Online Safety Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Allan of Hallam
Main Page: Lord Allan of Hallam (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Allan of Hallam's debates with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall follow on directly from some of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, around privacy. I shall not repeat the arguments around children and pornography but touch on something else, which is the impact of these amendments on the vast majority of internet users, the 85%-plus who are 18 or older. Of course, when we introduce age assurance measures, they will affect everyone: we should not kid ourselves that it is only about children, because everyone will have to pass through these gateways.
I shall speak particularly to Amendments 184 and 217 on privacy. I am sure that most adults will support extra safety measures for children, but they also want to be able to access a wide range of online services with the least possible friction and the lowest risk to their own personal data. We can explore how this might work in practice by looking at something that we might all do in this Chamber. Looking round, I believe that we are all at least 18 years old, and we might find ourselves idly passing the time creating an account on a new user-to-user or search service that has been recommended. We should consider this group of amendments by how that might play out. In future, the services will have to check that we are in the United Kingdom—there is a range of ways in which they can do that. Having confirmed that, they will need to understand whether we are 18-plus or a child user so that they can tailor their service appropriately.
I hope we all agree that the services should not be asking us for passports or driving licences, for example, as that would be entirely contrary to the thrust of privacy regulations and would be a huge gateway to fraud and other problems. The most efficient way would be for them to ask us for some sort of digital certificate—a certificate that we have on our devices where we have proven to a trusted third party that we are 18-plus. The certificate does not need to contain any personal data but simply confirms that we are of age. That is very similar to the way in which secure websites work: they send a digital certificate to your browser and you verify that certificate with a trusted third party—a certificate authority—and then you can open an encrypted connection. We are reversing the flow: the service will ask the user for a certificate and then verify that before granting access. A user may have a setting on their device in future where they confirm that they are happy for their 18-plus certificate to be given to anybody or whether they would like to be asked every time there will be a new set of privacy controls.
Building the infrastructure for this is non-trivial. Many things could go wrong but at least the kind of model I am describing has some hope of achieving widespread adoption. It is very good for the adult users as they can continue to have the frictionless experience as long as they are happy for their device to send a certificate to new services. It is good for the market of internet services if new services can bring users on easily. It is good for privacy by avoiding lots of services each collecting personal data, as most people access a multiplicity of services. Perhaps most importantly in terms of the Bill’s objectives, it is good for children if services can separate out the vast majority of their users who are 18-plus and then focus their real efforts on tailoring the services for the minority of users who will be children. The Bill will introduce a whole set of new obligations.
We should not underestimate the scale of the challenge in practice; it will work only if major internet companies are willing to play the game and get into the market of offering 18-plus certificates. Companies such as Google, Meta, Amazon, Apple and Microsoft—the ones we normally love to hate—will potentially provide the solution, as well as not-for-profits. There will be foundations for those who object to the big internet companies, but it is those big internet companies which will have the reach; they each have millions of users in the United Kingdom. This is not to fly the flag for those companies; it is simply a question of efficiency. I suspect that everyone in the Chamber uses a combination of services from those big providers. We already share with them the personal data necessary for age assurance, and there would be no additional sharing of data. If they were willing to provide a certificate, they could do so at the kind of scale necessary for the 50 million or so adult internet users in the United Kingdom to be able to get one easily and then pass it to services when they choose to access them.
There may be some discomfort with big tech playing this role, but I cannot see the kind of aggressive targets that we are setting in the amendments working unless we take advantage of those existing platforms and use them to make this work. Amendment 230 tells us that we have about 18 months, which is very soon in terms of trying to build something. We should be clear that if we are to deliver this package it will depend on persuading some of those big names in tech to create age certification schemes for UK users.
For this to have widespread adoption and a competitive market, we need it to be free of direct financial costs to individual users and to services choosing to age-verify, as we have asked them to do so. We need to think very carefully about that, as it raises a whole series of competition questions that I am sure Ofcom and the Competition and Markets Authority will have to address, not least because we will be asking companies to provide age certification free of charge that will be used by their existing and future competitors to meet their compliance requirements.
