Strathclyde Review
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(8 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, the review undertaken by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde may be pointing us in a direction that is worth pursuing, but for very different reasons from those advanced by my noble friend and not in the way recommended in his report. Our debate, following my noble friend’s report, has tended to focus on whether the House, by its vote on 26 October, broke a convention of the constitution. We are in danger of getting into a muddle. There has been no attempt to define what we mean by “convention”. The Joint Committee on Conventions did not offer a definition. My noble friend in his report offers a definition that is not incorrect, but it is incomplete.
There is much misunderstanding of what we mean by constitutional convention. Conventions are non-legal rules that determine a consistent, indeed invariable, pattern of behaviour. Those who comply with them do so because they accept that they are, as David Feldman has cogently expressed it, “right behaviour”. Conventions do not become such by the words of a particular person, be it Viscount Cranborne in 1945 or Lord Sewel in 1998. They are not created, but develop. A convention exists once there is an invariable practice. Kenneth Wheare distinguished between conventions and usage—in effect, a distinction between invariable and usual practice. The Cranborne doctrine of 1945 developed into the Salisbury convention. The statement of Lord Sewel developed into a convention named after him, even though the convention is such only by departing from the words that he used. It is a convention because seeking a legislative consent Motion is an invariable practice.
It is our usual practice not to withhold agreement to statutory instruments, but it is not our invariable practice. As we have heard, the House has asserted its right to reject statutory instruments and has on occasion exercised it. This House therefore does not regard itself as bound, and has not been bound, by a moral imperative that we should not reject statutory instruments. So long as that is the case, there is no convention. The Joint Committee got itself into something of a confusion on this issue, partly because of a failure to define conventions, but it recognised that no convention was breached if the House defeated a statutory instrument. As it reported at paragraph 228:
“The Government appear to consider that any defeat of an SI by the Lords is a breach of convention. We disagree”.
The fact that there is no convention is borne out by the words of my noble friend in the course of asserting that there is. My noble friend’s report states on page 15:
“The convention that the House of Lords should not, or should not regularly, reject SIs is longstanding but has been interpreted in different ways, has not been understood by all, and has never been accepted by some members of the House”.
The very wording draws attention to the absence of any agreement on what this supposed convention constitutes. Some Members, like my noble friend, may believe that there is a convention but, for it to be one, Members generally have to consider themselves bound not to vote down SIs. There is no such acceptance by the House. There was thus no breach of convention in respect of how this House deals with statutory instruments. That was not the problem. The problem derives from the fact that we exercised our power in respect of a statutory instrument that engaged the financial privilege of the Commons. The key section of my noble friend’s report is to be found on pages 21 and 22. That should have been the focus of his report. As my noble friend recognises, there is nothing to stop us developing procedures particular to delegated legislation that cover financial privilege.
I am not against reviewing our powers in respect of statutory instruments, but I take the view that if our powers in respect of delegated legislation are to be restricted, the powers should at least be analogous to those provided in the Parliament Acts in respect of primary legislation. My noble friend’s recommendation in favour of option 3 claims on page 18 that it is, but then admits, on page 20, that it is not, since there would be no suspensory veto. If we are to go down the route recommended by my noble friend, there needs to be something else built into the procedure to ensure that the reasons for objecting to an SI are taken seriously. I therefore endorse what several others noble Lords have argued—in other words, what may be termed option 3 plus.
In short, while I think that my noble friend’s report has come up with some stimulating proposals, it derives from a false premise and comes up with recommendations not geared to the mischief that prompted my noble friend’s inquiry. In the short term, there is a case for acting in respect of SIs that engage the Commons supremacy in respect of tax and spending. In the longer term, as several noble Lords have said today, there is a case for a substantial review of how we deal with statutory instruments. We have had recommendations from the Wakeham commission and the Goodlad committee. There is also a report on the subject produced by the Hansard Society, which has made the case for revisiting how Parliament as a whole deals with secondary legislation, recognising the limitations of the other place. Rather than a rushed quick fix, a more holistic approach is the way forward.
House of Lords Reform
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(9 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I wish to address three points based on the four Motions before us. The first is on the purpose of reform. I very much welcome the Motion moved by my noble friend the Leader of the House. She quite rightly stresses the importance of incremental reform. There is general acceptance in the House that we should undertake such reform to address the size of the House. The acceptance is, in many respects, a starting point in our consideration. We accept the need for it but are in danger of avoiding the reasoning behind it. Why do we undertake reform? We need to have a clear understanding of the qualitatively distinctive role of the House and the justification for it; only then can we establish what needs to be done to ensure that we are doing our job as effectively as we can. The House of Commons indulges in the politics of assertion. This House engages in the politics of justification. We need to protect that. Our work rests, as with much of the British constitution, on a series of understandings. We could begin by recognising what they are and drawing them together. That would in essence establish the foundations of this House’s role in the political system.
The size of the House can be located within this wider context. Having a larger membership creates problems for the efficient functioning of the House and in how it is perceived by the media and the public. It is necessary that we address it and I initiated a debate on it last year. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that while such reform is necessary it is not sufficient. A smaller House may increase our efficiency, but we need to look not just at the size of the House but also at the process by which Members are appointed.
My second point relates very much to the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall. There is public disquiet at the size of the House, but the legitimacy of the House in the eyes of the public rests as much on the process of appointment as it does on how many Peers sit in the House. The 2007 Ipsos MORI poll of public attitudes to this House found that the factor deemed most important in determining the legitimacy of the House was trust in the appointments process. Some 25% of those questioned deemed it important; 70% deemed it very important. Next in ranking was the process of detailed legislative scrutiny. We need to look therefore at the appointments process, implementing the provisions of the Steel Bill by putting the Appointments Commission on a statutory basis, raising the threshold for appointment and making the whole process more transparent.
My third point relates to the other two Motions before us in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Steel of Aikwood and Lord Pearson of Rannoch. As we have heard this afternoon there are various proposals for reducing the size of the House. The point to stress, and it has come over in a number of speeches, is that they are not mutually exclusive. One could have an age limit, as we have heard, but one may need to think about other reforms as well. Indeed, I argue that we have to. An age limit is effective but, as we have heard, it is arbitrary and does not deal with the party-political conundrum highlighted by the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Pearson. As we have heard, one can get fluctuations in party support, sometimes quite significant ones as we saw in May’s general election. One may get alternation of parties in office, with each incoming Government wanting to boost their numbers. We may need therefore to consider a more subtle means of adjusting numbers than is possible through an age limit. One possibility is to consider a formula whereby following an election each party is allocated a number of Members based on the party’s support in the election, be it in terms of votes or seats or arguably, following the line of my noble friend Lord Jopling, a combination of the two, with say 90% of the Members being elected by the party group in the House and the remaining 10% in the gift of the party leader. That is one possibility, but it is to be considered alongside and not necessarily instead of the others put forward.
