House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Banner (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 68, which, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson indicated, takes the premise of his Amendment 56 and rolls it out to all Supreme Court justices. I declare an interest as a practising King’s Counsel who fairly frequently appears before the Supreme Court, including in one appeal where judgment is still pending.

I supported the replacement of the Appellate Committee with the new UK Supreme Court, and I still believe that was the right decision. In a modern democracy, all courts, and in particular the final court of appeal, must not just be but be seen to be separate and independent from the other branches of the state.

However, a collateral and I think probably unintended effect of this, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson outlined, has been significantly to reduce the pool of Cross-Bench legal expertise in this House. By convention, certainly by the turn of the millennium, sitting Members on the Appellate Committee did not speak in debates and did not otherwise participate in relation to controversial matters, although they did sit in committees to some degree. However, upon their retirement they invariably would—and those who remain still do—make an invaluable contribution to the work of this House.

It is also the case that, prior to retirement and while in office as judges, by virtue of being Members of this House, those on the Appellate Committee would have a fuller and further first-hand understanding of the procedures of Parliament, which, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson indicated in his excellent lecture at Policy Exchange earlier this afternoon, may have assisted the judges in their consideration of the Prorogation issue in the second Miller litigation.

Now that the final court is outside this House, its members no longer need to receive a peerage upon being appointed and, contrary to what had been advocated in some quarters, no convention to that effect has been established. In recent years, among full-time Supreme Court justices, only the President has been by convention awarded a peerage—albeit that the Lord Chief Justice, who occasionally sits in that court, has also by convention been awarded a peerage.

The result of all this has been significantly to reduce the pipeline of top-tier judges able to contribute to the work of this House. Amendment 68 would rectify that by requiring all current and future Supreme Court justices to be awarded a peerage. I myself would envisage that, during their tenure on the court, they would follow the Appellate Committee’s former convention that sitting judges do not speak in debates and do not otherwise participate in controversial matters, but, upon retirement, they would be able fully to engage and thus continue the long-established and invaluable tradition of our most senior judges contributing to the work of this House on their retirement from the Bench.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 56, 57 and 68 in this group, to which I have added my name. I declare an interest as a member of the Bar. I also declare a special interest in that, across the corridor in my chambers is the room of Lord Dyson, who was the first member of the Supreme Court not to be the beneficiary of a peerage under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, and therefore the first person from these Benches that the House did not have the benefit of hearing from, which in my view was a great loss—and that applies to many members of the Supreme Court.

There is an element of confusion in the general public, and indeed even in the politically engaged general public. When they read of public pronouncements from the likes of Lord Dyson or Lord Sumption, they are under the impression that these people are Members of this House. When the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 came into force, there was a question about what title one gave to the Justices of the Supreme Court. So, when Sir John Dyson, as he then was, became a member of the Supreme Court, having formerly been the Master of the Rolls in the Court of Appeal, where he was Lord Justice Dyson, there was a need to differentiate him from the members of the Court of Appeal and to give a special title to members of the Supreme Court.

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[Lord Strathclyde (Con)]

My Lords, I am following my noble friend’s argument and I very much support him, but does he believe, as I do, that, after 2005, there was an understanding between the Labour Government and the Justices of the Supreme Court that they would all be made Members of the House of Lords—Peers in their own right—but would not sit in the House of Lords until after they had retired. If such an understanding had taken place, it would have solved a great number of problems. I hope the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General might give us an answer, if he knows, on whether there was such an understanding after the 2005 Act.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am very grateful to my noble friend for his intervention, and I very much hope there was such an understanding—but I am afraid I cannot find a trace of that agreement.

Turning to the answer given to a question put to Jack Straw on this question in January 2009, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, asked him about the future of the justices of the Supreme Court. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, noted that the Law Lords performed an important function in the legislative process and asked the then Lord Chancellor what the position would be once they had retired, along the lines outlined by my noble friend—thus suggesting that there was an informal agreement that this would be what would occur. The then Lord Chancellor’s answer was:

“Of course, that was one of the arguments against change and … I can see the case”.