There may be some listening who think that we can rely on small age-assurance start-ups. Some of them have a really important role to play and we should be proud of our homegrown industry, but we should be realistic that they will reach scale only if they work with and through the large service providers. Many of them are already seeking those kinds of relationship.
As a test case, we might think of an application such as Signal, a messaging app that prides itself on being privacy-first. It does not want to collect any additional information from its users, which is perfectly reasonable, given where it is coming from. It will be really interesting to see how comfortable such a service will be with working with certification schemes, under which it can prove that users are over 18 by taking advantage of the data held by other services which collect significant amounts of data and have a very good idea of how old we are.
I have not focused on under-18s but, once this system is in place, application providers will be thinking very carefully about the pros and cons of allowing under-18s on at all. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is also concerned about this. There will be services that will think very carefully, if they find that the vast majority of their users are 18-plus, about the extent to which they want to put time and effort into tailoring them for users under 18. We do not intend that outcome from the Bill, but we need realistically to consider it.
Just to be clear, I say that the purpose of my question to the Minister was to get at the fact that, for low-risk situations, there can be age assurance that is a lot less effective or intrusive, for that very reason.
I agree; that is very helpful. I think Amendments 74, 93 and 99 also talk about the exclusion, as the noble Baroness raised, of services from the child safety duties if they can show that they are only 18-plus. It will be quite material and critical to know at what level they can demonstrate that.
I have avoided talking about pornography services directly, but there are interesting questions around what will happen if this model develops, as it likely will. If big tech is now starting to provide age certification for the kinds of mainstream services we may all want to access, they may be much less comfortable providing that same certification to pornography providers, for reputational reasons. A mainstream provider would not want to enter that market. Ofcom will need to take a view on this. We have talked about interoperability in the framework we have created, but it is a big question for Ofcom whether it wants to steer all age certification providers also to provide 18-plus certification for pornography providers or, effectively, to allow two markets to develop—one for mainstream certification and one for certification for pornography.
I have taken a few minutes because this is a very high-risk area for the Bill. There are material risks in willing into existence a model that depends on technical infrastructure that has not yet been built. The noble Lord, Lord Bethell, referred to prior experience; one of the reasons why we have not delivered age assurance before is that the infrastructure was not there. We now want it built, so must recognise that it is quite a high-risk endeavour. That does not mean it is not worth attempting, but we must recognise the risks and work on them.
If the implementation is poor, it will frustrate adult users, which may bring the Bill into disrepute. We need to recognise that as a genuine risk. There are people out there already saying that the Bill means that every internet service in the world will ask you for your passport. If that is not the case, we need to stress that we do not expect that to happen. There are also potentially significant impacts on the market for online services available to both adults and children in the UK, depending on the design of this system.
The purpose of thinking about some of these risks today is not to create a doom-laden scenario and say that it will not work. It is entirely the opposite—to say that, if we are to move ahead into a world in which children are protected from harmful content, for which very good reasons have been articulated and a huge amount of work has gone ahead, and in which services can tailor and gear access to the age of the child, we have to be able to take the 18-plus out of that, put it into a separate box and do so in a really easy, straightforward manner. If not, the 18-plus will end up dragging down what we want to do for the underage.
I hope that explanation helps in the context of these amendments. We will need to test them against it as implementation happens over the next few months.
I just realised I forgot to thank the Government for Amendment 271, which reflected something I raised in Committee. I will reflect back to the Minister that, as is reinforced by his response now, it goes precisely where I wanted to. That is to make sure—I have raised this many times—that we are not implementing another cookie banner, but are implementing something and then going back to say, “Did it work as we intended? Were the costs proportionate to what we achieved?” I want to put on the record that I appreciate Amendment 271.
