House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Banner (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 68, which, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson indicated, takes the premise of his Amendment 56 and rolls it out to all Supreme Court justices. I declare an interest as a practising King’s Counsel who fairly frequently appears before the Supreme Court, including in one appeal where judgment is still pending.

I supported the replacement of the Appellate Committee with the new UK Supreme Court, and I still believe that was the right decision. In a modern democracy, all courts, and in particular the final court of appeal, must not just be but be seen to be separate and independent from the other branches of the state.

However, a collateral and I think probably unintended effect of this, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson outlined, has been significantly to reduce the pool of Cross-Bench legal expertise in this House. By convention, certainly by the turn of the millennium, sitting Members on the Appellate Committee did not speak in debates and did not otherwise participate in relation to controversial matters, although they did sit in committees to some degree. However, upon their retirement they invariably would—and those who remain still do—make an invaluable contribution to the work of this House.

It is also the case that, prior to retirement and while in office as judges, by virtue of being Members of this House, those on the Appellate Committee would have a fuller and further first-hand understanding of the procedures of Parliament, which, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson indicated in his excellent lecture at Policy Exchange earlier this afternoon, may have assisted the judges in their consideration of the Prorogation issue in the second Miller litigation.

Now that the final court is outside this House, its members no longer need to receive a peerage upon being appointed and, contrary to what had been advocated in some quarters, no convention to that effect has been established. In recent years, among full-time Supreme Court justices, only the President has been by convention awarded a peerage—albeit that the Lord Chief Justice, who occasionally sits in that court, has also by convention been awarded a peerage.

The result of all this has been significantly to reduce the pipeline of top-tier judges able to contribute to the work of this House. Amendment 68 would rectify that by requiring all current and future Supreme Court justices to be awarded a peerage. I myself would envisage that, during their tenure on the court, they would follow the Appellate Committee’s former convention that sitting judges do not speak in debates and do not otherwise participate in controversial matters, but, upon retirement, they would be able fully to engage and thus continue the long-established and invaluable tradition of our most senior judges contributing to the work of this House on their retirement from the Bench.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 56, 57 and 68 in this group, to which I have added my name. I declare an interest as a member of the Bar. I also declare a special interest in that, across the corridor in my chambers is the room of Lord Dyson, who was the first member of the Supreme Court not to be the beneficiary of a peerage under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, and therefore the first person from these Benches that the House did not have the benefit of hearing from, which in my view was a great loss—and that applies to many members of the Supreme Court.

There is an element of confusion in the general public, and indeed even in the politically engaged general public. When they read of public pronouncements from the likes of Lord Dyson or Lord Sumption, they are under the impression that these people are Members of this House. When the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 came into force, there was a question about what title one gave to the Justices of the Supreme Court. So, when Sir John Dyson, as he then was, became a member of the Supreme Court, having formerly been the Master of the Rolls in the Court of Appeal, where he was Lord Justice Dyson, there was a need to differentiate him from the members of the Court of Appeal and to give a special title to members of the Supreme Court.

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[Lord Strathclyde (Con)]

My Lords, I am following my noble friend’s argument and I very much support him, but does he believe, as I do, that, after 2005, there was an understanding between the Labour Government and the Justices of the Supreme Court that they would all be made Members of the House of Lords—Peers in their own right—but would not sit in the House of Lords until after they had retired. If such an understanding had taken place, it would have solved a great number of problems. I hope the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General might give us an answer, if he knows, on whether there was such an understanding after the 2005 Act.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am very grateful to my noble friend for his intervention, and I very much hope there was such an understanding—but I am afraid I cannot find a trace of that agreement.

Turning to the answer given to a question put to Jack Straw on this question in January 2009, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, asked him about the future of the justices of the Supreme Court. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, noted that the Law Lords performed an important function in the legislative process and asked the then Lord Chancellor what the position would be once they had retired, along the lines outlined by my noble friend—thus suggesting that there was an informal agreement that this would be what would occur. The then Lord Chancellor’s answer was:

“Of course, that was one of the arguments against change and … I can see the case”.


He then said that

“it crucially depends on whether we continue with an all appointed House of Lords”.

So the answer was that they just parked the issue, saying that it was all dependent on what was going to happen in future to the House of Lords. The Lord Chancellor goes on to say that

“if we go to a 20% appointed chamber”,

which was one of the things then being considered, the number of noble Lords would be “fewer”. That was why he refused to commit at that point in answer to that question.

The issue was raised again in July 2009 in a question from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and it was answered by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice. He said:

“My Lords, justices of the Supreme Court who are appointed after October 2009 will not automatically become Members of the second Chamber on retirement, but could be considered for appointment by the Appointments Commission. It is right to say that former Law Lords will be able to take up their places again … on retirement from the Supreme Court, and it is right that this House needs a lot of expertise, particularly in that field”.—[Official Report, 20/7/09; col. 1375.]


Of course, he was right in that respect. But the reality is that that has not happened. If one looks at the appointments that have been made by HOLAC, one sees that former justices of the Supreme Court have not numbered highly among the appointments. This has been a very significant omission and now is the moment, I suggest to your Lordships, to rectify that error.

At the very least, the Wolfson-Elie compromise of giving peerages to the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court should be strongly considered by the Government, but I would suggest it should go more widely than that: every member of the 12-member court should receive life peerages on appointment. That should be the convention. There would then be no need for these courtesy titles. When they retire, they would then hopefully become engaged and active Members of your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make one brief contribution to this debate, which is likely to go on for some time. I enjoyed listening to the contributions entirely from lawyers except for the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. They had one thing clearly in common: none of them had any reference whatsoever to the subject of hereditary Peers being removed from this House. They are entitled to have made their amendments because of some ruling, which came from somewhere that I have not yet discovered, that under remote circumstances hereditary Peer membership could relate to other parts of the constitution. I accept that this might be the case in some remote circumstances. However, it is very difficult for me to understand, in any sensible conversation, what relevance adding, through these amendments, 25 protected places in the House of Lords has to the subject of this Bill.

