Football Governance Bill [HL]

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Moynihan]

4: Clause 1, page 2, line 4, at end insert—
“(3A) In exercising their powers and functions under this Act, the Secretary of State or the IFR may not act in a way which conflicts with any regulations or rules of international football governing bodies.”

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 4, I shall speak to Amendment 5, which is consequential. I place on record my thanks to the Minister for her much-appreciated constant support for all Members of your Lordships’ House, not least me, regarding meetings, letters and her engagement on the numerous issues that are relevant to the Bill, which already this afternoon has been improved.

My amendment recognises that English football operates successfully in an intensely competitive global market. In Europe, UEFA runs the Champions League. This summer, FIFA hosts the first Club World Cup competition, with $1 billion in prize money available. Chelsea and Manchester City will compete for the trophy in the States. They do so for one reason: FIFA and UEFA recognise the Football Association as the sole governing body for all rules and regulations governing football in England. That is why the FA has a veto over any rule change in the constitution of the Premier League. The FA is the sole member of UEFA and FIFA. The FA is the sole footballing member of the British Olympic Association, meaning that the FA has control over the men’s and women’s Great Britain Olympic football teams. All England’s professional football teams are members of the FA. The English Football League, made up of the three fully professional divisions below the Premier League is self-governing, subject to the FA’s sanctions. In another place, David Newton, giving evidence to the committee, stated that

“the FA is responsible for 16 million or 17 million players and all the money flows within football”.—[Official Report, Commons, Football Governance Bill Committee, 14/5/24; col. 63.]

Like every other league in England, the FA Premier League comes under the jurisdiction of the FA and must submit its rules each year for approval and sanction. However, this fundamental duty of the governing body is not reflected in this Bill, which is why my amendment seeks to protect our football clubs, to avoid jeopardising their growth in international competition and the authority of the FA. Sadly, as drafted the Bill removes the FA from the face of football regulation in England. Its 13 mentions in the 124 pages are mostly definitional: the company number is there in one reference; the FA is referred to as the Football Association in a couple of others; it is not there as a voting board member of the IFR. Otherwise, it is purely an organisation that is consulted without any authority, without any need for the IFR to take into account what the Football Association, the one recognised governing body of football in this country, feels. The FA is given one power, on page 40, in Clause 49(2), which is its one power in the whole Bill:

“A regulated club must not change the name of a relevant team operated by the club unless the change has been approved by the Football Association”.


That is the one name-changing power in the Bill.

UEFA has never hesitated in making clear that it is imperative to protect and preserve the independence of the Football Association as the sole governing body for football in England, in accordance with the UEFA and FIFA statutes. UEFA stated that legislation that

“compromises the FA’s autonomy as the primary regulator of football in England”

would be non-compliant with these statutes, which are upheld and enforced rigorously across Europe and globally. UEFA warned last year that there should be

“no government interference in the running of football. We have specific rules that guard against this in order to guarantee the autonomy of sport and fairness of sporting competition; the ultimate sanction for which would be excluding”

the national governing body

“from Uefa and teams from competition”.

UEFA’s statutes do not permit it to recognise the primacy of a state-licensed regulator. The autonomy of the FA cannot be challenged. It has no right to hand its core powers to a government-appointed regulator which conflicts with UEFA’s regulation. This was well covered in Committee, and the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, said:

“I do not want fans to be alarmed by our discussion”.—[Official Report, 27/11/24; col. 761.]


She referred to the letter, which she said was a private letter from UEFA, and there was no intention for it to be published. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out during the debate, the letter

“is obviously relevant to the Bill … Transparency demands, in my respectful submission, that we be allowed to see it—unless UEFA will not allow that”.—[Official Report, 15/1/25; col. 1236.]