I appreciate the noble Lord’s interjection and, indeed, his engagement on this issue, which has informed the amendments that we have tabled.
In relation to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, as I set out, there are already robust safeguards for user privacy in the Bill. I have already mentioned Amendment 124, which puts age-assurance principles in the Bill. These require Ofcom to have regard, when producing its codes of practice on the use of age assurance, to the principle of protecting the privacy of users, including data protection. We think that the noble Baroness’s amendment is also unnecessary. I hope that she and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, will be willing to not move their amendments and to support the government amendments in the group.
My Lords, I follow the noble Lord, Lord Russell, particularly in talking about Amendments 43, 87 and 242, which raise some interesting and quite profound questions on what we are expecting from the market of internet services once the Online Safety Bill is in place.
It is worth taking a moment to remind ourselves of what we do and do not want from the Bill. We want services that are causing harm and are unwilling to take reasonable steps to address that to leave the UK market. That is clear. As a result of this legislation, it will be likely that some services leave the UK market, because we have asked them to do reasonable things and they have said no; they are not willing to comply with the law and therefore they need to be out. There is a whole series of measures in the Bill that will lead to that.
Equally, we want services that are willing to take reasonable steps to stay in the UK market, do the risk assessments, work at improvements and have the risks under control. They may not all be resolved on day one—otherwise, we would not need the legislation—but they should be on a path to address the risks that have been identified. We want those people to be in the market, for two reasons.
The first is that we want choice for people; we do not take pleasure in shutting people who are providing services out of the market. Also, from a child safety point of view, there is a genuine concern that, if you limit choice too far, you will end up creating more of a demand for completely unregulated services that sit outside the UK and will fill the gap. There is a balance in making sure that there is a range of attractive services, so that teenagers in particular feel that their needs are being met. We want those services to be regulated and committed to improvement.
Something that is in between will be a hard decision for Ofcom—something that is not great today, but not so bad that we want it out tomorrow. Ofcom will have to exercise considerable judgment in how it deals with those services. This is my interpretation of where proportionality and capacity come in. If you are running a very large internet service, something such as PhotoDNA, which is the technology that allows you to scan photos and detect child abuse images, is relatively straightforward to implement. All the major providers do it, but there are costs to that for smaller services. There are some real capacity challenges around implementing those kinds of technology. It is getting better over time and we would like them to do it, but you would expect Ofcom to engage in a conversation as a smaller service—smaller not in terms of its users but in its engineers and capacity—may need a little longer to implement such a technology.
A larger service could do proactive investigations. If it has a large team, once it has identified that something is problematic, it can investigate proactively. Again, a smaller service may not have the bodies on the ground to do that, but you would hope it would develop that capacity. It is important to recognise something about capacity if we are to encourage those that are half way between to come to the light side rather than slip off to the dark side.
I am interested in the Minister’s interpretation of these words and the instruction to Ofcom. We will be dependent on Ofcom, which will sit on the other side of a real or virtual table with the people who run these companies, as Ofcom can insist that they come in and talk to it. It will have to make these judgments, but we do not want it to be conned or to be a walkover for an organisation that has the capacity or could do things that are helpful, but is simply refusing to do them or somehow trying to pull the wool over Ofcom’s eyes.
Equally, we do not want Ofcom to demand the impossible of a service that genuinely struggles to meet a demand and that has things broadly under control. That is the balance and the difficult judgment. I think we are probably aiming for the same thing, and I hope the Minister is able to clarify these instructions and the way the Government expect Ofcom to interpret them. We are looking for that point at which Ofcom is seriously demanding but does not get overbearing and unnecessarily drive out of the market people who are making best efforts to do their risk assessments and then work hard to resolve those risks.
My Lords, I speak to Amendments 286 and 294, which are the last two amendments in this group, and I will explain what they are about. They are in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie, who unfortunately cannot be here this evening, to which I and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, have added our names, as has the Minister, for which we are very grateful. They serve a simple purpose: they seek to insert a definition of the phrase “freedom of expression” into the list of definitions in Clause 211 and add it to the index of defined expressions in Clause 212.
