Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 17th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

109C: After Clause 55, in subsection (1), leave out “may” and insert “must”

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for being a listening Minister and for the hard work she has put into bringing forward this amendment. She has explained what government Amendment 109B does. Essentially, it brings the guidance under which non-crime hate incident records are made by the police under statutory guidance to be issued by the Secretary of State. That is very welcome, but I have some questions to ask about the amendment and some points to make that appeared in my original amendment but do not figure in Amendment 109B.

The first is my Amendment 109C, which would make it mandatory for the Secretary of State to issue this guidance. That was the sense of the Committee when we debated it: that the Secretary of State should do this, not that the Secretary of State should have the option of doing it. But in the very first line of proposed new subsection (1) “may” appears, which I think should be “must”.

I will make it clear at this point that it is not my intention to press any of my amendments to a Division or to seek the opinion of the House, but I would like to hear my noble friend’s explanation of why “may” is, in her view, an appropriate word here when the sense of the Committee was that it should be “must”. The anxiety is not that the current Secretary of State will fail to issue the code of practice because, quite clearly, having brought forward the amendment it would be very strange if she did not act. The anxiety is that a future Secretary of State could, using “may”, revert to the status quo if they wished because there would be no obligation on them to maintain the code of practice. I would like to hear some assurance from my noble friend, and possibly even a word that she might bring forward this modest change at Third Reading.

My Amendment 109E affirms the importance of freedom of expression, especially in the light of the recent Court of Appeal decision in the Miller case. In the interests of brevity, I will not comment on this amendment further but leave it to more qualified noble Lords who might wish to comment on it after me, because I know that we have a very heavy day.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing her two amendments, which we welcome. It was fair of her to point out the legacy of the recording of non-crime hate incidents and the legacy of the Macpherson report on Stephen Lawrence’s murder. We welcome that the existing guidance will be turned into statutory guidance. I have one question for the Minister: what is the likely timetable for that statutory guidance to be available to be reviewed by Parliament?

On Amendment 114E in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, I have a genuine question, and this is not a party-political point: how would his amendment have an impact on domestic abuse cases? As I have said before to the House, I sit as a magistrate in both family court and the criminal court, and I deal with a lot of cases related to domestic abuse. While non-hate crime incidents are not recorded on the police national computer, we see information on call-outs and it is common to see information on text records between the parties, usually a man and a woman. Sometimes those text records go on for pages and are relentlessly abusive. How would that information be affected by his amendment?

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Without having myself looked at the wording of the amendment, the original wording, which I think is preserved in the current amendment, would have excluded disclosure in relation to individuals but not in relation to groups. In the context of the original amendment, therefore, I think that point would have been covered. The noble Lord makes a very good point, and if I were pressing the amendment or the Government were intending to take it forward in any way, of course it would need to be reviewed to ensure that his point was properly addressed.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends for setting out their amendments. I shall respond to them in turn. Amendment 109C seeks to impose a duty on the Home Secretary to issue a code of practice, while our amendment provides her with the power to do so. My noble friend Lord Moylan has pressed me on this issue. I assure the House that we certainly will issue such a code of practice; indeed, Home Office officials will shortly begin the process of drafting the aforementioned code. The permissible language in Amendment 109C is a common drafting approach but, as I have said, it is our firm intention to prepare and issue a code relating to non-crime hate incidents. As I said earlier, I can assure the House that decisions relating to existing non-crime hate incident data will also be made in due course as the process of drafting the new code begins.

My noble friend asked me if the College of Policing would pause the recording of NCHIs, as they are called, while the guidance was being formulated. The current non-statutory guidance on NCHIs will remain in place until the new code of practice enters into effect.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked about the timing of the amendment and when it would come into force. The reason why we have not issued a timescale is that the code will require careful drafting to ensure that it both meets the needs of the police and protects the public. Furthermore, as noble Lords will know, the Court of Appeal has only recently handed down its judgment in the Miller case and the code will have to account for that ruling. We do not wish to impose unduly restrictive timeframes on the process of drafting and publishing a code that will fully align with these objectives.

My noble friend has suggested, previously and again today, that a unit of some description could be set up to provide advice to police forces on whether specific incidents should be investigated by the police force as non-crime hate incidents. That suggestion requires further consideration, and I will try to give it my full consideration in due course.

My noble friend Lord Blencathra raised concerns that the amendments provide that the first iteration of the code is subject to the affirmative procedure, with the negative procedure applying thereafter. This point has been raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which he chairs so ably; I am sorry that he will be stepping down. We take the committee’s views very seriously. I will set out why we have adopted this approach.

As I have already indicated, in framing the code, we need to ensure that we have given effect to the ruling by the Court of Appeal in the Miller case. By ensuring that the first iteration is subject to the affirmative procedure, we are enabling both Houses expressly to approve the code, thus ensuring that this House can confirm that it is content that the code reflects that judgment.

