Online Safety Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 10th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am rather disappointed that, while this is a large group on freedom of expression, it is dominated by amendments by myself and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, dipping their toes in the free-expression water here and I am glad that the Minister has added his name to their amendment, although it is a shame that he did not add his name to one of mine.

Earlier today we heard a lot of congratulations to the Government for listening. I have to say, it depends who you are, because the Government have not listened to all of us. It is notable that, of the hundreds of new government concessions that have taken the form of amendments on Report, none relates to free speech. Before I go through my amendments, I want to note that, when the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and I raise concerns about free speech, it can be that we get treated as being slightly eccentric. There has been a generally supportive and generous mood from the regulars in this House. I understand that, but I worry that free speech is being seen as peripheral.

This country, our country, that we legislate for and in, has a long history of boasting that it is the home of liberty and adopts the liberal approach that being free is the default position: that free speech and the plurality and diversity of views it engenders are the cornerstone of democracy in a free society and that any deviation from that approach must require extraordinary and special justification. A comprehensive piece of law, such as the one we are dealing with, that challenges many of those norms, deserves thorough scrutiny through the prism of free speech.

When I approached this Bill, which I had been following long before I arrived in this House, I assumed that there would be packed Benches—as there are on the Illegal Migration Bill—and that everybody, including all these Law Lords, would be in quoting the European Court of Human Rights on Article 8 and Article 10. I assumed there would be complaints about Executive power grabs and so on. But it has been a bit sparse.

That is okay; I can live with that, even if it is a bit dispiriting. But I am concerned when the Government cite that the mood of the Committee has been reflected in their amendments, because it has not been a very large Committee. Many of the amendments that I, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and others tabled about free expression represent the concerns of a wide range of policy analysts, civil rights groups, academics, lawyers, free speech campaigners and industry representatives. They have been put forward in good faith—I continue to do that—to suggest ways of mitigating some of the grave threats to free speech in this Bill, with constructive ideas about how to tackle flaws and raising some of the problems of unintended consequences. I have, at times, felt that those concerns were batted away with a certain indifference. Despite the Minister being very affable and charming, none the less it can be a bit disappointing.

Anyway, I am here to bat again. I hope that the Government now will listen very closely and consider how to avoid the UK ending up with the most restrictive internet speech laws of any western democracy at the end of this. I have a lot of different amendments in my name in this group. I wholeheartedly support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, requiring Ofcom to assess the impact of its codes on free speech, but I will not speak to them.

I will talk about my amendments, starting with Amendments 77, 78, 79, 80 and 81. These require platforms to have particular regard to freedom of expression, not just when implementing safety measures and policies but when writing their terms of service. This is to ensure that freedom of expression is not reduced to an abstract “have regard to” secondary notion but is visible in drafting terms of services. This would mean that users know their rights in clear and concrete terms. For example, a platform should be expected to justify how a particular term of service, on something such as religious hatred, will be balanced with consideration of freedom of expression and conscience, in order to allow discussions over different beliefs to take place. Users need to be able to point to specific provisions in the terms of service setting out their free speech protections.

This is all about parity between free speech and safety. Although the Government—and I welcome this—have attempted some balance, via Clause 18, to mitigate the damage to individual rights of free expression from the Bill, it is a rather weak, poor cousin. We need to recognise that, if companies are compelled to prevent and minimise so-called harmful content via operational safety duties, these amendments are saying that there should be parity with free expression. They should be compelled to do the same on freedom of expression, with a clear and positive duty, rather than Clause 64, which is framed rather negatively.

Amendment 188 takes on the issue of terms of service from a different direction, attempting to ensure that duties with regard to safety must not be allowed to restrict lawful expression or that protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. That states that interference in free speech rights is not lawful unless it is a last resort. I note, in case anyone is reading the amendment carefully, and for Hansard, that the amendment cites Article 8—a rather Freudian slip on my part that was not corrected by the Table Office. That is probably because privacy rights are also threatened by the Bill, but I meant Article 10 of course.