They follow an amendment which I proposed in Committee. My amendment at that stage was to insert the definition into Clause 18, where the phrase
“freedom of expression within the law”
appears. It was prompted by a point made by the Constitution Committee in its report on the Bill, which said that the House might wish to consider defining that expression in the interests of legal certainty.
The same point arose when the House was considering the then Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill. Following a similar amendment by me, a government amendment on Report, to achieve the same result, was agreed to that Bill. My amendment in Committee on this Bill adopted the same wording as the government amendment to that Bill. In his response to what I said in Committee, the Minister pointed out, quite correctly, that the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act and this Bill serve quite different purposes, but he did say that the Bill team—and he himself—would consider our amendment closely between then and Report.
What has happened since is the amendment we are now proposing, which has undergone some changes since Committee. They are the product of some very helpful discussions with the Bill team. The most important is that the definition placed in Clause 211 extends to the use of the expression “freedom of expression” wherever it appears in the Bill, which is obviously a sensible change. It also now includes the word “receive” as well as the word “impart”, so that it extends to both kinds of communication that are within the scope of the Bill. The words “including in electronic form”, which are in my amendment, have been removed as unnecessary, as the Bill is concerned with communications in electronic form only.
There are also two provisions in the Bill which refer to freedom of expression to which, as the definition now makes clear, this definition is not to apply. They are in Clauses 36(6)(f) and 69(2)(d). This is because the context in which the expression is used there is quite different. They require Ofcom to consult people with expertise as to this right when preparing codes of conduct. They are not dealing with the duties of providers, which is what the definition aims to do.
As the discussion in Committee showed, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, demonstrated again this evening, we tend to use the phrases “freedom of speech” and “freedom of expression” interchangeably, perhaps without very much thought as to what they really mean and how they relate to other aspects of the idea. That is why legal certainty matters when they appear in legislation. The interests of legal certainty will be met if this definition finds a place in the Bill, and it makes it clear that the reference is to the expression referred to in Article 10(1) of the convention as it has effect for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. That is as generous and comprehensive a definition as one would wish to have for the purposes of the Bill.
I am grateful to the Minister for his support and to the Bill team for their help. When the times come, either the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, or I will move the amendment; it comes at the very end of the Bill so it will be at the last moment of the last day, when we are finishing Report. I look forward to that stage, as I am sure the Minister does himself.
My Lords, I want to respond to some of the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. I have been looking forward to this debate equally, as it touches on some crucial issues. One of the mistakes of the Bill that I place on the Government is that it was sold as somehow a balancing Bill. It is not; it is a speech-limiting Bill, as all Bills of this kind are. Its primary purpose is to prevent people in the United Kingdom encountering certain types of content.
If you support the Bill, it is because you believe that those restrictions are necessary and proportionate in the context of Article 8. Others will disagree. We cannot pretend that it is boosting free speech. The United States got it right in its first amendment. If you want to maximise speech, you prohibit your parliament regulating on speech: “Congress shall make no law that limits speech”. As soon as you start regulating, you tend towards limitations; the question in the UK and European contexts is whether those limitations are justified and justifiable.
I understand the point the noble Lord is making but, if he were thrown out, sacked or treated in some other way that was incompatible with his rights to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European convention, he would have cause for complaint and, possibly, cause for legal redress.
That point is well made. In support of that, if the public space treated me in a discriminatory way, I would expect to have redress, but I do not think I have a right in every public space to say everything I like in the classic Article 8 sense. My right vis-à-vis the state is much broader than my right vis-à-vis any public space that I am operating in where norms apply as well as my basic legal rights. Again, to take the pub example, if I went in and made a racist speech, I may well be thrown out of the pub even though it is sub-criminal and the police are never called; they do not need to be as the space itself organises it.