It is appropriate that further iterations of the code are then subject to the negative procedure. We do not think there will be any further major rulings on the topic of non-crime hate incidents. Any further changes will thus simply reflect the routine need periodically to review such guidance. It would be disproportionate to require the affirmative procedure for every dot and comma change in further future iterations; indeed, the fundamental premise of the code will already have been expressly agreed by Parliament. We therefore do not believe that the affirmative procedure for future iterations would be an effective or necessary use of parliamentary time. I also confirm to my noble friend that we will respond to the DPRRC shortly.

Amendment 109E seeks to incorporate a specific reference to the importance of the right to freedom of expression within the list of matters that may be addressed in the code. When discharging her functions, including preparing this new code of practice, the Home Secretary must already act in compatibility with convention rights; a number of noble Lords rightly asked about this. That includes Article 10, which ensures a right to freedom of expression. It is therefore not necessary to include a reference to the importance of the right to freedom of expression, because this is already a given under the Human Rights Act. None the less, I assure noble Lords that the code will address issues around freedom of expression. Indeed, in my opening remarks, I noted that we will ensure that the content of the code fully reflects the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the Miller case.

Finally, Amendment 114E would prohibit the disclosure of non-crime hate incident personal data on an enhanced criminal record certificate. I cannot support such a blanket prohibition. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, illustrated one of the reasons why. First, non-crime hate incidents are simply one form of police intelligence that sit alongside many others—missing persons data, evidence of anti-social behaviour, unproven allegations of sexual assault and perhaps domestic abuse. They exist in line with the police’s common-law powers to prevent crime and keep the Queen’s peace. There are rightfully circumstances in which police non-conviction information of various kinds will be considered for disclosure in enhanced checks which are used in relation to roles involving close working with vulnerable adults or children. Maintaining this regime is essential for safeguarding purposes.

Secondly, the rules surrounding disclosure of this type of data are already governed by the statutory disclosure guidance produced by the Home Office. The third edition of this guidance came into force on 16 November last year. Non-crime hate incident intelligence is not an exceptional form of police intelligence; it is simply a type of non-crime incident data collected by the police to prevent crime. That is why it is covered in the same statutory guidance. The statutory disclosure guidance has been tested by the courts and assists chief officers of police in making fair, proportionate and consistent decisions in determining when local police information should be included in enhanced criminal record certificates. Singling out this category of police data for non-disclosure would be inconsistent with the principles set out in the statutory guidance and, as such, unnecessary and disproportionate.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, since the guidance was published before the Court of Appeal decision, the guidance on disclosure should at least be reviewed in the light of the court decision and the reference to “chilling effect”, to ensure that it is fully compatible? Since that was so much part of the debate in the Court of Appeal—not simply recording but also disclosure—would it not make sense to review it?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My noble friend has jumped the gun on what I was going to say. We are confident that the statutory disclosure guidance, the latest version of which was published on 16 November, sets out clearly the criteria and principles which chief officers must have regard to in making decisions to disclose non-conviction information.

The safeguards in the statutory disclosure guidance are very robust. Should a chief officer consider that information ought to be disclosed in line with the guidance, the applicant is invited to make representations. Should the decision to disclose be confirmed following any representations given, that information will be included on the certificate that is sent to the applicant only. Importantly, the applicant also has a right to appeal that disclosure through the independent monitor, who considers cases where an individual believes that the information disclosed within an enhanced criminal records certificate is either not relevant to the workforce they are applying for or that it ought not to be disclosed.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

On Report, questions and interventions are generally for points of elucidation and the Back-Bencher will have spoken before the Minister. That aside, in terms of what happens to historic cases, I think that will be determined upon the updating of the guidance. I will write to noble Lords as I think it is an important point as there may be many examples of it. I will write to the noble Baroness and put a copy in the Library because it is an important point of clarification.

Getting back to what I was saying about the safeguards, it is important that they balance the rights of job applicants with those of the vulnerable people they might have contact with. This goes back again to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Alongside the existence of this strict statutory disclosure guidance, I can reassure noble Lords further. As I mentioned in the previous debate, DBS records suggest that, in any event, it is rare for non-crime police information of any sort to appear on an enhanced criminal records certificate supplied to a potential employer. This type of information featured in only 0.1% of the 3.9 million enhanced checks issued by the DBS between April 2019 and March 2020.

My noble friend has also, helpfully, raised with me before today whether the government amendment may encompass disclosure within its remit by referring to the processing of data. While the Home Secretary’s code will set out the rules for those who process NCHI data, there is no obligation for the code to address every conceivable act of processing. We have been clear that the Government’s intention is to not include disclosure within the code of practice; as such, the issue of disclosure will not be covered or referenced in any way in the code of practice.

It is imperative that we do not set an unhelpful precedent by legislating in such a way as to undermine the police’s ability to build intelligence on possible offending and risk to life more broadly. I stress again the often vital role that this data plays in helping to safeguard the vulnerable. It is not there to enforce correct opinions—referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—nor is it there to serve a purpose unconnected with policing; rather, it is part of the police’s function to prevent crime.

