Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, being still relatively new in your Lordships’ House, it seems impertinent of me to start by welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, to his place, but I do so heartily. I add only that, from the pictures hanging in the corridors, there are many precedents that men used to wear hats in the Chamber as well, so perhaps we should make it a universal ambition to restore that for everybody.

Obviously I am speaking in the company of many distinguished lawyers, and not being myself a lawyer, distinguished or otherwise, it is likely that I am going to go tramping off the narrow path that has been trodden so far. I intend to do that, because I propose to use my few minutes to talk about airports, about which I do know something. My complaint is, as noble Lords will hear, not that the Bill goes too far but that the Bill is far too narrow.

Let me start by reminding noble Lords that when the Roskill commission reported in 1971, recommending the siting of London’s third airport at Cublington in Oxfordshire, it took the Government of the day 30 months in total to reject the recommendation, adopt another plan altogether and legislate for that other plan through the Maplin Development Act. By contrast, the Airports Commission chaired by Sir Howard Davies reported in June 2015, recommending a third runway at Heathrow, and it took the Government three years, until June 2018, to prepare and bring forward the national policy statement for designation by Parliament. Part of the reason for that delay is no doubt that the Government, or their civil servants, were paying close attention to the book mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, called The Judge Over Your Shoulder, with the mistitled subtitle A Guide to Good Decision Making.

In June 2018, Parliament designated the national policy statement. That did not give it the force of statute, but it did give it a statutory force. None the less, campaign groups then got together and brought judicial review proceedings, which were rolled up and heard by the High Court. By my recollection, 17 points of objection were made to the process followed by the Government. All of them were dismissed by the High Court. Nothing daunted, the campaigners headed off to the Court of Appeal. All 17 points were considered again. Of course, the objectors had to win only one point to gain their objective, and they did. The Court of Appeal stubbed its toe on the question of what the definition of “policy” was in the phrase “government policy”. The NPS was then suspended by the Court of Appeal until the Government redid their homework.

I will cut to the chase: that did not actually happen. Instead, the case proceeded to the Supreme Court, which, in December 2020, five and a half years after the Airports Commission had submitted its recommendation, reversed the Court of Appeal decision and effectively, as I understand it, rejected all the objections that had been made. That nearly brought the Government and Heathrow Airport to the point where they could then start to submit a development consent order for consideration by inspectors to be appointed.

The third runway is now moot in any event because of the pandemic, just as Maplin fell before a change of government and the massive hike in oil prices that occurred in the early 1970s. So neither of those is particularly a live case at the moment, and I am not here to argue Heathrow’s case. Far from it: I have spent 20 years campaigning against the expansion of Heathrow. My concern is broader than that. It is that the third runway was to be—and if it goes ahead, is to be—financed by private capital. The delay and uncertainty added by this lengthy, constantly shifting response in judicial review, have a real cost on the cost of capital, which we all have to pay. It has a chilling effect on foreign investment in UK infrastructure. This is not the vindication of citizens’ rights spoken of by certain noble Lords; this is the continuation of politics in the judicial forum. Different noble Lords will react differently to this. Some will see it as the law doing its job. I do not. I see it as a distortion of the balance of our constitution compared with 1971. I put this down as a challenge to those who have suggested so far in this debate that everything is more or less beyond improvement in the judicial review garden.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, with the agreement of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, I rise to thank my noble friend the Minister. I know from conversations with him that the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who cannot be in his place today would join me in expressing our appreciation to my noble friend the Minister for the integrity, openness and engagement—and consequently the trust—he has engendered since Report. This is an example of government and the House working constructively to improve the operation of the criminal justice system and those affected by it.

The amendment moved by my noble friend addresses one limb of the amendment in my name in Committee and again on Report. It puts into effect the Government’s own previously announced policy of making the termination of licences automatic. I welcome that, but I still hope that soon the Government will also adopt the second limb of that amendment to reduce the qualifying period from 10 years to five. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, the Justice Select Committee in the other place is considering this whole case.