Amendment 188 addresses a genuine dilemma in terms of Ofcom enforcing safety duties via terms and conditions. These will transform private agreements between companies and users into statutory duties under Clause 65. This could mean that big tech companies would be exercising public law functions by state-backed enforcement of the suppression of lawful speech. One worry is that platforms’ terms of service are not neutral; they can change due to external political or commercial pressures. We have all been following with great interest what is happening at Twitter. They are driven by values which can be at odds with UK laws. So I hope the Minister will answer the query that this amendment poses: how is the UK able to uphold its Article 10 obligations if state regulators are legally instructed to enforce terms of service attitudes to free speech, even when they censor far more than UK domestic law requires?

Amendment 162 has a different focus and removes offences under Section 5 of the Public Order Act from the priority offences to be regulated as priority illegal content, as set out in Schedule 7. This amendment is prompted by a concern that the legislation enlists social media companies to act as a private online police force and to adjudicate on the legality of online content. This is especially fraught in terms of the legal limits on speech, where illegality is often contested and contentious—offline as well as online.

The inclusion of Section 5 would place a duty on service providers to take measures to prevent individuals ever encountering content that includes

“threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour”

that is likely to cause “harassment, alarm or distress”. It would also require service providers to minimise the length of time such content is present on the service.

I am not sure whether noble Lords have been following the dispute that broke out over the weekend. There is a film on social media doing the rounds of a trans speaker, Sarah Jane Baker, at the Trans Pride event screaming pretty hysterically “If you see a TERF, punch them in the effing face”—and I am being polite. You would think that that misogynistic threat would be the crime people might be concerned about, yet some apologists for Trans Pride claim that those women—TERFs such as myself—who are outraged, and have been treating the speech as saying that, are the ones who are stirring up hate.

Now, that is a bit of a mess, but asking service providers, or indeed algorithms, to untangle such disputes can surely lead only to the over-removal of online expression, or even more of a muddle. As the rule of law charity Justice points out, this could also catch content that depicts conflict or atrocities, such as those taking place in the Russia-Ukraine war. Justice asks whether the inclusion of Section 5 of the POA could lead to the removal of posts by individuals sharing stories of their own abuse or mistreatment on internet support forums.

Additionally, under Schedule 7 to the Bill, versions of Section 5 could also be regulated as priority illegal conduct, meaning that providers would have to remove or restrict content that, for instance, encourages what is called disorderly behaviour that is likely to cause alarm. Various organisations are concerned that this could mean that content that portrayed protest activity, that might be considered disorderly by some, was removed unless you condemned it, or even that content which encouraged people to attend protests would be in scope.

I am not a fan of Section 5 of the Public Order Act, which criminalises stirring up hatred, at the best of times, but at least those offences have been and are subject to the full rigour of the criminal justice system and case law. Of course, the courts, the CPS and the police are also bound, for example by Article 10, to protect free speech. But that is very different to compelling social media companies, their staff or automated algorithms to make such complex assessments of the Section 5 threshold of illegality. Through no fault of their own, those companies are just not qualified to make such determinations, and it is obvious that that could mean that legitimate speech will end up being restricted. Dangerously, it also makes a significant departure from the UK’s rule of law in deciding what is legal or illegal speech. It has the potential to limit UK users’ ability to engage in important aspects of public life, and prevent victims of abuse from sharing their stories, as I have described.