We heard in January that UEFA did not want it published, but only a couple of weeks ago we had a different answer from DCMS. A request was made to the DCMS freedom of information team, and the reply to James Wild MP reads as follows: “We have dealt with your request under the Freedom of Information Act. We regret that we were unable to respond to your request because it exceeds the cost limit set out by the Act. Section 12 of the Act makes provision for public authorities to refuse requests for information when the cost of dealing with them would exceed the appropriate limit, which for central government is set at £600. This represents the estimated cost of one person spending 3.5 working days in determining whether the department holds the information, locating, retrieving and extracting the information. We consider your request would be over the statutory limit, because this would take considerable resources, involving many staff across the department. UEFA is a key stakeholder across sport and is engaged with the department on a regular basis”.

It would take some imagination to work that into a script of “Yes Minister”. Consider if every country established its own regulator without the national governing body being at the centre. This would lead to a fragmented, inefficient and inconsistent approach to football governance across the continent and, in essence, challenge and hinder the ability of UEFA, FIFA and the IOC to maintain cohesive and effective governance standards.

This amendment, recognising that the FA is in no way part of the proposed legislation that your Lordships are considering, would protect English football and our clubs. In many ways, it is a growth amendment. If the Minister is right and there is no threat of scope creep, the amendment lies comfortably in the Bill. If I and my colleagues are right, its place in the Bill provides a protection against mission creep, which none of us wants to see. I therefore hope that the House will support us, and I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, eloquently explains why the Secretary of State and the IFR must seek to avoid conflict with UEFA and FIFA regulations. They are the governing bodies, despite the lunacy of some of their decisions, most recently the FIFA proposals to expand the World Cup to 64 teams and to extend half-time so that there can be a concert while players seek to maintain warmth and fitness. Notwithstanding that, they are the governing bodies, and the structure of English football recognises this.

It does so because both UEFA and FIFA impose in their rules and regulations an obligation on member associations—the FA, as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, says—to comply with UEFA and FIFA regulations, and to ensure that clubs and leagues also comply with UEFA and FIFA regulations. The FA imposes a similar obligation on member leagues and the Premier League—its rule B14. It imposes a contractual commitment on clubs and the Premier League to comply with the statutes and regulations of FIFA and UEFA.

Notwithstanding all this, I am, with great respect, doubtful as to the wisdom of Amendment 4 from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. Do we really wish to incorporate into English law, so that it is a matter that can be raised in the High Court, the statutes and regulations of UEFA and FIFA? Is it really our wish to allow those who are concerned by a decision of the Secretary of State or of the IFR to go to court and say that the decision is a breach of a UEFA or FIFA regulation? It would be welcomed enormously by sports lawyers such as me. The opportunities for litigation are endless because, regrettably, the UEFA and FIFA regulations are not always drafted with the precision and clarity—I put it modestly—that we expect and see from the parliamentary draftsmen in this country.

I would be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, could address this point when he comes to reply. There will be a further enormous expanse of litigation in football, and we will find that decisions are even more regularly open to litigation—to challenge in the courts—if his amendment is accepted.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

As if I planned this seamlessly, I was just coming on to the FoI request. In my view—this is not what I got from the Box note—this is a lesson on how to get an FoI request rejected, unless rejection was actually the intent. I hope the Benches opposite will bear with me as I explain. The FoI request referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Moynihan and Lord Parkinson, was an extremely broad request for all correspondence ever to the department from UEFA. In the response, the requester was advised to narrow his request to a particular timeframe for the department to be able to respond. In my humble view, that sounds perfectly reasonable. I understand that such a letter has not yet been sent in, but, clearly, the responder may choose to accept the advice from officials.

Turning to the specifics of the amendments themselves, much as I do not want to see the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, lose the opportunity for future litigation, I am afraid that, rather than protecting English football, his amendments would have serious unintended consequences. The amendments would see a regulator established by an Act of Parliament in this country take a position of deference to a private international organisation. That would not only undermine the sovereignty of Parliament but leave English football in a very weak position.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brady, raised concerns, both today and on the fourth day in Committee, that the Bill compounds the problem of UEFA’s and FIFA’s ongoing leverage over Premier League clubs, creating a regulatory environment that could become fundamentally unstable. While I do not accept that that is currently the case for the Bill, amending current drafting, to fix in statute that the regulator must fall in line with whatever rules those organisations set, would surely create such an issue. The result of these amendments would be a concerning loss of autonomy and independence for the regulator and, in turn, for English football as a whole. For those reasons, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contribution to this debate. I will attempt to respond to the comments that have been made.