I hope that when my noble friend replies he will be able to say that, if that committee recommends a reduction in the qualifying period from 10 years to five, the Government will be quick to adopt that amendment and put it into effect. Both measures—the automaticity of the referral and the potential reduction of the qualifying period from 10 years to five—are primarily aimed at IPP prisoners out on licence, not those in prison, though I appreciate that my noble friend has pointed out that those on recall may gain some benefit from this.

This is the first crack in the wall of this regime made in the last 10 years. It would be very easy for noble Lords to think that now is a moment when we could perhaps relax; the Government, having made a concession and implicitly recognised an injustice, will move, quietly perhaps, to resolve the whole matter quickly. But that is not what the Ministry of Justice is expecting to see happen.

In a Written Answer given in the other place by my right honourable friend Kit Malthouse on 3 December last year, the Ministry of Justice set out in round numbers how many IPP prisoners it expected to see released on licence in each of the next five years. It came to 800. But when asked how many of those out on licence it expected to see recalled to prison over the same period, the total came to a staggering 3,400. The Ministry of Justice expects 2,600 more IPP prisoners, net, to be in jail over the next five years than there are today. That is nearly a doubling of the number of IPP prisoners in prison today. This problem is not resolved; we have not even begun to resolve it. This problem is going to get worse and the Government are obliged to take it seriously.

My noble friend referred on Report to the existence of an action plan. He said that the ministry had an action plan for dealing with the problem. Requests to see the action plan have been met with a response from my noble friend to the effect that it will be available shortly, or it is not currently available, but we may look forward to it. I do look forward to it; we might all look forward to it, but we would like to see it soon. We would like to see it address this problem and put this scandal properly behind us as soon as possible.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister, who has found himself wallowing in a misery of injustice and has done a great deal at least for the issue to be recorded in statute. For me, that is the only advantage of this amendment, but I respect very much the efforts he has made to produce an amendment at all.

Beyond that, I entirely agree with the observations from my noble and learned friend Lord Brown and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. We have not got to the end of the beginning of this, but the end of the beginning has possibly come into sight. For me, after the shambles of this dreadful piece of statutory—I could get carried away and then I would be speaking unparliamentary language, but noble Lords all know what I mean; I shall just stick to shambles—we can begin to make up for what has gone on over too many years.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 81 in my name which is substantially the same as one I tabled and withdrew in Committee. I am grateful for the support of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull. We are dealing with a shame and a scandal. I shall not dwell on the nature of it because that has been well spelled out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I shall come to the substance of the amendment because, of the three tabled on this topic, it is the one that is the most modest and helpful—indeed, it is intended to be most helpful to the Government.

Unlike Amendment 80, referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, it does not concern those in prison serving an IPP, only those living in the community on licence—that is, those who have been released after the Parole Board has resolved that they do not represent a serious risk to public safety. At the moment, these persons are potentially subject to a lifelong licence. They can be recalled to prison for a breach of the licence conditions at any point. The only way the licence can be terminated is for the individual to apply to the Parole Board for a licence review after the expiry of the qualifying period, which is currently set at 10 years.

The Government have stated that they wish those reviews to be automatic in future, not requiring an application from the prisoner. My noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar said on 21 July in a Written Answer to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett,

“From September this year, officials will refer automatically to the Parole Board the case of every offender serving the IPP sentence who has become eligible to apply for termination of his/her IPP licence.”


I take that as a definitive statement of government policy: automatic referral. But yesterday, when I attended a meeting of the Justice Select Committee in the other place—referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett—and a question about this was put to Sonia Flynn, chief probation officer, she did not reply using those words. She said something rather different. She said that from September, the probation service had started proactively encouraging those who qualified to make an application. She had no explanation when asked by a member of the committee why, of the 500 persons currently entitled to apply for their licence to be terminated, only 20 had applied.

There is a good reason why the probation service is not carrying out the policy in the terms set out by my noble friend. Close examination of the current legislation makes it clear that the review can be undertaken only on the prisoner’s application. The Government cannot, therefore, make an automatic referral to the Parole Board without the prisoner’s active collaboration.

