House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Hermer Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Attorney-General (Lord Hermer) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. Amendments 55, 62 and 97, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Inglewood and Lord Lucas, and the noble Earl, Lord Devon, all seek, in different ways, to place a duty on the Government to review and report on the impact of legislation after it receives Royal Assent.

As a matter of principle, and when they are applied in the right case for the right reasons, obligations to review and assess the impact of legislation can serve a very valuable public function. For example, the scope or size of the subject matter of a Bill might give rise not just to a range of predictable outcomes but to a material risk of adverse impacts in the real world that cannot be adequately assessed at the time of the Bill’s passage. Those impacts could be wide-ranging: for example, they could be financial or environmental or could entrench any manner of inequality. While Parliament can always review the impact of legislation at any time of its choosing without an explicit statutory authority, on occasion, as I have said, a mandatory obligation can serve a proper and indeed important function. However, the Government’s view is that there is no adequate rationale for a review and reporting requirement here.

This Bill is very simple. The primary purpose it seeks to achieve is singular: to remove the right of the remaining hereditary Peers to sit and vote in your Lordships’ House. We also know well what the impact will be: the loss of those Peers. I mean no disrespect to the great public service of those Peers to say that their loss will not give rise to unforeseen, significant adverse consequences that come anywhere close to the sort of justification we would want for the measures sought by these amendments.

We know from experience what the impact will be, because your Lordships’ House has already experienced a far more significant reduction of hereditary Peers following the 1999 Act—which, I note, itself had no post-legislative reporting requirements to scrutinise impact. There has been little suggestion that those reforms produced any profoundly detrimental impacts, let alone ones that would justify the steps proposed in these amendments. The House continued to function effectively then, and, as I say, while we truly value the work of hereditary Peers to date, the House will continue to function when this reform is completed. As the Leader of the House said at Second Reading, the Bill does not alter any core functions of your Lordships’ House.

I hope those points address the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood. I thank him for clarifying that his is a probing amendment, and for his thoughtful contribution and the important points he made about our constitutional framework. However, the noble Lord’s amendment is not confined simply to a review-and-report requirement: if agreed, it would continue in perpetuity to impact any subsequent legislation that alters the composition of your Lordships’ House. In other words, there would be a requirement to undertake reviews indefinitely after every general election until the end of time. With the greatest respect, I suggest that would be a disproportionate measure—but I hope the brevity of my response will not be mistaken for a lack of gratitude for his thoughtful contribution to the debate.

The noble Lord asked what insurance policy is in place. I hope that there are several, not least the Government making plain that this reform—completing the work, as we put it—is the beginning of steps for a further reform of your Lordships’ House, the next being close consultation across the House on the shape of further reform. I agree with very many of the sentiments expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. As we go forward, it is important to ensure that we capture and protect the important role of the second Chamber in revising and reviewing legislation, ensuring that it has a degree of independence from the other place. The reassurance I give is that it is our intention to consult widely and collegiately on the steps ahead.

I turn briefly to the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, whom I have known for a long time prior to coming into this House. As he knows, I greatly respect him and our friendship, but I am afraid I consider his remarks, drawing a comparison between the Bill and the risks faced in the Weimar Republic, quite misplaced. All of us in this House are no doubt acutely aware that this is a delicate moment for liberal democracies and your Lordships’ House no doubt has an important role to play at this delicate and important time, but the power of our contribution will be diluted if we reach too quickly for overstatement or—the more so—inappropriate overstatement. This is a manifesto commitment that is limited in scope, and we serve ourselves well to remember that and not to rhetorically overreach.

I turn to Amendment 97, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Devon. The House of Lords will continue to be called the House of Lords following the passage of the Bill. The removal of the right of hereditary Peers to sit and vote in this place does not change the fact that Members of this House, save for the Lords spiritual, will continue to consist of Peers of the realm. The answer to the eloquent speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, as to why is simply a literal one. In answer to the point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Devon, about the dictionary definition of the “House of Lords”, I respectfully suggest that that version of the dictionary, like this House, requires some subtle updating.

