Lord Moynihan
Main Page: Lord Moynihan (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)(6 days, 16 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 173A standing in my name on the Order Paper. Here, we are referring to Clause 32, and it is the Secretary of State who will be taking a power beyond this Bill, not even by positive resolution but by using a much lighter negative resolution procedure, to determine the time period for the approval of new owners and offices. I quote from the Government’s memorandum to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which states that
“the contents of the IFR’s suitability tests may likely change, compared to when the Bill is introduced … Once the contents of the IFR’s tests are set in statute, the Government will be better placed to set the time window in regulations”.
This is, after all, an important clause which addresses the scope of powers to attach or vary discretionary licence conditions. I would have thought that the consultation period should be very specific and placed on the face of the Bill. There is a risk here that the regulator may not consult the clubs in the leagues and just hurry the process through, which I am sure is not the intention, but why on earth not put it on the face of the Bill—not only which clubs and leagues are affected—which is not part of the Bill, as we have previously debated?
The very least the Government can do on this occasion is amend this clause, given the scale of these powers, and change the scope of the manifold discretionary licence conditions that the Government, not the regulators, are imposing on football clubs here. They must consult them. It seems eminently sensible that they should consult them, and I would have thought that the Minister would be the first to say that they will consult them. If they will, I cannot understand why we would not put that in the Bill.
My amendment says simply that, before submitting a request under subsection (6), the regulator must consult, first, the clubs; secondly, “each specified competition organiser”; and, thirdly, such other persons as the regulator considers appropriate. The consultation, as it stands, is not specific enough and risks the regulator not consulting the clubs and leagues on this issue. I really do believe that there would be every intention for the regulator to do so, so let us just clarify that in the Bill so that there is no danger that the regulator would avoid that possibility. I hope my amendment gains the approval of the Minister when she comes to wind up.
My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 173B, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hayward, who I hope feels better soon. It introduces a number of key principles for the governance of capital buffer requirements that the IFR could potentially impose. This amendment fills an important gap in the Bill. I am also supportive of other amendments encouraging the IFR to adopt an outcome-focused approach, allowing the leagues to develop detailed financial rules within the overall statutory framework, as this will help to preserve the competitive balance with the design of common rules for all clubs. I am sure that the Minister will agree that this approach reflects the light-touch model that she has been describing.
As we heard in our debate on Monday, the Bill allows for a more interventionist approach for the IFR with individual clubs, through its discretionary licence conditions. In these cases, it is important that some clear parameters are set out in the Bill to ensure that any capital buffer requirements that may be developed are workable, proportionate and reflective of football’s realities.
Football clubs operate in vastly different financial contexts, even within the same pyramid. At one end, a relatively modest capital buffer of, say, enough to cover six months of operating costs might have saved a club such as Bury, for instance. But, at the other end, the challenges faced by Premier League clubs are of an entirely different scale. For a Premier League club relegated to the Championship, or indeed a club expecting but then failing to qualify for the Champions League, I understand that the financial shock can amount to as much as £90 million to £100 million.
Crucially, the way these clubs manage such risks is fundamentally different from clubs in lower leagues. At this level, as we have heard, clubs do not rely on cash reserves alone. Instead, they utilise a range of financial tools, including player trading, which is a core part of football’s economic model, as well as secured credit facilities—often backed by guaranteed revenues—and parachute payments, which I know we will discuss later and which help with the transition on relegation.
Without explicit reference in the Bill, there is a danger that the IFR might impose overly rigid liquidity requirements that would privilege clubs with access to unlimited working capital—I am thinking, for instance, of those backed by sovereign wealth funds—while unfairly disadvantaging others. This amendment would ensure that capital buffers reflect the real-world financial tools that clubs use to manage risk, including non-cash assets, as I have just described.