--- Later in debate ---

On this basis, I hope that the tablers of the amendments in this group will agree that the Government are acting in good faith, and will therefore not press their amendments this evening.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Before my noble friend sits down, I heard what he said, but if the Justice Select Committee in the other place was to recommend a reduction in the qualifying period from 10 years to five years, would he at least give his personal undertaking to do his very best to ensure that the Government found an opportunity to legislate for that at the earliest possible time?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am not quite sure of the meaning of a personal undertaking from me to ensure that the Government will find an opportunity. I hope the House will appreciate that I have personally put a lot of time and effort into this matter. When I see the Justice Select Committee’s report, that time and effort will not diminish.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to my Amendment 208C. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer eloquently introduced it. He took all my best lines—in fact, all my lines—so I will be very brief. This is a very modest amendment. It simply requires a review of the resources and support available for the resettlement and supervision of prisoners serving IPP sentences who are released on licence.

I very much hope the Government will listen to this afternoon’s debate. There is such a powerful force behind these amendments all around the House; it should provide enough cover to the Government to do the right thing. One comes back, time after time, to the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, when he described this situation as the greatest single stain on our criminal justice system. Surely the Government must respond sympathetically to what noble Lords are saying this afternoon.

All I want to do is emphasise what the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, said about the Catch-22 situation that applies particularly to those who have been put out on release. First, if those people are honest about the fears and problems they have faced in prison, they can often risk being considered unsafe to be released in the first place. Secondly, if they ask for help with a mental health problem in the community, they could be assessed as being high risk and be recalled to prison. It is an extraordinary situation. If they enter into a new intimate relationship, they do so in the knowledge that an upset partner could make false accusations which would result in recall. How are people meant to live in that situation? As the authors of the Prison Reform Trust report say—it is an extraordinary and moving piece of work—it is hard to imagine how any of us could hold on to our sanity and self-belief in this situation. I plead with the Government to take note and be sympathetic to the plight of these people.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 208D in my name. I am grateful to the noble Lords who have lent it their support.

At Second Reading, I said that I considered it a shame to this country that there were still prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for the public protection. I do not propose to elaborate on this today, although I associate myself with the remarks made by noble Lords in the debate so far.

Some amendments in this group are probing amendments, but Amendment 208D seeks to change the law in a way which is helpful to the Government. It does not concern those in prison under an IPP, only those living in the community on licence; that is, those who have already been found by the Parole Board to be safe for release without presenting a threat to public safety. As noble Lords have described, currently these persons are potentially subject to a lifelong licence. They can be recalled to prison for a breach of the licence conditions at any point while the licence is in force. The only way in which the licence can be terminated is for the individual to apply to the Parole Board for a licence review after the expiry of the qualifying period. This is currently set at 10 years. The Government have stated that, in future, they wish these reviews to be automatic, and not to require an application from the prisoner.

On 21 July, in response to a Question for Written Answer from the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar said:

“From September this year, officials will refer automatically to the Parole Board the case of every offender serving the IPP sentence who has become eligible to apply for termination of his/her IPP licence.”


There is a problem. Close examination of the current legislation makes it clear that the review can be undertaken only on the prisoner’s application. Therefore, the Government cannot make an automatic referral to the Parole Board without the prisoner’s active co-operation. This somewhat holes the policy of automaticity. Amendment 208D addresses this deficiency by amending the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 to require the Secretary of State to make an automatic referral to the Parole Board at the end of the qualifying period. If the application is dismissed, it can be made annually thereafter. The referral does not depend on the acquiescence or collaboration of the prisoner. It allows the Government to do what they have said they want to do. I hope the amendment will command their support. It does not prejudge in any way the decision of the Parole Board on that referral. The decision as to whether or not to terminate the licence remains entirely in its hands.

Noble Lords may wonder why a prisoner entitled to a review at the end of the qualifying period should be slow to make one on his or her own initiative; in other words, why is there a need for automaticity? It certainly seems strange not to apply for a termination of the licence. As noble Lords have explained, a person on licence under an IPP and who commits an offence for which an ordinary criminal might receive a short determinate sentence can be recalled to prison for an indeterminate term.