Amendments 91 and 94 have joined this group to accommodate the noble Earl, who is, sadly, not available for the final day of Committee. I hope I accurately capture the amendments in saying that they address a narrow point about the power to refer disputes to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but also a wider point that seeks to address gender inequality in the succession to peerages. I will first address the narrow point about referrals to the Judicial Committee, which I will come to again substantively when we discuss the amendments to Clause 2 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, next week.

As your Lordships know, this House currently has a role in handling complex and disputed peerage claims under Standing Order 77. The aim of Clause 2 is to remove that role. The intention is that that role will be fulfilled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, whose jurisdiction to do so is already established by virtue of Section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833. The effect of the noble Earl’s amendment would be to place the issues arising out of inheritance and title, irrespective of complexity, on the Judicial Committee. The Government, and indeed the Privy Council, would perceive this to be an unacceptable burden on an already exceptionally busy body. It would, in short, amount to an unnecessary and disproportionate use of its resources and expertise. For those reasons, and given the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, we cannot accept the amendments.

Finally, and most importantly—

[The Earl of Devon (CB)]

The Minister may have misunderstood the purport of my amendment, which is merely to ensure that when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council exercises the functions that it will exercise following the passage of this Bill, it does so in a way that does not discriminate against claimants due to their gender. It is nothing more than that—I am not adding any work. I just wish that women could inherit hereditary titles.

[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

I am very grateful for that, and I shall turn to that point now, but the actual wording of the noble Earl’s amendment would have the effect that all disputes, not just complicated and contentious disputes, would be referred to the Judicial Committee, so there is a very practical objection to it.

I turn to the wider point, which I know is the one of most interest to the noble Earl. I shall deal with both amendments in turn, starting with Amendment 91. In the Government’s view, the amendment unacceptably seeks to force on the Judicial Committee how it should exercise its jurisdiction with regard to gender equality and to impose an obligation on it to report on how that obligation has been discharged. With the greatest of respect, that misunderstands the appropriate constitutional role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which is to apply the law. If the law distinguishes between the sexes, as the noble Earl is aware that it does currently in succession to hereditary titles, the Judicial Committee must apply it accordingly.

As I leave that aspect of Amendment 91 and turn to Amendment 94, I of course recognise the importance of the issue that the noble Earl seeks to raise through his good faith amendments. The Government very much share his unease at the inequality baked in to so many hereditary peerages. The fact that fewer than 90 hereditary peerages allow women to inherit titles is something that I know Members in both Houses and across this House are not comfortable with. The Government are committed to the principle of greater equality.

On careful reflection, not least through the engagement that the noble Earl has had with my noble friend the Leader of the House, we do not consider that the amendments have a place in this Bill. The law around succession is complex and the inequities are not confined to gender. The law around succession to hereditary titles also affects adopted children, those born to unmarried parents and children born via assisted conception, using donors. That is before we enter into the issue of whether any future reform should protect the expectation of living heirs or managed property rights. We consider that those are issues that should be considered, but they need to be carefully considered holistically and do not properly form part of this legislation, however aligned we are with the noble Earl on the rationale behind his amendments.

There is also an additional objection of a constitutional nature to Amendment 94, because it seeks to impose on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council an obligation to consult. Such a requirement to consult on how the law should be applied in the area of peerage claims very significantly cuts across the judicial independence of the Judicial Committee. I appreciate, of course, that that is not the noble Earl’s intention, but I fear that his amendment would critically undermine the independence of the committee. Either the committee independently and impartially applies the law or it takes views on social policy. It cannot do both. However, as I have said, nothing in my response to the amendments from the noble Earl should be taken as a suggestion that he is not raising very important points—he is—but they are not part of the policy aims outlined in our manifesto commitments or in this Bill.

I turn briefly to the issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech. As the contrasting contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, demonstrated, there is no consensus on this point, and it underlined— I say with the greatest respect—that this Bill is not the place to determine that question. For those reasons, I respectfully request that noble Lords do not press their amendments.

[Lord Inglewood (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General for his remarks about my amendment. He got the message I was trying to convey. All I would say, to use his phrase, is that we are living in delicate political times. It is incumbent on us to think about the worst possible eventualities that might emerge long after the passage of this Bill.