The single most important liquid asset for football clubs towards the top of the pyramid is their players. As I am sure my noble friend Lady Brady can tell us, player trading is often one of the first mechanisms that they turn to when managing financial shocks—yet the Bill provides no clarity on how the IFR will treat these assets. Even when player liquidity is recognised, valuation of these assets is critical. Under current UEFA financial fair play rules, players developed through academies are often valued at zero, for instance, based on book value, rather than their actual market worth. The purpose of UEFA’s rules is different, but, if copied by the IFR for the purposes of capital buffers, for instance, this could penalise clubs such as Crystal Palace, Southampton, West Ham or Arsenal, which have brought through many talents into their first teams in recent years.
This amendment therefore seeks to ensure that the IFR adopts sophisticated valuation methodology, including proper independent valuation of players and, in particular, a proper recognition of the value of academy players. Without these safeguards, the IFR risks undervaluing clubs’ most significant assets, forcing them to meet capital buffer requirements that are, in practice, unnecessary.
We have heard many times in this Committee that the competitive balance is the lifeblood of football, but poorly designed capital buffer requirements could easily and accidentally disrupt this balance. We must avoid this outcome, so I hope that even if the Minister is unable to accept the level of specificity in Amendment 173B, she will recognise that this area of the Bill is a source of anxiety for clubs. I hope she will agree that the principles within this amendment are important and that it is the Government’s intention that the IFR pursues a tailored approach, informed by guidance, that will protect the competitive balance and investability of the English game.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Markham, Lord Moynihan and Lord Hayward, for tabling these amendments, and the noble Lords, Lord Markham and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for giving notice of their intention to oppose the question that Clause 22 stand part of the Bill. Like other noble Lords, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, a swift recovery and hope to see him back for the next day of consideration by this Committee.
I will start with Amendment 172 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Markham. It is vital that the regulator has the appropriate tools to address systemic financial risks that might arise. Indeed, in recent years clubs have faced a number of systemic risks, such as during the Covid-19 pandemic, when many clubs faced financial difficulties, some of which are still felt by clubs today.
The ability to restrict clubs’ overall expenditure may be the most appropriate and effective tool in certain circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord Markham, asked about limiting expenditure, which is already used within football. Some leagues already have rules limiting expenditure on wages and limits on permissive losses. I reassure him that the regulator is further constrained when taking action here. First, we have made it absolutely clear that the regulator has the ability only to restrict overall expenditure. It cannot place restrictions around specific transactions or types of transactions, to micromanage spending in that way.
Furthermore, the regulatory principles enshrined in the Bill in Clause 8 include the principle that the regulator should act proportionately. We would expect this to be reflected in any discretionary licence condition that the regulator sets. Restricting overall expenditure might be the most proportionate and least interventionist or burdensome response to these risks. Without this tool, it might have to apply a different response that may be more restrictive or less effective.
I turn to Amendment 173A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to which the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Addington, also spoke. While we appreciate the intent, we are confident that clubs and competition organisers would already be captured under the current wording in the Bill, of persons the regulator “considers appropriate”. As I have outlined in previous debates, the Government do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to put an exhaustive list of stakeholders in the Bill. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has a different view, but we feel that the regulator will be best placed to determine which persons are appropriate to consult depending on the decision in question. However, I look forward to further discussions with him on this point.
The regulator is required to consult anyone it considers appropriate. Failing to do so would be a breach of its statutory obligations and could result in legal challenge—
I was not for a minute suggesting that there should be an exhaustive list that should be consulted; I was simply highlighting three very specific groups of people who should be consulted, which I think the Minister agrees with. There should be no doubt in the minds of the Committee that if you simply list clubs and competition organisers and then say “such other persons as the regulator considers appropriate”, you capture everything she has just said and make it very clear that the regulator will approach and consult clubs and competition organisers—which is the whole purpose behind this clause and surely one that has her full support. Why not simply clarify it in a very simple additional nine words?
I hear what the noble Lord says and look forward to further discussions with him on that point, but we feel that the regulator will be best placed to determine which persons are appropriate to consult.