None the less, there are reasons why IPP prisoners do not apply for a termination of their licence. First, many do not know what the qualifying period is, nor what it means. Nobody is obliged to contact them to tell them. There is evidence of confusion, even among probation officers, as to the rules. In any event, many prisoners out on licence will not be in regular contact with a probation officer, since, although the licence lasts for a minimum of 10 years under the current system, supervision can be terminated after five. Many IPP prisoners out on licence after that many years simply do not want to take the risk of re-engaging voluntarily with a criminal justice system which they believe has treated them so unfairly. Automaticity is good and necessary. The Government agree and I hope this amendment will pass.

There is one more part to the amendment which is easily missed. I referred earlier to a qualifying period after which a review of the licence can be applied for. If this amendment passes, it will take place automatically. The qualifying period is set by law at 10 years. The very last words of the amendment would have the effect of reducing it to five years. As far as I know, this is not government policy. It is, of course, open to my noble friend to accept the part of the amendment dealing with automaticity, while rejecting the reduction in the qualifying period.

I hope that noble Lords will support me in pressing this on the Government. For those IPP prisoners who receive a short minimum term, the 10-year licence period is wholly disproportionate to the term that would have been attached to the equivalent determinate sentence, had one been imposed instead of an IPP. It can hardly be argued that it is necessary for public protection. As I said earlier, under this amendment, the decision whether or not to terminate a licence would remain with the Parole Board. Reducing the qualifying period to five years would simply reduce the length of time after which an individual out on licence would be entitled to a review. These people would be out on licence with the approval of the Parole Board and would have shown themselves to be safe in the community for five years. The number of IPP prisoners out on licence who are recalled after five years is, in any case, very small. Furthermore, the latest available data show that no IPP prisoner committed a serious further offence five years or more post release. Their supervision can be—and often is—terminated after five years.

I believe that everything argues in favour of a reduction in the qualifying period to five years. I hope that the Government will accept this part of the amendment as well. A person in this position—with a track record of living safely in the community for five years—needs the opportunity that we wish for all prisoners: to serve their sentence and return to the community to make a useful contribution to their own and to others’ lives.

[Lord Bradley (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall contribute very briefly to this group of amendments. I fully support the views already expressed. I will not repeat them. I strongly commend the opening speech by my noble friend Lord Blunkett. He set out clearly the direction of travel which this House wishes to take.

I will speak briefly on Amendment 208B, particularly proposed new subsection (2)(b), which the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, has already eloquently described. It states the need for

“an assessment of the welfare and mental health support available to prisoners”—

still serving an IPP sentence—

“including measures to reduce the risk of self-harm and self-inflicted death”.

I declare my interests in the register as trustee and vice-chair of the Prison Reform Trust. Again, I thank it for the excellent work it has done over a number of years in this area, culminating in the report by Edgar, Harris and Webster, entitled No Life, No Freedom, No Future. I think this sums up the mood of the House this evening.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

106: After Clause 42, insert the following new Clause—
“Retention by the police of personal data relating to non-criminal conduct perceived to be motivated by hostility
(1) The processing of relevant data by a police authority in accordance with Article 6(1) of the GDPR and section 35 of the Data Protection Act 2018 is not lawful unless it is undertaken in accordance with regulations made by statutory instrument under this section.(2) In this section, “relevant data” means personal data relating to a data subject which is based in whole or in part on the perception by another person that the conduct of the data subject was motivated wholly or partially by hostility or prejudice towards any group of people sharing a characteristic and where the conduct in question is unlikely to constitute a criminal offence.(3) In this section, “a police authority” means—(a) a person specified or described in paragraphs 5 to 20 of Schedule 7 to the Data Protection Act 2018;(b) a person acting under the authority of such a person.(4) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of the processing of information—(a) pursuant to an ongoing criminal investigation;(b) for the purposes of the internal administrative functions of the police authority.(5) Regulations under this section must—(a) identify different categories of personal data and processing of the personal data in question;(b) include provisions by reference to each of the various categories of processing and personal data as to—(i) the person or persons whose authority is required for the processing of the personal data;(ii) the notifying of the data subject of the processing of the personal data; (iii) the period for which the personal data can be retained (including provision for the granting of authority for extending that period);(iv) the disclosure of the personal data to third parties;(c) have particular regard to the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the extent to which that right is adversely affected by the processing of relevant data by any police authority.(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, each House of Parliament.(7) In section 113B of the Police Act 1997, after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) An enhanced criminal record certificate must not give the details of a relevant matter to the extent that doing so would result in the disclosure of relevant data as defined at subsection (2) of section (Retention by the police of personal data relating to non-criminal conduct perceived to be motivated by hostility) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021.”(8) In this section—(a) the terms “personal data”, “data subject”, “processing” and “the GDPR” have the same meanings as under section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018;(b) the term “characteristic” includes but is not limited to any protected characteristics under section 4 of the Equality Act 2010.”