I do not want to prolong it because I do not want to promote debate. However, with such a loose definition of what is included and what is not, on the same logic if you had a Bill to reduce class sizes in infant classes it would be entirely within the scope of the Bill to discuss university admissions processes—because, obviously, if you reduce class sizes, that gives an opportunity for children to develop more effectively and stand a better chance of getting into university. Lawyers can do that but, in the interests of common sense and as a general principle, if an amendment has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject of the Bill, it would be a good idea to determine that it is out of order.

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All the points in the debate raised both the merits and the demerits of the arguments as to what further reforms should take place that would shape your Lordships’ House. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, mentioned the real care that must be given before fixing categories, whether or not that is a good idea in principle, and, if so, how they should be fixed. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, made the important point that it is not the nature of the office but the commitment to participate that should dictate this. All of these are matters for careful and collegiate consultation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. The answer he proposes is that the Prime Minister retains the discretion to appoint retired members of the Supreme Court to this House. How does that answer the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that this appears to place a slightly invidious choice on the Prime Minister where he is conferring a favour on a judge? If it were automatically all judges, there could be no suggestion that decisions are made that might favour them in the list of peerages.

[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s intervention. I can well anticipate that, if this is an issue that arises on consultation, there may be a distinction—to my mind, it is potentially a constitutionally important distinction—between the appropriateness or otherwise of the appointment of senior judges on their appointment to judicial office, which gives rise to the constitutional tensions that I alluded to a moment ago, and appointment upon retirement. I hope that that answers his question, at least in part.

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[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I sympathise with a very great deal of what my noble friend said. I speak with a certain family background, and I too regret the diminution of the role and status of the Lord Chancellor. That said, we are where we are and we cannot sensibly address this amendment without asking ourselves what the role of the Lord Chancellor is and should be. Since 2007, the Lord Chancellor has also been Secretary of State for Justice, sitting in the House of Commons. The Secretary of State for Justice has a very large number of responsibilities that touch on the constituency interests of Members of Parliament. I find it very difficult to believe that Members of Parliament would accept the Secretary of State for Justice sitting in the House of Lords.

That takes one directly to the role. Are we to separate the role of the Lord Chancellor from that of Secretary of State for Justice? That is certainly possible; it could be done. But what other departmental responsibility would the Lord Chancellor then have? I accept that there are some senior offices that can be represented in this House—if I may say so, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General does so with distinction. He has been preceded by other Attorneys-General in this House, and I regard that as perfectly proper because there are a relatively few constituency interests that would engage Members of the House of Commons.

That, to a lesser extent, was also true of the Foreign Secretary. My noble friend Lord Cameron occupied the role of Foreign Secretary with great distinction. It caused real problems in the House of Commons, as indeed did the role of Lord Carrington at the time of Lady Thatcher’s Government. In both cases, this had to be met by having a very effective deputy. But, again, the Foreign Secretary’s role, although hugely important, raised relatively few constituency interests.

My point is this: if the Lord Chancellor is to have a serious departmental responsibility, which has constituency interests engaged so far as Members of the House of Commons are concerned, that Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice or whatever, has to be in the House of Commons. If this Committee accepts that, one is then driven to ask: what, if any, departmental role would a new Lord Chancellor have? I find it very difficult to identify one. If that is the case, we are diminishing and not enhancing the role of the Lord Chancellor. So, while I agreed with an awful lot of the underlying sentiments expressed by my noble friend, I cannot back him on this one.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I have my name on Amendment 60. It seems to me that the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in this regard—the Lord Chancellor having by law to be a Member of your Lordships’ House—is sensible. My noble friend Lord Hailsham’s point is easy to answer. Part of the constitutional pottage made by the Blair Government when they passed the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 was the creation of the Ministry of Justice, with its Orwellian-sounding name. It has not been a happy experience melding the operation of the prison system with the court system, and I suggest that the answer is that that is broken up and the Prison Service returned to the Home Office. Accordingly, there would be no need for a separate Secretary of State for Justice, thus answering my noble friend Lord Hailsham’s point, and the Lord Chancellor could therefore return to this House and protect the interests of the judiciary in the Cabinet. He could indeed also return to being Speaker of this House, which would further guarantee his independence from the Government of the day. That, of course, is for another day, but, at the moment, I strongly support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, with regard to the future position of the Lord Chancellor. Of course, that will not involve the Lord Chancellor sitting as a judge in the future, and I question whether it would involve him sitting as Speaker in this House. However, he clearly does have a role, but one that he can perform effectively only if, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, observed, the office is seen as one of the great offices of state, as it once was; if it is acknowledged as “a destination job”, as he described it, the final step in a distinguished political career. By that means, he could also be appointed Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, something that is sorely lacking at the present time. Because responsibility for the constitution is somewhat nebulous within government, and I acknowledge that that has been the case since 2005.

The responsibility is devolved to the Cabinet Office to some extent and to the Ministry of Justice in other respects, and there is a clear case for identifying someone who is in a position to discharge the role of Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. A suitable person appointed to such an office would also resume the position that great Lord Chancellors occupied in the past. He would be not only the adviser to government on matters of constitutional nicety, but the moral conscience of the Government as well.

That role is difficult to define until it is absent, and it is a role that a suitable Lord Chancellor sitting in this House would be able to perform, with the strength to speak truth to power—something that has sometimes been absent in executive government in this country, as we have faced various constitutional challenges. I heartily endorse the amendment proposed by my noble friend.