We have a track record of achieving change. The obstacle to achieving legislative reform has not been this House, but rather successive Governments, who have had to be pressed to agree to the reforms we favour getting on to the statute book. Major reform has failed not in this House, but in the Commons. We have the political will to achieve change. We should articulate our role and the understandings that sustain it and then agree on what needs to be done to ensure that we are as effective as we can be. We cannot afford to miss the opportunity, but let us make sure we do not fixate on just one part of what needs to be done. Our starting point should be not size, but purpose.
English Votes for English Laws
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Butler, for initiating this debate. Seeking answers to what we now call the West Lothian question is nothing new. The Government of Ireland Bill of 1893, the so-called “In and Out Bill”, provided that Irish MPs would vote only on “imperial” legislation. The Speaker’s Conference on Devolution in 1919 proposed that grand councils of MPs from England, Scotland and Wales should consider Bills that affected their particular part of the United Kingdom. Harold Wilson in 1964 raised the issue in respect of Northern Ireland. He queried the logic of Northern Irish MPs voting on legislation where Stormont held concurrent powers; and he asked the Attorney-General, Sir Frederick Elwyn Jones, to devise an “in and out” solution.
The attempts normally flounder when it comes to devising an effective means of implementation. There are problems of definition and process. I make two points. First, the Government’s proposals do not provide for English votes for English laws. As the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said, they provide for an English veto of English laws. Secondly, context is important. Given other constitutional changes, implemented or proposed, there may be a case for looking at the proposals as part of a constitutional convention—I would argue for a convocation—looking at, and ensuring that they fit with, what is happening to other parts of the constitution.
Parliamentary Privilege
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(10 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, as the first Member to speak who was not on the committee, I welcome the report of the Joint Committee. It is a measured and persuasive report. I also welcome the response of the Government. Privilege is a matter for both Houses, but the Government have an important role to play in facilitating the recommendations of the Joint Committee, not least when legislation is involved. I was very pleased to see the constructive engagement by the Government. There were few issues on which the Government reached a different conclusion to that of the committee. On reporting proceedings, I incline to the view of the Joint Committee, for the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Healy, outlined; but on the other issues, for reasons that I shall develop, I agree with the Government.
The report accepts that the current position is not tenable. The assertion of privilege in respect of those summoned to appear before Select Committees has for some time been akin to admiring the emperor’s clothes. In practice, committees rarely have difficulty in securing the witnesses they wish to give evidence. For those summoned, it is often seen as a matter of some pride to appear before a parliamentary committee. It is normally in their interest to appear; they want their views to be heard. The occasions when there is a problem are few and far between, but it is on those occasions when either House may need to assert its powers to ensure that committees can fulfil their essential tasks. As the Joint Committee recognises, it is in the public interest that committees have the power to function effectively. As it records, each House needs to be prepared for when someone summoned tests the penal powers of the House. As it says at paragraph 61:
“It will be too late to consider these matters when a crisis arrives”.
The committee recommends against legislating to confirm Parliament’s penal powers. I think it is correct in arguing that the disadvantages of legislating outweigh the advantages. Legislating would bring privilege within the purview of the courts, not only to determine the scope of privilege, as they do, but also to determine whether a contempt has been committed. It would entail a significant reduction in the exclusive cognisance of Parliament, and give to the courts a role that I suspect they would not necessarily welcome. There is a powerful principled case for maintaining the concept of two constitutional sovereignties, and there would need to be a compelling case to move away from it. I do not believe such a case has been made.
The Joint Committee gets to the nub of what is needed in paragraph 77. It is essentially a test of institutional confidence. This House recently resuscitated its long-standing power to suspend Members. The fact that the power had not been used since the 17th century did not mean that it no longer resided with the House. As the Clerk of the House of Commons told the Joint Committee in respect of privilege, it is not a question of the powers but rather one of their enforcement. However, enforcement must comply with standards of fairness, ensuring that those appearing before committees know what is expected of them and providing a rigorous process, including recourse to legal advisers, should they be subject to a complaint of contempt.
I believe that the committee’s recommendation for a clarification of powers and setting out fair procedures is entirely appropriate. It addresses what is clearly a problem that needs resolving, but also provides the flexibility to meet changing expectations.
The need for flexibility is at the heart of the committee’s report. I wholly accept the argument that flexibility is preferable to a statutory codification of privilege. There is no need for such codification, not least given—as the Joint Committee records—that there is no persistent conflict between Parliament and the courts. The relationship has tended to be characterised more by comity than by conflict. There have been exceptions and on occasion judges have entered into territory that should remain barred to them. Pepper v Hart was designed to enable courts to look at the parliamentary record when there was an ambiguity that could not be resolved other than by examining what the Minister had said. It was not an invitation to pass judgment on what was said and done in either House, but some judges seemed to think that it gave them latitude for such commentary. However, those have been the exceptions, not the rule; and the courts generally have shown no desire to encroach on matters that are deemed to fall within Parliament’s sole jurisdiction. As the Master of the Rolls, Lord Dyson, observed in his recent Bentham Presidential Lecture, talking about judicial review, judges are,
“mindful of the … territory into which they should not enter”,
and in exercising their power, they,
“seek to uphold the decisions of the legislature and to secure the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law”.
Where there may be conflict or uncertainty, that is a case for dialogue rather than confrontation. The relationship tends to fit with what Alison Young has characterised as a “democratic dialogue”. As the Government response records in respect of the question as to whether the Register of Members’ Interests should be considered as a parliamentary proceeding:
“This is another case where closer contacts between Parliament and the Courts can mitigate the risks of misunderstandings and improve the consistency of decision making”.
It is important that means of maintaining such contact are developed. One of the many advantages of retaining this House as the highest court of appeal was that it provided a forum in which the Law Lords could appreciate the importance of Parliament and other parliamentarians could appreciate the role of the Law Lords. That relationship was entirely legitimate and indeed, in my view, served to provide some protection for the role of the judiciary against sometimes ill informed criticism by the Executive. Means are now being developed of ensuring that a dialogue can be maintained between the legislature and the judiciary.
Parliamentary privilege needs to be protected in order to enable Parliament to fulfil its functions. The stress is on Parliament rather than parliamentarians. As the noble Lord, Lord Bew, said, parliamentarians enjoy protection only in so far as it is necessary to protect the House of which they are Members. As the report notes, MPs and Peers do not enjoy the immunities accorded to Members of some other parliaments. I think that our approach is appropriate. Privilege should be for the benefit of the nation. It is not designed for the personal benefit of Members.