I am making the point that terms of service are about managing these privately managed public services, and it would be a mistake to equate them entirely with our right to speak or the point at which the state can step in and censor us. I understand the point about state interference but it cuts both ways: both the state interfering in excessively censoring what we can say but also the state potentially interfering in the management of what is, after all, a private space. To refer back to the US first amendment tradition, a lot of that was about freedom of religion and precisely about enabling heterodoxy. The US did not want an orthodoxy in which one set of rules applied everywhere to everybody. Rather, it wanted people to have the right to dissent, including in ways that were exclusive. You could create your own religious sect and you could not be told not to have those beliefs.
Rolling that power over to the online world, online services, as long as they are non-discriminatory, can have quite different characters. Some will be very restrictive of speech like a restrictive religious sect; some will be very open and catholic, with a small “c”, in the sense of permitting a broad range of speech. I worry about some of the amendments in case there is a suggestion that Ofcom would start to tell a heterodox community of online services that there is an orthodox way to run their terms of service; I would rather allow this to be a more diverse environment.
Having expressed some concerns, I am though very sympathetic to Amendment 162 on Section 5 of the Public Order Act. I have tried in our debates to bring some real experience to this. There are two major concerns about the inclusion of the Public Order Act in the Bill. One is a lack of understanding of what that means. If you look at the face of the language that has been quoted at us, and go back to that small service that does not have a bunch of lawyers on tap, it reads as though it is stopping any kind of abusive content. Maybe you will google it, as I did earlier, and get a little thing back from the West Yorkshire Police. I googled: “Is it illegal to swear in the street?”. West Yorkshire Police said, “Yes, it is”. So if you are sitting somewhere googling to find out what this Public Order Act thing means, you mind end up thinking, “Crikey, for UK users, I have to stop them swearing”. There is a real risk of misinterpretation.
The second risk is that of people deliberately gaming the system; again, I have a real-life example from working in one of the platforms. I had people from United Kingdom law enforcement asking us to remove content that was about demonstrations by far-right groups. They were groups I fundamentally disagree with, but their demonstrations did not appear to be illegal. The grounds cited were that, if you allow this content to go ahead and the demonstration happens, there will be a Public Order Act offence. Once you get that on official notepaper, you have to be quite robust to say, “No, I disagree”, which we did on occasion.
I think there will be other services that receive Public Order Act letters from people who seem official and they will be tempted to take down content that is entirely legal. The critical thing here is that that content will often be political. In other parts of the Bill, we are saying that we should protect political speech, yet we have a loophole here that risks that.
I am sure the Minister will not concede these amendments, but I hope he will concede that it is important that platforms are given guidance so that they do not think that somebody getting upset about a political demonstration is sufficient grounds to remove the content as a Public Order Act offence. If you are a local police officer it is much better to get rid of that EDL demonstration, so you write to the platform and it makes your life easier, but I do not think that would be great from a speech point of view.
Finally, I turn to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on Amendment 188 about the ECHR Article 8 exemption. As I read it, if your terms of service are not consistent with ECHR Article 8—and I do not think they will be for most platforms—you then get an exemption from all the other duties around appeals and enforcing them correctly. It is probably a probing amendment but it is a curious way of framing it; it essentially says that, if you are more restrictive, you get more freedom in terms of the Ofcom relationship. I am just curious about the detail of that amendment.
It is important that we have this debate and understand this relationship between the state, platforms and terms of service. I for one am persuaded that the general framework of the Bill makes sense; there are necessary and proportionate restrictions. I am strongly of the view that platforms should be allowed to be heterodox in their terms of service. Ofcom’s job is very much to make sure that they are done correctly but not to interfere with the content of those terms of service beyond that which is illegal. I am persuaded that we need to be extraordinarily careful about including Public Order Act offences; that particular amendment needs a good hearing.
