Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(14 years ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, it strikes me that the amendment prompts three questions. The first is whether we should change the date, and that is what my noble friend Lord Hamilton and some others have addressed. The second is whether this is a question that is appropriate to be included in the referendum. That is the substantial point that we should address. There are various problems in including this question. One has already been alluded to: it is a limited choice. It may be that electors prefer to go on a Monday or a Sunday, so we do not know whether providing this dichotomous choice will reflect the actual preferences of electors, as they are being offered too limited a choice. Another problem—it is a technical point—concerns what would happen if electors expressed a preference for Saturday rather than Thursday as far as the Bill is drawn. We know what will happen if they vote yes on the question of AV, but the Bill is merely silent as to what the consequence would be, so in effect it would be akin to an opinion poll.
The third and most important point is why we should have this question rather than others. We will be looking at other questions to be included, but priorities are important. If we start adding to it, there is a danger of overdoing it, and I am not sure this question should take priority for the simple reason that we could find out through an opinion poll. I think that that would be sufficient for these purposes.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. It is one that is had practically every time we have any Bill that mentions voting. The facts are interesting. Since 1935, every general election has been held on a Thursday. In 1931, it was held on a Tuesday. In 1922 and 1924, elections took place on Wednesdays, and in December 1918, as my noble friend Lord Snape said, election day was a Saturday, so weekend voting is not a new idea. There is no statutory requirement for elections to held on Thursdays. They could be held on any weekday except Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, Good Friday, a Bank Holiday, or any day appointed for public thanksgiving or mourning. It was in 1983 that Saturday and Sunday were also designated as dies non under the parliamentary election rules in the Representation of the People Act. This amendment gives an opportunity to debate whether Saturday should be a dies non, but not Sunday.
To deal with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, I emphatically think this is obviously not a question for a referendum. If we start voting in a referendum on whether it should be Thursday or Saturday, goodness knows what we will then be voting on in a referendum. I am opposed to it being in a referendum. Referendums should be kept for constitutional questions. I know from talking to my noble friend Lord Snape that that of course was not his intention. His intention was that we should debate the issue in relation to whether it is appropriate. I agree completely with the approach taken by my noble friend Lord Rooker on whether it increases turnout. We all agree that we should try to increase turnout. Attractive as the approach taken by the noble Lord, Lord Renton of Mount Harry is, that he has never had any trouble on Thursdays—because he has always won his elections, presumably, that is why he likes Thursday—I am not necessarily sure that should be the bar to it.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, that we should look into the question. In fact, pilots have taken place in local elections in relation to Saturdays and it would be helpful to hear from the Government what the evaluation of those pilots was and what the conclusion in relation to it is. Ultimately the test is the one that my noble friend Lord Rooker sets: does it increase turnout? If it does, then I hope that the Government will think about doing it seriously.
Lord Hamilton of Epsom
My Lords, I very much support the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart: and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, on his previous interventions. We are greatly reluctant about compulsory voting, which has to be right. People have to have the option of not voting at all. I am afraid that on this issue I am not with the noble Lord, Lord Snape, as I was on his previous amendment, but I was rather attracted by his suggestion of incentives to vote, rather than doing what the Australians always purport to do, which is to fine people who do not vote. I do not quite know how many Australians get fined for not voting, but I suspect that it is not a very efficient system.
However, an incentive to enable people to vote strikes me as rather attractive. An incentive that takes the form of, say, a voucher to knock something off your rates or something of that sort, which you are given in the polling station, would encourage people to vote in person. That would get us away from the problem of the growing number of postal votes and all the fraud involved in that, which was alluded to in an earlier discussion.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I shall not repeat my earlier points about whether it should be included in the Bill, which I will take as given. I will briefly address the substance of the argument. I acknowledge that there are quite substantial arguments for compulsory voting, but my view is very much along the lines advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart of Swindon. Voting should be regarded as a civic duty. It should not be a statutory obligation. If people do not wish to vote, we should not force them to vote. I am also a bit wary of the argument that is sometimes used in favour of compulsory voting: that there is an increasing disaffection with politics, which is why people are not voting, so there should be compulsory voting.
I do not find particularly attractive the argument that we should say to people, “Look, you are being put off politics, therefore we are going to force you to vote”. That would increase their disaffection rather than ameliorate it. I do not find the argument persuasive, although I accept that there are arguments on the other side. I rather warm to the thinking advanced about incentives to get people to the polling station. That is well worth exploring, but with the obvious proviso of “not in this Bill”.
Lord Bach
My Lords, this is another interesting debate that was started by my noble friend. The amendment does not necessarily say that compulsory voting is a good or a bad thing. It just asks that this might be added to the referendum that the Government intend. At great risk of taking a slight difference of opinion to that of the noble Lord, Lord Norton, this is probably a better question for a referendum than the previous amendment.