I entirely accept that there are detailed regulations, in particular in relation to money laundering, but that is a far more specific area, where there is a government system and a whole army of people with expertise to assess those matters. The question is whether we wish to make it a function of the independent football regulator to have a whole department that is concerned with this. I see the force of the principle, but I remain sceptical about it in practice.
My Lords, this is one of the best debates we have had in Committee to date. I am equally sympathetic to the points made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the interventions of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the concern about the practicality of this, but none of that is covered in Amendment 200, which is in this group.
Let us just assume, hypothetically, that a state-owned entity acquiring a football club in England has an excellent human rights record and no problems with modern slavery. Under Amendment 200, it would be banned from owning a club in England because it is state-controlled. All the points that have been made are relevant and important, but Amendment 200, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is very specific and states that:
“No state-controlled club may be granted an operating licence”.
There is no reference to human rights abuses or to any of the important issues regarding the supply chain, which have been mentioned. It simply states that a foreign-owned, state-controlled company cannot own an English football club. If we pass this amendment, immediately we would then have to divest the Abu Dhabi United Group of its majority ownership of Manchester City and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund of its ownership of Newcastle United, to mention but two cases.
How have the Premier League and UEFA addressed this to date? They have focused on the word “control”. When the Premier League addressed the Newcastle ownership test, it received “legally binding guarantees” that the state of Saudi Arabia would not have control over Newcastle United in the event of any deal. However, the Bill goes much further. It grants powers to the regulator that are not just about control. An individual has to be considered who has
“a higher degree of influence”
over the ownership of a club. The control test that UEFA and the Premier League currently use, which is a tough test that takes up a lot of time and energy, is overridden by a requirement in this legislation—for the first time in sport—to test whether an individual has a higher degree of influence. There can be no doubt that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, as chair of the PIF, has a very high degree of influence over that board —he appoints it. Indeed, a Minister from that board has been appointed to be chairman of Newcastle.
If we go forward and accept Amendment 200 as it stands, what would we be saying to football, to Newcastle, to the Qataris—who might want to acquire a company, which there has been much speculation about, not least in this Committee—and to Abu Dhabi in relation to Man City? It would drive a coach and horses through the current ownership of the Premier League. It would be a very serious decision by the Government to take state control over who owns the football clubs in this country.
I say that because it comes down to the degree of state influence that is behind the regulator. The Government have said:
“Regarding the scope of the tests, we recognise the trade-offs involved, and are aware of the range of corporate structures behind clubs”,
and they specifically mention here sovereign wealth funds. They go on to say:
“We are designing the legal scope of the tests with these challenges in mind”.
They call them challenges, to be faced down at the request of government. We would have an open back door in the Bill if we accepted the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, straying into foreign policy in a way that we do not currently do. We have plenty of legislation elsewhere on the statute book allowing the Government to intervene if they felt they needed to in a certain circumstance.
The Government have therefore further confirmed the scope of the regulator. To me, it is incredibly important that the regulator is not given so many powers as to require it to have direct influence. I lost an amendment on Monday night, when I asked for that at least to be defined and for consultation to go out to find out what “significant influence” means in this context. I think that is extremely important.
I have a question for the Minister. I cannot find an answer as a result of the debates we have had so far, but football needs an answer and probably needs it now. Is it the Government’s position that the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, should be able to own Newcastle United under the definition of ownership in the Bill? It is a very simple question, with a yes or no answer. If yes, why have Ministers deliberately constructed a Bill that will quickly put him through the ownership test of significant influence, and why did the Minister confirm on Monday that she wanted incumbent Heads of State to be tested? If no then surely the Government should say so, and we should have that as part of an open debate.
I hope that, if that question is answered this evening, there will be no doubt in future about what the Government intend, not least following the Prime Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia last week and his offer to go to a football match with the Crown Prince. It is only reasonable for Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince to know whether he is expected to divest himself of the interest in Newcastle United or not.
