 919.]
We have had a discussion about knife crime, a huge issue affecting us at present. One can only imagine what would happen if the Home Secretary were right and criminal elements got their hands on .50 calibre rifles, and what damage they could do.
The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, poured scorn on advice given by officials. I was a Secretary of State and had officials who gave me advice in NATO as well. It is the role of Ministers to listen to advice and to make decisions, but the Home Secretary presumably would not come to Parliament not having given careful attention to the advice offered to him on that occasion. There must have been something pretty radical to change his mind—not just the assembled Members of Parliament who argued vociferously against it.
I went through the great debate about handguns in 1997-98, and I have heard all the arguments before. Yes, they will be safe if we have safeguards and the police are satisfied. I remember the number of people who had these handguns, some of them large numbers of handguns, and being assured that they were all safe—yet we saw the two major incidents in Hungerford and Dunblane caused by the private ownership of handguns.
I am not reassured by some of the statements that have been made. I would prefer to follow the course of action laid down by the Home Secretary in his opening speech at Second Reading. I hope that during the consultation we will be able to make that case and that the Home Secretary will return to his original view.
My Lords, I understand why the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy of Southwark and Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, are saying what they say. I am not as surprised as the noble Lords, in that my experience is that Governments argue until they are blue in the face that they could not possibly adopt an opposition amendment, only to adopt it at the next stage. Such a change of view is not without precedent when it comes to these matters.
I am more warmly disposed to the calls of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for a compromise, if you will, of increased security. However, I hope to be even more convinced by the Minister that the right way forward is further consultation.
My Lords, I join this debate for a couple of reasons, having listened to it in Grand Committee in the Moses Room. I was disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, did not try to copy the accent of the HLI Jock. Your Lordships would have understood why the rifle was handed over.
I hope my noble friend on the Front Bench will solve an argument that I had at the weekend about how easy it is to modify a rifle that is constructed above 13,600 joules to below 13,600 joules. If that could be on the record it would be helpful. Also, could he not introduce the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Attlee under Section 63 of the 1968 Act?
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for his question, because there is a disproportionate number of young people as both victims and perpetrators of knife crime. The young chap who was killed on Saturday night in my neighbourhood is just one example. I have talked about the £22 million early intervention youth fund to support communities on early intervention and prevention with young people. There will also be the £200 million youth endowment fund over 10 years, which the Home Secretary has announced and which will enhance that, along with a consultation on the new legal duty to underpin a public health approach to tackling serious violence. The notion that any one department or measure is the answer to this is not true at all, as the noble Lord will absolutely know. This issue is more complex and it transcends government departments. We all need to work together on it, but he is absolutely right to start with young people.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. It talks about early intervention with young people, yet since 2010 there has been a 26% reduction in government support to local authorities. It talks about the police having the resources to tackle serious violence, yet compared to 2010 there are 20,000 fewer police officers in front-line roles. It talks about a statutory public health duty, but there is no mention of additional resources to support that duty. This Government are responsible for creating the environment where this knife epidemic has been able to take hold, and they should take responsibility for funding solutions. For example, why will the Government not adopt the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, to have centrally funded, ring-fenced money for community police officers? We need visible policing in high-risk areas to reassure communities and to build trust and confidence, so that the police and communities can work together to take knives off the streets.
The noble Lord is absolutely right to point to early intervention, and I mentioned some of the funding streams that either have gone forward or will be going forward to that end. He also talks about the police; both I and the Home Secretary have absolutely acknowledged the pressure that the police have been under, particularly over the last couple of years. As the Home Secretary said, he will be making up to £970 million available next year. It is a shame that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is not in his place, but I pay tribute to him and the work that he did while he was Metropolitan Police Commissioner on reducing some of the problems of knife crime in communities in London. I am sure that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and my honourable friend Vicky Atkins will be in discussion with the noble Lord on some of the learning points from his tenure for how we can address this really terrible growing issue.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before I start, I pay tribute to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, for her stamina and agility, this being the third Bill this week that she has fronted on behalf of the Government.
There has recently been a series of cases where historic sexual offence allegations have received extensive coverage in the media but have not led to any charges, ruining reputations. Although these have involved high-profile individuals, other cases have ruined the reputations of ordinary people locally when criminal allegations have been made public, even when the Crown Prosecution Service has taken no further action. The Bill would make it unlawful for the identity of a person arrested to be published unless and until either they were charged with or summonsed for an offence, or a judge agreed that it was in the interests of justice or in the public interest to do so or that it was required in order to comply with human rights. It would apply to all criminal offences and not just those of a sexual nature.
This is a very limited Bill, covering only those people arrested by the police, but being arrested by the police lends credence to allegations. Members of the public, encouraged by the press and the media, form the impression that there is no smoke without fire if the police go as far as arresting an individual. There is a wider debate to be had about whether a police raid on someone’s home, for example, creates a similar presumption of guilt in the minds of the public, but that is for another day. In the same way that the laws of sub judice apply only after charge or summons, this legislation applies only after someone has been arrested.
Similarly, the Bill would not cover allegations of a sexual nature made after someone’s death. Although the impact of such allegations can be devastating for the family of the deceased, impacting in a similar way to allegations resulting in someone being arrested by the police, they are outside the scope of this Bill. However, we have to face the reality—that, in the eyes of the public, people are no longer considered to be innocent until proven guilty by a court.
I am very grateful to Anna Soubry, Member of Parliament for Broxtowe, for allowing me to use her Bill, which she introduced as a Private Member’s Bill in the other place in June 2010. I am also very grateful to Nicole Winchester for her excellent House of Lords Library briefing on the Bill, which I will rely on heavily in my comments to the House today. The only exception that I take to the briefing is that Ms Winchester says that the Bill is similar to that put forward by Anna Soubry in 2010. In fact, it is exactly the same.
In essence, it comes down to this. The College of Policing guidance about naming people on arrest says:
“Police will not name those arrested, or suspected of a crime, save in exceptional circumstances where there is a legitimate … purpose to do so”.
However, the press and the media will name those arrested or suspected of crime. They are not bound by the College of Policing guidance, and recent high-profile cases prove that the legislative framework is not sufficient.
Clause 1 would prohibit the publication or broadcast of the name, address and any still or moving picture of an arrested person if such information could lead members of the public to identify the individual as the person suspected of committing the offence in question. Subsection (2) sets out that these restrictions would remain in place unless and until the individual was charged with the offence for which they were arrested.
Clause 2 proposes that a Crown Court judge would have the power to direct that the reporting restrictions set out in Clause 1 would not apply in individual cases, either in their entirety or in relation to specified matters and time periods only. Under the clause, this direction could be made by a judge where it is required to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998, in the interests of justice or otherwise in the public interest. With regard to what is considered in the interests of justice, Clause 2(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples where it may be pertinent for a judge to make such a direction.
I am just trying to be helpful. Clause 2(1)(b) says,
“in the interests of justice”,
but Clause 2(2)(a) says,
“it may lead to additional complainants coming forward”.
Is that not the problem at the moment? Does this legislation deal with that central problem?
My Lords, the way that this legislation deals with that issue is that a Crown Court judge would have to make that decision. It is no longer left to the discretion of the police or indeed the media that those details should be placed into the public domain. As the noble Lord has said, examples are where it may lead to additional complainants coming forward, where it could lead to information that assists the investigation, or where it could lead to information that assists the arrested person.