Lord Norton of Louth
It strikes me that there is an interesting argument here. If this is put in a referendum, the sort of people who will turn out to vote will probably favour compulsory voting. Of course, those who are against it will not go to the polling station.
Lord Bach
That, of course, is the danger with the referendum in the first place perhaps. The right to vote is obviously very precious, and we should encourage people to use it as much as possible. As a descendent of Mrs Pankhurst, dare I say that the suffragettes who fought—some, of course, died—in that cause would see this debate as important. Of course they were fighting for the right to vote, not for the compulsion to do so, but at some stage in the future the House might want to give rather more time to this interesting debate than it will this afternoon, for obvious reasons.
Let me make one thing clear. While it may not be a brave view—but it is the truth—I can say from the Front Bench that we have no particular opinion either way as to whether compulsory voting is right or wrong, and I daresay that may also be the view of the Government. It is very much a matter of individual judgment. Compulsory voting has a long and distinguished history. I believe it began in ancient Greece where it was every citizen’s duty to participate in decision-making. Those in favour of compulsory votes point to the argument that a Government elected in such circumstances can claim greater legitimacy because it removes the possibility of a party winning an election on 40 per cent of the vote when the turnout stands at just over 60 per cent.
Lord Norton of Louth
I refer back to the earlier point made by the noble Lord. He said that he does not have a view either way. What would he do if there was compulsory voting in this House?
Lord Bach
My Lords, I was careful to say that it was the Front Bench of the Official Opposition that had no official view either way. As it happens I, too, do not have a particularly strong view either way. However, I would say that the Australian experiment in compulsory voting is one that we need to look at quite carefully. It does not seem to be a complete failure, to put it mildly. What is important is that it appears to be understood and accepted by voters in Australia. Obviously compulsory voting boosts turnout and, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, has already told us, spoiling one’s ballot paper is a distinct option if one is not minded to vote. The voter’s power to choose remains unrestrained, and there is obviously a bit of learning by experience if you have to vote, although there are problems with compulsory voting.
Voting was described as a civic duty by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, but perhaps it is a civic right and one that no one in a free country should be compelled to exercise. Fines imposed for non-voting could be regarded as some kind of restriction on individual freedom, and in this country in particular there would be administrative difficulties, to put it mildly, in making voting compulsory, as well as many other more historic difficulties in actually putting it into effect.
I want to ask the Leader of the House one question, because different views have been expressed from the government Front Bench over the past few months, although not in this debate. As I understand it, it is compulsory in this country to register to vote. In other words, there is a sanction if you do not register. This is not meant to be a trick question. It is quite important for the House to understand whether it is compulsory to register, and what we mean by “compulsory” in this sense. In theory, at least, fines can be imposed on those who do not register, but of course in practice that does not happen. If that is true about registration, it would certainly be true for compulsory voting.
This is a subject for a much longer and more detailed debate than we can give it this evening. A referendum question might be a way of canvassing public opinion on the matter.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(14 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, in a few hours I am catching a train back to Hull because I am teaching in the morning before returning tomorrow afternoon. I mention that because I have just worked out that I will have a bigger audience in my seminar in the morning than I have here this evening.
As various speakers have noted, this measure is two Bills in one. I deprecated the practice of the previous Government of bringing forward omnibus Bills and I do not endorse its continuation under the present one. I shall address the two parts of the Bill. I start with two overarching concerns, the first of which has been variously mentioned this evening. Unrelated to the merits of the particular proposals, it is the speed with which the Bill has been brought forward. As the Constitution Committee has noted in its report on the Bill, and I declare an interest as a member of that committee, it is to be regretted that there was not time for consultation or pre-legislative scrutiny. I know there are reasons why Bills cannot always be subject to such scrutiny, not least in the first Session of a new Parliament under a new Government, but Bills in such a situation have usually been contemplated and worked on prior to the general election. In this case, because the government manifesto or programme was a post-election product, there is a somewhat greater case for rigorous scrutiny.
The second concern is the relationship of the Bill, primarily Part 1, to the stated aims of the Government. I am uncertain about how a referendum confined to the alternative vote relates to the principles enunciated by Ministers as underpinning proposals for constitutional change. Voters are to be offered a referendum but on a restricted choice, which derives from a compromise; I understand the politics. My concern is how electors will feel about being offered such a choice. It does not necessarily deliver on the Government’s stated aims, and I have problems with the premise that underpins the proposals for change. Like my noble friend Lord Lamont of Lerwick, I do not accept that our political system is broken. There has been a crisis of confidence, but it has been in politicians rather than the political system. Electing the same people by somewhat different means will not restore confidence. The answer lies in behaviour and not in institutional change. I regard what we are engaged in here as a form of displacement activity.