In conclusion, again, I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Moylan for raising these important issues. I hope that he can see that the Government have taken him very seriously; the government amendments, together with the assurances that I have given in response to Amendments 109C and 109E, will, I think, address the concerns raised, by bringing parliamentary oversight to this process while protecting fundamental police functions that are already subject to strong safeguards. I hope, therefore, that he will see fit not to press his amendment—he has indicated that he will not—and that he will support the government amendments as drafted. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend, and for her reassurances, and I look forward to seeing the letter that she is going to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 109C (to Amendment 109B) withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

For those reasons, I support the amendment. It would stop every police officer and require them to think about whether they have gone “beyond reasonable doubt”. It is better to get the community working with you instead of you feeling that they do not want you to do whatever you are doing. Community policing is at the hub of it; intelligence is necessary; stop and search is a useful tool, but, at the moment, the language used does not stop people doing that which they know instinctively they ought not to be doing.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I generally support this important legislation, but I expressed at Second Reading and again in Committee my sense of unease about the whole concept of serious violence reduction orders but also about the detail of their implementation. It is clear that my arguments have not borne the fruit I would hope to see, because I have read—since she kindly copied it to me—my noble friend’s letter to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in which the Government made it clear that they did not see any scope for budging either on the principle or on the detail of the implementation of these provisions. So, rather than engage in a discussion across a broad front, I shall simply focus my few remarks on Amendments 90K and 90L in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, which deal with what might be the most egregious question on this subject, that of “ought to know” or “ought to have known”, depending on how it is phrased in the Bill.

The Government are proposing that people should be subject to these orders, which are serious constraints on their liberties and which have potentially severe reputational consequences. In some cases, these may be merited, but in the case of “ought to have known” it is extremely difficult to accept that the burden on those who receive these orders is merited, on the basis not of their carrying a knife, not even that they knew a knife was being carried but that they ought to have known a knife was being carried.

There are three essential problems. The first is meaning. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, pointed to the difficulties that arise from the variability of language. The expression “ought to have known” is one that we can easily use in different ways in ordinary, natural language. But we are dealing here with language that ought to be drafted in a precise fashion and can be applied in a predictable way in a court of law, because we want our laws to be predictable. We want people to know that, if they do this or that, they will be in trouble, but if they do not do so, then that is okay. I do not know what “ought to have known” means in a legal sense.

The second problem is evidence. Even if you had a clear understanding of what the words “ought to have known” mean, how is that to be established in a court of law when, as I have said before to your Lordships, it is difficult enough to establish in a court of law what somebody did or did not know, let alone what they ought to have known. There is an evidential question here.

The third problem arises from the first two. It will be a decision of this Parliament to adopt this language which throws a huge interpretational burden on the courts. We do not know how the courts are going to interpret or implement this language. I do not want to draw unfair parallels, but when we discussed in Committee and on Report the question of prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for public protection, it was clear that the Home Secretary of the day, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, did not expect the provision to be applied by the courts with the liberality that the judges felt obliged to apply because of how it had been drafted. I hope I have explained that correctly. In other words, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, thought it would be applied only occasionally, but when the judges read what they were expected to do, they felt obliged to apply it more liberally to far more cases, which had never been his intention when he had proposed it. We are potentially in similar circumstances here. We simply have no idea, if we agree this language, how it is going to be applied by the courts in actual cases: with what breadth or how frequently it will be applied to people who were not carrying a knife and did not know that a knife was being carried but it is felt on some basis that they ought to have known.

I am not trying to detract from the other amendments in this group by focusing my remarks on this narrow point, which has been addressed by other noble Lords. I am focusing on these two amendments because I would hope that my noble friend might, after reflecting on it, be willing to come forward at Third Reading with something that rethought this approach. Or at the very least, if it did not rethink it, she would say that she was going to add words or guidance or some other supplement to the Bill which would make the circumstances in which this applied very specific such that we had that level of certainty that we did not impose this burden on the courts. We should have certainty in law but also certainty in our own minds as to how frequently and commonly this penalty would be applied in the event of “ought to have known” cases.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support the general thrust of what the Government are trying to achieve, although I have some sympathy for one or two points that have been raised by previous speakers. I do not speak as a zealot for stop and search. It has dangers, which I hope I can persuade noble Lords I have taken seriously in the past.

The Government seem to be trying to change the culture of people carrying knives, either in public places or sometimes in private. Far too many people have been carrying knives and clearly still are, leading to minor arguments ending up in fatal events. We know that people who are repeat offenders disproportionately account for a disproportionate amount of crime. As few as 10% of offenders, on some occasions, can account for two-thirds of the crime. That applies to victims as well as to the places that they meet, which are repeat locations. Legislation over the years has tried to do something about that and, I think, has generally been well intended.

