House of Lords Reform

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 12th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I begin with two propositions that, in my view, should form the basis for determining reform of this House. The first is that form should follow function—we need to determine what purpose an institution serves. What is the principal purpose of this House, as a second Chamber of Parliament? The second proposition is that good law is a public good. If one accepts that, that helps determine the principal role of this House. It is a House of legislative scrutiny. That is not its only role, but it is the one that establishes it as a necessary part of our constitutional system.

The House of Commons is the elected Chamber, and the fact that it is elected ensures that it enjoys primacy. The fact of election also creates political imperatives for its Members. They need to be elected and re-elected, and they focus on activities that enhance their chance of re-election. They devote time to constituents’ demands, which have become more onerous decade by decade. They focus on outward-looking activities that bolster their political profiles. The quest for electoral success drives them to put the interests of party ahead of the institution of which they are Members. Focusing on detailed scrutiny of legislation does not come high on their list of political imperatives.

That shapes the relationship between the two Houses. The House of Commons determines the ends of legislation, and we accept that. We focus on the means. If one accepts that good law is a public good, that is a necessary role, and this House is ideally placed to fulfil it. The fact of being an appointed Chamber is a benefit—we lack the political imperatives facing MPs. We have the benefit of the experience and expertise of the membership, and the benefit of procedure: we do not utilise programme Motions, there is no selection of amendments by the chair and we do not normally employ closure Motions. We devote as much time as is needed to considering all the amendments tabled to Bills. This House makes a significant difference to the detail of Bills, and its changes are generally acknowledged by government as having improved the legislation. The law of the land would be significantly diminished without the work of this House.

Those two propositions should therefore form the basis of reform. We should avoid big bang reforms that destroy the complementary role of this House as a Chamber of legislative scrutiny. There is a democratic argument for an appointed second Chamber—those familiar with the literature will be aware of that. We should equally avoid discrete reforms that are detached from the purpose of the House. An arbitrary age limit, for example, may remove some of the experience and expertise that contributes to the work of the House, but removing Members who may have made little or no contribution would not have such an effect.

To bolster the capacity of the House to fulfil its key function necessitates focusing on how Members reach this House. We need to ensure that those qualified to contribute to the work of the House are nominated. We need to enhance our structures and procedures to reinforce what we do. That means looking not just at how we deal with Bills once introduced—should we consider, for example, taking evidence on Bills?—but also at the legislative process holistically. Expanding pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny would likely contribute to better Bills and would play to the strengths of the House. We are ideally placed to enhance post-legislative scrutiny. Such changes would enable us to engage more with those outside the House who wish to contribute their knowledge on a particular measure.

There is scope for reform, but we need to ensure that it derives from our understanding of what this House exists to do. In my view, we already do a good job of legislative scrutiny. We can take steps to ensure that we do it even better—that should be our focus, and that should drive reform.