He then said that

“it crucially depends on whether we continue with an all appointed House of Lords”.

So the answer was that they just parked the issue, saying that it was all dependent on what was going to happen in future to the House of Lords. The Lord Chancellor goes on to say that

“if we go to a 20% appointed chamber”,

which was one of the things then being considered, the number of noble Lords would be “fewer”. That was why he refused to commit at that point in answer to that question.

The issue was raised again in July 2009 in a question from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and it was answered by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice. He said:

“My Lords, justices of the Supreme Court who are appointed after October 2009 will not automatically become Members of the second Chamber on retirement, but could be considered for appointment by the Appointments Commission. It is right to say that former Law Lords will be able to take up their places again … on retirement from the Supreme Court, and it is right that this House needs a lot of expertise, particularly in that field”.—[Official Report, 20/7/09; col. 1375.]


Of course, he was right in that respect. But the reality is that that has not happened. If one looks at the appointments that have been made by HOLAC, one sees that former justices of the Supreme Court have not numbered highly among the appointments. This has been a very significant omission and now is the moment, I suggest to your Lordships, to rectify that error.

At the very least, the Wolfson-Elie compromise of giving peerages to the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court should be strongly considered by the Government, but I would suggest it should go more widely than that: every member of the 12-member court should receive life peerages on appointment. That should be the convention. There would then be no need for these courtesy titles. When they retire, they would then hopefully become engaged and active Members of your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make one brief contribution to this debate, which is likely to go on for some time. I enjoyed listening to the contributions entirely from lawyers except for the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. They had one thing clearly in common: none of them had any reference whatsoever to the subject of hereditary Peers being removed from this House. They are entitled to have made their amendments because of some ruling, which came from somewhere that I have not yet discovered, that under remote circumstances hereditary Peer membership could relate to other parts of the constitution. I accept that this might be the case in some remote circumstances. However, it is very difficult for me to understand, in any sensible conversation, what relevance adding, through these amendments, 25 protected places in the House of Lords has to the subject of this Bill.

I do not want to prolong it because I do not want to promote debate. However, with such a loose definition of what is included and what is not, on the same logic if you had a Bill to reduce class sizes in infant classes it would be entirely within the scope of the Bill to discuss university admissions processes—because, obviously, if you reduce class sizes, that gives an opportunity for children to develop more effectively and stand a better chance of getting into university. Lawyers can do that but, in the interests of common sense and as a general principle, if an amendment has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject of the Bill, it would be a good idea to determine that it is out of order.

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All the points in the debate raised both the merits and the demerits of the arguments as to what further reforms should take place that would shape your Lordships’ House. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, mentioned the real care that must be given before fixing categories, whether or not that is a good idea in principle, and, if so, how they should be fixed. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, made the important point that it is not the nature of the office but the commitment to participate that should dictate this. All of these are matters for careful and collegiate consultation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. The answer he proposes is that the Prime Minister retains the discretion to appoint retired members of the Supreme Court to this House. How does that answer the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that this appears to place a slightly invidious choice on the Prime Minister where he is conferring a favour on a judge? If it were automatically all judges, there could be no suggestion that decisions are made that might favour them in the list of peerages.

[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s intervention. I can well anticipate that, if this is an issue that arises on consultation, there may be a distinction—to my mind, it is potentially a constitutionally important distinction—between the appropriateness or otherwise of the appointment of senior judges on their appointment to judicial office, which gives rise to the constitutional tensions that I alluded to a moment ago, and appointment upon retirement. I hope that that answers his question, at least in part.