On Part 1, I have a principled objection to referendums. However, the Government, like their predecessor, do not. As the Constitution Committee notes, if there are to be referendums then reform of the voting system is a constitutional issue that merits being subject to one. However, the proposal raises two basic problems. Reform of or, as is proposed, abolition of the House of Lords is also a major constitutional issue. Why a referendum on one but not the other? The other problem is the provision to give effect to change if more electors vote yes than no. If there is a turnout of only 20 per cent of electors and they split 51 per cent to 49 per cent in favour of change, to what extent can one claim that the change enjoys legitimacy through endorsement by the people? I appreciate that there are problems with thresholds. One has a choice between having some form of threshold, be it in terms of turnout or the proportion of those voting yes, or omitting or amending Clause 8 so that the implementation of a yes vote is not automatic but instead is left to Parliament to determine what to do in the light of the turnout and outcome.
On the second part of the Bill, I shall focus on the reduction in the number of MPs rather than on constituency boundaries. On the provisions for boundary changes, I confine myself to endorsing some of the proposals embodied in the report by the British Academy Policy Centre entitled Drawing a New Constituency Map for the United Kingdom. In particular, I see the case for providing for an extra period of consultation, following publication of representations received in the initial 12-week period, in order for counterobjections to be made, thus following the practice of New Zealand and Australia. I also endorse the proposal for more assistant commissioners to be appointed, not least for dealing with the representations made on boundary proposals.
I turn to Clause 11 and the provision that the number of constituencies in the United Kingdom shall be 600. I support a reduction in the size of the House of Commons. I chaired the Conservative Party's Commission to Strengthen Parliament, which reported in 2000; my noble friend Lord Forsyth was a member. We were more radical than what is proposed here in terms of numbers, though less ambitious in terms of timing. We favoured a staggered reduction in the number of constituencies. That would give time for not only the Boundary Commission to prepare, but also the parties and the Members themselves.
My noble friend the Marquess of Salisbury introduced a Parliamentary Government Bill in 1999 providing for a staggered reduction over a 20-year period. At the end of that period there would be a House of 400 members. We recommended a staggered reduction resulting in a House of 500. In our view, that would leave us with constituencies that were still quite viable—some MPs already serve their constituents well in seats with electorates in excess of 90,000—and not damage the capacity of the House of Commons to fulfil its functions effectively. Indeed, we believed it could enhance the efficiency of the House, given that we identified the current number as contributing to the strain on the House’s resources. Better resources for fewer Members would, in our view, aid rather than hinder the efficiency of the House. We also took the view, though it may seem counterintuitive, that larger constituencies may facilitate a closer, longer-term relationship between Member and constituents, in that less radical changes would be required to constituency boundaries to take effect of demographic changes.
I accept that there is no magic number. As I say, our view was that a House of 500 could deliver efficiently what is expected of the House of Commons, but one could make a case for a smaller or even a greater reduction. The principal point is that there is a case for reducing the size of the House. However, there is a necessary corollary to such a reduction—that there must be a corresponding reduction in the number of Ministers. Indeed, in our report we argued that there was a case for having fewer Ministers, even if the size of the House of Commons remained unchanged. Various people who gave evidence to our commission, including former Ministers, argued that there were too many Ministers. We recognised that Ministers were seen to be busy people but, as Frank Field put it to us, the amount of work increased to occupy the time made available by Ministers. The case for a reduction in numbers was well put to us by my noble friend Lord Hurd of Westwell, who told us that,
“a decision by an incoming Prime Minister to abolish twenty ministerial posts at different levels would not only be popular but would be followed immediately by an adjustment of workload. The Whips and those who enjoy exercising or receiving patronage would be dismayed, but the benefits would be great”.
A reduction is not only desirable but also essential if the number of MPs is reduced. So far, the Government have resisted attempts to amend the Bill to provide for a reduction proportionate to the reduction in the size of the House. The Minister in the other place, David Heath, argued that the demands of government necessitated the number of Ministers. If my noble friend wishes to argue that when the debate finishes, I will be interested to see what empirical support he is able to provide.
The other argument advanced is that the issue could be considered later and does not need to be addressed in the Bill. I do not accept that argument. I do not regard reducing the size of the House of Commons by almost 10 per cent to be a matter of greater importance than the fundamental relationship between Parliament and the Executive—in this case, between the House of Commons and the part of it that forms the Government. I do not wish to see the Government strengthened through a reduction in the number of MPs. The so-called payroll vote—or rather the jobsworth vote, as it includes unpaid PPSs—is already too large. It will be even more so if the Bill is enacted. I know that providing for a reduction in the number of Ministers in the other place does not then deal with the number of Ministers in this House or with PPSs but that is not an argument for not amending the Bill. There is a compelling case for reducing the number of Ministers and for doing so now, and then for addressing the other elements of patronage. There are too many PPSs, for example, and their independence has been eroded over time, but that fact is not a reason not to move now in respect of the number of Ministers.