I agree with many of the things that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, has said. He had a worrying experience, but a lot of it has been London based. For historical reasons, there have been three different types of legislation which have caused real problems in this city, but occasionally in others. The sus law of the 1960s allowed unqualified stop and search. That caused a great many problems and was got rid of.

Then along came Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 44 was precisely intended for locations that were likely to be attacked by terrorists—places such as Parliament. It was intended to draw a line around places and, if someone went into this area, they could be searched without cause. In fact, the Metropolitan Police applied that throughout London. Every one of the 32 boroughs was covered by that piece of legislation, so people who live in London have had that experience of stop and search without cause for tens of years. Whether it be people who are now being stopped and searched, or their parents or grandparents, they have that experience. That is the thing that I am afraid has disproportionately affected how they feel about the legislation.

The latest version is Section 60. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised this and I have some empathy with part of what he said, for the reason I will explain. Section 60 was intended, again, to circumscribe certain areas where there was to be stop and search without cause—perhaps a park where many people had been stabbed or a location where gangs had been meeting and attacking each other. In that area, everybody was warned, “If you go in this area and carry a knife, you are likely to be stopped and searched without cause”, because the idea was to disrupt their offending pattern. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that often these areas are not well described. People are not told that they are about to enter one, so, therefore, when an officer stops someone, they can be suspicious and ask whether they are in a Section 60 area or have they been stopped and searched for no good reason at all.

As I said, I am not a zealot for stop and search. In 2011, when I took over the Met, we had just had the London riots. We never had a public inquiry into those events, but one of the conclusions I drew for myself when I looked at the figures was that stop and search had been very high. In the two preceding years, 2.6 million people had been stopped and searched in London. At the time, there were only 8.4 million people living in London. If we discount people who were not on the streets because they were older or younger, this was a very high number and that worried me. Over the succeeding three to four years, we reduced stop and search by 60% and we reduced Section 60s by 90% because, frankly, they were like confetti scattered around London. Ironically, the more there were, the less they could be policed.

There was a disproportionate amount of vague stop and search. Within that, we had disproportionality: there were very high figures for people of Asian appearance after 9/11 and that was certainly true of the black community as well. Over three years, we managed to get the stop and search disproportionality for people of Asian appearance down, from over seven times more likely than the white community, to less than one compared to the white community. We did not have as much success with the black community. We got better but nowhere near what I would call a more representative look.

I am only trying to convince your Lordships of two things. A targeted stop and search, even where there is not a cause, can be really helpful, either geographically or targeted on the offender. That is where the serious crime prevention orders can make an impact. Generally, they are targeted only at people who have been convicted already of carrying a knife, or who have been carrying a knife and have not been convicted but a court has been persuaded that there is a good reason.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 5th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to speak after the noble Baroness. I wondered how I might find a way of defending this Bill in what I suspected would be a hostile environment, but my anxiety was alleviated when I heard the introductory speech of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar who made a compelling case for the broad principles on which the Bill rests. I was wholly with him on that.

The starting principle of international law is that no country is under an obligation to grant admission to any non-national. Admittedly, that obligation is moderated by international treaty conventions that we have entered into. I was glad to hear my noble friend say that we were going to adhere to the convention on refugees. It does not, of course, mean that all irregular arrivals are refugees and those who are not should be removed.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, and various other noble Lords have appealed to our common humanity as the basis on which we should be constructing our immigration law. While we all respect and acknowledge the obligations that arise from our common humanity, that is to get things the wrong way round, because we also have a moral obligation to our own people who live here, in part because we claim and exercise the exclusive right to act on their behalf in this area. I regard that as a prior and balancing moral right. In fact, I would say that the purpose of immigration law is the protection of the stability and welfare of our own society and that our obligations under common humanity are a constraint on how we implement that law, rather than confusing it with what its purpose is.

However, there is an area in the Bill that causes me deep concern: the provisions allowing for the removal of British citizenship in even more administratively curtailed circumstances than exist at the moment. Various noble Lords on the Labour Benches have objected to this—the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, gave us a wonderfully distracting pointer to legislation from 1914—but they should note that it was actually a Labour Government, with the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, that for the first time introduced the power to deprive British citizens, by birth or descent, of their nationality, provided they had a second nationality that they might fall back on. That had never existed before. Once that door was opened—once that principle was given up—all this complaint about what are effectively subsequent tidying-up exercises is, in my view, pure hypocrisy.

My concern is different. I object to the removal of citizenship in any circumstances because I have a more conservative—some might say hopelessly quixotic—view of what nationality actually means and should mean for us. My conception of British nationality is much more profound than a mere travel document. It is—or should be—a permanent and reciprocal bond of loyalty on the one hand and protection on the other. It is not a driving licence to be taken away if you clock up the wrong number of points; it goes to your identity. When you lose your nationality, you do not just lose your identity papers, you lose your identity. It really is not a driving licence or administrative ticket.