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[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I sympathise with a very great deal of what my noble friend said. I speak with a certain family background, and I too regret the diminution of the role and status of the Lord Chancellor. That said, we are where we are and we cannot sensibly address this amendment without asking ourselves what the role of the Lord Chancellor is and should be. Since 2007, the Lord Chancellor has also been Secretary of State for Justice, sitting in the House of Commons. The Secretary of State for Justice has a very large number of responsibilities that touch on the constituency interests of Members of Parliament. I find it very difficult to believe that Members of Parliament would accept the Secretary of State for Justice sitting in the House of Lords.

That takes one directly to the role. Are we to separate the role of the Lord Chancellor from that of Secretary of State for Justice? That is certainly possible; it could be done. But what other departmental responsibility would the Lord Chancellor then have? I accept that there are some senior offices that can be represented in this House—if I may say so, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General does so with distinction. He has been preceded by other Attorneys-General in this House, and I regard that as perfectly proper because there are a relatively few constituency interests that would engage Members of the House of Commons.

That, to a lesser extent, was also true of the Foreign Secretary. My noble friend Lord Cameron occupied the role of Foreign Secretary with great distinction. It caused real problems in the House of Commons, as indeed did the role of Lord Carrington at the time of Lady Thatcher’s Government. In both cases, this had to be met by having a very effective deputy. But, again, the Foreign Secretary’s role, although hugely important, raised relatively few constituency interests.

My point is this: if the Lord Chancellor is to have a serious departmental responsibility, which has constituency interests engaged so far as Members of the House of Commons are concerned, that Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice or whatever, has to be in the House of Commons. If this Committee accepts that, one is then driven to ask: what, if any, departmental role would a new Lord Chancellor have? I find it very difficult to identify one. If that is the case, we are diminishing and not enhancing the role of the Lord Chancellor. So, while I agreed with an awful lot of the underlying sentiments expressed by my noble friend, I cannot back him on this one.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I have my name on Amendment 60. It seems to me that the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in this regard—the Lord Chancellor having by law to be a Member of your Lordships’ House—is sensible. My noble friend Lord Hailsham’s point is easy to answer. Part of the constitutional pottage made by the Blair Government when they passed the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 was the creation of the Ministry of Justice, with its Orwellian-sounding name. It has not been a happy experience melding the operation of the prison system with the court system, and I suggest that the answer is that that is broken up and the Prison Service returned to the Home Office. Accordingly, there would be no need for a separate Secretary of State for Justice, thus answering my noble friend Lord Hailsham’s point, and the Lord Chancellor could therefore return to this House and protect the interests of the judiciary in the Cabinet. He could indeed also return to being Speaker of this House, which would further guarantee his independence from the Government of the day. That, of course, is for another day, but, at the moment, I strongly support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, with regard to the future position of the Lord Chancellor. Of course, that will not involve the Lord Chancellor sitting as a judge in the future, and I question whether it would involve him sitting as Speaker in this House. However, he clearly does have a role, but one that he can perform effectively only if, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, observed, the office is seen as one of the great offices of state, as it once was; if it is acknowledged as “a destination job”, as he described it, the final step in a distinguished political career. By that means, he could also be appointed Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, something that is sorely lacking at the present time. Because responsibility for the constitution is somewhat nebulous within government, and I acknowledge that that has been the case since 2005.

The responsibility is devolved to the Cabinet Office to some extent and to the Ministry of Justice in other respects, and there is a clear case for identifying someone who is in a position to discharge the role of Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. A suitable person appointed to such an office would also resume the position that great Lord Chancellors occupied in the past. He would be not only the adviser to government on matters of constitutional nicety, but the moral conscience of the Government as well.

That role is difficult to define until it is absent, and it is a role that a suitable Lord Chancellor sitting in this House would be able to perform, with the strength to speak truth to power—something that has sometimes been absent in executive government in this country, as we have faced various constitutional challenges. I heartily endorse the amendment proposed by my noble friend.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 3rd March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Well, let us agree to differ on that.

