Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Baroness Coffey

Committee stage
Friday 6th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I have four amendments in this group, three of which are closely related. They are Amendments 85, 894 and 896, the latter two of which are consequential on Amendment 85. I also have Amendment 100, but I will come back to that towards the end. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom for lending their names to Amendment 85, and to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for adding his name to Amendment 894

One of the concerns about the Bill is the possibility that the definition of one of the key qualifications, to have a terminal illness, becomes expanded over time—what I am going to call “creep”. I will not detain the Committee with examples from other jurisdictions, but there are examples where the scope for assisted dying has been made available to people with conditions that would hardly qualify as terminal illness and might well not have qualified as appropriate in the minds of the legislators who first put the legislation together. I think it would give the public some confidence in the Bill if they were to know that the capacity for creep was severely limited. My suggestion for limiting it is that there should be a list of what constitutes terminal illness. I am not suggesting that this list should be in the Bill; I believe it should be issued by the Secretary of State by way of regulation and should be updated periodically in the light of medical advice.

I turn now to a couple of questions I have for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and I will then deal with some objections that might be raised. My first question concerns his own definition, in Clause 2(1)(a), that

“the person has an inevitably progressive illness or disease which cannot be reversed by treatment”.

My question to him in the first place is whether he regards “inevitably” and “progressive” as adding anything to the notion of being terminal; in other words, is each a subset of the other? Is the definition getting narrower with the addition of each of those words, or are they in fact otiose? If you left them out, would the scope of the definition be just the same? I would be interested to know his answer, although it does not affect directly what I am now going to say.

The question of the list was dealt with in the other place to some extent, and arguments were made which suggested that it would all be very difficult because people did not always die from one illness: sometimes they had two terminal illnesses, or they had complications or comorbidities. Medically, I am sure that is absolutely the case, but I do not think it is relevant to what I am arguing for, because the Bill is clear that you have to pass certain qualifications and thresholds to be considered for assisted dying. One is that you have

“an inevitably progressive illness or disease which cannot be reversed by treatment”,

but you have to have only one of them in order to qualify. You could have two, but you would still qualify—it is irrelevant. You could have one with several comorbidities, and you would still qualify. It does not matter how an individual might die in the end. What matters is their condition at a particular moment and whether they have

“an inevitably progressive illness or disease”

at a particular time—so applying the list does not seem very difficult to me.

The other objection that might be raised is that the list would be very difficult to put together because there are many illnesses or diseases, but I think this is wrong. If one considers illnesses or diseases as a way of dying, and one excludes such things as falling off a roof or some adventitious accident of that character, the diseases or illnesses on the list are all known. We know, medically, what people die of. Very occasionally, a new illness or disease of a terminal character arrives. AIDS was an example in the 1980s and 1990s. It completely shocked us, partly because it is such a rare thing for a new terminal illness or disease to arrive. Of course, my amendment would allow for the Secretary of State to adjust the list if there were such an eventuality in the future, heaven forfend. We do know what they are, and we can put them together. The Secretary of State can make a list, it will be subject to scrutiny—because, as I think the noble and learned Lord will confirm, all regulations made under the Bill have to be made by affirmative statutory instrument—and people will be able to comment. I think that would give them great assurance that creep was not going to be a feature of this. I would be grateful to hear the noble and learned Lord’s response to that proposal.

I come briefly now to my Amendment 100 in this group, which is quite different. This is genuinely probing because, when I read the Bill and got to Clause 2(4), I found a sentence that began:

“Nothing in this subsection results”.


It was strange, typographically, because it is not a new paragraph—there is not a paragraph break—but nor does it run on directly as a sentence. It has obviously been botched in at some point, probably in the other place. Anyway, these things happen. I read it, and then I read it again, and I read it over and over again. At the end of it, I still could not work out what the sentence actually means. Even if I could construe it in such a way that it did mean something, I would not know what it meant in the context of Clause 2. This is a genuine probing opportunity for clarity from the noble and learned Lord as to what import he thinks this sentence has in the clause. It would certainly please me, and I think many other noble Lords, if we understood that and whether, in fact, it should stand or be swept away. My proposal to delete it at this stage is, as I say, entirely probing, in order to hear what the noble and learned Lord has to say.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 73. One of the issues here is whether a disease is terminal without treatment. A simple example is type 1 diabetes. The World Health Organization classifies diabetes as a disease. That means that, under the Bill as it stands, as pointed out by witnesses in oral evidence to the Commons Select Committee, anybody who decides not to take their insulin, for whatever reason, would automatically have an irreversible disease and they will die. I want to explore through this amendment whether that is what we are thinking about.

Steel Industry (Special Measures) Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Baroness Coffey

Committee stage
Saturday 12th April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise on the back of that very interesting amendment to take the brief opportunity to ask again the question that I asked when we debated the Bill earlier today, which relates to the same clause of the Bill—namely, when the Bill says that the Secretary of State has the power to exercise force on entering premises, which force in practice would he intend to use? The Bill gives him no power to direct chief constables; it would be practically, and probably constitutionally, improper for him to send civil servants from his department to force entry into premises. There is also no provision in the Bill allowing him to seek a warrant that would result in bailiffs being able to enter the premises.

I genuinely want to know how, in practice, the Secretary of State would exercise force. When I asked that question in today’s earlier debate, I did not get a satisfactory answer—or, indeed, any real answer at all. I have no doubt that, now that the Minister has had the opportunity to discuss it with the Attorney-General, who is sitting next to her, it may be possible that she can answer me in her response to this debate.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendment tabled in my name. I am conscious of the extraordinary powers that are being granted to the Secretary of State today.

I will briefly speak in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Freeman of Steventon. It is my understanding, having been in government, that anything in the name of the Secretary of State can be automatically delegated to a civil servant, but it cannot go beyond that. As we have seen in a number of cases, civil servants already have some powers to gain entry, but only in relation to specific Acts of Parliament—so perhaps this amendment would give a wide-ranging element.

This is clearly not an occasion to use the Civil Contingencies Act, but something that surprises me about this Bill is that the powers being given to the Government and the Secretary of State today are extraordinary and go way beyond what happened with the Coronavirus Act 2020. The inspiration for my amendment comes from the Bill that was presented to Parliament then. It set out that, to have scrutiny, a report would be put forward by the Secretary of State—over several periods, not just a year—and that there would be a debate on that report. Having a report matters because it would bring together how the powers have been used: have they been used in the way that both Houses anticipated? It may even extend to the provision of how the finances would be distributed for the regulations we have yet to see.

Overall, it is important that, when we give these powers for just one industry—I guess that if we were to name the company it would end up being a hybrid Bill, so that has been deliberately avoided to make sure that it covers the entire steel industry—we should be able to have regular discussions, not simply because this is the steel industry but due to the scale of the powers being granted. To that end, that is why I have literally lifted, with a bit of adjusting, what happened in the Coronavirus Act. Frankly, for something that took over our country in such an unprecedented way, I hope that the Government would concede to think carefully about how they will report back to this House and how this House can be involved.