Clause 2(3) sets out who would be able to apply for such a direction from the judge or ask for it to be reviewed. That includes the court itself, the person who has been arrested, a chief constable, a prosecuting authority or any other person who is considered by the judge to have sufficient interest. Clause 2(4) would mean that if a joint application was made by the arrested person and the chief constable or prosecuting authority, the court would have to make the direction.
Clause 3 would it make it a summary offence to contravene the reporting restrictions set out in Clause 1. It also sets out the different methods of reporting and who would be responsible for any offences. For example, in the case of a newspaper the proprietor, editor and publisher would be responsible. For a broadcaster, any body corporate engaged in providing the service in which the programme was included, and any person with functions corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper, would be liable. In addition, Clause 3(2) states that the Director of Public Prosecutions or the director of the Serious Fraud Office would need to give consent for proceedings under Clause 3 to begin.
Clause 4 sets out a defence that would be available to those who breach Clause 1, stating that if those charged under Clause 3 were not aware, and neither suspected nor had reason to suspect that the publication or programme in question was of or included the prohibited matter in question, they would not be able to be prosecuted under the Bill.
Clause 5 outlines that the penalties available would be a prison term not exceeding six months, a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both. If an offence is committed by a body corporate, Clause 6 would apply. The clause sets out that if the offence is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of a senior officer of the body corporate, or a person purporting to act in such a capacity, then both that individual and the body corporate would be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against. Clauses 7, 8 and 9 relate to interpretation, the making of orders and miscellaneous matters such as territorial extent, with the Bill applying to England and Wales only.
It is claimed that not publicising the names of arrested people would go against the principles of open justice. The Bill deals with that argument by allowing the accused, his lawyer, the police or anyone else with an interest in the case to make application to a Crown Court judge to lift anonymity. The John Worboys case is often cited as an example of where police released information that resulted in 85 further victims coming forward. In cases such as Worboys, where it appears likely that there may be further victims, a court could give permission for the details to be released.
Another aspect of open justice is to counter arbitrary actions by the state. Once someone has been arrested, save in exceptional circumstances, they have the right to have a friend or relative informed and be represented by a lawyer. The increased chances of people being effectively kidnapped by the state and disappearing as a result of the Bill still remain diminishingly small.
It should also be noted that anonymity is protected only until the point of charge. Once the Crown Prosecution Service or the police have decided to charge someone, or to issue a summons for them to appear before a court, the right to anonymity ceases in the interests of open justice. The court process, the heart of an open justice system, would remain open.
There are already exemptions to open justice—for example, where the details of the victim of an allegation of a sexual offence cannot be published or broadcast. There have been cases where alleged victims have engaged in consensual sexual activity but have subsequently claimed that they did not consent, and it is only when their identity became known that this pattern of behaviour has come to light. It is acknowledged even here that there are risks, but they are necessary and proportionate.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, sexual offence victim anonymity is necessary and effective, not because College of Policing guidelines prohibit the naming of sexual offence victims but because it is a criminal offence to identify the victim. Similar arguments apply to pre-charge anonymity: there may, in a limited number of cases, be a risk, but overall the effect of pre-charge anonymity is only positive.
Some would like anonymity to go further, until the person is convicted, particularly in sexual offence cases because of the stigma attached to such allegations, but we have resisted such calls in the interests of open and transparent justice. The difference between publication of the details of the accused at arrest and at charge is significant. In order to justify an arrest, the police have to have only reasonable cause to suspect that an offence is being, may have been or may be about to be committed—a very low bar. Before someone is charged with an offence, however, the Crown Prosecution Service must be convinced that there is more than a 50% chance of conviction and that it is in the public interest to prosecute the individual. While individuals remain innocent in the eyes of the law until convicted, pre-charge anonymity provides a balance between the rights of the individual and the right to free speech and open justice.
The devastating impact of being wrongly accused and having this information published and broadcast usually involves high-profile individuals, such as Lord Brittan, Paul Gambaccini and Sir Cliff Richard. In the latter case, Cliff Richard pursued a privacy action against the BBC and South Yorkshire Police, but this required over £1 million in up-front costs that would have been forfeited if the case had been lost, a course rarely open to those of limited means.
This type of “trial by media” can also apply to previously unknown individuals, such as Christopher Jefferies, who was falsely accused of murdering Joanna Yeates in 2010. I have also been told of a local garage owner whose business was ruined over false allegations that he was turning back the odometers of the cars he was selling, and of the suicide of a local teacher who was wrongly accused of a sexual offence. This Bill is not about protecting the famous but protecting all those falsely accused.
Despite the efforts of the police and the Government to prevent this, despite all the furore over Operation Yewtree and Operation Midland, and the Leveson inquiry, it is still happening. In December, a couple arrested over the drone chaos at Gatwick Airport had their identities published in the press and broadcast by the media. They said they felt completely violated. The couple were arrested but later released without charge. They said their privacy and identity had been completely exposed after being named in the media and having had their home searched. They said:
“We are deeply distressed, as are our family and friends, and we are currently receiving medical care. The way we were initially perceived was disgusting”.
The current situation can be summed up by the words of Sir Richard Henriques, a former Justice of the High Court in England and Wales, in An Independent Review of the Metropolitan Police Service’s Handling of Non-recent Sexual Offence Investigations Alleged against Persons of Public Prominence. I quote:
“I consider it most unlikely that a Government will protect the anonymity of suspects pre-charge. To do so would enrage the popular press whose circulation would suffer. Present arrangements, however, have caused the most dreadful unhappiness and distress to numerous suspects, their families, friends and supporters. Those consequences were avoidable by protecting anonymity. Nobody is safe from false accusation and damaging exposure under present arrangements. A reputation built on a lifetime of public service or popular entertainment can be extinguished in an instant. I sincerely believe that statutory protection of anonymity pre-charge is essential in a fair system”.
He does not say that statutory protection pre-charge is unnecessary, but that the Government are unlikely to protect the anonymity of suspects pre-charge because it would enrage the popular press. Now is the chance for the Government to prove Sir Richard Henriques wrong. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am conscious of the time but I want to address some of the comments made. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is rightly concerned about the police going on fishing expeditions by publicising the fact that they are investigating or have arrested somebody. There is a difference between investigating a case where the Crown Prosecution Service feels that there is insufficient evidence to bring charges and a case where there is sufficient evidence. Of course, once a person has been charged, there is no limit on the amount of publicity that can be given to the case so that other individuals can come forward. Therefore, the number of cases where a judge would grant a lifting of anonymity would be a lot smaller than the noble Lord thinks.
I thank my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames for his support. As he said, it is a question of balance. The important legal principle of a presumption of innocence is in jeopardy; the Bill attempts to restore it in a limited way. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, publicity may be helpful in some cases. The Bill allows for that to happen.
The Minister emphasised the police’s role in all this, saying that it would be premature to take action until after the review from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services on how the revised College of Policing guidelines were working. However, I remind her of the Gatwick case, to which noble Lords have referred. The police did not reveal the identity of the individuals they arrested. Neighbours told the press that a home was being raided, so the press identified the individuals either by talking to their neighbours or by examining the electoral roll. They then published the details and vilified the individuals, blaming them for the disruption to those people caught up in the chaos—wrongly. That points to the need for this legislation, as opposed to a review of the College of Policing guidance. Having said that, I ask the House to give the Bill a Second Reading.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberOne of the few joys of being in the Opposition is that, unlike the Minister, I do not have to repeat the names of organisations and locations. I thank the Minister for her explanation of the purpose and meaning of this order. It was discussed in the Commons on Tuesday, following which it was approved without a Division. We did not oppose it, and that will be our position today in your Lordships’ House.