I turn finally to the last amendment, Amendment 275—I will keep this short, for time’s sake. I will not go into detail, but I hope that the Minister will take a look at it, see that there is a loophole, and discuss it with the department. In skeleton form, the Free Speech Union has discovered that the British Board of Film Classification runs a mobile classification network, an agreement with mobile network providers that means that it advises mobile providers on what content should be filtered because it is considered suitable for adults only. This arrangement is private, not governed by statute, and as such means that even the weak free speech safeguards in this Bill can be sidestepped. This affects not only under-18s but anyone with factory settings on their phone. It led to a particular bizarre outcome when last year the readers of the online magazine, “The Conservative Woman”, reported that the website was inaccessible. This small online magazine was apparently blacklisted by the BBFC because of comments below the line on its articles. The potential for such arbitrary censorship is a real concern, and the magazine cannot even appeal to the BBFC, so I ask the Minister to take this amendment back to the DCMS, which helped set up this mobile classification network, and find out what is going on.

That peculiar tale illustrates my concerns about what happens when free speech is not front and centre, even when you are concerned about safety and harm. I worry that when free speech is casually disregarded, censorship and bans can become the default, and a thoughtless option. That is why I urge the Minister before Third Reading to at least make sure that some of the issues and amendments in this group are responded to positively.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend on the Front Bench said at various points when we were in Committee that the Bill struck an appropriate balance between protecting the rights of children and the rights of those wishing to exercise their freedom of expression. I have always found it very difficult indeed to discern that point of balance in the Bill as originally drafted, but I will say that if there were such a point, it has been swamped by the hundreds of amendments tabled to the Bill by my noble friend since Committee which push the Bill entirely in the opposite direction.

Among those amendments, I cannot find—it may be my fault, because I am just looking by myself; I have no help to find these things—a single one which seeks to redress the balance back in favour of freedom of expression. My Amendments 123, 128, 130, 141, 148 and 244 seek to do that to some extent, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for the support she has expressed for them.

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Another thing to recognise—and this is where I perhaps depart from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan—is that we are in a sense dealing with privately managed public spaces on the internet. There is a lot of debate around this but, for me, they are functionally equivalent to other privately managed public spaces such as pubs, hotels or sports grounds. In none of those context do we expect all legal speech to be permissible. Rather, they all have their own norms and they enforce them. I cannot go into a sports ground and say what I like; I will get thrown out if I carry out certain actions within most of those public spaces. We are talking about privately managed public spaces; anyone can go in but, in entering that space, you have to conform to the norms of that space. As I said, I am not aware of many spaces where all legal speech is permitted.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I understand the point the noble Lord is making but, if he were thrown out, sacked or treated in some other way that was incompatible with his rights to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European convention, he would have cause for complaint and, possibly, cause for legal redress.

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

That point is well made. In support of that, if the public space treated me in a discriminatory way, I would expect to have redress, but I do not think I have a right in every public space to say everything I like in the classic Article 8 sense. My right vis-à-vis the state is much broader than my right vis-à-vis any public space that I am operating in where norms apply as well as my basic legal rights. Again, to take the pub example, if I went in and made a racist speech, I may well be thrown out of the pub even though it is sub-criminal and the police are never called; they do not need to be as the space itself organises it.

I am making the point that terms of service are about managing these privately managed public services, and it would be a mistake to equate them entirely with our right to speak or the point at which the state can step in and censor us. I understand the point about state interference but it cuts both ways: both the state interfering in excessively censoring what we can say but also the state potentially interfering in the management of what is, after all, a private space. To refer back to the US first amendment tradition, a lot of that was about freedom of religion and precisely about enabling heterodoxy. The US did not want an orthodoxy in which one set of rules applied everywhere to everybody. Rather, it wanted people to have the right to dissent, including in ways that were exclusive. You could create your own religious sect and you could not be told not to have those beliefs.

Rolling that power over to the online world, online services, as long as they are non-discriminatory, can have quite different characters. Some will be very restrictive of speech like a restrictive religious sect; some will be very open and catholic, with a small “c”, in the sense of permitting a broad range of speech. I worry about some of the amendments in case there is a suggestion that Ofcom would start to tell a heterodox community of online services that there is an orthodox way to run their terms of service; I would rather allow this to be a more diverse environment.