It is thus entirely right that Members are subject to prosecution for “ordinary crimes”, whether committed on the parliamentary estate or elsewhere.
Following the principle that Members should not enjoy privileges that are not essential to enabling Parliament to fulfil its functions, I agree with the Government that there should be no change to current requirements in respect of jury service. As the response notes, Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service will readily grant requests to defer jury service where necessary. I certainly see no grounds for arguing that Members should have a right of excusal from jury service in England and Wales, but officers of either House should not. The officers arguably are more essential to the fulfilment of the functions of each House than is any individual Member.
For the same reason, I agree with the Government in respect of the right of Members not to respond to court summonses. As the government response notes, it is a privilege not enjoyed by other public figures. As it says, there is no strong rationale for Members to be treated differently from non-Members in this area. Indeed, I think there is a danger of bringing Parliament into disrepute if a Member hides behind parliamentary privilege in order to avoid responding to a court summons. There is no compelling case that such immunity is necessary for Parliament to fulfil its functions.
On most other issues, the Government agree with the Joint Committee’s recommendations. I welcome the Government’s acceptance that there should be no disapplication of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights in respect of criminal prosecutions and that Section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 should be repealed. Both are consistent with protecting freedom of speech as essential to enabling Parliament to fulfil its functions and maintaining the clear division between the legislature and the judiciary.
My principal question is directed to my noble friend the Leader of the House, and that is: what next? That question is especially germane in this House. As the report states at paragraph 79:
“If the House of Commons were to adopt our proposals on how its penal jurisdiction should be exercised, we would expect the House of Lords to adopt similar procedures, adapted to the conventions prevailing in that House, in due course”.
“Due course” is a rather imprecise indication of timescale and there is always the danger that, with no set timetable, there may be a tendency to defer any action. It would be helpful to know what steps are being taken to ensure that we do, as the Joint Committee recommends, build on its work, and when we may expect to see the fruits of the deliberations that take place. The report of the Joint Committee is very welcome. It is important that it does not gather dust. It is in the interests of the House that we act on it. Agreeing to the Motion tabled by my noble friend the Leader of the House is a start, but it is essential that we ensure that it is not both a start and an end point.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, like other noble Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, for opening the debate and for his chairmanship of the Select Committee. Indeed, as the Select Committee says, parliamentary privilege is one of the special characteristics of our democracy that is crucial but often misunderstood. The Select Committee has gone a very long way towards clearing up many of those misunderstandings and has provided much-needed clarity about the freedoms and protections that each House needs to function effectively. As such, they are an essential bulwark of our democracy—hence the importance of the work of the Select Committee, which I think has been endorsed by every noble Lord who has spoken in this debate.
As the noble Lord said, parliamentary privilege very much came to public attention in the wake of the 2009 expenses scandal, when three former MPs and one Member of your Lordships’ House accused of false accounting over their expenses sought to argue that they ought not to be prosecuted because of parliamentary privilege. As we have heard, the matter was dealt with by the courts in, I suggest, a most sensible way.
I agree that, in the light of that judgment, the Joint Committee’s central conclusion is that,
“the case has not been made for a comprehensive codification of parliamentary privilege”.
I also agree that legislation should be considered only when it is shown to be absolutely necessary. I agree with the Joint Committee’s rejection of the Government’s original proposals in relation to Article 9, and I am glad that the committee has taken such a firm view on that.
My noble friend Lady Healy and the noble Lord, Lord Bew, spoke eloquently of the challenges of media reporting in the current age and of the need for those who are reporting to respond at speed. The noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, referred to the Bill proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, relating to media reporting in Parliament. Given that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has not been able to make progress in the current Session and given all the problems that we know Private Member’s Bills have in getting through the other place, as the noble Lord, Lord Hill, the Leader of the House, will be responding, I take the opportunity to ask whether the Government will offer time for that Bill to go through the other place.
My noble friend Lord Davies made the very important point that we are being sent away for what one might call obscenely long recess dates at Easter; there are rumours about Whitsun; and we are not coming back from the Summer recess until mid-October. I do not believe that the Government cannot find parliamentary time to enable that to happen. I would welcome some optimism from the Leader of the House either that the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, if introduced in the other place by an honourable Member, will be given all speed or that the Government themselves will bring forward some legislation.
On Select Committees, I was very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, for his interesting insight in relation to penal powers and the need for flexibility, which I strongly support. I agree with his conclusion on jury service, although I was struck by one of his comments. I think he said that officers were more valuable than Members to the Houses of Parliament. While we certainly have superb officers, I think that, as Members, we have some role to play.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I was trying to work out the difference between the collective of officers versus the value of individual Members. It reminded me of the “Yes Minister” episode about the National Health Service that concluded that the NHS would run enormously smoothly if patients were not to come through hospitals.
The substantive point on which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, was very persuasive was the question of whether Members should be exempt from jury service. On this matter, the committee report recommends, in paragraph 253, that,
“the Government should bring forward legislation providing that Members of either House should be among those who have a right to be excused from jury service”.
I very much agree with the noble and learned Lord. Many of the previous exemptions have gone and I am sure it is right that all parts of society should expect to be called for jury service, including Members of your Lordships’ House and the other place. On this matter, I hope that we will not move to accept the committee’s report.
With regard to the Motion of the Leader of the House, it seems to be an eminently sensible approach, although I note that in paragraphs 37 to 39 of the committee report, some doubt is placed on the benefit of resolutions passed by both Houses. I ask the Leader: what is the effect of such a resolution? Is it simply a plea to individual departments to make sure, in drafting legislation, that they abide by the resolution, or does it have rather more strength? If the noble Lord could provide some reassurance on that, it would be helpful.
Overall, it seems to me that we are coming to a very satisfactory conclusion. The Select Committee’s report is very welcome. It has been very well written and argued. Apart from one or two areas about which I have doubts, I have no doubt that it has done a great service to your Lordships’ House, to parliamentary privilege and to the way that Parliament works in general.
House of Lords: Size
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
To move that this House takes note of the case for reducing the size of the House of Lords.
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, the proposition I wish to put to the House is straightforward. In terms of membership, the House of Lords has grown, is growing and ought to be reduced. There is an immediate problem; there is an even greater prospective problem.
My starting point is that this House does a good job in fulfilling functions that add value to the political process. It complements the elected Chamber, not least in carrying out tasks that the other House may not have the time, resources or political will to fulfil. However, the fact that we do a good job does not mean that we could not be even more effective than we are. Enhancing our effectiveness has two elements. One is making changes to how we operate and the other is bolstering public confidence in what we do. Unlike the other place, we cannot take our legitimacy for granted. We have to earn it. The changes that would enable us to fulfil our functions more effectively and enhance public support go well beyond limiting how many Members we have. However, addressing the size of the House is critical because of its relevance to fulfilling the functions of the House and our public standing.