Ever since the Terrorism Act 2000, no proscription order brought forward by any Government has been opposed by the official Opposition, and that is not about to change. Seventy-four international terrorist organisations are now proscribed under the Act. As the Minister said, it is intended that this order will come into effect tomorrow. The Minister referred to the organisations and groupings that will be proscribed under the order. Two have been established in the last two years or so, and carry out their attacks and atrocities in specific areas of Africa. The third is Hezbollah, which has been around for rather longer, nearly 40 years. The then Labour Government proscribed Hezbollah’s External Security Organisation in 2001, and its whole military apparatus, including the Jihad Council, was proscribed in 2008.
In her letter of 25 February, the Minister said:
“Hezbollah, as a political entity in Lebanon has won votes in legitimate elections, and forms part of the Lebanese Government. It has the largest non-state military force in the country”.
The effect of this order is to proscribe the political as well as the military wing of Hezbollah, and thus proscribe the organisation in its entirety.
I have a few questions to raise with the Government about the order, and about what has led to it being brought forward today. Just 13 months ago, in a Commons debate, the Security Minister was resisting arguments for proscribing Hezbollah in its entirety—resisting what the Government are seeking to do through this order today.
The Security Minister—he is still the Security Minister—said in that debate:
“Hezbollah also represents Lebanon’s Shi’a community and, over time, has gained significant support from that community. Hezbollah provides social and political functions in Lebanon. As a major political group and the largest non-state military force in the country, Hezbollah clearly plays an important role in Lebanon … I have heard from many Members today that Hezbollah’s military and political wings are indivisible, joined at the hip and centrally led. That is not … the view of every country. Australia, New Zealand and the EU take a different view”.
He went on, just 13 months ago, to say that,
“it is difficult to separate Hezbollah from the state of Lebanon. Hezbollah is in the Parliament and the Government, and that represents a different challenge from that which we find with many other terrorist groups”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/2/18; cols. 507-8.]
Do the Government still subscribe to the comments I have just quoted, made by the Security Minister just 13 months ago? What has changed over the last 13 months to lead the Government to adopt the approach they now propose in relation to the political wing of Hezbollah, which we will not be opposing, but which the Government were arguing against in January of last year?
In the debate in the Commons on Tuesday, the Home Secretary said:
“I can say that Hezbollah has been reported in many open sources as being linked to or claiming responsibility for many atrocities. These include a suicide bomb attack on a Buenos Aires Jewish community centre in 1994 that left 85 people dead and hundreds injured. The bloodshed came just two years after an attack on the Israeli embassy in that same city, which killed 29 people. Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian war since 2012 continues to prolong the conflict and the brutal repression of the Syrian people. In 2016, it helped besiege Aleppo, stopping humanitarian aid reaching parts of the city for six months, putting thousands at risk of mass starvation. Its actions continue to destabilise the fragile middle east”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 283.]
I am sure nobody would wish to do anything other than condemn the specific acts referred to by the Home Secretary last Tuesday, but the point is that all those acts he referred to were known about when the Security Minister was arguing, 13 months ago, against proscribing the political wing as well as the military wing of Hezbollah. Again, what has happened over the last 13 months to lead to the Government changing their stance?
In her letter to me of 25 February the Minister wrote:
“Hezbollah itself has publicly denied a distinction between its military and political wings”.
I think, though, that I am right in saying that that was known at the time of the debate in the Commons in January of last year, when the Security Minister was arguing against proscribing the political as well as the military wing of Hezbollah.
At the end of the debate in the Commons last Tuesday, in response to questions about why the Government had changed their stance, the Home Secretary said:
“I will give four reasons”.
It would be helpful if the Minister could repeat those four reasons, since it seemed to me that he gave only two. He said:
“First, there is secret intelligence. I think the House will understand why we cannot share it … there has been a step change in the activity of Hezbollah, particularly in Syria”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 304.]
The second, I think, was that the proscription review group had expressed the view that Hezbollah in its entirety met the definition of a terrorist organisation in the 2000 Act. Does that mean the proscription review group was not of that view at the time of the debate in January 2018, when the Security Minister argued against the course of action the Government are now proposing—namely, that the political as well as the military wing of Hezbollah should be proscribed? If so, what is it, at least in general terms, that has led the proscription review group to change its view of 13 months ago?
The Home Secretary also said that both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development have looked again at the work they do in Lebanon. They are clear that they can continue that work and support the legitimate Government of Lebanon and its people. What exactly does that mean in practice? One of the Conservative contributors to the debate on this order in the Commons on Tuesday said that he thought Hezbollah provided,
“13 out of the 68 Members of Parliament in the governing coalition”.
That Conservative contributor went on to say that there were,
“important development objectives, particularly in the south of Lebanon where Hezbollah has the core of its support from the poorer Shi’a communities in the Lebanon”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 294.]
If the FCO and DfID think that they can continue their work in Lebanon—and the Minister for Security laid some stress in the debate 13 months ago on how the stronger the state of Lebanon is, the weaker Hezbollah will be—does it mean that they will be having, or continuing to have, contact with members of the political wing of Hezbollah in Lebanon, even though this order proscribes Hezbollah in its entirety, including its political wing?
One change since the debate in January 2018 is not a new Minister of Security, but a new Home Secretary. Maybe that is an important, though not decisive, reason behind the change in the Government’s stance. This order will be passed by your Lordships’ House, and I stress again that we are not opposing it, but I would like some answers on the record from the Government to the questions I have asked and the points I have made, because I do not think the questions addressed in the letter of 25 February sent to me by the Minister on behalf of the Government were in relation to Hezbollah.
My Lords, I also thank the Minister for explaining this order. I completely agree with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on the Government appearing to fail to answer the question, “Why now?”
If somebody is demonstrating on the streets of London and there is only one flag—there are not separate flags for the military and political wings of Hezbollah—I understand that it might be difficult to prosecute them when half the organisation is proscribed and the other half is not. But the questions remains, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said: what has changed since January last year when the Government supported the political wing of Hezbollah being kept separate? Indeed, the Minister talked about how important it is that we support the international effort to tackle terrorism. While the US, Canada, the Netherlands and Israel all designate the whole of Hezbollah a terrorist organisation, as the noble Lord said, the European Union and Australia designate only the military wing as terrorist. What has happened?
Our other concerns are around changes that have happened very recently under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act, which we opposed. It extends the existing offence of supporting a proscribed organisation to include recklessly expressing support for it, rather than intentionally inviting support, with a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. It also extends extraterritorial jurisdiction for these offences, so British citizens and residents who express support for Hezbollah, wear clothing related to it or wave its flags in other countries can be prosecuted in the UK. This raises a serious concern: someone who does something supportive of the political wing of Hezbollah—including recklessly expressing support for it—in a country where it is not proscribed, such as in Australia, or Lebanon itself, could still be prosecuted in the UK.
In the debate on the then Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich—former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—said that he was concerned that, while he was in post,
“at least 14 of the 74 organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 … are not concerned in terrorism and therefore do not meet the minimum statutory condition for proscription”.—[Official Report, 17/12/18; cols. 1642.]
The Minister will recall the debate, when concern was expressed that organisations were being proscribed for political reasons rather than because they fulfilled the statutory requirements for being proscribed.
Of course, one can speculate about what has changed. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, talked about a change of Home Secretary. He may not welcome my commenting that political capital has been made from the leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, having previously been a supporter of Hezbollah. Of course, the Labour Party is facing considerable issues regarding anti-Semitism, and the concerns of the Jewish community about Hezbollah are well known. But I am sure that these have nothing to do with the timing of the whole of Hezbollah being proscribed on this occasion.