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 106, 326 and 330 in my name. In doing so, I have been requested to offer the apologies of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who wished very much to speak on this amendment and whose name is on the list of supporters, but he was not able to be here because of professional obligations.

Amendments 326 and 330 are essentially minor consequential amendments; the meat, if you like, of the debate on these amendments is in Amendment 106. These amendments concern non-crime hate incidents. They are a subject of controversy and much debated, but I hope to persuade your Lordships’ House that this amendment is largely not controversial because it is essentially procedural in character and does not change current practice for recording those crimes.

With so many distinguished lawyers having indicated that they wish to speak in this debate, I hesitate to start by giving a brief summary of the legal background, but I shall do so tentatively and subject to their correction. A hate crime is a crime—it may, in principle, be any crime—that is conjoined with a motivation, on the part of the perpetrator, of hatred towards a particular or specified group. That hatred needs to be perceived either by the victim or by one of a number of other groups of people acting reasonably—for example, a witness, such as a police constable or whatever. It is an alloy, if you like, of a crime and a motivation.

But what happens if one part of that alloy is missing—if there is evidence of a motivation of hate but there is actually no crime or no action that constitutes a crime or meets the threshold for bringing a prosecution? That is the essence of the non-crime hate incident: a hate incident that occurs without being conjoined with a crime. Such non-crime hate incidents are often recorded by the police, and, if the perpetrator is known, they are recorded against their name, so to speak: they go to a record in the name of that person. At the moment, all this happens under guidance issued by the College of Policing. This guidance is quite extensive and elaborate, if you choose to look it up, but it has no statutory force or democratic supervision, and it is inconsistently applied between police forces.

I think that most noble Lords would agree that this is not a satisfactory position. The bulk of this amendment—all of it, apart from one subsection that I will come to shortly—effectively obliges the Home Secretary to issue guidance within six months of the passage of the Bill and to take account of certain matters in doing so, one of which is the human right to freedom of expression. It does not tell her what the guidance that she issues should contain or prevent her from adopting the existing guidance wholesale, should she wish to do so, but it brings the whole matter under political oversight for the first time. Because it is proposed that this should be done through a statutory instrument made under the affirmative procedure, it brings it to the attention, and makes it available for the comment, of both Houses of Parliament. So democratic accountability will be brought to this process for the first time, and I think that that can only be widely welcomed by Members of this House.

This amendment does not explicitly affect police practice in relation to any current police investigation. It does not apply to any police action in relation to hatred expressed towards an individual as opposed to that motivated by hatred of a group. Cases of stalking and things of that character directed at an individual would not be caught by the amendment.

That deals with the bulk of the amendment—all the parts of it—except subsection (7) of the proposed new clause. I am going to come to that separately because it is slightly different. Subsection (7) prohibits the police from including this data, if they have recorded it, when responding to requests for an enhanced criminal record check. As I say, it has a slightly different character to the rest of the amendment, but it addresses what I—and many others—perceive as an injustice.

Other noble Lords may speak later, giving instances of that injustice by referring to particular cases. I would like to address what I regard as the principle of the injustice. If you are accused of a crime, you have the opportunity to state your case and protest your innocence in an open court in front of an impartial judge and a jury. That is not the case if you have a non-crime hate incident recorded against your name. There is no process that those who believe themselves to be innocent of that allegation can pursue to clear their name apart from judicial review which, as we know, is an expensive and arduous process and not available to most people.