There are two aspects to the size of the House. One is the total membership and the other is the active membership. The total membership is especially relevant to how the House is seen by the public, and the active membership is relevant to the capacity of the House to do its job. In terms of total membership, the House has grown markedly since the passage of the House of Lords Act 1999. At the start of the new Session of 1999-2000, we had 666 Members—in other words, a membership slightly larger than that of the House of Commons. Today, we have a total of 835 Members, making the House more than a quarter larger than the House of Commons. We are the largest second Chamber in the world. That remains the case even if we exclude those who have taken leave of absence or are ineligible. Excluding those who are ineligible or have taken leave of absence, we have 781 Members. However, we have to take into account the fact that ineligible Members, such as those holding judicial posts, will in due course be able to resume their seats. Some of those on leave of absence because of the positions they hold, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, may well resume their seats upon completion of their current posts.
However, even working with the figure of 781, imagine what will happen if a new list of Peers is announced. Then think ahead to the next Parliament and the likely creation of another list. There may be ebbs and flows—we lose some Members each year and there is a lull between lists—but the underlying trend is clear. That is demonstrated graphically in Figure 2 of Meg Russell’s pamphlet, House Full, published in 2011. As she points out, the largest single number of Peers to be created in any one year since 1999 was the 117 who were created in 2010-11.
The number, be it of all Peers or just of eligible ones, is rising and has risen most markedly in the past three years. It is not beyond reason to envisage a House at some point in the next Parliament with a total membership close to, or even in excess of, 900 Members. A House of that size, whether active or inactive, does nothing for the reputation of the House; it is difficult to defend in the public arena.
One can certainly justify a House similar in size to that of the other House, given that we need a large membership to sustain an active House of part-time Members. We benefit fundamentally from Peers having outside links and maintaining current expertise. This House forms an invaluable arena for discourse by civil society. However, the more that we grow in number beyond the size of the other place and, like Topsy, just grow and grow, it is difficult to defend against the criticism of being primarily an expanding repository of political patronage.
There is no obvious justification for the expansion in terms of fulfilling the tasks that are core to our activity. The more that we grow in size, the more that the position becomes indefensible. It would not be bad if there were a rational argument for the growth in numbers, but there is no clear intellectual basis for it. The composition of the new membership in this Parliament bears little relationship to the stated aim of the coalition agreement in terms of membership proportional to votes in the general election. To achieve proportionality now would require a further, substantial injection of new Peers.
There is a more tangible problem in terms of the resources of the House. The growth in membership in recent years has brought in Members who contribute regularly to the work of the House. This is reflected in the daily attendance: the average daily attendance in the Session 2009-10 was 388, while in the most recent session, 2012-13, it was 484. As Meg Russell records, this substantial recent growth in the active membership generates three problems. First, it puts pressure on the limited resources of the House. Secondly, it puts pressure on the work of the House, not least in terms of demands to contribute to Question Time and debates. Thirdly, it has a negative impact on the culture of the House. The more that Members are brought in quickly and in large numbers, the more that this makes it difficult to socialise Members in the accepted norms of the House, and the danger is that the House may become more fractious and partisan.
The pressure on resources is fairly obvious, not least in terms of space. Members have always been underresourced relative to Members of the other place. This is shown in the extent to which Peers are allocated not offices of their own but rather desk space. The pressure is also obvious in the Chamber, in that at various times it is not able to accommodate all the Members who wish to attend. We have a smaller Chamber than that of the other place but a larger membership. The Commons has seating for more than 60% of its Members; we cannot match that, even based on the average daily attendance, and the situation is clearly growing worse.
The increase creates particular problems in a House that works on a fairly lean support base. The cost of this House is notably less than that of the House of Commons. In the previous Session, the cost to the public purse of the House of Commons was £392 million while the cost of the House of Lords was £87 million. We may take some pride in delivering value for money, but making a case for more public money at the present time is difficult. We are expected to make efficiency savings. That will be difficult with an influx of new and active members, each eligible for an attendance allowance and transport costs and adding to the demands on the resources of the House. There is clearly a problem in how this will be seen by the public. There is also the problem of how we can cope within our existing physical capacity and administrative support. The demand is in danger of outstripping the ability of the House to meet it.
So the situation that we are in is clearly problematic, and if there are many more creations then it will likely become unsustainable. What, then, is the answer? There are various steps that can be taken, although in taking them it is important to have regard to certain principles. One is that no party or coalition of parties forming a Government should have an absolute majority. Another is that there should be a protocol, a formula, on the balance between the parties in order to prevent another escalation in membership. Any reduction needs to have regard to the balance between political groupings in the House. A third is that we should work towards a membership that is smaller than that of the House of Commons. That may take time but it is a useful aspiration; it provides a framework for managing the reduction in numbers.
One immediate and rather modest step would be to put a limit on the size of the House. One proposal is to have a moratorium on the creation of new Members. I would propose a cap on membership. That way, one could create new Members but only when existing ones had demised. One could develop a formula of creating, say, only one new Peer for every three who left the House. That would gradually reduce the size of the House; it would be a slow process, but over the course of the Parliament it would reduce the size of the House by at least 50.
Other steps include those embodied in the Bill introduced in this House by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and that in the other place by Dan Byles, such as removing Peers who hardly ever attend. That would not affect the active membership but would have a beneficial effect in terms of public perception. Another provision of the Bill would create a form of retirement provision, which would have the effect of the Members ceasing to be Members of the House, with no provision for retirement to be rescinded.
More radical proposals have been canvassed. These include proposing a mandatory retirement age or imposing a set period for which a new Peer may serve, such as 10 or 15 years. The problem with each of these is that it has the potential to rid the House of Members who are making a substantial contribution to it. There is another proposal that would not have such an arbitrary effect and could be geared to the need to maintain a balance between the parties in the House and allow for some recalibration in each Parliament: to determine the number that each political grouping should have in a Parliament and to allow each to elect from within its own ranks those who should remain within the House—in other words, a scheme not dissimilar from that employed in 1999 to determine which hereditary Peers should remain in the House.
My purpose this afternoon is not to put forward a particular proposal, but rather to emphasise the necessity to address the problem. The more we can get on record the need to act, the sooner we may be able to achieve some steps by government to address the compelling need for some corrective action. Accepting the need for a cap on membership would be a starting point.