My Lords, I welcome my noble friend Lord Scriven to this debate and congratulate him on making those points. When it comes to the modern slavery amendments—to take on the point from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—if other people are looking at this, surely the regulator should be able to take their opinion. Surely that would be a reasonable step. If the Bill does not allow that, I am sure we could do that quite easily.
On state ownership, I put my name to Amendment 200 because I thought that at the very least we deserved an answer. The previous Government’s Back-Benchers did not like the Telegraph under control and, let us face it, more people have heard of Newcastle United than they have the Telegraph.
This is an important point. Are we happy with a cultural asset being in the hands of a foreign power, regardless of the fact that we have a reasonably good relationship with it on most things? It is not all things, as we do not like certain things about it. That is a real question, and the Minister is being asked a series of real questions. I hope that at the end of this we will know whether these points are worth pursuing at other stages of the Bill. These questions really should be answered, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I would be grateful if the noble Lord allowed me to take away that specific example. I will write to him and to the Committee and place a letter in the Library, so that they have a detailed response on that point.
These are all issues that the regulator will take very seriously. Where the amendments before us today go further than existing drafting, this introduces elements that we do not believe are necessarily relevant to an owner’s suitability. They would require the regulator to make a subjective and potentially speculative judgment on whether the individual has engaged in any activity that would risk bringing the game into disrepute. Where a potential dispute relates to things like criminal history, the regulator will already have to consider these things. But “disrepute” is a vague term; could it arise through an owner’s conduct in their personal life, or their political views? In the Government’s view, it would put the regulator in quite a difficult position, making a value judgment on what constitutes disrepute, which would undermine the principle of a reasoned, evidence-based test.
Turning to Amendment 199 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, the test is supported by the regulator’s information-gathering powers to ensure its determination is evidence-based. These powers will help the regulator tackle unco-operative individuals or organisations that do not provide the information. However, let me be clear: if the regulator does not have enough evidence to make its determination, the individual will be found unsuitable.
I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns about restrictions on an owner’s funds. I want to reassure her that the test requires an owner to submit financial plans and demonstrate sufficient financial resources to run the club. As part of this, we expect that the regulator will consider things such as the liquidity of those resources and their availability to actually be used to fund the club. The regulator will also need to be satisfied that the owner does not have wealth connected to illicit finance. To do this, it can conduct enhanced due diligence on the owner’s source of wealth. This would identify any links to criminality, corruption and money-laundering. We believe, therefore, that the intent of the noble Baroness’s amendment is delivered in the current drafting of the Bill. I hope she takes reassurance from this, but I am happy to meet her to discuss this if my explanation has not satisfied her.
I turn to amendment 200 from my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton, which the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, also spoke to. This Government are not making a judgment on different forms of ownership. We recognise that good ownership can take many forms, and it is investment from responsible owners that has been a driving factor in the success of English football. Banning any one particular kind of ownership would not, in our view, be in keeping with the flexible and proportionate approach to regulation we are proposing. I believe that this approach has broad support across the Committee. Prospective owners with state backing will be assessed against the same set of criteria as any other prospective owner, on a case-by-case basis. I hope that answers the question about Newcastle from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson.
I apologise for intervening on the Minister’s speech, but I did ask a very specific question, which I think she has answered but I would be grateful if she could make it clear to the Committee. Through the higher degree of influence test, which we have debated and understand, and which is unique to this regulatory framework, will the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia be subject to an ownership test—yes or no?
Any owner, with state backing or otherwise, will be assessed against the same set of criteria as any other prospective owner, on a case-by-case basis.
Yes. Prospective owners with state backing will be assessed against the same set of criteria and, by requiring new owners to undergo the regulator’s test, we better mitigate against harm to clubs by preventing unsuitable custodians ever becoming owners. Giving the regulator the power to test incumbent owners where there are concerns about their suitability ensures that any unsuitable owners can be removed.