We have serious concerns about the whole process, which we expressed in debates on the then Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill. However, like the formal Opposition, we will not oppose this order; we simply wish to place on the record our concerns about the process.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and at his request, I move Amendment 4 and shall speak also to Amendment 69 in this group.
Amendment 4 is intended to enable the Bill to encompass electronic systems of age verification such as Yoti, once those systems have passed scrutiny by the Home Office, as a way of addressing age verification challenges. With regard to Amendment 69, the Bill requires retailers to undertake age verification online and offline. In the absence of recognised standards against which online or offline age verification schemes can be audited and recognised, this amendment allows retailers to comply with the requirements of the Bill through any scheme they choose which is recognised by the Secretary of State. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendments 4 and 69, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, raise the issue of age verification. Our world is becoming more digital and, when age verification can be done digitally, it should obviously be done in that way. That might not be possible yet but it is becoming easier and, if it can be done, it certainly should be. I have to admit that I had never heard of Yoti. Perhaps I am showing my age but I had absolutely no idea what it was. However, I have learned something today. Amendment 69 would provide for schemes to be recognised by the Secretary of State as suitable for this purpose and would provide for the maintenance and updating of a list of those schemes. That seems sensible and I certainly support the amendments.
I thank the Minister for her explanation, although I am a little confused. My understanding is that, as part of compulsory age verification for access to online pornography, there is a list of age verification systems endorsed by the British Board of Film Classification on the Government’s behalf, and that these online pornography sites have to comply with the restrictions that the BBFC imposes in line with government instructions. Therefore, there is some age verification that relies on electronic systems, so a lot of what the Minister says seems to contradict what is happening in another part of the Government, the DCMS.
I thank other noble Lords for speaking to these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, wanted the Government’s response on the record. We now have this, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 4 withdrawn.
Amendment 5
My Lords, Schedule 1 contains a list of corrosive products for the purposes of the offences in Clauses 1 to 4 that relate to the sale and delivery of corrosive products. The Bill includes a power by regulations to amend Schedule 1. In Committee, I undertook to consider an amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to require prior consultation before any such regulations are made. As I indicated in the debate, we would fully expect to consult affected persons in any event, but we are content to include an express requirement to this end in the Bill. These amendments do just that. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for these amendments. One of the main things that irked people in the police service was people taking credit for other people’s work. These amendments were originally spotted and drafted by my noble friend Lady Hamwee.
My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendment 13. The only purpose of revisiting these amendments which we tabled in Committee is to make a point—and I refer to a letter in relation to these matters from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, dated 12 February—about the fact that two substances of the concentration specified in Schedule 1, sulphuric acid and nitric acid, are specified there as substances which should not be sold to people under the age of 18. This is despite the fact that you need a Home Office licence under the Poisons Act to buy these substances. Therefore, the chances of someone under 18 getting a Home Office licence to buy what are precursors for making explosives are diminishingly small. Indeed, in her letter the noble Baroness says that it is extremely unlikely that anyone under 18 will be able lawfully to acquire or purchase these acids. This goes to the point of a lot of this Bill—that it is there simply to send a message, which is not what we should be using legislation for. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out, these amendments return to the debate we had in Committee about the relationship between some of the substances we have listed in Schedule 1 to the Bill and the provisions of the Poisons Act 1972. The noble Lord is concerned that we have listed both nitric acid and sulphuric acid in Schedule 1, despite the fact that these are already regulated substances within the Poisons Act.
I reiterate the point I made in Committee, that both sulphuric and nitric acid were identified by our scientific advisers at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the police as appropriate for inclusion in Schedule 1. This was because we know that sulphuric acid has been used in attacks, and that nitric acid is considered to be one of the most harmful corrosive substances. While I understand the noble Lord’s concerns about including these two poisons which are already regulated under the Poisons Act, our overriding concern in framing the Bill’s provisions relating to the sale and delivery of corrosive products is that we do all we can to prevent anyone under 18 getting hold of these substances. We therefore think it is appropriate that they are included in Schedule 1.
My Lords, the Minister has completely failed to address the point that I just raised—but in any event I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 14 I will speak also to the other amendments in this group.
As drafted, the Bill creates a ludicrous, verging on farcical, situation where corrosive substances and bladed articles cannot be delivered to a residential address unless they are ordered from an overseas company. If they are ordered from an overseas company and the UK delivery company does not know what the content of the parcel is, there are no restrictions whatever on these items being delivered to a residential address. At the same time, UK companies are prohibited from delivering both corrosive substances and bladed articles to residential addresses.
If, however, there is an agreement between the UK delivery company and the overseas company that the delivery company will be alerted to any corrosive substances or bladed articles which it will be asked to deliver to a UK residential address, the Government set out in this Bill the steps that the delivery company must take to ensure that the corrosive substance or bladed article is only delivered into the hands of someone 18 years of age or older on the doorstep of the residential address.
If overseas companies are allowed openly to sell and deliver corrosive substances and bladed articles to UK residential addresses, with a system of age verification at the point of handover, why on earth cannot UK companies do exactly the same thing? It is happening right now in the UK in relation to alcohol, so why not enshrine it in legislation and apply it here?
The Bill as drafted not only disadvantages UK companies compared with overseas competitors, but prevents companies like John Lewis delivering items such as food processors, because they have a blade, to people’s homes. It also creates the anomaly of self-employed plumbers and the like, who run their businesses from their home, being able to have these substances and items delivered to their residential address even though the seller and the delivery company may have no way of knowing beyond reasonable doubt that a business is carried on from that address. The Bill creates other anomalies where designer knives—ones made specifically for the purchaser, for example—can be delivered to residential premises.
The sole purpose of prohibiting the delivery of corrosive substances and bladed products to residential addresses is to keep them out of the hands of those under 18. All these anomalies and difficulties can be avoided if an age-verification system at point of handover—a system already set out in this legislation—is available to both overseas and UK businesses. That is what these amendments seek to do. I beg to move.
My Lords, these amendments, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seek to allow the delivery of corrosive and bladed products to residential addresses where steps are taken to ensure that the recipient is over the age of 18. If we can get to a position where this is possible, I would be very happy to support these amendments. Getting the balance right between putting in place precautions to stop young people getting their hands on these products, and adequate offences, is something we should all support. If that can be done in a way that is not damaging to business, that is all the better.
I am, of course, very concerned about the situation regarding knife attacks in Sheffield, and we will come on to my amendments about that later. We had a very positive meeting earlier this week. I am happy to support these amendments if we can get that balance right. I still have an issue about putting restrictions on overseas companies as our jurisdiction ends here in the UK. If we can get a system whereby we ensure that British companies are not disadvantaged and, equally, have some restrictions, I will fully support that.
Turning to my noble friend’s question, if your home is also your registered business address, then clearly is it both. The noble Lord actually raised that point in Committee. The residential address can be either just a residential address or both a business and a residential address.
Returning to my other point about someone being prohibited from selling a product to a home address, we want to avoid any liability regarding checking age falling on the delivery company when the item is handed over. This is because delivery companies indicated in our discussions with them that they might simply refuse to deliver items on behalf of sellers if the legal responsibility for checking age falls to them. We are willing to accept this risk in relation to overseas sales because we are less concerned about the impact on overseas sellers, should their trade be affected, but for UK sales we do not want to place a liability on deliverers because there is a risk that they will then refuse to deliver any bladed items. The Government position is therefore that any liability for ensuring that any remotely sold corrosive and bladed products in the UK are not sold and delivered to under-18s should fall solely on the seller.