Given that, may I invite my noble friend the Leader of the House to focus not simply on where we are now, but on where we are likely to be in two, five and 10 years’ time? In terms of creations already announced, could he give us some indication of the additional costs estimated to be incurred in a full financial year once the introduction of the current tranche of new creations has been completed? Does he accept that a further list of Peers in the current Parliament will create not just additional but significant difficulties in terms of the finite resources of the House? Projecting ahead, would my noble friend accept that the problem will be exacerbated in the next Parliament, especially in the event of the return of a new Government? That will be the case if the new Government is a majority Conservative Government. Would not the new Government expect to create more Peers? If my noble friend accepts that there is a problem, either now or prospectively, what steps does he anticipate the Government taking to address it?
The problem has been touched upon by various bodies in recent years, including the Leader’s Group chaired by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, who I am delighted to see in his place, as well as more recently by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place. My noble friend told the committee that he found that there was a broad consensus among Members that the current House is too big and the overall size should be reduced. Given that there is such a consensus on the problem and what should be done about it, I look forward to hearing from my noble friend, speaking as the Leader of the House, what he plans to do to give effect to the will of the House. I beg to move.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, may I point out to the House that the timings are very tight indeed for this debate? I can help.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken, and to my noble friend the Leader of the House in particular for replying to the debate. I also appreciate greatly the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who is speaking in her third debate today. I thought that she encapsulated the point extremely well—size matters. Many of the speeches demonstrated concerns felt in different parts of the House.
This House clearly performs valuable functions; I do not think that the functions are in doubt. Nor is the fact that the House fulfils them effectively. I think that we do a very good job indeed; that is the great merit of the House. We tend to do the work extremely well, and I think that we should proclaim that fact. But my point is that the growing size of the House does not facilitate us in fulfilling those functions effectively. As I have said, it is only one aspect that we need to address, but it is an important one.
I say to my noble friend Lord Caithness that we will continue to have these debates until action is taken. He himself went on to refer to the problem of numbers, and came up with one or two ideas, one of which I would fully endorse—it is something that I have supported for some time. We need to think through the implications of the fact that we continue to grow. It is that dynamic element that my noble friend Lord True did not really address. Nor, to some extent, did my noble friend Lord Hill. We need to have a clear view as to what we believe is the optimum size of the House—and then, within that, the distribution among the different groupings. As my noble friend Lord Tyler indicated, we have not really had that discussion. That, I think, should be our starting point.
I endorse the comments of a great many noble Lords who have spoken. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hill for what he said, as far as he felt able to go. However, I am sure that he will understand when I say that we will push him to go further. I end with a quote addressed to those who think that things are fine as they are. Burke said:
“A state without the means of some change is without the means of its own conservation”.
Draft House of Lords Reform Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(12 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, as a supporter of the Government perhaps I may say how encouraging it is to note that on the definition offered by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde, so far in this Parliament the House of Commons has managed to reach a consensus on every measure brought forward by the Government. I was also interested to hear that we will not be having a referendum because all three party manifestos agree, including the Labour Party manifesto, which promised a referendum.
I too served on the Joint Committee and I too pay tribute to my fellow members. As we have heard, the committee devoted considerable time and effort to examining the draft Bill. However, it was fundamentally hampered in two respects. The first was that the Government presented us with a Bill of which we had the detail but for which we had no justification. Assessing the Bill on the Government’s own terms is not possible if the Government make no attempt to say what they are.
If one reads the White Paper, one can extract from the disparate comments two criteria, each of which is asserted rather than justified: that is, that the Bill delivers an elected House—a “fundamental democratic principle”, according to the White Paper—and that it maintains the existing relationship between the two Houses. The report of the Joint Committee demonstrates that the Bill fails by the Government’s own criteria. It may provide for election but the attempt to ring-fence the position of the House of Commons through Clause 2 is inadequate to the task. Indeed, if you read the evidence, it is fairly clear or would suggest that you can have one but not the other. The committee, as we have heard, took evidence on the Parliament Acts. As the report mentions, it would be possible to make statutory provision for them to continue in force. That, though, is to say what could be done, not what should be done. But even if the Acts were maintained, that would not be sufficient to maintain the existing relationship between the two Houses. As one reporter put it to the noble Lord, Lord Richard, at last week’s press conference, how exactly do you prevent an elected House from ignoring conventions? You cannot.
The second limitation was that of time. The committee did the best that it could with the Bill before it. It may, as the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, said, have set a record for the number of meetings it held. Despite that, there was not time to examine the Bill in depth. Even if the Parliament Acts were maintained, they are blunt weapons for determining outcomes, and to rely on them on a regular basis would likely create significant tensions within the political process. The draft Bill provides no deliberative means for resolving disputes and, given the pressures we were under, the committee did not address how such disputes should be resolved. We dealt with it only in the negative sense of finding that Clause 2 was inadequate for maintaining the present relationship between the two Houses.
I take that as illustrative of what was not considered. The report is as important for what it omits as much as for what it includes. That is not a criticism of the committee but of the limitations under which we operated. I know the response adopted by some—we have already heard it—is that we did not need to address the fundamentals of what was proposed, and that further time was not needed, because the issue of Lords reform has been discussed for the past century. There is, in their view, little more to be said on the merits, and it is a case of agreeing the detail.
That view is not only wrong but dangerous. The case for an elected House and hence for the Bill is based on contested concepts and philosophies. We hear trotted out claims as if they are self-evidently true. There will be other opportunities to address these claims; here, I just wish to focus on the assertion that the issue has already been extensively considered over the course of a century or more.
Consideration of the future of the second Chamber, and its relationship to the first, has been sporadic and very rarely undertaken in terms of first principles. There has been little consideration of the role of Parliament in our constitutional arrangements and the place of the second Chamber within Parliament. The two principal exercises were those of the Bryce commission in 1918 and the Wakeham commission in 2000. Otherwise the debate, though extensive at times, has been at a rather superficial level, essentially of detail rather than principle. Even in 1911, the debate on the Parliament Bill was not a principled debate about the place of the second Chamber in the constitution of the United Kingdom. It was shaped by politicians’ stances on Irish home rule.
We need to address the issue from first principles. We need to consider how the second Chamber, and indeed the first, is composed once we are clear as to what we expect of Parliament. We have not really done that. There is reference to parliamentary reform at times, but that normally refers to procedural and structural change in the Commons. Lords reform usually refers to changes to the composition of this House. There have been few attempts to address change from the perspective of Parliament as Parliament.
That is why I am a signatory of the alternative report. I have previously argued the case in this House for a constitutional convention, to undertake an exercise in constitutional cartography. Significant constitutional change is difficult to reverse. It usually has significant consequences for other parts of our constitutional framework. We need to get this right. Contrary to what some have said, the place of the second Chamber has not been thoroughly thought through. The report of the Joint Committee has demonstrated what is wrong with the Government’s proposals. The report, though, should not be the end of a process of examining the place of the second Chamber, but rather an impetus to look holistically at our constitutional arrangements. We cannot afford to get it wrong.
Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
He came here by an act of patronage, then, which is the point I was seeking to make.
Let me cite some statistics that may illustrate the point. Despite all the arguments made about primacy, et cetera, all the arguments made that we have to work out the new relationship, here are the figures. The House of Lords Library tells me that there are 71 bicameral legislatures around the world of which, leaving aside the micro-nations in the Caribbean whose constitutions were written by us to reflect ours, only seven are not elected second Chambers, seven have no connection with democracy, and seven are appointed, as we are—leaving aside Great Britain. One of them, for reasons that utterly perplex me, is Canada. But the other six may give us cause to pause for a moment. They do not include great democracies. They are Belarus, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman, Jordan and Lesotho. That is the company we keep. Those are not great defenders of democracy. How is it that in every other legislature, all of them with elected second Chambers, issues of primacy, the issues which hold up people’s agreement with democratic reform in this place, are not great problems?
Here is the reason why it is said that we do not have to observe the principles of democracy. My noble friend alluded to it a moment ago. It is because, apparently, it works—in that curious, untidy, rather British way, nevertheless, it works. And if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. It does not work. There are two functions of a second Chamber. The first is to revise and the second is to hold the Executive to account. The first of those we do rather well. We are graciously permitted to follow along with a gilded poop-scoop, clearing up the mess behind the elephant at the other end of the Corridor, but when it comes to stopping the elephant doing things, when it comes to turning it round, when it comes to delaying it on the really big things that matter, we do not succeed. How can we challenge the Executive on big things when we are a creature of the Executive?
I do not believe that if we had had a reformed, democratic second Chamber, we would have had the poll tax, but we did. I do not believe that we would have gone to war in Iraq either, but we did. The last time that I said that, there was much twittering saying, good heavens, should a second Chamber have the right to say whether a nation goes to war? Yes it should. I see no problem with that. There is no problem with the Senate in America. That has not stopped America going to war. There is no problem with the Senate in France, one of our closest and immediate allies in Libya and which put more troops into Bosnia than any other nation and suffered greater casualties.
Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
I will make the point and then I will take the noble Lord’s intervention. There is one nation in Europe which may be insufficiently able to take decisions about military action when it needs to, and that is Germany. The Bundesrat, the second Chamber in Germany, has no say over going to war. However, there is no reason why a second Chamber should not be asked whether to ratify treaties or whether it is reasonable to go to war. Why is that possible everywhere else in the world but impossible here?
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, if a second Chamber can block the nation going to war, what does that tell us about the primacy of the first?
Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
Of course the first Chamber is going to have primacy. That is readily established in every other bicameral system in which there is an elected second Chamber. However, on the issue of whether to go to war, in the United States the President has to get the agreement of both Houses of Congress. Has that seriously prevented the United States going to war? Quite the contrary. This is an issue on which this House, as an elected Chamber, should be able to exercise its rights.
The time has arrived to bring this place up to date. The time has arrived when we have to stop what is not only an anachronism but an undemocratic anachronism. We send our young men out to fight and die and, perhaps worse still, to kill others in the name of democracy but we do not have a democratic second Chamber in this country, as is the case with the vast majority of bicameral systems throughout the world. Why can they cope with democracy but not us? Is our democracy so ineffective and immature and are our institutions so weak that we cannot cope with what they can cope with and we have to resort to the kind of principles that operate in Bahrain and Belarus?
This place is an anachronism and an undemocratic anachronism, and I am in favour of a fully elected second Chamber. However, if the proposition put forward by the committee as a compromise is the best one that we can achieve, I shall happily vote for it. By the way, I also believe that it should be supported by a referendum. The reality is that this is a reform that can no longer wait. Our democracy is in danger. We have to start renewing the democratic structures of this country, and the reform and democratisation of the second Chamber is part of that process. We cannot keep this waiting any longer. We have a proposition; we should take it up and do the business now.
House of Lords: Working Practices
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I add my congratulations to my noble friend, Lord Goodlad, and the members of the Leader’s Group on producing what I regard as an excellent report. It is wide ranging and constructive and, in my view, acts as an essential road map for the reform of this House.
In the time available, I, too, wish to focus on the legislative process. When I had the honour to chair the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House, we published a report in 2004 on Parliament and the Legislative Process. We looked at the legislative process at that, encompassing pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny as well as how a Bill is considered, once introduced. This report builds on and reinforces our recommendations and I wish to reiterate what needs to be done. Once a Bill is introduced, Ministers tend to be rather wedded to its contents. For Ministers, success in legislative terms is Royal Assent rather than the effects of the measure, once implemented. Parliament needs to focus more on pre-legislative scrutiny before Ministers’ minds are made up, and on post-legislative scrutiny, to determine whether an Act has achieved what it was intended to achieve. We have made some progress with pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny, as my noble friend Lord Strathclyde said, but we need to do much more. This report embodies some essential proposals.
On pre-legislative scrutiny, I commend the recommendations of the group. The group endorsed the Constitution Committee’s view that pre-legislative scrutiny should be the norm and not, as now, the exception. Many of the reasons given by government for avoiding pre-legislative scrutiny do not hold water. I have made the point in the House before that, if a Bill is not to be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny, the Minister in charge of the Bill should be required to make a Statement to the House explaining why not. Even if we cannot compel pre-legislative scrutiny, we can at least ensure that Ministers justify their actions. We need to work on government to get Ministers away from the mindset that they must rush to legislate. There is a culture of legislating almost for the sake of it. We need more rigorous mechanisms in place to limit the urge to legislate.
Once a Bill is introduced, it should be subject to more rigorous scrutiny than is presently the case. We tend to think that our scrutiny is better than that of the other place. When it comes to taking evidence, the Commons is way ahead of us. I very much welcome the Leader’s Group recommendation that Bills should be amenable to scrutiny by a Public Bill Committee, similar to that employed in the Commons. I would be somewhat more radical than the Leader’s Group. The Constitution Committee recommended that every government Bill should be subject to examination at some stage during its passage by an evidence-taking committee. I think that it should be the norm for a government Bill starting life in this House to be examined in a Public Bill Committee. That applies even if it has had pre-legislative scrutiny. Committee scrutiny may be necessary to see to what extent the Government have taken on board recommendations made at the pre-legislative stage and to examine what new material, which may be substantial, has been included by government. I think that sending all government Bills to Public Bill Committees should be the default option, with reasons having to be given on why a Bill should not receive such scrutiny.