I say this is quixotic, but that bond is a real and lived experience. When, in the same legislation in 2002, the Labour Government introduced citizenship ceremonies, I thought they would be rather tacky, un-British, American sorts of things—but actually, when I saw people coming time and again to my own town hall when I was a councillor, and coming in a sort of festive, family spirit, almost like they were coming to a wedding, I saw then how real that bond can be between citizen and nation. That is what a Conservative Government should be building up; we should not be pursuing and entrenching this cynical Labour ploy. Especially following Brexit, we should be building up and strengthening the bond between citizen and nation, whereas it seems to me that this provision goes only to dissolve it further.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I have two points to raise. Following the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, I start by saying that this is a sensitive subject. I agree with him that, even though this is the day of burial of Sir David Amess, and he is in our thoughts, I do not wish to criticise the police and their conduct on that day or talk about that incident. I want to talk at a slightly more abstract level. I appreciate that anyone in charge of the crime scene on that day faced a difficult decision and it is not for me to criticise what they did at that time; that is not my point.

My first point is to stand back and ask a more abstract question: who owns a death? The assumption, especially when a death is violent or in emergency circumstances, is that the death is owned by the state—by the police and the ambulance service primarily. They are in charge, it belongs to them and everybody else must have permission to be admitted. Even the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds sort of admitted that and gave that point away by saying that police needed better training to understand why and when they should admit people to the scene.

I would go a little further and say that the claims of the police and ambulance service have to be understood and considered in the light of other claims. Those other claims include the claims of the family and the dying person themselves as to who owns what is going on and who has a say. If we simply collapse into thinking that it is just a matter of getting better police procedure, we are conceding the major point. Of course it is in the public interest that a criminal who has killed people should be brought to justice, that their trial should be fair and the evidence preserved. But that is not the only interest in a death. It is not the only subject and there are other claims we should consider.

This afternoon, as some noble Lords know, there was an Oral Question on this topic in my name on the Order Paper. One noble Lord genuinely asked: has this subject ever come up before? I think he meant: has it ever come to a ministerial desk before? The answer of my noble friend was that she thought not—that the Amess case had brought it to public attention, but it had not really come up before. However, the real answer to that question is, “Yes, yes, yes”. It has come up before, for example at the Manchester Arena, and countless times in care homes over the last year throughout this country; it just does not rise to the level of Ministers’ desks.

Here, I have to admit that I have taken some advice from a distinguished academic specialising in emergency response, and I am told by her that this is partly because there is indeed police training on this subject, but it is primarily focused on how to explain to the families afterwards why the priest was not allowed in. That is the main focus of police training, rather than training them to think of the circumstances in which they might relinquish their claim—valid though it is—in order to respect the claims of others. That is my first point, and I think we should reflect on that.

My second point is a little more practical: we can do this better if we want to. We have done it better in the past. I was told today, again by the same distinguished academic, that there are lovely pictures from the Second World War of ARP wardens going into bomb sites—arduous and horrible work—immediately after a bombing to try to rescue the dying and recover the dead. They were accompanied by clergy with “ARP clergy” written on their tin hats, because it was assumed that these people were correctly and properly embedded in any team that was going to identify, and to find and rescue, people who were dying in the wake of a bomb. Of course, in those circumstances, there was no question of identifying the perpetrator. The perpetrator was well known and was not going to be brought to criminal trial on that basis.

I am treading on slightly uncertain ground for me here, but if you go to other countries—to Israel, for example—I am told that where there are bombs and emergency responses, there are people who are again embedded with the police. They would not be clergy because Judaism operates in a different way; there is no function, as I understand it, reserved to a clergyman in Judaism that cannot be carried out by a lay person. Although the approach to death is slightly different—it is not a question of last rites for the dying, but more a case of the proper treatment of the dead—these people are embedded with the police and it is all well understood. My noble friend Lord Moynihan, asking a supplementary question earlier today, drew attention to practice in certain US states. Again, there is much better relationship, a working relationship, between the police and what are called faith groups, in exactly these circumstances.

That illustrates the two points. First, we need to ask ourselves some radical questions about who is charge in these circumstances, and who has a claim—not just as a petitioner, merely standing at the door asking—to be there at the death. Secondly, if we want to, we can do better. That is why, today, I asked my noble friend if she would at least undertake a study that looked at practice in other countries and jurisdictions to see how they do it and what we can learn from that. I think we would benefit greatly from that. I do not ask any more.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell and Lady Masham, for tabling this probing amendment, prompted by the tragic and terrible murder of Sir David Amess and the inability of the attending priest to gain access to Sir David in what may have been his final moments. I am not sure if it is a declarable interest but, like Sir David, I am a Catholic. My support for this amendment is a product of my faith.