I, as a hereditary Peer, was trying to do something that lawyers say you cannot do: issue commands from beyond the grave. We should bear in mind extreme eventualities, because the one thing that is certain is that this reform is not the last reform. This is not a dialectical process, ending up in some nirvana. We must be alert.

As far as the wider debate is concerned, I thank those who participated. It seemed to me that it struck a divide between those thinking along the lines I described and those thinking rather more differently. I think the noble Earl, Lord Devon, got it right. He said in the future people will be concerned about titles and sex, because that was what a great deal of the discussion earlier this afternoon was in fact about.

Finally, the noble Earl, Lord Devon, on the Cross Bench, who is a personal friend, made me feel very inadequate. I may be a hereditary Peer, but my hereditary peerage did not exist at the time I was born. This is in very great contrast to the noble Earl. All I would say—I hope this gives pleasure to the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Grocott—is that I came into the world as citizen Vane, and I am quite happy to leave it under that epithet. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the first life peerages were conferred under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, which remained in force until the impact of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. It is perhaps notable that the first three appointments as Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were Scottish lawyers. It is also notable that the next three appointments as Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were Irish lawyers. However, 15 years later, a suitable English lawyer was identified and appointed.

Against that background, I turn first to Amendments 56 and 57, in the name of my noble friend Lord Wolfson, to which I have added my name. I must note two points. First, I express a degree of surprise about the advice he received from the Cabinet Office upon his appointment to the Government. There is a long and perhaps dishonourable tradition of Attorneys-General, Solicitors-General and Lord Advocates assuming high judicial office after their service in government. Indeed, in the case of the Lord Advocate, it was invariably the practice into the 1960s that he would appoint himself to the most senior judicial office available, there being no conflict of interest. However, there are very good reasons why it is of benefit to this House, as a political House, to have the benefit of those who have served in high judicial office, whether they do so following their retirement or at an earlier stage.

It was a point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that, while Lords of Appeal in Ordinary sat in this House, they would do so with a self-denying ordinance. They would not engage in matters that were potentially controversial from the perspective of their judicial office; for example, you would not have seen them engage in debates with regard to the Human Rights Act and other similar matters. However, as my noble and learned friend pointed out, it gave those in high judicial office some impression of the political mood so far as legislation was concerned, and that would have an impact on them when they came, in due course, to address what were potentially politically controversial issues that were raised to a point of law. I suggest that there was always a significant benefit in having such qualified persons in this House, albeit that it may be appropriate that they should be here after the judicial retirement age of 75 and up to the Government’s intended retirement age of 80—I see some of the government Back-Benchers wincing at that, but I understand that that is the intention.

I support the points made by my noble friend Lord Wolfson. I do not go so far as the amendment proposed by my noble friends Lord Banner and Lord Murray, and I do not take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that we are dealing here with protected places. We are dealing here with those who are not executive appointments to this House, of which a greater proportion are going to emerge as a result of this legislation.

In these circumstances, it appears to me that there are two elements. There is the element of an honour conferred on those who are granted high judicial office, and that is already reflected in the fact that the present President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court had a peerage conferred on him upon his appointment and the fact that the Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, had such an honour bestowed upon him as well. Frankly, I would be confident that those who have held high judicial office and have been public servants for so long a part of their career will, as a matter of course, become engaged in the proceedings of this House if that opportunity is presented to them.

I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that there should be no link between the peerage and a distinguished office which has been held. I do not believe we have to go down a slippery slope. However, I acknowledge that the separation of powers has to be noted and acknowledged, albeit Montesquieu was talking about the United States’ system and not our own—and even there, there are changes afoot.

I invite the Government to consider very seriously Amendments 56 and 57, and to comment on the other attendant amendments which would bring those who have held high public office and been distinguished public servants into this House, almost invariably on to the Cross Benches.

[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions, which in this group concern the appointment of specific public servants to your Lordships’ House. I will start, if I may, with the amendments that concern the conferral of peerages on serving members of the senior judiciary, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson and Lord Banner, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness.