The Gordon Brown proposals are out there, and there are a range of other matters that we could begin to pull together very quickly; we do not need to start again. I find the reference to the Council of the Nations and Regions interesting. In two or three weeks I have a Question on how precisely the new Council of the Nations and Regions will fit in to our constitutional arrangements, because I am not at all sure that I or the Government yet understand how it will fit in.

We need to level up the way our politics are done. I have spent most of my political life in Yorkshire. We now have a situation in which Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have some voice in London, but the English regions and the English principal councils do not. I am not entirely sure that mayors elected on perhaps 29% or 30% of the vote on a 25% turnout will have that much legitimacy to represent their areas to the central Government. The question of how far the second Chamber should be constituted so as to strengthen the representation of areas outside London in the centralised governance of this country is very important, so we need to move on to that.

We shall say from these Benches to the Government Front Bench, several times, that before we clear this Bill we need some assurance as to where we go from here and when we might start to move from here. This is an interesting, slightly idiosyncratic set of proposals, but one could perhaps throw it into the mix.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that this is an ingenious, but perhaps at points impractical, solution. But it does address one of the more eccentric features of the by-election procedure, not least the use of single transferable vote. Of course, the only Members of the UK Parliament elected by single transferable vote are the hereditary Peers elected in by-elections. I am not sure whether that is the proposal for the by-elections in my noble friend Lord Lucas’s amendment, but I am speaking of the nature of the electorate—or selectorate—for the by-elections. The 92 under the present reforms are largely elected by the hereditary Peers of each party and group, save for the 15 places that were occupied by Deputy Speakers in 1999, when the vote was by all Members of the House. As I understand the proposal from my noble friend Lord Lucas, the Deputy Speaker solution is proposed for these by-elections.

I must say, as a sideline, that I particularly enjoyed voting in one of those by-elections, when the House had to choose between the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and Earl Lloyd-George. I do not think I am breaking any confidences by saying that I voted for Earl Lloyd-George because he demonstrated a particular fondness for the creation of hereditary peerages, although perhaps not always for the best reasons.

Be that as it may, this amendment highlights the core of the mischief of this Bill, in that it means that one of the few avenues of getting into this House that is not controlled by the selection of the Prime Minister—whereby everybody in this House has to be sharp-elbowed enough to catch the eye of the Prime Minister pro tem —is being closed. I commend my noble friend Lord Lucas on proposing a solution that keeps open another avenue into this House.

[Lord Strathclyde (Con)]

My Lords, I have listened to parts of this debate, and I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, was saying: this takes this debate down a different course. We are now discussing the “what ifs” and what could happen. It shows something quite serious about the Government’s thinking. Not in this Bill but in the manifesto, they talk about other things that are planned for the future. Yet there is no White Paper, or even any Green Paper, on the Government’s thoughts on the nature of the House of Lords that they want.

All we are being offered is what is in the Bill—that is it. There is no promise of anything in the future, no careful thought, no publication of a White Paper and not even a timetable for those things. There is no promise that anything will be published before the next general election. We could go through the whole of this Parliament—those noble Lords who will still be here—wondering when the next stage of reform is going to take place. There does not need to be anything because the Leader of the House has not yet convinced her colleagues that they should explore their thoughts and study the bookshelves of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, to look at what has happened in the past and come forward with those proposals.

My noble friend Lord Lucas has tried valiantly to build on the existing by-elections, if I can continue to call them that, by having them filled by members of the public. My noble friends Lord Trenchard and Lord Lucas have thought about alternatives. I do not expect the noble Baroness to accept any of these amendments in any shape or form. When it comes to democracy, I know that we have an amendment later on in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Wallace of Saltaire, which I am supporting, so I will keep back my more general comments about a more democratic mandate. This follows the preamble to the 1911 Act, which the Government, for the time being, seem to have turned their face against, which I very much regret.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 11th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, following the constitutional crisis of 1911, the Constitutional Year Book of 1912—then an annual book of political writers and speakers—expressed at page 84 the prevailing nature of appointments to your Lordships’ House in the following terms:

“The unlimited power of the Crown to add to the House of Lords has at times been looked upon as dangerous to its independence. As long, however, as a peerage is necessarily hereditary, the permanence of the creation and the necessary succession of an heir who be wholly independent would restrain a Sovereign or a Minister, save in the most exceptional cases, from any lavish exercise of this power.”