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised a comparison with the legal position on media organisations. Although football clubs up and down the country are vital community assets, they are not the cornerstone of our democracy that free media is. Investment from responsible owners has been a driving factor in the success of English football, which is why we are putting in place a stable regulatory environment that will continue to attract investors with a long-term prudent approach to growing football clubs as important community assets. What is important, in our view, is that owners are suitable, and the approach to testing owners set out in the Bill ensures just that.
This has been a hugely useful debate and, although I will have to come back on a number of points, I hope my response has provided some reassurance. But, for the reasons I have given, I would be grateful if my noble friends and other noble Lords would not press their amendments.
My Lords, I hope that Amendment 180 will be much simpler, because is a bit niche and, dare I say it, anoraky in nature, for which I apologise. It would amend Clause 27 by removing subsection (7).
This subsection states that where a prospective owner or officer does not inform the regulator of their intention to become an owner or an officer
“as soon as reasonably practicable”,
that person must inform the regulator as soon as it is reasonably practicable. We probably understand the issue there. Not to mince my words, it is a slight tongue- twister. It is a bit confusing and nonsensical. In essence, it says that if someone has not told the regulator in the period when they were meant to, they must do so later
“as soon as reasonably practicable”.
I hope that this provision is a fairly simple one to tidy up. Again, I think we all understand the good intentions here, but I would be grateful if the Minister could clear that up. I will leave it to my noble friend Lord Moynihan to raise his amendments.
My Lords, I will be equally brief in proposing my Amendments 187ZA and 187ZB. The drafting of the Bill states that if the regulator takes too long to determine applications for new owners and officers, then the applicants are treated as not suitable under Clause 32(5), through absolutely no fault of their own. This is not aligned with practice in other regulated sectors. It could have an impact on that person wider than purely their involvement in the club and be detrimental to clubs that have only one potential new owner, who is deemed unsuitable purely because the regulator ran out of time.
The change that I propose to Clause 32(5) would reverse the consequence of excessive delay, addressing the inherent unfairness in the current drafting. This is aligned with how statutory time limits on mergers work, for example. If the CMA fails to make a decision within a specified timeline, the merger is automatically allowed. These are clarifying amendments; I very much hope that the Government will see benefit in improving the legislation by accepting them.
My Lords, I will say a few words about one of the amendments, but first want to follow up on what the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, was saying about multi-club ownership. He was suggesting that multi-club ownership could alleviate risk. I see the point that he was making, but we have to be clear that it can also generate risk. This is an ongoing conversation that many people in football are having. We have to consider its prevalence and the fact that it is increasing, but there are questions about how it could distort competition and lead to complications with loan deals or the sale of players. This is a big question that will loom over us in the future. It is not just a one-way issue, as perhaps the noble Lord was suggesting.
I want to say a couple of words about Amendment 201. Clause 37 says very clearly that in determining whether it considers that an individual has the requisite honesty et cetera, the regulator should have regard to whether the individual has been convicted of a serious criminal offence. Amendment 201, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Bassam, goes somewhat further and says:
“No individual with an unspent serious criminal conviction, whether or not in England and Wales, shall be permitted to own a controlling stake in, or serve as a director for, any regulated club”.
That is a clear statement of intent about the serious nature of some of the issues that have arisen about specific clubs in recent times. I ask the Minister to tighten up on this, take the prospect of owners with serious convictions very seriously and say that it should be a bar to ownership and not simply something that has to be taken into account.
My Lords, I too will speak to Amendment 204 on multi-club ownership, as the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has made some important points and it would be helpful for the Committee to understand the position of the Government. It can alleviate risk. It is also highly complex and can make it very difficult, in terms of due diligence, for the regulator to look at an English club under this legislation without taking into account the financial exposure that a multi-club owner could have in another country with other clubs.
This is a growing trend; it is not new. A significant number of Premier League clubs and six EFL Championship clubs form part of a wider multi-club model, a structure first explored exclusively in Europe by ENIC, now the majority shareholder of Tottenham Hotspur. The rationale underpinning multi-club ownership aspirations, which underlines just how complex the situation can be, ranges from player recruitment and development efficiencies to knowledge sharing, resource synergies and brand penetration.