I start from a happy place of consensus, set out so eloquently by the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson, Lord Banner and Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Garnier and Lord Keen. There can be no doubt as to the enormous benefit that your Lordships’ House gains from the presence and participation of former members of the senior judiciary. That benefit is not limited to the contribution of judges. As all the noble Lords I have just listed demonstrate, the contribution of eminent practitioners in the law adds to your Lordships’ House. If I may say so, there was no finer reflection of the contribution made to your Lordships’ House and its importance than the contribution made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.

Before it is thought that I am in competition with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and others for a Private Eye award, there are three reasons why we cannot agree to these amendments. The first is that the Government’s intention is that this is and will remain a single-purpose Bill, to give effect to our manifesto commitment to remove hereditary Peers from participation in your Lordships’ House. I am not going to labour that point because it has been made in respect of so many amendments and was reiterated by the contribution from my noble friend Lord Grocott. We do not consider it appropriate or desirable to seek to piggyback quite separate proposals for reform on to the Bill.

That merges into my second reason. The future composition of your Lordships’ House beyond the proposal in this Bill is a matter best considered in the round. The Government have committed to consult on an alternative second Chamber—and before that, on further reforms—in due course. One can anticipate that it is highly likely that Prime Ministers of all parties will wish to continue to appoint retired senior judges to your Lordships’ House, but, before more comprehensive reform, we consider it appropriate that appointments remain for now at the discretion of the Prime Minister. Of course, if there are to be changes, we entirely accept the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, that logic dictates that, in respect of judges, it should be extended to Northern Ireland if it is extended to Scotland, England and Wales.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. The answer he proposes is that the Prime Minister retains the discretion to appoint retired members of the Supreme Court to this House. How does that answer the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that this appears to place a slightly invidious choice on the Prime Minister where he is conferring a favour on a judge? If it were automatically all judges, there could be no suggestion that decisions are made that might favour them in the list of peerages.

[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s intervention. I can well anticipate that, if this is an issue that arises on consultation, there may be a distinction—to my mind, it is potentially a constitutionally important distinction—between the appropriateness or otherwise of the appointment of senior judges on their appointment to judicial office, which gives rise to the constitutional tensions that I alluded to a moment ago, and appointment upon retirement. I hope that that answers his question, at least in part.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

The noble and learned Lord draws a distinction between appointment to the Lords on taking office and appointment at the end of office being served, but we have heard already that the current President of the Supreme Court was appointed to this House on assuming the office—of course, on the understanding that he would not participate in the debates of the House. Is the noble and learned Lord saying that that is unconstitutional?

[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

The constitutional tension is between judges who sit on cases that may often concern government legislation also sitting in the legislature. The distinction I seek to draw simply seeks to exemplify the merits and demerits of a debate that may well take place during consultation. It is not meant to reflect any firm view of the Government as to where that may ultimately land.

I make one final point on the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, drawing on the wider point that I made a moment ago about the merits of looking at this in the round. It is worth reflecting that, if this were to come into effect today, it would create a significant number of new Members of your Lordships’ House. Putting aside judicial Members, of that large number, only five would be women. It is also right to remind ourselves that, in the long history of the Appellate Committee of your Lordships’ House and then the creation of the Supreme Court in 2010, there have been only four women judges or members of that committee.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

The point I was making with my amendment was not necessarily to make the case for all—I take the arguments that the Minister and others have made about a slippery slope—but to tease out the distinction between the constitutional point that the Minister identified, on the necessity of appointing judges on appointment, and maintaining the independence of action of senior public servants who might want to curry favour with Prime Ministers who have the power to put them in the House of Lords after they complete their jobs.

[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

The noble Lord’s intervention exemplifies the important conversations that lie ahead as we try to unpick those tensions.

As I have just alluded to, there are wider questions around the future composition of this House. The Government are committed to other reforms, not least the alternative second Chamber set out in our manifesto. There is no doubt that this House will continue to be blessed with legal expertise. There is also no doubt that, with any appointment to your Lordships’ House now or in future, the expertise offered by former members of the senior judiciary will be a blessing to your Lordships’ House. Although noble Lords have pressed an important point and this has been an important conversation, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, may I kindly ask him to comment on the claim by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that the amendments to the Bill in this group are too wide-ranging in scope? The clerks have been clear that amendments on the composition of your Lordships’ House are in scope on the basis that the removal of one group of Members is closely connected to, and has repercussive effects on, the wider membership. I believe it is against the practice of the House implicitly to criticise the clerks on the Floor of the House, which the noble and learned Lord appeared to do. Apparently, on 12 March the Government tabled amendments to change the scope and long title of the Employment Rights Bill. The Government have therefore done it on another Bill, so there is no need for the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on this Bill.