While, to our modern ear, this sounds very much of its era, I suggest it contains a vital kernel of truth, which remains wholly valid today. As my noble friend Lord Roberts of Belgravia pithily put it, they were cronies of the previous Monarchs and Ministries whose successors are not beholden to anyone living.

To place this 1912 analysis in its legal context, your Lordships’ House, in the Wensleydale Peerage case of 1856, held that the Crown no longer possessed the right of creating a peerage for life which conferred a seat and vote in this House. Interestingly, a life peerage without a seat and vote in this House, was seemingly valid—something which is perhaps worthy of an exploration given the comments earlier in today’s debate.

All this had, of course, evolved by 1911 with the admission of Law Lords to your Lordships’ House by statutes passed in 1886 and 1887, by which those judges held the rank of Baron for life. The Life Peerages Act of 1958 ultimately reversed the effect of the Wensleydale Peerage case. However, at the time of the passage of that Act, and until the 1999 Act, life Peers were greatly outnumbered by those here through the lottery of heredity.

The fundamental truth, which echoes down to us from this statement of 1912, is this: the power of membership of this House should not solely be in the hands of the Executive and, more specifically, in the hands of the Prime Minister of the day. Let us be in no doubt: this Bill will bring about a fundamental shift to our constitutional arrangements, as already observed today by, among others, my noble friend Lord Norton and noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy. The Prime Minister alone, as a result of this Bill, will have the sole power of patronage under the 1958 Act. The only group in this House not subject to that power will be the 26 Bishops of the Church of England.

From the date of commencement of this legislation, these other avenues of entry to this House, entirely separate from the world of political patronage, will be locked and barred. As a consequence of this expulsion, we will become a House composed only of those political or sharp-elbowed enough to be able to catch the eye of a Prime Minister. This Bill will thus deprive the House of much experience and expertise of those from outside the world of politics and its penumbra. The House will be a much weaker place for it. As the noble Lord, Lord Moore of Etchingham, rightly pointed out, public opinion is not likely to look favourably upon a House composed solely of those appointed by comparatively recent Prime Ministers. As the noble Lord observed, it is we, appointees, who are likely to be viewed as the rump.

As my noble friend Lord True said at the outset today—and repeated by others—in passing this Bill we will be snapping the threads of history, so well described by my noble friend Lord Roberts. This in turn reflects the Labour Government’s cavalier approach to our constitution, as embodied in these proposed expulsions from our Parliament of many valuable colleagues on the grounds, as noted by my noble friend Lady Mobarik, of their accident of birth.

NATO and European Political Community Meetings

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not think I can make an announcement about an announcement. However, I can tell the noble Lord that it is a commitment to 2.5%. We will get the outcomes through the strategic defence review. I think the House will want more information about not only the amount of money that is spent but how it is spent. When the strategic defence review reports, we will report back to the House.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal said in her remarks that the best form of deterrence for illegal migration was to return those who had no right to be here. Since 2018, the five largest nationalities crossing by small boats have been from Albania, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The previous Government set up a highly effective return agreement with Albania. There is no agreement with the other four. Do the Government intend to remove people from those countries, and if they do, where do they plan to remove them to?

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

I think the noble Lord slightly truncated my comment. I said that the greatest deterrence was the feeling that they were going to be caught, and that if they were caught and were not entitled to be here, they would be returned. It was slightly broader than what he said. Having bilateral agreements with countries, whereby people can return to safe countries, is certainly part of the plan and the mix of how we deal with this issue.