I attended the meeting yesterday, and I was very attentive to what was said. The first question was about UEFA, and the first thing said in response by Joanna Manning-Cooper, who represented the FA at the meeting, was that UEFA has been

“happy since the start of the journey”.

I wrote that down; that was precisely what she said. I have to say to noble Lords that the correspondence that was sent in September last year to the Secretary of State reflected five pages of unhappiness about the potential of this legislation as far as UEFA was concerned. It is inconceivable, to any noble Lord who has read that letter, that that could possibly be seen as UEFA’s happiness since the start of the journey.

I make that point because I would never have started with the strength that I have had on this subject in Committee, and today, unless I had read the letter. I was sent two different copies of the same letter from two different sources; it has been widely distributed. Everything that I said in my opening remarks reflected the content of that letter and the very real concerns that UEFA had.

I am surprised that the Government have not published that letter, and I believe that they should have done so, because it is simply not true to say that UEFA has been happy since the start of the journey. It is also disingenuous to say that the request that was made was so wide as to have taken a great deal of time, when everybody knows precisely what correspondence was requested. The Written Question placed by James Wild was: please provide an electronic copy of correspondence from UEFA

“on the proposal to introduce a football regulator”.

That is specific; it is not wide in its remit. Everybody knows which letter we are talking about. It is disingenuous to say that it would take three and a half days for a civil servant to go through all the letters that UEFA has sent on the subject of the introduction of a football regulator, when this Bill has been only a year in the making, including the time that the Conservative Party spent on it. As I said, I would not have taken the view that I had—including when listening to the meeting yesterday—if I had not also registered very significant surprise at the comment that the Bill will take no powers away from the Football Association.

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Moved by

[Lord Moynihan]

6: Clause 2, page 2, line 31, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) For the purposes of this Act a “specified competition” includes—(a) the Premier League,(b) the English Football League, and(c) the National League,and any successors to those leagues.(3A) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the competitions specified in section (3).”

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 6 I shall speak also to my Amendment 82. The purpose of Amendment 6 is found in the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report of 20 November last year. It makes the very reasonable point that, in a Bill of this kind, it is probably wise and helpful to state in it whom it refers to. The fact of the matter is that the Bill makes no reference to whom it refers.

The committee says that

“the Bill’s scope and purpose should appear clearly in the Bill. Clause 1 … states the purpose of this Bill as being to protect and promote the sustainability of English football. Yet the meaning of ‘English football’ (and therefore the remit of the IFR) is incomplete and requires filling out in regulations made by the Secretary of State. We recommend that the power of the Secretary of State in clause 2 to define ‘specified competitions’ should be removed from the Bill”.

This is because it is self-evident and clear that the

“Government policy is … that the top five leagues of the men’s professional game should be regulated”.

It concludes:

“This policy should appear in primary legislation, not be relegated to secondary legislation”.


It is fairly rare that a Bill of this magnitude and importance—certainly in sport—does not say to whom it refers but instead says that, in due course, the Secretary of State will come forward and tell us to whom it refers.

An argument has been put forward that if the Bill said to whom it refers it would make it hybrid. It is indeed interesting that, in describing this amendment, the Government called it a hybrid amendment—but it is not at all. As far as I was concerned when tabling it, it was to put in the Bill to whom this legislation refers, which seemed self-evidently sensible. However, I can see that there is the possibility that saying to whom it refers can turn it into a hybrid Bill—some people would hold that view. I was advised by the head of public Bill procedure that my amendment would put certain leagues in the Bill as leagues that need to be included in the independent football regulator’s remit, as set out in regulations.

The regulation-making power in Clause 2(3) does not specify any leagues and has a dehybridising provision attached to it. So it is interesting that, without naming the clubs or the leagues to which this legislation refers, the Bill still has a dehybridising provision attached to it.