In almost any situation in which someone has suffered a terrible injury, there is the possibility that a crime has been committed and therefore, of course, the location of that injury will become a crime scene. Current police procedures are very specific about the management of such scenes and actions taken in those first minutes may be critical to resolve any crime that has been committed. The responsibility lies with the first officers to attend. Access to such a scene is necessarily limited. A scene log will be created to manage and record all the activities within the crime scene. However, a variety of people do gain access. They include ambulance and medical personnel, undertakers, photographers and scene of crime officers. They all have a legitimate purpose in being at the scene, but not all these purposes relate to the maintenance of the integrity and provenance of any material that may be recovered from the scene. Crime scene officers are required to ensure that persons entering the scene are wearing suitable protective clothing to prevent contamination of the scene, and to ensure that they are protected from any hazards present. So, it is possible to provide safe access for clergy that will not in any way contaminate or inhibit an investigation. The question then must be: is it desirable to do so?

Northern Ireland has seen the cost and the benefit of the presence of a priest on many occasions. The PSNI has worked with very well with clergy of all denominations. Perhaps I could remind your Lordships of the terrible murder of the two corporals, Derek Wood and David Howes, by the Provisional IRA on 19 March 1988 in west Belfast. Father Alec Reid of nearby Clonard Monastery attended them as they lay dying. His prayers—his intervention at that most savage moment—were enormously important to so many.

Two Belfast priests died during the Troubles attending their parishioners who had been shot. Father Hugh Mullan died in 1971, going out into gunfire knowing that he could be shot. Another, Father Noel Fitzpatrick, died in 1972 when accompanied by a parishioner, Paddy Butler. Waving a white handkerchief, he attempted to reach wounded men during sustained and heavy gunfire. These were brave men living their call to minister. It has long been a tradition in this country and many others that there is recognition of the value of spiritual and pastoral support. For this reason, chaplaincy services are publicly funded in many situations. However, at the present moment, attending an emergency scene as a priest can be a daunting experience, as the response of police and ambulance personnel is not certain. It depends on a decision made by someone who may have no religious faith and who may see absolutely no justification for permitting access by a priest.

To be able to receive sacramental spiritual support in the event of a death, or possible imminent death, is of profound meaning and importance to Catholics. Indeed, the support of a priest or other minister of religion is of great importance to those of other denominations and faiths. As your Lordships have heard, Cardinal Nichols and the Commissioner of the Met have agreed to establish a joint group to study the access given or refused to Catholic priests at scenes of traumatic violence and to consider whether any changes are required to the guidance issued to officers facing such a situation. This is a very positive initiative that will inform the national debate. There can be no doubt that many factors will be considered but, given that safe access, with protection against any crime scene contamination, can be secured, the primary question must be whether such access should and can be managed in a way that will enable the celebration of the sacraments at this most sacred moment, the moment when we believe a soul is passing.

Undoubtedly, any future guidance will require processes for the identification, training, et cetera, of clergy who might be granted access in such situations, but these are practical issues which can be resolved. I put my name to this amendment because I believe it can be done, and it should be done, for the support of the dying person and for their family and friends, who may be enormously comforted by the fact that a priest was allowed to attend someone at this most sacred moment.

Emergency Services: Ministers of Religion

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Moylan]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to establish a multi-professional strategy for the emergency services concerning the attendance of ministers of religion at the scene of situations involving serious injury.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, today of all days, we remember Sir David Amess, who tragically died carrying out his duties as a public servant. Our thoughts and prayers are with his loved ones, as well as with all those involved in scenes of traumatic injury. Decisions regarding the management of such situations remain an operational issue for the emergency services involved. There are no plans to establish a multi-professional strategy on this issue.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, the tragic death of Sir David Amess brought to national attention a problem that experts and academics in the field of disaster and emergency response have recognised for some time—namely, the lack of a considered approach to the role of ministers of religion and their access to victims at end-of-life in disasters and emergencies. While I welcome the fact that the Archbishop of Westminster and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner have opened a dialogue on this topic, does my noble friend agree that a national standard is required? Will she undertake a study, preliminary to that, of other jurisdictions such as Israel, Italy and even Northern Ireland, where practice tends to be more nuanced and accommodating?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

There are certainly lessons to be learned from other jurisdictions, as my noble friend said. I totally empathise with the situation that both David Amess’s family and the police found themselves in during that dreadful incident. Given the people who are involved, I hope and expect a sensible and pragmatic conclusion to be arrived at through the discussions.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

Debate on Amendment 224 resumed.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments to which I put my name in this group, which are in the names also of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but before I do so I will make a few remarks about two amendments that I have not put my name to but now see clearly that I should have done, namely Amendments 226A and 226B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top. These amendments address a part of the Bill that makes one potentially subject to a serious violence reduction order for what one “ought to have known”. The noble Baroness dealt with it from the point of view of its equalities implication when she spoke to her amendments. I will deal with it from the point of view of its absurdity.