The Leader’s Group recommends, as we have heard, the appointment of a legislative standards committee. I think that its reasons for so doing are persuasive, but I wish to link the recommendation with that for more rigorous post-legislative scrutiny. In the light of the Constitution Committee’s report, progress was made in respect of post-legislative scrutiny, or rather post-legislative review. We need to build on that to ensure effective scrutiny by Parliament. The existing mechanism, as the report recognises, is inadequate. The Law Commission recommended a Joint Committee to undertake post-legislative review. If we cannot get a Joint Committee, I would establish one in this House. What I would propose, though, is merging it with the proposal for a legislative standards committee. This would enable us to make more efficient use of our resources and enable the committee to maximise expertise in the legislative process. We could thus have a committee that considers the form of legislation and advises on best practice, both in terms of the construction of Bills and post-legislative review, as well as undertaking substantive inquiries on particular Acts.
I attach great importance to these recommendations. They would allow the House to play to its strengths and enhance the scrutiny of legislation. They are proposals that are essentially within the gift of the House. We can move quickly to establish a legislative standards committee, resolve that government Bills shall normally be referred to a Public Bill Committee, and require Ministers to explain why any Bill introduced without pre-legislative scrutiny should be considered by the House. I therefore commend these proposals. I think that the other recommendations of the report merit serious consideration. It is an excellent report. Reform is necessary and urgent.
House of Lords: Reform
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Strathclyde
That this House takes note of the Government’s proposals for reform of the House of Lords set out in Cm 8077.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, as my name is one of those being put forward to serve on the Joint Committee, I shall not address the detail of the Bill; instead, I shall address the wider context. The Joint Committee will look in detail at the specific contents, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester provided us yesterday with an excellent template for assessing the Bill.
It might be helpful for my noble friend to clarify a number of points relating primarily to the demand, purpose and consequences of the Government’s proposals. I begin with demand. I detected yesterday a whiff of the cod liver oil approach; it is good for you whether you like it or not. I distinguish between demand and support. I also distinguish between support for a principle and support for the means to deliver on that principle.
I have a specific question: what clear empirical evidence is there of demand for the Bill? I hear the argument that we should not let the views of the public determine the issue, but if we are to do things in the interests of voters in this particular form, it would at least be appropriate to consider their views. The last in-depth survey I saw was the Ipsos MORI poll of 2007. Do the Government have more contemporary data?
Could my noble friend also tell us what the identifiable problem is that the Bill is intended to address? Various justifications are offered. One is clearly that the election of the second Chamber is the democratic option. That is advanced as if it is self-evidently true. My noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway raised a fundamental question yesterday; democracy is a contested concept—a point that was developed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Exeter. If we take the definition of representative democracy offered by Schmitter and Karl—that it is,
“a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and co-operation of their representatives”—
the draft Bill before us is not the democratic option, because there is election but no accountability.
In any event, in a situation of asymmetrical bicameralism, in which the elected Chamber enjoys primacy, it does not follow that Members of the second Chamber necessarily have to be elected for the system to be judged to be democratic. Indeed, if the accountability of government is the basis of the definition, it is possible to argue that an elected second Chamber undermines the core accountability at the heart of our existing system. Of course there is a counterargument, but that merely serves to make my point: that we are dealing with a contested concept. We cannot proceed on the basis of an assumed agreement as to its meaning.
The same could be said about the concept of legitimacy. It would be helpful to know how the Government define the concept and then relate that to how they believe the legitimacy, once defined, of the elected 80 per cent will embrace the unelected 20 per cent—or will the 20 per cent be somehow illegitimate?
On definition, it would also be helpful to know how the Government define primacy in the context of the relationship between the two Houses. Despite the general saving clause, Clause 2, my noble friend Lord Strathclyde and the Deputy Prime Minister have both conceded that the relationship between the two Chambers will change over time. The noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, told us that one can have an elected second Chamber but maintain the primacy, if not the supremacy, of the Commons. He also told us that an elected second Chamber may have prevented an unwise war. I am not sure how one can reconcile those two statements. Where does primacy begin and end?
The noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, also introduced a comparative element. Only a minority of second Chambers are wholly elected. Elected second Chambers are to be found predominantly in federal nations. It is not clear what purpose would be served by an elected second Chamber in a unitary state, where electors would be voting for members of that Chamber in exactly the same capacity as they would be voting for members of the first. It injects an element of redundancy into the system. I thus invite my noble friend to tell us precisely what problem is being addressed by the Bill.
I turn from the perceived problem to the proposed solution. There is a profound difference between situations where a second Chamber is crafted as part of a new constitution and where a change is made within the context of an established polity. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Exeter raised this yesterday. Very few studies have been undertaken of second Chambers as second Chambers, let alone of changes to them in established democracies. In drawing together the findings of one study of changes to second Chambers in leading western nations, Meg Russell and Mark Sandford concluded, in an article in the Journal of Legislative Studies—I declare an interest as editor of the journal—
“These examples suggest that the design of second Chambers is very difficult to get right. They may be criticised for having too little power, or on the other hand of having too much; for being too democratic, or not democratic enough; for being sidelined and irrelevant or for being a carbon-copy of the lower house. When considering why upper house reform has not happened, one of the first answers has to be lack of clarity over the purpose of the upper house … As Mughan and Patterson have put it, second Chambers remain ‘essentially contested institutions’”.
In essence, it is very difficult to get right. This points to the crucial importance of ensuring that change is well grounded in an understanding not only of what is required—that is a clear and accepted goal—but of a clear recognition of the means for achieving it. Could my noble friend therefore tell us what studies have been undertaken or utilised by the Government of practice elsewhere, in terms of moving from one second Chamber to another, in order to determine that this measure is the best means for achieving the Government’s goals? In short, I think it would be of value to the House, and to the Joint Committee, to know what studies have been undertaken or commissioned by the Government as to the demand for, and consequences of, the Bill. That will provide a solid basis for the detailed work that is now to be undertaken, and to which I for one, will devote myself on behalf of the House.
Lord Peston
Could I ask the noble Lord why he did not include, in an excellent speech, one other question that we need to ask the government Front Bench—whether it has any intention of taking any notice of what the overwhelming majority of their Lordships are saying?
Lord Norton of Louth
I am grateful for that additional, very pertinent question. Given the time limit, I had to condense my speech from about 20 questions.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(13 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, as he just outlined, is premised on the belief that reducing the number of MPs creates a problem in that the proportion of Ministers in the other place then becomes greater than at present. My starting point is different. My contention is that there are already too many Ministers. Reducing the number of Ministers exacerbates rather than creates a problem.
The size of the so-called payroll vote in the House of Commons, including Parliamentary Private Secretaries, has grown over the years. In 1950, it constituted 15 per cent of the House. It now constitutes 21 per cent. Expressed as a proportion of the number of MPs in the coalition parties, it is 38 per cent.