I assume that the Government recognise that, if the Bill said to whom it referred, there was a possibility that this would make it hybrid. The way that this has been done so far is by avoiding putting a hybrid provision in the Bill, in that there may not be a genuine class of football clubs playing in certain leagues but not others. In the view of the officials, the leagues specified in my amendment do not form a genuine class. Therefore, if the House agreed to my amendment, the Bill would be at a high risk of becoming hybrid. I do not want to put that to a vote and test the will of the House because there is clear evidence, in both Houses, that there is a will to move forward with this legislation. If there is therefore a move by the Government to avoid it being tested for hybridity by putting the clubs and leagues into secondary legislation, that is the decision that underpins the Government’s wish to enact this legislation.

However, I will move this amendment because it is important to try not to avoid saying to whom and to which competition the Bill refers. When we scrutinise legislation we need to know to whom it refers. It is neither sensible nor wise to bring legislation forward before either House without clarity on that point. Therefore, I believe that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee made an important point for the House to consider. I beg to move.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend Lord Moynihan that the name of this group on the list circulated by the Government Whips’ Office is a little unfortunate. This is an important issue into which we stumbled unwittingly in Committee. It is not clear that even the amendment which my noble friend Lord Moynihan has moved would make the Bill hybrid. This is a question which needs to be considered separately. Both in the amendment which my noble friend Lord Markham and I brought in Committee, and in the other amendments brought by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, relating to National League North and South, we stumbled across the conundrum that my noble friend Lord Moynihan has set out: that, by trying to say in the Bill whom it regulates, there was a risk that it would have to be considered hybrid and dealt with in that way.

As my noble friend has said, this reflects the concern raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House. In its eighth report, it recommended explicitly that this delegated power be removed from the Bill. It said:

“Government policy is clear—that the top five leagues of the men’s professional game should be regulated. This policy should appear in primary legislation, not be relegated to secondary legislation”.


It is unfortunate that we have been unable to find a way around this problem. In one of the meetings which my noble friend Lord Markham and I had with the Minister and the Bill team between Committee and now, we asked them to go back to parliamentary counsel to see whether there was another way around this. No other way has been found, which is unfortunate.

I take the point that the Minister made in our conversation that it is very clear who is being regulated by this Bill in the first instance. There has been a lot of consultation with them, both during the previous Parliament and in this one. My concern, reflected in my Amendment 85, is about those who might be brought into scope—say the women’s game, or the National League North and South if, in due course, future Governments were to agree with the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, made in Committee. There are plenty of people in football who have not had the same degree of engagement with this Bill that the top five leagues have had which has got us to this point. That is why I tabled my Amendment 85, which concerns the dehybridising provisions of the secondary legislation that might be brought forward by this Bill to try to ensure that those football organisations that might come under the scope of the Bill in the future can have the same level of consultation and opportunity to give their views that the top five leagues in the men’s professional game have had hitherto.

I am grateful to all the minds that have been applied to this problem and to the members of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for highlighting it. I regret that we have not been able to find a way of saying in the Bill who is being regulated but, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan said, none of us wants to delay the Bill by exploring this point further. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

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[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contribution to this debate. For the avoidance of doubt, I was not around for the 1975 Bill—I was far too young—but I was present for the 1989 Bill, as the Minister rightly pointed out. I was working on that important Bill with my great and noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, whom I am glad to see in his place today.

There is a serious point, which was why I tabled this amendment. When we look closely at Bills and scrutinise them, we really must try to start from the premise that we know who we are talking about and which competitions we are talking about. When the Minister says that there is absolutely no doubt about which competitions and clubs we are talking about, one would expect the House and the Government to put it in the Bill.

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Moved by

[Lord Moynihan]

7: Clause 3, page 3, line 15, leave out “influence or”

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 7, I will also speak to Amendment 28, which refer to the owners’ and directors’ test, which goes far beyond the regulatory requirements in sport—in FIFA, UEFA, the FA and the Premier League. It would require an additional test to be made to determine a potential owner of a football club, and that additional test is one of influence. My amendment seeks to leave out reference to the “influence” a person can have over the activities of a club in being considered for a licence to operate as a professional football club in England, to create clarity in the Bill.