What ought one to know? Your Lordships’ House is full of astonishingly complicated rules about which carpet you can and cannot stand on, what date you have to put amendments down by and things like that. As a relatively recent Peer, I have spent most of the last year wandering around the place wondering what I ought to know. Is that a basis for culpability of some sort? How is it to be established? I am not a lawyer at all and I have no experience of the criminal justice system, but it is surely hard enough to establish in court as a matter of evidential fact what a particular person knew or did not know, let alone what they ought to have known. This is all to be worked out by a judge, without the benefit of the wisdom of a jury, with no particular guidance and no idea what “ought to have known” means. The whole thing is completely absurd. The idea that one should have one’s liberties restricted simply because of what one “ought to have known” should be taken out of the Bill. These amendments would effect that and I lend my support to them.

On the amendments to which I have put my name, noble Lords have already made the case extremely well. We need to start with a clear understanding that a serious violence reduction order is a criminal sanction. It is nothing less. We cannot make it the same as civil penalties. This all started back in the 1990s when parking offences were decriminalised. In my service as a local councillor, I benefited hugely from that. It was a tremendous idea and worked extremely well, but we cannot then carry on applying the same principle. An SVRO is not a parking ticket; it is a potentially serious restriction on your liberties that travels with you and, if you are a young person, stigmatises you, if are trying to make your way in university or wherever you might move to around the country, by making you go and register and so on. This is not a parking ticket; it is very much more serious.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I think I backtracked quite a bit to say that the courts would then make the judgment call on whether the SVRO would be made, based on the facts of the case. I am not saying that, theoretically, it could not happen, but the courts may decide otherwise. It would depend on the facts of the case.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Perhaps I may just add that it seems so widely drawn that the first condition, in proposed new subsection (1), is that there has to be an offence. It does not say that there has to be an offence involving violence. So, first there has to be an offence. Then you engage proposed new subsection (3)(b): during the commission of the offence, whatever it might have been, did the person involved carry a knife? If the offence was, say, a driving offence, I am sure that an SVRO would not be applied for or granted, but there is a large area of discretion here. When you take it a little further into proposed new subsection (4), it is simply an offence—the carriage of a knife and the question of “ought to have known”. So the whole thing wanders off into this speculative landscape where evidence does not seem to matter and it is all mental constructions. I am sorry for going on.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

It is no problem at all; this is Committee, where we clarify these issues. But I think it is fair to say that the trigger for the SVRO, essentially, is the conviction.

Immigration Rules: Au Pairs

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I have just explained this. The youth mobility scheme is open to the whole world and we are open to having arrangements with any country in the world. We already have arrangements with nine countries, with two more to be added next year.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I have no view as to whether the Government should take action to address the shortage of au pairs. However, I ask my noble friend to agree that, if any action is taken by the Government as a result of this shortage, there will be no undue discrimination in favour of EU countries as opposed to those in the rest of the world. We have left the European Union, and that means that we stand on an equal relationship and footing with every country in the world. Any scheme that is introduced should not contain the discriminatory element implicit in this Question.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My noble friend clearly gets it: since we left the EU, we are treating all countries the same.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 25th October 2021 Lords Chamber

Directly elected mayors and police and crime commissioners already have considerable de facto authority in their local areas from their electoral mandate, without the need for legal powers to force other bodies to provide them with information. Clause 16 is not necessary and should not stand part of the Bill. To suggest that anyone in a position of trust and responsibility who is working with the issues and people affected by serious violence needs to be coerced, to have a legal duty placed on them to collaborate and to pass information that is essential to the prevention and tackling of serious violence to the appropriate authorities, is an insult and is likely to be counterproductive.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I lend my support to Amendments 34, 60 and 65 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to which I have added my name. I do so particularly in regard to the Bill’s effects on local authorities, having 28 years’ experience of having served on one.

Local authority officers, especially those working in social services, are the most collaborative people possible—they have multiagency working written into their DNA—but within proper professional limits, especially concerning the guardianship of personal information. Their focus is always first and foremost, properly, on the welfare of their client—in the case of serious violence, often young people living in the twilight zone between potential offender and, at the same time, potential victim. Of course, the risk in these provisions is that the disclosure of information provisions in Clause 15 changes the relationship between social worker and client so as to drive the latter away from services that could in fact divert them from serious violence.

What I do not fully understand and has not been made explicit is whether Clause 15 alters or expands the existing legal and professional constraints that social workers operate under in relation to the release of information to the police. If it does not, what is the point of it? If it does, will my noble friend say in what way and to what extent it does so, and what the rationale is? It may be that my noble friend can satisfy my concerns about this, but in the meantime the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, particularly Amendment 65 requiring depersonalisation of data, go some way to address those concerns, and I support them.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this group enables me to raise a concern that will not be new to the Committee or to the Minister but has not been resolved as a general issue and is possible as the Bill is drafted. It is the reluctance of immigrant women—it is usually women—suffering domestic abuse to go to the police for help because they fear that information will be shared with immigration authorities.