When we published our report, the then party leader, William Hague, described it as a route map for a future Conservative Government. I hope the Government will now revisit this issue with some urgency. It is a matter of constitutional significance.
Legislation: Pre-legislative Scrutiny
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(14 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Strathclyde
My Lords, I do not agree with either the general premise of the noble Baroness’s argument or the specific examples. The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill was published on 22 July and the Committee stage in another place did not begin until October. So there was plenty of time, albeit there was a Summer Recess, for it to be examined.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, does my noble friend agree with me that there should be a presumption in favour of pre-legislative scrutiny? Does he think it desirable that if a Bill is brought forward without pre-legislative scrutiny, the Minister sponsoring the Bill should at least make a Statement to Parliament explaining why the Bill has not been so subject?
Lord Strathclyde
My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend will find as the Parliament gathers pace that there are more and more Bills for pre-legislative scrutiny. I made the case at the beginning that—in the very first Session of a Parliament, particularly when many of the ideas we are bringing forward were tested at the anvil of election and, indeed, while we were in opposition—it would be unfair to have a mandatory basis for pre-legislative scrutiny.
House of Lords Reform
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(14 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, like others, I have no problem with taking note of the case for reform of the House of Lords. Indeed, I am happy to support reform. There are various changes that we could and should make in order to render the House more effective and efficient in fulfilling its tasks, not least those changes so clearly adumbrated by my noble friend Lord Steel of Aikwood. However, like others, I distinguish between reform and what the Government propose for this House, which is not reform but destruction. The Government's case for a largely or wholly elected House is built on stilts. In the time available, I wish to address each of these and demonstrate why they cannot bear the weight given to them.
First, we are told that having an elected second Chamber is the “settled view” of the House of Commons. This derives from the outcome of two Divisions in 2007. It is not clear why the votes of MPs in 2007 constitute a settled view but their votes in 2003 do not. How can something decided on only one occasion constitute a settled view? If there is a settled view, it is the consistently expressed view of this House, which apparently is to be dismissed.
Secondly, we have heard the argument a number of times that an elected second Chamber is the “democratic” option. This is usually advanced as if it is self-evidently true. We have a representative democracy, at the heart of which is the concept of accountability. Our system of asymmetrical bicameralism ensures that we maintain what has been termed “core accountability”: that is, there is one body—the party or parties in government—responsible for public policy and accountable through elections to the House of Commons for that policy. There is no divided accountability, as exists in presidential systems and/or where both Chambers are elected. The role of this House, by virtue of not being elected, is to complement the elected Chamber and not to conflict with it. Once one elects a second Chamber, the relationship will change and undermine the core accountability that I consider a particular strength of our current system.
Thirdly—this is related—we are told that an appointed Chamber lacks legitimacy. Legitimacy derives from a popular acceptance that certain people are the most appropriate for fulfilling particular tasks. The means by which they are selected to fulfil their task will vary according to the nature of the task. There is survey evidence that people want this House to fulfil its current tasks, not least that of detailed scrutiny of legislation. The legitimacy of the Commons derives from election. Our legitimacy derives from having a membership that is especially qualified, through experience and expertise, to engage in informed scrutiny. They are different forms of legitimacy but they constitute legitimacy none the less.
Fourthly, we are told that moving to an elected Chamber will not affect the relationship between the two Houses. My noble friend Lord McNally has said in answer to a Written Question from the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart of Swindon:
“The Government believe that the basic relationship between the two Houses, as set out in the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, should continue when the House of Lords is reformed”.—[Official Report, 24/6/10; col. WA 206.]
Perhaps, in replying to the debate, my noble friend can tell us why he thinks that the Parliament Act was put on the statute book. Election will change the relationship between the two Houses and indeed the relationship in the second Chamber between the parties. The partisanship that is a feature of the other place—a consequence of competitive election—will translate to this place. It will be difficult to see how demands for greater powers than those presently held by this Chamber can be resisted.
My noble friend’s Answer demonstrates the key failure of the Government’s approach. Our constitution comprises a number of bodies that have evolved over time, each interlocking with other parts of the system. No one institution is a wholly autonomous body capable of being removed or replaced without having implications—sometimes fundamental implications—for the other parts. We have to understand the complex nature of our constitution before we make substantial change to any one part. We have to have a clear understanding of what Parliament does—and what we expect of it—in relation to the body politic before we embark on replacing one of its Chambers.
Some claim that the subject of Lords reform has been debated ad nauseam. It has been debated at length, but most of the debate, like the White Papers on Lords reform, has focused on process. The Government appear to have achieved the remarkable feat of not having engaged with the principles and not having thought through the consequences. We need to engage in a proper, thorough debate. I look forward to my noble friend agreeing that any legislation must be a consequence of such debate and not a substitute for it.