In trying to understand what “influence” means, we are immediately referred to paragraph 15(1) of Schedule 1, where, in keeping with the financial regulation, we are once again somewhat left in the dark:

“The Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about the meaning of significant influence or control for the purposes of this Schedule”—


in other words, for the purposes of the test. As such, as we scrutinise the Bill before us, we have no certainty as to the meaning of “significant influence”, yet its impact on the Premier League and on EFL clubs could prove far-reaching.

In Committee, I took the example of Newcastle to seek clarity from the Government by working through a specific case. Newcastle is majority-owned and financially controlled by the Saudi sovereign wealth fund, the PIF. The PIF became the majority shareholder and de facto owner of the club, with 80% of the shares acquired, in October 2021. The chair of the PIF is the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the son of Saudi Arabia’s King. MBS, as he is known, runs the Saudi Government.

For once, there is a clear distinction between this Bill and the one inherited from the last Conservative Government. In the Conservative Bill, there was a protection against the Government-appointed regulator investigating whether MBS, the Crown Prince and chair of the PIF, was a fit and proper person to exercise control over Newcastle through the chairmanship of the PIF. This Government then deleted the very protection which the previous Conservative Government put in the Bill that required the regulator to have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of the Government. This removal was a direct consequence of UEFA’s insistence to the Prime Minister that such protection politicises sport.

Sadly, I assure the House that, for anyone who has read this Bill, the answer to Newcastle fans is that, unlike under the Premier League or UEFA rules, the Crown Prince is open to investigation by the regulator, and the Minister was clear on that question. That is exactly what the Government intend the regulator to do, because they have removed the one protection it had. The regulator in the Bill has full rights to use his or her many powers to investigate and opine over the suitability, or otherwise, of any owner who exercises a degree of influence over any club, including Newcastle United. That is just one example. Such detailed and intrusive due diligence risks being replicated across the Premier League unless the Bill is amended as I propose.

The Secretary of State will write the guidance that determines what significant influence or control means, yet there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to consult anyone on drafting that guidance. We can speculate what the definition might be by looking at other legislation where the same phrase is used, but there is no guarantee that the Secretary of State will follow the same approach on this Bill as has been taken for other legislation. So, it is not worth relying on the Companies Act guidance, because there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to follow that guidance. The Premier League rulebook requirements about acquisition of control are significantly narrower in scope than this Bill. In fact, I could find no example of any legislation regarding any sport anywhere in the world that is so intrusive as to have the phrase “significant influence over”, as a criterion for ownership.

Without any doubt, the Crown Prince is an owner in the context of the Bill, an owner who exercises influence over the activities of the club as defined in proposed statute and regulation. I understand that, since December, it has been made clear to the Government that any proposal to put the Crown Prince through the detailed due diligence would be resisted. After all, it does not exist in any other sport worldwide, so it would be the first time any country had legislated to that extent for the ownership of a professional club. It would potentially lead to the PIF revising its proposals for a substantial investment in the Newcastle area, or so that is said in the world of sport. I hope that the Minister can dispel that rumour and confirm that nothing of the sort has been said to anyone in Number 10 or DCMS. It would also help the House to know, if the Saudi Crown Prince is to be excluded, whether all state entities are to be excluded from the influence test.

This is the most far-reaching direct political intervention in the running of any sport in the history of this country —a country which once gave the world rules and regulations for sport to be universal, autonomous and self-regulating, in the context of the discussion with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is a historic irony that it should now be our Government to be the first Government to take control of sport. Existing Premier League ownership tests are already onerous, as they should be. The influence test only creates uncertainty, militates against growth and has the potential to be deeply damaging to English football without generating any benefit. I beg to move.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my substantial Amendment 45, together with the consequential Amendments 42, 43 and 44. I have followed the Bill closely from the stand—it has been televised on every occasion it has been debated.