Last week, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner published a report entitled Safety Before Status, and one of her recommendations is that

“the Home Office should introduce a firewall between police and immigration enforcement, accompanied by safe reporting mechanisms”

I cannot resist saying that it continues

“and funded referral pathways to support.”

Perpetrators can use a victim’s insecure status as a component of coercive control. They can use status that is not insecure, but the victim is led to believe that it is. If victims are to come first, it is essential that they know that they can seek support without putting themselves in danger of deportation. I was going to ask noble Lords to imagine what this means, but I am not sure any of us can: not only the financial and accommodation implications considerations but, in some communities, shame and abandonment by the family in the country of origin. There are a number of very difficult consequences—that is putting it too mildly.

The commissioner’s report says:

“Immigration abuse and insecure immigration status as a risk factor is not always identified in local safeguarding protocols, and often the risk faced by victims … is misidentified.”


She goes on:

“Information sharing with immigration enforcement undermines trust in the police and public services”—


a point that has been made this evening—

“and enables perpetrators to control and abuse survivors with impunity. A key reason why staff in public services share information with immigration enforcement is for the perceived purpose of safeguarding a victim. Data sharing in this capacity, however, can put the victim or survivor at risk … and, even where enforcement action does not take place can compound the experience of immigration abuse, pushing victims and survivors further away from support.”

I could not let this group go by without raising that issue.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Sandhurst on his maiden speech and welcome him to the House, where I am sure he will make a wonderful contribution.

I welcome much that is in this very large Bill. While I realise that the provisions on protest are controversial, I welcome the clarity they bring on the limits to legitimate protest. As the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Matt Twist, has said,

“Whatever the cause, activists do not have the right to cause unreasonable and serious disruption to … communities.”


I agree with that. I personally compare it to secondary picketing: an attempt to disrupt people who are not decision-makers in order to embarrass the true decision-makers. We outlawed secondary picketing, and no one would now bring it back. I think it will be the same in this case.

However, I have three areas of concern that I want to bring to the House’s attention which are united by what I call a theme of preventive justice. There was a movie some years ago in which preventive justice was taken to a point of refinement whereby merely having a thought with a criminal intention resulted in a raid by the police on your premises to ensure that you were unable to put it into execution. I have never thought that a particularly British, commendable or desirable approach to the administration of justice, but it appears to have had a powerful effect on successive Home Secretaries.

Starting in 1998, we had the ASBOs. From that, we have gone on to a whole quiver-full of administrative processes that place restrictions on people without the tedium of having to have a criminal conviction proven. This Bill adds a further arrow to that quiver in the shape of the serious violence reduction order. Other noble Lords have spoken about this. They have also pointed out that, coupled with the proposed statutory duty on public authorities to collaborate in relation to prospective serious violence—that is, to prevent it—these points raise important questions about the character of criminal justice in this country, about how it has evolved and about equalities.

My second concern continues the thread of preventive justice. I find myself in troubling agreement with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and certain other noble Lords who have spoken, on the question of indeterminate sentences. Much of what I was going to say has been made otiose by the compelling speech, laden with statistics, made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, so I do not need to spend a great deal of time on that, but the fact that so many people are still languishing in prison under this cruel sentence, which has been found to be incompatible with our obligations on human rights, is simply a shame to this country. This Bill gives us a useful opportunity to set in hand a judicially led process for turning those sentences into determinate sentences.

Finally, the Bill presents an opportunity—again, it is not in the Bill, but I think it should be—to put an end to police forces’ kafkaesque practice of maintaining records of actions that are explicitly not criminal; that is, the Monty Pythonesque, self-contradictory non-crime hate incident. If there is any defence for this, it is again on the basis of preventive justice: “We want to know these things, because although they are by definition not crimes, there might be a crime some time in the future.” I do not think this is at all defensible, so I hope that in Committee there will be an opportunity to address those three areas at least and discuss them.

I hope that the Government will take the opportunity to put right these issues and bring back to our justice system a little less administrative pre-emption and a little more proving of things on the basis of evidence and facts.

Undercover Policing Inquiry

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Wednesday 14th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure that the rationale would not be to deny people access to justice. Clearly, the revelation of any names would be a matter for the chairman of what is an independent inquiry.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, the inquiry was set up in 2015; over five years passed before opening statements were delivered. Some 90 staff are directly engaged, and, as my noble friend has said, the cost, so far, exceeds £36 million, but that excludes very considerable expenditure by police forces responding to the inquiry. I estimate that the inquiry’s total cost to the public purse, by the time it reports—well into the current decade—will be in excess of £100 million. Can my noble friend the Minister tell me if that is a reasonable forecast that the department is budgeting for?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I am not sure whether it is a reasonable forecast, but, responding to my noble friend’s points, I can say that the inquiry needs to deliberate promptly and with an eye properly on its use of public funds in order to do so.