I have one final point to make, about a meeting that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and I had with the Sheffield knife manufacturers. As a result of that meeting, I want to satisfy myself of the position in relation to a couple of major delivery companies to ensure that that has not changed. Nothing in the meeting led me to doubt the position, but I just want to clarify that. In the meantime, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for his qualified support for these amendments. As far as the explanation from the Minister was concerned, however, if you are a sole trader, you could be considered to be conducting your business from your home address. The Inland Revenue would be the only ones who knew that, and that information would be confidential. Therefore, there is no way that a delivery company could establish beyond reasonable doubt whether your residential address was a business address or not. As with a lot of this Bill, it clearly has not been thought through. The Minister has completely avoided the fact that this significantly disadvantages UK businesses as opposed to overseas ones. If they do not inform the UK delivery company what is in the parcel, there is absolutely no comeback on the delivery company whatsoever. Anything can be delivered to a residential address, whether it is a bladed article or a very strong acid ordered from an overseas business.
The Government say they want to avoid putting a liability on delivery companies, but this legislation puts liability on delivery companies if they are delivering corrosive substances or bladed articles from overseas. The only difference concerns whether the company is from the UK or overseas. Again, the Minister failed to answer how age verification at a collection point is more secure than on the doorstep. She completely failed to address the issues I raised. However, there are far more important things to get on to so at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I raised this issue at Second Reading and in Grand Committee. I am grateful for the support I have received from across the House. We are placing shop workers at the forefront in the Bill. They risk a prison sentence or a lesser punishment if they get it wrong, as they will have committed a criminal offence in selling the products referred to in the Bill to a person under 18 years of age. I have no problem with that. These products cannot be sold to young people and we need a deterrent in place to make sure that this is adhered to.
My issue is that the Bill places additional responsibility on shop workers but gives them no additional protection. This issue has been raised many times in the House, not just in the context of the Bill. My noble friend Lady Kennedy of Cradley raised this matter in a recent Question to the Minister. When I was young—a long time ago—I was a shop worker. I enjoyed the work very much. As a young person, it got me talking to people, which gave me confidence. It was hard work and not without its risks, but it was enjoyable.
I know that the Government are looking at this issue; they are seeking further evidence, but the evidence is already there. Even if the Government decide to act at a later date, I worry that we will have moved on and in the weeks, months and years to come, I will be sitting here asking when the Government will introduce legislation, only to be told that they are waiting for a suitable Bill. There are always pressures on legislation—we all know that—but this time, the pressure is paramount. I am very worried that we will move no further forward.
No doubt the Minister will tell me shortly that there is no problem and there is a whole range of offences; for example, anyone who assaults a shop worker can be charged and, if found guilty, convicted. However, far too often, these offences are not prosecuted; that is a serious problem. Indeed, many offences are not even reported so they get nowhere near a police officer. In the Bill, we are placing duties for specific offences on shop workers but giving them no further protection. Let us imagine being in their position, refusing to sell knives or acids to angry young people who want these products. That is not a nice place to be. We expect shop workers to enforce the law in that situation but give them no protection to do so. We owe them a minimum additional protection, which my amendment seeks to provide. Approximately 280 shop workers are assaulted every single day. I was once a member of USDAW; it is a great trade union. It campaigns for shop workers and knows the industry its members work in. It regularly consults the Government and other agencies and puts forward its view. It has done a good job of finding evidence of the problem.
My amendment is different to the one I moved in Committee in one key respect: it goes beyond the imposition of a fine and introduces a maximum imprisonment term of six months. That is not because I want to increase the prison population—I support community sentences—but I want to give the court the power to look at the full suite of options available and impose a sentence that fits the crime. On reflection, limiting it to a fine was not the right thing to do—it is too restrictive—so I wanted to give the court the power to impose the penalty it thought was appropriate for the case. Perhaps I should have done that in the first place, but it is the right thing to do. I hope that the Minister will respond to this debate in detail and give me some good news. I beg to move.
My Lords, as I said in Committee, we support the amendment. Until last Friday, we were prepared to vote with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, should he divide the House, for the reasons he clearly set out. However, at the end of last week, the noble Lord changed the amendment so that the penalty attached to the proposed new offence included a maximum term of imprisonment of six months. Noble Lords will know from the comments of my noble friend Lady Hamwee on the fourth group of amendments that we oppose short-term sentences, as does the right honourable David Gauke MP—the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Justice—and Rory Stewart, the Minister of State for the Ministry of Justice. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is also opposed to short-term prison sentences but that this is the only way to secure a community sentence, as we discussed previously, which has to be an alternative to custody. If only there were some way of having the latter without the former. Of course, as I have explained to the noble Lord in correspondence, if the threat to, or the assault on, a shop worker were more serious, there are alternate offences with which someone could be charged and which carry a sentence of imprisonment.
We support the principle that shop workers expected to enforce the law on the selling of age-restricted items, in that they are being asked to prevent underage people making such purchases, should have some legal protections not afforded to other members of the public.
My Lords, I listened with interest as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, introduced his amendment. I am sure that all Members of the House are broadly sympathetic to what he seeks to achieve in terms of protecting shop workers. No one should be put in harm’s way through their employment if it can possibly be avoided. I understand what he is driving at with the thrust of the amendment.
I am interested in how the law copes with other circumstances where shop workers and other members of the hospitality trade, such as people in pubs and betting shops, have to make age-related decisions regarding their customers. For example, someone may want to buy a drink or glue, but such products are already age-restricted. I would have thought that similar circumstances to those described by the noble Lord of people being aggravated because they are not being sold those products could arise. It strikes me that there is nothing particularly new, per se, in the circumstances before us in the Bill. When my noble friend the Minister responds to the debate and the noble Lord has the opportunity to respond to her comments, perhaps both of them could consider how the current circumstances work; for example, what happens if a barman has to deny service to someone aged 17 because they have been asked for their identity documents and have produced a fake ID, which I understand is prevalent, and is any specific statutory protection applied to that worker? If not, why should this case be different?
The purpose of my intervention is to understand in rather more detail the current legislative circumstances surrounding people who have to make age-related decisions. My understanding is that younger people are used to being asked for ID; one has to look only in a tobacconist’s or an off-licence to see lots of signs saying that those aged under 21 should be prepared to justify their identity. It seldom happens to me, but it is possible. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, the government amendments in this group introduce knife crime prevention orders. Noble Lords will recall that these amendments were debated in Grand Committee on 6 February but were withdrawn because it was clear that they did not attract universal support, as the procedural rules in Grand Committee require. The government amendments before us today are the same as those debated in Grand Committee. Given that we have already had a substantial debate on these new civil orders, I do not intend to go through every aspect of them. However, it is worth stating again why the Government have brought forward these measures and to summarise how they will work.
All noble Lords will appreciate that we face a significant increase in knife crime at present, particularly in London but also in other major cities and across the country. It is sad to say that hardly a day goes by without further horrific examples of the devastation that such crimes cause, not only to individual families but to entire communities. We must do everything we can to stop this increase in violent crime.
The latest police recorded crime figures published by the Office for National Statistics in January for the year ending September 2018 show that there have been close to 40,000 knife-related offences. This is an 8% increase compared to the previous year. The number of homicides where a knife or sharp instrument has been used has increased by 10% in the last year to 276 offences. Of all recorded homicides in the latest data, more than four in 10 involved a knife or a sharp instrument. Police-recorded offences involving the possession of an article with a blade or point rose by 18% to approaching 20,000 offences in the year ending September 2018. This rise was consistent with increases seen over the past five years and is the highest figure since the series began in March 2009.