My amendment seeks to delete the unnecessary and counterproductive Clause 27, which is prematurely engaged at the very earliest stages of a potential sale and purchase agreement between the seller of a football club and perhaps a number of purchasers. By deleting Clause 27, notification will be engaged only once the parties have reached a conditional agreement and heads of terms and a single preferred bidder has emerged. At that point, Clause 28 would be engaged as in the Bill.

Football is a game of dreams, and some dream so hard that they want to own their own club. In a small way, I am one of those people. Back in 1932, my grandfather was an Olympic athlete, and he was known as Flying Fuller. Back then, he answered a small advertisement in the Eastern Daily Press and acquired 250 shares in the Norwich City Football Club. When he passed away 40 years ago, I inherited those shares. I have enjoyed attending the annual general meetings and generally being a keen observer of how the business of football operates ever since.

From that 40-year perspective, I can tell noble Lords how clubs change hands, and it is not how the Bill contemplates. The Bill anticipates that, at some point, someone dreams big and they need to submit themselves to the IFR so that an army of Rachels can measure them up for the sheepskin coat, which is the particular uniform that owners of football clubs tend to wear. Forget for a moment that time might be of the essence, that they might be subject to an HMRC winding-up order or that there might be other cash flow issues; even before the seller can open the books, the purchaser needs to have been vetted by a civil servant.

How have we come to this place? This is not how deals work. Unless the books are opened, how could the purchaser even know whether the deal was feasible? Then, unless the purchaser was qualified, the seller could not open those books for fear that person was a charlatan. Noble Lords can see the jeopardy here.

Quite simply, the new law, and Clause 27 in particular, would prevent buyer and seller being put together. This Bill purports to stop clubs going bust, but the actions of the Bill would ensure that they did.

As I look back and reflect on the ownership of our club in Norwich, during my small slice of ownership, I recall how Norwich City Football Club was owned by Robert Chase, a local builder. When the wind blew out of his sails, it needed somebody with deeper pockets to take over, but nobody came forward. By and by, a man called Geoffrey Watling, who owned a local taxi firm, came forward to act as midwife, and he held that club while he hawked it around. Here was a modest man with a deep interest in the community. He understood what the role of the football club can and should be, and he put himself in harm’s way when nobody else would step up to the plate. All Norwich fans thank him for what he did. The main stand, even today, is named for him. Eventually, Delia Smith, the famous TV chef, together with her husband Michael Wynn-Jones, acquired the shares of the club in a story that was beautifully told in the Times about three weeks ago. It must have been a very expensive taxi ride for them both, and no two people could have done more to act in the public interest and save our club.

Last week the club entered a new phase with a new owner, Mark Attanasio, taking a leading role. We hope he can bring us to past glories. By all accounts, he is a worthy custodian of our club. I would rather have Delia’s blessing than Rachel’s.

The purpose of telling these tales is that had there been a regulator operating under Clause 27, Robert Chase would have thrown in the towel long before he did. Kind-hearted Geoffrey Watling would not have been allowed to step in as midwife, because he would have failed Clause 37(4). He only owned a taxi company; he had no qualifications. You would have to question why a husband and wife team from Suffolk would put themselves in harm’s way to own Norwich City Football Club in Norfolk, similarly failing Clause 37(4), because being a cook is not necessarily the requisite qualification for club ownership. Put simply, as a result of Clause 27, our club would have folded; it would have prevented these deals before they even started. With the best of intentions, Labour is creating a doom loop for clubs in trouble—a vortex from which few will be able to escape. The consequence of Clause 27 is to condemn a club in trouble to extinction.

My amendments would not prevent the IFR eventually certifying someone under Clause 28, but it would stop the snuffing out of hope at Clause 27. Of course, it is regrettable that only faceless bureaucrats can allow you to don the sheepskin coat in the first place. In my view, the regulator should not be allowed at this early stage to prevent clubs doing different and taking those calculated risks—the rolling of the dice.

Football is not just embellished by the great players—the Beckhams and the Ronaldos. It is decorated by the local characters, people like the Roberts, the Geoffreys, the Delias and the Michaels. We should be encouraging them to dream. Labour is at risk of turning our national game into the dull men’s club—a system where local people are prematurely discouraged from standing up for their communities, and big business and remote shareholders with fat lawyers are preferred. This is in direct conflict with the two key outcomes set out in Clause 1, where the economic and social well-being of local communities are key objectives.