I accept the case for Ministers sitting in Parliament. However, Ministers are members of a body that is expected to subject the Government to critical scrutiny and to hold them to account. The capacity to fulfil that task, both in voice and vote, is limited if the votes at the disposal of the Whips increase. A consequence of the Bill is that the proportion of the House not able to call the Government to account becomes even larger.
I appreciate that there is an argument that the number of ministerial posts has increased in order to meet growing demands of government. However, as I said in evidence to the Public Administration Committee in the other place, I have seen no study to support that contention. There is an alternative explanation: that the growth has been for political reasons, providing a greater pool of patronage appointments available to the Prime Minister. In my evidence to the Public Administration Committee, I quoted Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s former chief of staff, in his book, The New Machiavelli, where he wrote:
“If prime ministers had their way they would appoint all the MPs on their benches to ministerial office. The payroll vote is an essential parliamentary tool and the bigger it is, the better”.
The patronage explanation has found support from a range of sources. The claim that there are too many Ministers has been supported by, among others, former Prime Minister Sir John Major and my noble friend Lord Hurd of Westwell. My noble friend in his evidence in 2000 to the Conservative Party’s Commission to Strengthen Parliament, which I chaired, argued that the number of Ministers could be reduced without undermining the essential tasks of government. He said that,
“a decision by an incoming prime minister to abolish twenty ministerial posts at different levels would not only be popular but would be followed immediately by an adjustment of workload. The whips and those who enjoy exercising or receiving patronage would be dismayed, but the benefits would be great.”
A former Cabinet Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, told the Public Administration Committee that some tasks could be carried out by officials. There is also the argument that some tasks are not necessary anyway. Ministerial work tends to expand to fill the time available—a point well made by a former Minister, Chris Mullin.
What is required is a greater emphasis on quality, rather than quantity. The emphasis has been on quantity for the sake of patronage, rather than on quality for the sake of good government. The growth of the payroll vote has strengthened the position of Government at the expense of the House of Commons. I contend that there is no need for so many Ministers. Ministers are largely amateurs in their roles as Ministers. Providing better training for them, and redistributing some tasks to Whips, as happens in this House, would ensure there was no reduction in efficiency. If anything I would contend the reverse.
The Commission to Strengthen Parliament agreed with my noble friend Lord Hurd and concluded:
“The case for reducing the number of ministers is compelling on its merits. It also has a number of beneficial consequences. Limiting the number of ministers increases the number of MPs who are not committed to government by the doctrine of collective responsibility. Narrowing the route to ministerial office may serve to make attractive the alternative careers in the House of Commons. We believe that these benefits should not be negated by extending patronage through other routes”.
We recommended that the number of Ministers in Cabinet should be kept at 20 and the number of other Ministers capped at 50. That is a little more than the number suggested by my noble friend Lord Hurd. Back in 1940-41, the Herbert Committee recommended an even lower figure, believing that government could be carried on by 60 Ministers. My right honourable friend Iain Duncan Smith introduced a Private Member’s Bill in the 1999-2000 Session to place an absolute limit on the number of Ministers at 82. In 2006, my honourable friend Jeremy Browne introduced a Bill to reduce the number of ministerial salaries payable from 83 to 60.
My amendment is a relatively modest one. It seeks to reduce the cap on the number of Ministers who can sit—paid or unpaid—in the House of Commons from 95 to 80. It is modest but essential.
I conclude by emphasising the constitutional significance of this amendment. When I raised the issue on Second Reading, my noble friend Lord McNally treated it somewhat dismissively, as an issue that could be discussed later, after the passage of the Bill. The constitutional import of the amendment is on a par with that of reducing the number of MPs. If the number of MPs is reduced, then the proportion of the other place that forms the Government increases, to the advantage of government and to the detriment of the House of Commons in being able to call to account that part of it which forms the Government.
My starting point is that there are already too many Ministers and reducing the number of MPs will exacerbate the problem. There has been, as I have indicated, a steady increase in the size of the payroll vote in the other place, and now is the time to reverse the process and to strengthen the House of Commons in its capacity to call the Government to account. I beg to move.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I was tempted by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, who suggested that we were in seminar mode. In that case I might feel the need to start allocating marks, and one or two people might not come out of it too well. I was initially encouraged by my noble friend’s “but”, although it was not as big a “but” as I would have liked. I hope between now and Report that he will go away and reflect on it so that if there are to be proposals, he can put a bit more flesh on the bone so that we know what they are going to be. I regard this to be as important as reducing the number of MPs. There is an extraordinarily important constitutional point about the relationship between the House of Commons and the part of it that forms the Government.
My noble friend made the legitimate point that the amendment cannot take into account the number of PPSs in the Commons. I understand that it cannot really be dealt with by statute. However, I hope that we might address it separately because there is an issue about PPSs, not just in quantity but in their role. Over time their latitude to vote against the Government has been constricted, and I am concerned now by how they are dealt with in the Ministerial Code, in which they are essentially members of the Government for the purpose of voting but Back-Benchers for the purpose of sitting on Select Committees. That is an issue to be pursued. The obvious point in the context of what my noble friend was saying is that if you reduce the number of Ministers, you reduce the number of people who require PPSs, so to some extent that addresses part of the problem but there is quite a long way still to go.
This is an extraordinarily important issue, so I hope my noble friend will reflect on what he has heard. I am grateful for the support that I have received from all parts of the Chamber, not least from the noble Lord opposite. The only point that I will make is that my amendment has an advantage over that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in that it comes up with a whole number. If one reduces the number proportionately, one ends up with a reduction of something like seven and a half Ministers. An incredibly important issue is at stake here, and I hope that my noble friend will reflect very seriously on it. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(14 years ago)
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Lord Tyler
That is what happens under the present system. The present system is totally inadequate in that respect because you have to plump. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, who undoubtedly understands the point I am making, I say that under the present system many people in this country feel that they are forced to vote in a very artificial way because their first preference is not likely to win. I am arguing that in many parts of the country people do not bother to register or to vote at all because they think that their first preference is not likely to win. The safer the seat—
Lord Norton of Louth
My noble friend’s argument is based on the premise that people are aware that under a different system—in this case AV—their votes will make more of a difference than under the present system. I should be interested to know what his empirical evidence is for that.
Lord Tyler
The empirical evidence, of course, is the way in which so many other elections, outwith elections to Parliament, operate. I think I am right in saying that all the parties now select their candidates through a form of AV and it is seen to be very effective. Many other professional organisations and trade unions use it and, as was pointed out earlier, the Lord Speaker was elected under that system. There are plenty of examples where people understand that by making a number of choices or preferences they can make a difference.