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[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and other noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. We do not accept Amendment 60 for three reasons, beyond the fact that it falls outside the intended scope of this single-issue Bill.

First, the amendment seeks to fetter the power of a Prime Minister to shape the Cabinet according to his or her own choosing. Under this amendment, if the Prime Minister wished to choose a sitting MP to be Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, as has been the case for every Lord Chancellor since 2007, that person would have to vacate their seat and trigger a by-election; or, if this amendment were to be accepted, the Prime Minister would be required to separate the roles of Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. In the Government’s view, that would be a constitutionally inappropriate fettering of the Prime Minister’s discretion to pick a Cabinet of his or her own choosing.

Secondly, there is no constitutional or public policy rationale to justify taking us back to the position that we were in before 2005. One cannot, for the reasons set out by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, simply pick and choose without going wholesale back to the 2005 position—putting the Lord Chancellor back on the Woolsack and as the senior judge—because what else is left of the Lord Chancellor’s role? It cannot simply be a rationale driven by nothing more than to have a member of the Cabinet committed to upholding the rule of law. That should be a commitment consistent with the ministerial code for all members of the Cabinet but, if I may say so, I also see it quite properly as a role for an Attorney-General. As the House will be aware, with the Prime Minister’s and the monarch’s grateful permission, the oath of the Attorney-General was changed when I took it to include an express commitment—although it would always have been implicit—to the rule of law.

Thirdly, the amendments fail to address what we would respectfully say are the most important attributes for a Lord Chancellor in the post-2005 age. Those attributes were identified by the Constitution Committee, which considered the Lord Chancellor’s role in a report two years ago—and I acknowledge the committee’s current chair, who is not in his place, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. In its final analysis, the report said that

“character, intellect and a commitment to the rule of law are the most important attributes for a Lord Chancellor to possess”.

We agree, and we do not consider that the acid test of those attributes is the House in which a Lord Chancellor should sit.

My right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor exemplifies the qualities of a great officeholder committed to the rule of law. More widely, as she has made clear, this entire Government see the rule of law as our lodestar. I have no doubt that the Prime Minister has appointed my right honourable friend in the confidence that the House in which she sits is no hindrance to her in discharging her vital constitutional responsibilities. For those three reasons, I respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions in this short but important debate. I make the point, although it really ought to go without saying—but I say it for the avoidance of doubt—that none of this is any reflection on the current occupant of the role, for whom I have the greatest personal respect. What we have to do when we consider constitutional matters is to move away from the personal and to the principled, and that is what my amendment is directed at.

The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General has identified three reasons why this amendment cannot be accepted by the Government. First, he said, it would fetter the PM’s choice of who to have in the Cabinet, but it does not; the PM can still appoint anybody to the role of Lord Chancellor. In fact, the Prime Minister is able to appoint anybody and is not limited to Members of the House of Commons, because somebody could be parachuted in, as has happened on previous occasions. There is no fetter at all—that is a good red herring.

The second point is about what the Lord Chancellor would do. That was the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham—and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, gave the short answer. The Lord Chancellor would be there to oversee the really important parts of our constitution: constitutional affairs, devolution, human rights and international treaties. We should therefore go back to the Lord Chancellor being in charge of a Department for Constitutional Affairs.

As to the last point, that the current Attorney-General is the first one to add into the oath a commitment to the rule of law, of course I share that commitment to the rule of law with him—although I think that our interpretation of what it contains may sometimes differ, but that is not a matter for now. With regard to statute, the Lord Chancellor is in a sui generis position. I continue to think that we have lost something important in the 2005 Act, and I hope that this conversation may continue, but of course I beg leave to withdraw the amendment this evening.