I was with Delia on that infamous “Let’s be ‘avin’ you” rant 20 years and two weeks ago. It passed into our legend and our lexicon. It is part of the colour of the game and our nation, yet this is exactly the sort of thing that will be lost if we do not attract and cherish the community-minded people. For the sake of anyone who loves our game, do not make it even harder than it is to get to the start line. Let us abandon Clause 27 and just rely on Clause 28, at which point the deal’s certainty is greater.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson, Lord Moynihan and Lord Fuller, for tabling their amendments, as it provides me with the opportunity to restate the Government’s position on these points and provide some clarification. I join the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, in wishing Newcastle good luck in their forthcoming match. We can agree on some things in your Lordships’ House.

I start with Amendments 7 and 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. Before I go into a bit more detail, I would like to clarify whether incumbent owners or officers could be tested. Indeed, they can be tested. The regulator can test incumbent owners or officers where it has grounds for concern about their fitness or, for owners only, the source of their wealth—but, I repeat, only where there are grounds for concern. It is vital that we have a strong definition of an ultimate owner in order to give transparency to fans and hold owners to account. The Government are intent on providing the regulator with the tools to identify the ultimate owner as accurately as possible.

On the point from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, point on precedent, this is why the Bill’s drafting takes its lead from the precedent of other Acts using “influence or control”, including the Companies Act’s “persons with significant control” regime, and the economic crime Act’s “beneficial owners” regime. We are confident that we have the correct definition to achieve the Bill’s aim. It ensures that an individual who exerts significant influence over a club, more than that of any other owner, can still be identified as the ultimate owner even if they do not have formal legal control. In fact, without this definition, ultimate owners could circumvent regulation. It is fundamental that clubs have suitable custodians in order to secure the future of clubs and, most importantly, to protect the game that fans hold so dear. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord can understand the importance of the definition.

I turn now to Amendment 28. As I outlined in Committee, I agree that it is important that the industry has certainty as to what the regulator will consider significant influence by owners. That is why the Secretary of State’s guidance will be produced in good time in order to give this clarity. I want to make it clear that the Bill’s provisions that define “owner” in Clause 3 and Schedule 1 come into force on the day the Bill becomes an Act. That means that the obligation for the Secretary of State to produce this guidance comes into force on that day.

We have taken on board the valuable points the noble Lord raised in Committee. After looking at this again in detail, we stand by our position that the intent of this amendment is met without needing to change the Bill. We do agree that, before guidance is produced, clubs should not be expected to identify those who meet the definition of an owner by exercising significant influence or control. I would therefore like to provide greater reassurance that the scenario the noble Lord is concerned about should not be an issue. I can commit that the Secretary of State’s guidance will be produced before clubs are required to identify their owners who meet the definition of having significant influence or control to the regulator.

In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on why we have not defined “significant influence and control” on the face of the Bill and are putting it in guidance instead, this approach is based on precedent. As I mentioned, the Companies Act also sets out the definition of “significant influence or control” in guidance rather than legislation. The Secretary of State’s guidance will give clarity to owners about who meets the definition.

Turning now to Amendments 42, 43, 44 and 45 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, I think it was a bit cheeky and that one should take a slight exception to the notion that Delia Smith is just a cook. I would argue that she is, through her professional career, arguably also a highly successful businesswoman. Leaving that point aside, however, the requirement to notify is there for a reason. Keeping unsuitable owners and officers out is a core part of the regulator’s regime. We want the regulator to block these individuals from entering the system, and not to have difficult, costly battles to remove them after the fact. So it needs to know who a club’s respective new owners and officers are before they buy or join the club. Put simply, the regulator needs to be able to gather the information that it needs to test them and work with them and the club to ensure that they submit a proper application in good time. It will help the regulator prepare to act quickly when it receives the application.