It is vital that the police have the powers they need to prevent knife crime and protect the public from the devastating effects of violent crime on our streets. When we prosecute young people for knife crime, it is already too late for families when their sons and daughters are lying in hospital or dead on the street. This is tearing some of our communities apart and if there are measures available that might help to tackle this issue, then we must not hesitate to put them in place.
These new civil prevention orders will enable the police to more effectively manage those at risk of being drawn into trouble and help steer them away from crime, and the Government make no apologies for bringing them forward. The orders are aimed at three groups of people: young people who have been carrying a knife; habitual knife carriers of any age; and those who have been convicted of violent offences involving knives.
In the case of young people, the police may have intelligence that a young person routinely carries a knife but for a variety of reasons they have been unable to charge them with a possession offence. Before risky behaviour escalates, a KCPO, as they are called, could be in place to divert the person away from a life of prolific offending.
As I have indicated, people who the police deem to be habitual knife carriers could also be subject to a KCPO. This would include people who may have previous convictions for knife crime or where the police have intelligence that they regularly carry knives. The KCPO would enable the police to manage the risk of future offending in the community. This is the cohort that the police see as their main target for these orders. They estimate that there are about 3,000 habitual knife carriers across England and Wales, although that is not to say that all that cohort would be made subject to a KCPO.
It may be helpful if I explain briefly how the orders will work. An application for a KCPO can be made by a relevant chief officer of police to a magistrates’ court or, in the case of young people, the youth court. A court may make an order only if it is satisfied that the defendant had a bladed article without good reason in a public place or education premises on at least two occasions in the preceding two years, and that the order is necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence involving knives. A KCPO can also be made on conviction where the defendant is convicted of a relevant offence and, again, the court thinks the order is necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence involving knives.
A KCPO may require a defendant to do anything described in the order and/or prohibit the defendant doing anything described in the order. The KCPO can include any reasonable prohibition or requirement which the court is satisfied is necessary, proportionate and enforceable. An order could therefore include things such as curfews or restrictions on going to a particular place.
A KCPO can also include positive requirements, and we think these are particularly important. A positive requirement could be attending some form of knife awareness training or a programme to move young people away from knife crime. Some of these programmes are already being funded under the serious violence strategy, and we are keen to build on the excellent work that is already under way to help divert young people from violent crime and is often provided by groups which have first-hand experience of dealing with knife crime in their communities. Where a KCPO imposes such a requirement it must specify a person who is responsible for supervising compliance with the requirement. For instance, if the requirement is attendance at a knife awareness intervention, the person designated to supervise compliance may be the youth worker providing the intervention.
KCPOs will have a maximum duration of two years and must be reviewed by the courts after 12 months. KCPOs issued to under-18s will be expected to be subject to more regular reviews, an issue which we will address in guidance. There are provisions for variation, renewal or discharge of KCPOs on application by the defendant or the police. There are also provisions for appeal against the order. Breach of the order, without reasonable excuse, is a criminal offence subject to a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
Young people are clearly an area of great concern to a number of noble Lords. The police tell us that the age at which people carry knives is getting lower. We also know from hospital data and from the police that younger and younger children are involved in knife crime as both victims and perpetrators. If we are serious about tackling the epidemic of knife crime on our streets, the measures we take must apply to young people.
I must point out that the civil orders available for dealing with sex offending apply to children as young as 10 and last for up to five years rather than the maximum of two years available under KCPOs. Likewise, the maximum penalties are up to five years in prison rather than the two years we have with KCPOs. I know that noble Lords might argue that sex offending is different and somehow more serious. I am not sure that argument is true given the number of knife-related deaths that we are now witnessing in our cities.
I know that noble Lords will also argue that it would be better to go the anti-social behaviour injunction route, which of course applies to children as young as 10. The argument here is that having contempt of court rather than a criminal offence for breach would make the orders more palatable because it would mean that children would not get a criminal record. The advice that we have had from police, some of which we heard yesterday at the round table, is I think advice that we should listen to very carefully. It is that making it a criminal offence to breach an order is important if we want the order to be taken seriously. I do, however, understand concerns about the application of these orders to young people. That is why we set the minimum age of 12, and that is why youth offender teams will need to be consulted on any orders against defendants under the age of 18. It is why we have said we will consult publicly on the guidance with community groups and youth organisations and others before these orders are brought into force.
This Government are determined to do all they can to protect the public and keep people safe. We must seize every opportunity to end the senseless cycle of violent crime that is corroding our streets. Knife crime prevention orders are not the complete answer to violent crime, but they most certainly will help. I beg to move.
My Lords, I said a lot about knife crime prevention orders in Committee. Tonight I am going to focus on pre-conviction knife crime prevention orders. Despite the Government’s claims to the contrary, they will result in many young people being criminalised instead of being diverted away from the criminal justice system. How can we be so sure? Because they are almost a carbon copy of anti-social behaviour orders, which did exactly that—criminalised swathes of young people for breaching a civil order imposed on them on the balance of probabilities but where a breach of the order was a criminal offence, exactly the same as these provisions.
A court has to be satisfied only on the balance of probabilities that, on at least two occasions, the defendant had a bladed article with them without good reason or lawful authority in a public place on school or further education premises. If they were caught in possession of a knife, they could be prosecuted. This is not about young people being stopped and searched and being found with a knife. This is about hearsay evidence, information from informants, the police being tipped off that someone is a knife carrier. An interim order can even be imposed without the defendant’s having the chance to put his side of the story. Imposed on the balance of probabilities, a breach of the conditions can result in a criminal record and up to two years in prison.
These are anti-social behaviour orders reinvented. They are primarily aimed at young people, as young as 12. It may have been a long time ago, but we were all young once. Young people make mistakes; they can be reckless, forgetful, mischievous. The orders would impose, on people who are more chaotic than responsible adults, conditions such as: being at a particular place between particular times on particular days; being at a particular place between particular times on any day; presenting themselves to a particular person at a place where they are required to be; participating in particular activities between particular times on particular days; prohibiting them from being in a particular place with particular people; participating in particular activities; using particular articles or having those articles with them. An order that imposes prohibitions can include exemptions to those prohibitions. They have to tell the police within three days if they use a name which has not previously been notified to the police, or they decide to live away from their home address for more than a month. What does,
“uses a name which has not previously been notified to the police”,
even mean? What if their schoolmates give them a nickname that they have become known by? Do they breach the order if they use that name? The young person is going to need a PA and carry a list of conditions with them at all times which they have to constantly refer to, to make sure that they do not breach the order.
Children are children. These orders can be imposed on young people who have never been in trouble with the police and have never been convicted of a criminal offence, and they could be sentenced to custody because they did not turn up for football practice as the order required them to do or because they were told not to associate with certain people but those people kept following them around. It would be easy for me or other noble Lords, let alone a child, to breach some of these conditions if they were imposed on us, and these orders would last a minimum of six months and up to two years.
My Lords, I am moving this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and at his request. Part of the defence to the sale and delivery of knives to under-18s is that the package containing a knife is clearly marked to indicate its contents. The amendment is intended to probe the effect of labelling a package as containing a knife on the likelihood of the package being stolen during delivery. I beg to move.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lucas, because it gives us the opportunity to consider the requirements that remote sellers need to meet if they are to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid selling bladed articles to a person under 18.
Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to sell a bladed article to a person under 18. It is a defence that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence—for example, that they had asked to see proof of a person’s age.