Furthermore, accruing interest in clubs that compete in the continent’s top leagues—those that hold higher bands and therefore score more points in the governing body endorsement system—is seen as a means for Premier League and EFL clubs to access a more eligible foreign pool of players. Having interests in multiple clubs is not a phenomenon unique to the UK; it pervades the European game. UEFA reports that clubs with cross-ownership relations account for more than a third of the top division in each of Belgium, France and Italy, in addition to England. Integrity of competition, reconciling the model with football’s rulebook, has become a complex issue for UEFA. At the centre of sport is competition, so if the same person, either a natural or a legally based entity, was to have control or influence over two rivals, there would be a risk to the integrity of competition whenever those rivals competed.
To mitigate that risk, football’s governing bodies have introduced rules to preserve the independence and integrity of competition between its clubs. At a domestic level, approximately two-thirds of European national football associations have rules directly limiting or restricting multi-club ownership. The famous article 5 of the regulations of the UEFA Champions League, on the integrity of the UEFA club competitions, stems from the governing body’s concern, which started back in the late 1990s. Article 5 regulates common ownership by prohibiting the same individual or legal entity having control or influence over more than one club playing in the same UEFA club competition. That notably includes the ability to exercise, by any means, a decisive influence on the decision-making of the club concerned.
With that brief explanation on top of the important points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, I would be very grateful if the Minister could confirm that she is completely comfortable with article 5 and will instruct the regulators not to impose any conflicting regulations in this area.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, Lord Addington, Lord Markham and Lord McNally, who I am sorry to hear is not available today, and particularly my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, for the amendments in this group.
Starting with Amendment 190 from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, I do not agree that the foreign and trade policy objectives of the Government have any bearing on suitability. Suitability should be based purely on an impartial assessment of the individual’s fitness, whether they have a source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct, and their financial plans and resources.
My Lords, before I speak to this group, I want to be clear about who the regulator will test and clarify an earlier point I made. I will ensure that all noble Lords who participated in the second group have their attention drawn to this clarification and apologise if I caused any confusion.
Schedule 1 to the Bill sets out details on who meets the definition of an owner. The Secretary of State will also set out guidance on one of the criteria for ownership, “significant influence or control”. An incumbent individual simply meeting the definition, including if they exert significant influence or control, does not mean that the regulator is required or obliged to test them. It may test an incumbent owner if there are grounds for concern about their suitability. The criteria for suitability are clearly set out in the Bill. This applies to any type of owner, be it a state owner or otherwise.
The key point I must stress—it goes for Newcastle United or any other club, although as someone who lived for a number of years in Newcastle I am particularly keen to reassure Geordies—is that the regulator will be operationally independent of government. It is not for the Government to prejudge the regulator’s assessment of who meets the definition of owner, whether there is concern about a particular owner or the outcome if the regulator tests a particular owner.
Finally, I want to reassure your Lordships’ Committee that this Government are unashamedly pro-investment, which will drive our growth mission. We want good, long-term investors into the UK, and foreign investment is key to this. I hope that noble Lords find this clarification helpful.
I thank the Minister for that. I think it is self-evident from her comments that once you remove the foreign and trade policy objective and put in place the significant influence test, you have a massive problem in the Bill. That massive problem is that it is self-evident, as has been discussed many times during the proceedings, that the Crown Prince—as chair of and in control of the PIF, with significant influence over it—would automatically come within the scope of significant influence as defined so far in debate on a number of occasions. I have no problem with that, and I do not think that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has any problem with that. If that is the case, so be it, and let us be honest about it. If it is not the case, “significant influence” is meaningless, and we should come back to it on Report and simply delete “significant influence”, which, incidentally, goes far further than any other regulator in Europe.