Clause 27 plays another important function. If a person has, for whatever reason, become an owner or officer of a club without the regulator first having found them suitable, they still have to notify the regulator as soon as possible after the event. Without this provision, there could be untested, unsuitable individuals in the system that the regulator was unaware of.

I move now to Amendment 46, in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson and Lord Markham. We agree that it would not be right for money related to terrorism to find its way into our clubs. The Bill, as already drafted, already stops that through its provisions on serious criminal conduct. Serious criminal conduct includes offences listed in Section 41 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. That is an extensive list of terrorism-related offences, ranging, to name a few, from membership of a banned organisation to encouraging terrorism to offences related to funding terrorism. Serious criminal conduct, including these terrorism offences, is considered under the ODT “source of wealth” and “honesty and integrity” tests. The club licensing regime lets the regulator block funding that is connected to serious criminal conduct. That is why we are confident that the Bill appropriately and thoroughly deals with terrorism-related activities.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 47, also in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson and Lord Markham. I am pleased to have another opportunity to highlight the information-sharing agreements that the regulator can and will use to its advantage. I absolutely agree that the regulator may need to work closely with other organisations and stakeholders when exercising its wider functions. I am grateful to the noble Lord for the discussions we have had on this point.

The Bill establishes a gateway for the regulator to share information with a range of organisations, including HMRC, the National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office. It also creates a specific gateway for HMRC to share information with the regulator and empowers the Secretary of State to create other such gateways by regulations, as needed. The regulator may already consult whoever it needs to in order to make robust decisions. The regulator will seek information and expertise from relevant organisations to help it to stay live to both national and international concerns. The shadow regulator is already building a strong relationship with the NCA and law enforcement to ensure that the regulator is in a strong position to gather and receive the information it needs. We are confident that the Bill adequately empowers the regulator to gather such information. For the reasons I have set out, I would be grateful if the noble Lord could withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

I turn first to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and his comment that by accepting this amendment, we would be watering down the regulation. On the contrary, if you look at the regulatory requirements of FIFA and UEFA, the FA, the Premier League or any of the other national governing bodies in football in Europe—which I have done—it is not a matter of watering down. This makes a much more intrusive additional layer of regulation which does not exist in any of the other countries. I simply put it to the noble Lord that there must be a reason for that. There is a good reason why, to the detailed regulation which exists in FIFA, UEFA, the FA and the Premier League, it is unnecessary to add this additional layer.

My noble friend Lord Parkinson on the Front Bench mentioned the exchange that took place over the clause having regard to foreign and trade policy objectives of the Government. It was a classic example of when UEFA said “Jump” and the British Government’s position was “How high?” I fear that if you take the FA out of the equation, which has happened now, we will see far more work for lawyers in the future than the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, anticipates. His point, however, on this amendment was perceptive and accurate. If the legislation is not changed this evening, it is incumbent on the Secretary of State at a future opportunity to make it absolutely clear in his consideration, which he will undertake, to make sure that there is clarity on that.

As far the Companies Act is concerned, I simply say to the House that there is no requirement whatever for the Secretary of State to take it into consideration when opining on this subject. If there is, it should be written into the Bill. Once again, as I have mentioned before, there are 31 different areas where we are going to wait to hear the detail of the competitions, the clubs and exactly what “influence” means—this is all for the future. This is in many respects a shell Bill, but using “influence” over has the impact that I have mentioned in the example of Newcastle, and I am very concerned about it.

I ask the Minister to write to me if she would, because I appreciate that she will not have had time to respond to the concerns that have been expressed with regard to the owners of Newcastle, not just with regard to the club, but to the response to this Bill when enacted in their investment in the Newcastle area, over and beyond their financing of the club. As I understand it, those rumours that are circulating are well grounded, but the Minister will no doubt be able to tell me. This is meant to be a growth Bill: all regulators are meant to grow the businesses that they regulate, but I fear that this will have exactly the opposite effect, and I think Newcastle may be on the receiving end of that. If we do not change the Bill to remove the “influence” over as a key criterion of control, we will have made an error, and for that reason I wish to test the opinion of the House.