Clause 15 provides that, in relation to remote sales—for example, online sales—of bladed articles, the seller can rely on the defence only if they can prove they have met certain conditions. These conditions are: that they have systems in place at the point of sale for verifying the age of buyers; that they clearly mark the package containing the article when it is dispatched, and have taken steps to ensure that the package is finally delivered is delivered to someone over 18; and that they did not arrange for the article to be delivered to a locker.
The amendment concerns the second of those conditions, which is that that when the package is dispatched it must be clearly marked to indicate that it contains a bladed or sharply pointed article, and that when finally delivered it should be into the hands of someone over 18. The amendment would remove the first part of this condition, so the package would need to be labelled to say that it must be handed to a person over 18, but it would not need to say it contained a bladed or sharply pointed article.
Before I turn to the amendment itself, it might be worth saying a bit about the purpose of Clause 15, which is to drive a change in behaviour by remote sellers. It sets out the minimum requirements we would expect sellers to meet if they wanted to be confident that they were not selling to under-18s, but it is mainly aimed at individual transactions—young people trying to buy knives online—rather than large business transactions. It is not aimed, for example, at a seller of kitchenware that deals exclusively with restaurants and hotels.
The requirements under Clause 15 are therefore the minimum requirements that a seller has to meet if they want to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, should they ever be prosecuted for selling to an under-18. Where a seller knows their customers, they may decide not to comply with the conditions under Clause 15 because they are sure they will never be prosecuted. Examples would be: where a seller sells only to a wholesaler; where a seller has traded with the same customer for years; or where a seller knows the individual they are selling to—for instance, where they make hand-made items for particular customers, they will know the buyer is over 18 and may decide that complying with the conditions is unnecessary.
Turning to the amendment, our discussions with delivery companies and those who provide collection point services indicate that they want any packages that they are going to handle to be clearly marked by the seller so that the risk that they inadvertently hand them over to a person aged under 18 is reduced. You cannot expect staff working for a delivery company or at a collection point to ensure that the package is handed over to an adult unless it is clear from the packaging what it contains and what the restriction is on delivery. It makes sense that those working for delivery companies and at collection points know what they are handling. This will enable them to treat the package with due caution. This is particularly the case where the package contains sharp objects or corrosive substances.
Finally, the amendment applies only to Clause 15 and not to Clauses 16 and 17, which deal with the same matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland, or to Clause 2, which sets the same conditions in relation to corrosive products where these are sold remotely.
I hope I have provided the noble Lord with sufficient explanation around the purpose of Clause 15 and the labelling requirement and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
I will write to my noble friend with an accurate answer on that. I am confident that there is a tight definition of this but at this hour I cannot recall it exactly.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, wanted the Government’s response to the amendment on the record and that is what we have achieved. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend is right to raise this matter because we have to constantly keep our laws under review to keep up with the fast-moving methods by which terrorists will seek to destroy the unity of this country. Laws are kept under review. Noble Lords have talked about an espionage Bill and a treason Bill. Certainly the CT Bill in which my noble friend took part was significant in updating some of our laws.
My Lords, yesterday the Minister implied that it was difficult to prosecute those involved with ISIS as we had, in effect, no extradition arrangements with Syria. That is why the Government had to deprive people of their British citizenship. Many of these people want to return to the UK but the Government are preventing them from returning to face justice by depriving them of their citizenship. Is the Government strategy confused or is it just me?
It might be the noble Lord because it is difficult to prosecute people in Syria, where we have no consular access. People have been prosecuted when they come back to this country and have been put into programmes such as Channel to try to rehabilitate them. There are a number of different remedies available to the Government and the Home Secretary to bring people to justice.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Viscount’s assertion is absolutely correct. Under international law, someone cannot be rendered stateless unless they are a dual citizen with citizenship of another country. However, I disagree with his view that the Home Secretary’s decision was wrong in all sorts of ways. Clearly, anyone who goes out to Syria and voices their support for ISIS is a danger to the UK if they return home.
My Lords, what does the Minister make of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, on today’s “Today” programme? He said that rather than depriving subjects of their British nationality, we should take responsibility for our citizens; otherwise, other countries will start doing the same to us, depriving British dual nationals of their other citizenship and dumping their problems on us.
I agree with much of what the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said. However, on taking responsibility for our citizens, if our citizens decide to take responsibility for themselves and go to one of the most dangerous parts of the world and engage with proscribed organisations, that is their decision. Therefore, given that we have no consular access in Syria, it is very difficult in any circumstances for the UK Government to take responsibility for one of our citizens who decides to travel beyond our reach.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI pay tribute to the noble Baroness and all that she has achieved on some of the recommendations that have come out of the report. On the three recommendations she talked about, there are several things going on. She will have seen the race disparity audit, which is published by the Government and continually updated on the government website to show exactly where the disparities lie and where improvements need to be made. Last year, the NPCC produced a diversity, equality and inclusion strategy led by Chief Constable Gareth Wilson. It attempts, across all areas of the police, to increase inclusion and diversity. The superintendents’ association and college have a mentoring and coaching scheme precisely to improve the recruitment of BME staff. The figure has improved, but the noble Baroness is right to ask the question because we have much further to go.
My Lords, I am told that, recently, almost 50% of all black and minority-ethnic officers of superintendent rank and above in the Metropolitan Police were under investigation of one kind or another. It is also alleged that a recent promotion selection process in the Metropolitan Police contained a test that was known to be culturally biased, and that some BME officers who passed every other part of the assessment were failed because they did not pass the culturally biased part. Will the Minister look into what appear to be allegations of institutional racism?
My Lords, these are very serious allegations indeed and I will of course look into them. If officers are under investigation, it may be more difficult for me, but the allegation that 50% of BME staff at superintendent rank or above are under investigation is very concerning.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 13A in this group is in my name. I make it clear from the outset that we support this Bill, which is why at Third Reading in the other place we did not vote against it. What we did—and what Labour did in the other place—was to vote against the Government’s Amendment 13 proposing a new clause after Clause 15, because it does not go far enough. It does not ensure that death penalty assurances are secured from foreign states to make sure that data provided by the UK, whether by law enforcement agencies or private companies, does not lead to someone being executed. The Government claim to have come a long way in their amendment, but it requires only that a Secretary of State seek death penalty assurances, not that any agreement is dependent on death penalty assurances being received.
The UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, which is incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1988. It is also a signatory to Protocol 13 to the convention. Article 2 of the convention states:
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which the penalty is provided by law”.
Article 15 states:
“In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”.
Article 57 states:
“Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision”.
However, the UK is also a signatory to Protocol 13 to the convention, Article 1 of which states:
“The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed”.
Article 2 of the protocol states:
“No derogation from the provisions of this Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention”.
Article 3 states:
“No reservation may be made under Article 57 of the Convention in respect of the provisions of this Protocol”.
In other words, there should be no death penalty in any circumstances whatever. That is our international legal obligation.
The UK has been clear—until this Conservative Government took office—that it will campaign to remove the death penalty wherever it exists in the world and will never facilitate the execution of anyone in any foreign state. The difficulty with the type of agreement covered by this Bill is that data provided by the UK to an American law enforcement agency, for example, could result in someone in the US being sentenced to death, contrary until recently to both the UK’s international obligations and its declared intention to do all it can to eradicate the death penalty wherever it exists in the world.
I say “until recently” because, in a High Court case in October last year, it was revealed in correspondence from the Home Secretary to the then Foreign Secretary that, in the case of two ISIS terrorists, evidence was going to be supplied to the US without a death penalty assurance. His letter said that,
“significant attempts having been made to seek full assurance, it is now right to accede to the MLA”—
mutual legal assistance—
“request without an assurance”.