We have control tests that are applied by UEFA, by the Premier League and across football. We do not have this significant influence test, and that is what is causing the problem. You remove the foreign and trade policy objectives and apply a significant influence test. The Minister was very clear in response to me on Monday that the Crown Prince would be absolutely full and central in any clear interpretation of that test. For the first time, she has put the definition of significant influence into the long grass as she said that it would come back in secondary legislation, that the Government do not actually know what it means and that she cannot give an answer to that in Committee or when we return on Report. But it is critical, because it comes to the very hub of political influence: what is the status of the Crown Prince? What is the status of Abu Dhabi? What would be the status of the Qataris if they wanted to buy a club in the Premier League, or indeed in any other league? My recommendation is that, given the uncertainty in the response that the Minister has just given and the absolute clarity on Monday evening and earlier this afternoon on the yes/no answer, we leave it for the time being and return on Report and analyse this in depth.
I felt I was clear, but I accept that the noble Lord has a different view. I look forward to ongoing discussions with him before and on Report. My comments related to a previous group, so I apologise to noble Lords who were not there to hear the context of my comments.
I will now move on to my remarks on this group, which—
I shall just say this, as it is so central to our proceedings this evening. Just for the record, on Monday evening the Minister said:
“Finally, on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, the whole point of the owners’ and directors’ test, which has been carefully designed, is to ensure that club custodians are suitable for assessing an owner’s fitness—this is absolutely crucial. It is right that any owner passes the tests set out in the Bill, so it would not be fair, appropriate or responsible to exempt certain types of owners from testing … This amendment intends that owners with diplomatic status or who are Heads of State, Government Ministers or high-ranking officials of foreign Governments would not be tested”.
That was in response to my probing amendment. She went on:
“I do not need to tell noble Lords about some of the people this could exempt from testing. That means that the regulator could not consider any personal finances or criminal history, no matter how egregious. Instead, it would have to ignore these matters, so the regulator could be letting unsuitable owners in”.—[Official Report, 16/12/24; col. 140.]
In other words, all those people I have just mentioned are subject to the tests set out in the Bill, and that would include anybody who was chair of a sovereign wealth fund that had invested in football in this country. That is what we will return to on Report. I do not think it is appropriate to lengthen the discussion this evening, as it has been well aired, but it is fundamental to removing that clause from the legislation in terms of opening up a can of worms now for the Government in identifying exactly what the suitable ownership test means.
Like other noble Lords, I want to move on, but I shall repeat two sentences that I referred to earlier. Simply because an incumbent individual meets the definition, including if they exert significant influence or control, does not mean that the regulator is required to test them. It may test an incumbent owner if there are grounds for concern about their suitability. Now I think we should move on. I do not feel that is a can of worms, but I appreciate that the noble Lord has an alternative view.
Moving to the group under discussion, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton for speaking to the amendments. On Amendment 206, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, the aim of the clause, as he knows, is to stop the possibility of clubs leaving to join a closed-shop breakaway competition, as several clubs attempted with the European Super League in 2021. While I appreciate the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment, the clause has been carefully drafted to ensure that there is no possibility of circumvention. That is why the duty also captures formerly regulated clubs, so an owner cannot remove a club from the specified competitions in favour of joining a new break- away competition.
It is unlikely that clubs in the sixth tier of English football or beyond will attempt to join a prohibited competition, so we do not think the risk that the amendment aims to cater for is a material one. What is more, if these clubs sought to join a competition that had been prohibited by the regulator, that would undermine the heritage and history of the club and should also be condemned—so it is no bad thing that the duty would capture them as well.
On Amendment 207, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton, which my noble friend Lady Taylor spoke to, I acknowledge the intent to protect the clause from any risk of circumvention. However, we do not believe it is necessary to extend the scope of the clause to the new clubs or entities that are created to take on the identity and players of a formerly regulated club in order to participate in prohibited competitions. We believe this is a remote risk. Even if a club could convince its players to do this, convince its fan base to follow them and work through the legalities, the FA’s existing requirements around the registration of clubs and players would offer sufficient protection. For the reasons I have set out, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.