This can attach a stigma to a person’s name that will potentially last for the rest of their life. They will be stigmatised for many years for not committing a crime. That seems to be a real and serious injustice, but it is not merely abstract and, as other noble Lords may explain, particular cases illustrate it. Given that this is a largely procedural amendment that adds democratic accountability to a process, I hope it will find support on all sides of the Committee and, indeed, from the Government. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I can certainly promise my noble friend and noble Lords who have been involved in the debate this afternoon that I will go back and see if I can put a timeframe on it.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, when I tabled these amendments, I had no idea that they would find universal approbation in all parts of the House or attract the support of so many distinguished legal figures. It is quite humbling to look at the list and see my noble friends Lord Sandhurst and Lord Hailsham, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—all highly distinguished figures in one department of the law or another. Indeed, I may have missed some speakers whose careers I am not equally familiar with. They are all united on two fairly straightforward points: first, that the operation of the current system of recording can cause genuine harm, unjustly, to particular individuals; and secondly, that this process should be subject to statutory and parliamentary supervision. Really, that is the essence of the entire case for supporting these amendments.

There were many speeches, for which I am grateful. I do not have time to thank everybody but it was an excellent debate, with speeches made by many people who, like myself, do not have any pretensions to legal expertise, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, my noble friends Lady Noakes, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean and Lord Dobbs, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Did I make a mistake there? Sorry. I am very grateful to everyone who has spoken.

I particularly draw attention to the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. They both made a very important point, which is that it can be useful to the police in preventing crime in the future to have access to this information and, in certain cases, to retain it. I do not pretend that the drafting of the regulations envisaged by these amendments is going to be simple. It will have to take account of the important points that they made. But these amendments do not prejudge the weight to be given to those various factors when the Government come to draw up the guidance envisaged. I am very sympathetic to the points they made.

I would like to give everybody a gold star for their speeches, except possibly my noble friend on the Front Bench, who sadly struggled; it is a matter of bitter regret to me that goes to my heart. My noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean put his finger on this: she struggled to explain, and did not really even attempt to explain, why these provisions should not be the subject of statutory supervision. She gave an example of harassment of an individual as to why this information should be retained. In my explanation of the amendment, I tried to point out that it would not affect harassment of individuals in individual cases. But if she feels that is not sufficiently clear in the amendment, I would be happy to accept further amendments from the Government that would make it abundantly clear. I hope that deals with one of the points she made.

My noble friend also said—and this is always an argument for doing nothing—that we must beware of unintended consequences of more stringent regulation. We have not asked for more stringent regulation or indeed for less stringent regulation; we have simply asked for proper regulation by properly constituted bodies. We are leaving it very much in the hands of the Home Office and my noble friend to come forward with something that they think appropriate.

I am very encouraged—if I can give some consolation to my noble friend—by her remark that her colleague the Home Secretary recognises that there is a problem and that some indication of some possibility of action was implied by that. Taking heart from that comment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 106 withdrawn.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Moylan Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 22nd October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Bill despite the respect I have for the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I wish to develop the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Masham of Ilton. When my father was on his last legs a few years ago, he was physically quite robust: he was capable of keeping up with current affairs, he lived at home and looked after himself. However, mentally he was becoming increasingly fretful and, indeed, had borderline paranoia in the last couple of years. I believe this is quite common among the elderly: it is a form of dementia even though he was not actually confused in the normal sense.

The news of the Liverpool pathway scandal that broke in his last year had a shattering effect on him. It destroyed any trust he had in the medical profession and it became extremely difficult to persuade him to attend hospital for treatment for the low-level chronic conditions he had that needed periodic attention. This is my worry. I am generally opposed to the principle of Bill, but my worry about its practical effects relates very much to this key question of the intimate type of trust that we all need to have in doctors and nurses when we are ill and we put ourselves in their hands.

It is not only people such as my father, who was borderline paranoid and suffered from conspiracy theories; it is many elderly people, who feel simply that a hospital is a place of life and cure, it is not a place where death is deliberately administered. I know that many doctors and nurses feel very similarly. There is evidence from other countries where this practice is legalised, of elderly people, in particular, being fearful of going to the hospital. How will this be dealt with? I have heard nothing from proponents of the Bill about how they would address—or even acknowledge—this concern. One possibility would be a radical separation between the NHS and assisted dying facilities: no sharing of personnel or premises. However, I have not heard an answer to it; that may or may not be workable. It needs to be addressed because it is fundamental to the social effects of the Bill if it is passed.