The then Foreign Secretary replied that in this,
“unique and unprecedented case … it is in the UK national security interests to accede to an MLA request for a criminal prosecution without death penalty assurances”—
a unique and unprecedented case to provide evidence to the US that may lead to executions. The Bill as drafted allows the Government to enter into a data exchange agreement where potentially there would be no death penalty assurance in any case. The Government’s new clause requires the Secretary of State only to seek such assurances; it does not bar the Secretary of State from entering into the agreement without death penalty assurances.
The Government will say that not entering into an agreement with the US could potentially allow terrorists and paedophiles to be a threat for longer. We say that we will not stand in the way of such an agreement provided that it does not result in UK data resulting in people being sent to the electric chair. The first thing to say about what the Minister said in her opening remarks is that these agreements are about securing legal authority to enable data to be provided that can be used in evidence in criminal proceedings. It is about giving legal cover for the handing over of data. It should not prevent the arrest and detention of dangerous suspects while that formal legal authority is obtained, and it can still be obtained through existing MLA arrangements, as in the case of the ISIS suspects. It may delay the trial, but it should not prevent the arrest and detention. Even if there were circumstances that I cannot personally envisage where the arrest and detention of a dangerous criminal were delayed, if the US says it will not sign an agreement containing death penalty assurances then it is the US that is prepared to allow the threats from terrorists and paedophiles to go on for longer by having to rely on the current MLA system.
I shall summarise our position using someone else’s words:
“Our amendment would prevent authorities in this country sharing data with overseas agencies where there is a risk of the imposition of the death penalty. More than 50 years ago parliament as a whole passed a law which ‘opposes the death penalty in all circumstances’. That is the law of the land. It means we do not co-operate with any government if the consequence could be capital punishment. Parliament has for a long time believed that the death penalty is so abhorrent, and the risks of a miscarriage of justice so awful, that we outlaw it. Our ban applies to all countries where the death penalty is still on the statute books. But government Ministers are desperate to cosy up to Donald Trump’s administration in the US, where the death penalty is still imposed. Our amendment simply blocks data sharing co-operation with all countries if the death penalty is a risk”.
I have just quoted, word for word, the shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott from her column in the Daily Mirror on 28 January this year about the Labour amendment that was replaced in the Commons by Amendment 13. However, Amendment 13A is designed to have the same effect as the Labour amendment passed by this House.
The opposition parties have worked together on this issue from the beginning, but this should not be a party-political issue; it is a question of fundamental human rights. Again, the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but essentially this Government are willing to sacrifice people to the electric chair in America if that is what it takes to secure the kind of agreement that the Bill covers. Asking us not to tie the hands of those negotiating the deal really means, “Do not ask them to insist on death penalty assurances”.
The question is: do we stand by Article 2 and Protocol 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and do we oppose the death penalty in other countries, or do we not? If we are prepared to see people being executed on the back of evidence provided by the UK, then noble Lords should support the government amendment rather than Amendment 13A. This is a question of principle, a question of conscience and a question of human rights, and we should support it on all sides of this House.
My Lords, I have been struggling to understand what the Government’s position might be. I think I picked up the Minister saying that the amendment concerns prosecutions in the United Kingdom only. With great respect, if that is right, I do not understand how that fits in with the language of the statute and the amendment itself. I will explain where I am coming from.
Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016—the section being amended—is headed “Interception in accordance with overseas requests”. We are contemplating a situation where a request comes from another country, presumably for prosecution in that country, on the basis of information that we have obtained via intercepts. The whole point of Section 52, without the amendments, is to authorise the making of interceptions in accordance with that request.
My understanding is that subsections (6) and (7) of Clause 1 deal with a precaution against the kind of point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was talking about—our international obligations. I agree almost precisely with the background which the noble Lord traced for us, set against Article 1 of Protocol 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides that sentencing to death is a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the convention. If one applies Article 1 of Protocol 13, it would seem to be a breach of our convention obligations to provide information to a foreign country that would lead to somebody being sentenced to death. I do not know whether that has ever been tested in a court, because I do not think the issue has been brought before a court—I am not aware of that happening. However, there seems to be a strong prima facie case that if the Secretary of State was proposing to do that, he could be stopped on the grounds that it would be in breach of this country’s international obligations.
I am puzzled about whether the Minister is right that the purpose of this section is to enable us to prosecute in our own country, where we have no death penalty. The idea of an international agreement is, I think, that it should be reciprocal; it would be a bilateral agreement with a particular country—let us assume it is the United States—and there would be obligations on both sides. We would seek the benefit of the agreement to obtain information for us to prosecute cases of child abuse, which the Minister referred to; one would very much want to secure an agreement which would enable that information to come to us. However, in the context of Section 52, the thrust seems to be the authorisation of intercept information by us to provide for prosecution abroad. I am having difficulty seeing how that fits in with what the Minister said earlier.
Let us assume that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right that this is really dealing with provision of information to go abroad. Then one comes right up against Article 1 of Protocol 13. What mechanism does one install to prevent a breach of the article? I think I am right that the mechanism of an assurance is well established in international law. In fact, in 2006 the United Nations produced a very helpful note, Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection, which traced the mechanisms that had been established to protect people who were being sent abroad by a country in answer to a request. The message in the United Nations paper is that one can protect oneself or one’s country against a breach of the international obligation by obtaining an assurance. However, the emphasis is on obtaining the assurance, because an assurance is given by the requesting country to the country from which the information to go abroad is being requested.
There was sometimes some doubt about whether that mechanism was reliable in a case where the threat abroad was of torture, because some countries are really not capable of preventing torture being perpetrated by all manner of officials, so an undertaking in that sort of situation is not really reliable. The paper goes on to say that if one is dealing with the kind of problem that we are contemplating—the risk of a death penalty being imposed—that is easily verifiable and an assurance could be relied upon as a secure protection against a breach of the international obligation.
My Lords, the central point here is whether or not we are in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. My view is that we are not. Article 1 of the 13th protocol does not prevent member states providing assistance to a third country, where that assistance contributes to the use of the death penalty by that country. Even if the amendment related to the use of the designation power, under Section 52 of the 2016 Act—which would be the gateway for the flow of information from the UK—it would still not prevent designation in the absence of assurances about the use of our material. That is not to say that we will be sharing information for the pursuit of the death penalty. Noble Lords have heard, on many occasions, that I am not going to pre-empt our negotiations with the US, but this shows that not only is the amendment unnecessary but it may not do what its sponsors hope.
The case of the foreign fighter, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about, shows that we are compatible with the ECHR, for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that any agreement would have to be put before Parliament. That is absolutely the case. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, talked about this being the negotiation stage. I would put it further back than that: it is the pre-negotiation stage. It is a framework Bill, on the basis of which treaties would be negotiated and made.
My Lords, will the Minister confirm that, when a treaty is put to Parliament, if the House of Commons approves it, then it does not matter what the opinion of this House is; the treaty is ratified even if this House votes against it? I obviously agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, that whether this is a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights has yet to be tested in court—certainly not at the European level. Will the Minister explain why the then Foreign Secretary had to say that seeking death-penalty assurances in the ISIS case was unique and exceptional, if the Government were not concerned about people executed on the back of evidence provided by the United Kingdom?
My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right. The treaty would be put to the Commons; the Lords could certainly have a view but that might not be taken into account by the Commons. That is nothing unusual. The Commons quite often exerts its supremacy.