Having expressed some concerns, I am though very sympathetic to Amendment 162 on Section 5 of the Public Order Act. I have tried in our debates to bring some real experience to this. There are two major concerns about the inclusion of the Public Order Act in the Bill. One is a lack of understanding of what that means. If you look at the face of the language that has been quoted at us, and go back to that small service that does not have a bunch of lawyers on tap, it reads as though it is stopping any kind of abusive content. Maybe you will google it, as I did earlier, and get a little thing back from the West Yorkshire Police. I googled: “Is it illegal to swear in the street?”. West Yorkshire Police said, “Yes, it is”. So if you are sitting somewhere googling to find out what this Public Order Act thing means, you mind end up thinking, “Crikey, for UK users, I have to stop them swearing”. There is a real risk of misinterpretation.

The second risk is that of people deliberately gaming the system; again, I have a real-life example from working in one of the platforms. I had people from United Kingdom law enforcement asking us to remove content that was about demonstrations by far-right groups. They were groups I fundamentally disagree with, but their demonstrations did not appear to be illegal. The grounds cited were that, if you allow this content to go ahead and the demonstration happens, there will be a Public Order Act offence. Once you get that on official notepaper, you have to be quite robust to say, “No, I disagree”, which we did on occasion.

I think there will be other services that receive Public Order Act letters from people who seem official and they will be tempted to take down content that is entirely legal. The critical thing here is that that content will often be political. In other parts of the Bill, we are saying that we should protect political speech, yet we have a loophole here that risks that.

I am sure the Minister will not concede these amendments, but I hope he will concede that it is important that platforms are given guidance so that they do not think that somebody getting upset about a political demonstration is sufficient grounds to remove the content as a Public Order Act offence. If you are a local police officer it is much better to get rid of that EDL demonstration, so you write to the platform and it makes your life easier, but I do not think that would be great from a speech point of view.

Finally, I turn to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on Amendment 188 about the ECHR Article 8 exemption. As I read it, if your terms of service are not consistent with ECHR Article 8—and I do not think they will be for most platforms—you then get an exemption from all the other duties around appeals and enforcing them correctly. It is probably a probing amendment but it is a curious way of framing it; it essentially says that, if you are more restrictive, you get more freedom in terms of the Ofcom relationship. I am just curious about the detail of that amendment.

It is important that we have this debate and understand this relationship between the state, platforms and terms of service. I for one am persuaded that the general framework of the Bill makes sense; there are necessary and proportionate restrictions. I am strongly of the view that platforms should be allowed to be heterodox in their terms of service. Ofcom’s job is very much to make sure that they are done correctly but not to interfere with the content of those terms of service beyond that which is illegal. I am persuaded that we need to be extraordinarily careful about including Public Order Act offences; that particular amendment needs a good hearing.

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Amendments 286 and 294 would insert a definition of “freedom of expression” into the Bill. As I mentioned, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friend Lady Fraser for proposing these amendments, which align the definition of freedom of expression in the Bill with that in the European Convention on Human Rights. We agree with them that it will increase clarity about freedom of expression in the Bill, which is why I have added my name to their amendments and, when we come to the very end of Report—to which I look forward as well—I will be very glad to support them.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, perhaps I could seek a point of clarification. I think I heard him say, at the beginning of his response to this short debate, that providers will be required to have terms of service which respect users’ rights. May I ask him a very straightforward question: do those rights include the rights conferred by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights? Put another way, is it possible for a provider operating in the United Kingdom to have terms and conditions that abridge the rights conferred by Article 10? If it is possible, what is the Government’s defence of that? If it is not possible, what is the mechanism by which the Bill achieves that?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

As I set out, I think my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, are not right to point to the European Convention on Human Rights here. That concerns individuals’ and entities’ rights

“to receive and impart ideas without undue interference”

by public authorities, not private entities. We do not see how a service provider deciding not to allow certain types of content on its platform would engage the Article 10 rights of the user, but I would be very happy to discuss this further with my noble friend and the noble Baroness in case we are talking at cross-purposes.