My Lords, I have said several times when we have been debating this Bill—and I will probably say it again when we get to the group about powers—that, for me, the point of the Online Safety Bill is to address the absence of accountability for the extraordinary power that the platforms and search engines have over what we see online and, indeed, how we live and engage with each other online. Through this Bill, much greater responsibility for child safety will be placed on the platforms. That is a good thing; I have been very supportive of the measures to ensure that there are strong protections for children online.
The platforms will also have responsibility, though, for some measures to help adults protect themselves. We must not forget that, the more responsibility that platforms have to protect, the more power we could inadvertently give them to influence what is an acceptable opinion to hold, or to shape society to such an extent that they can even start to influence what we believe to be right or wrong—we are talking about that significant amount of power.
I was of the camp that was pleased when the Government removed the legal but harmful aspects of the Bill, because for me they represented a serious risk to freedom of expression. As I just described, I felt that they risked too much inadvertent power, as it were, going to the platforms. But, with the Government having done that, we have seen through the passage of the Bill some push-back, which is perfectly legitimate and understandable—I am not criticising anyone—from those who were concerned about that move. In response to that, the Government amended the Bill to provide assurances and clarifications on things like the user-empowerment tools. As I said, I do not have any problem; although I might not necessarily support some of the specific measures that were brought forward, I am okay with that as a matter of principle.
However, as was explained by my noble friend Lord Moylan and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, there has not been a similar willingness from the Government to reassure those who remain concerned about the platforms’ power over freedom of expression. We have to bear in mind that some people’s concerns in this quarter remained even when the legal but harmful change was made—that is, the removal of legal but harmful was a positive step, but it did not go far enough for some people with concerns about freedom of expression.
I am sympathetic to the feeling behind this group, which was expressed by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I am sympathetic to many of the amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, pointed out, specifically Amendment 162 in relation to the Public Order Act seems worthy of further consideration by the Government. But the amendments in the group that caught my attention place a specific duty on Ofcom in regard to freedom of expression when drawing up or amending codes of practice or other guidance—these amendments are in my noble friend Lord Moylan’s name. When I looked at them, I did not think that they undermined anything else that the Government brought forward through the amendments to the Bill, as he said, but I thought that they would go a long way towards enforcing the importance of freedom of expression as part of this regulatory framework—one that we expect Ofcom to attach serious importance to.
I take on board what the noble Lord, Lord Allan, said about the framework of this legislation being primarily about safeguarding and protection. The purpose of the Bill is not to enhance freedom of expression, but, throughout its passage, that has none the less always been a concern. It is right that the Government seek to balance these two competing fundamental principles. I ask whether more can be done—my noble friend pointed to the recommendations of the Equality and Human Rights Commission and how they reinforce some of what he proposed. I would like to think that my noble friend the Minister could give some greater thought to this.
As was said, it is to the Government’s credit how much they have moved on the Bill during its passage, particularly between Committee and Report. That was quite contrary to the sense that I think a lot of us felt during the early stages of our debates. It would be a shame if, once the Bill leaves the House, it is felt that the balance is not as fine—let me put it like that—as some people feel it needs to be. I just wanted to express some support and ask my noble friend the Minister to give this proper and serious consideration.
As I set out, I think my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, are not right to point to the European Convention on Human Rights here. That concerns individuals’ and entities’ rights
“to receive and impart ideas without undue interference”
by public authorities, not private entities. We do not see how a service provider deciding not to allow certain types of content on its platform would engage the Article 10 rights of the user, but I would be very happy to discuss this further with my noble friend and the noble Baroness in case we are talking at cross-purposes.
On that point specifically, having worked inside one of the companies, they fear legal action under all sorts of laws, but not under the European Convention on Human Rights. As the Minister explained, it is for public bodies; if people are going to take a case on Article 10 grounds, they will be taking it against a public body. There are lots of other grounds to go after a private company but not ECHR compliance.
My Lords, I genuinely appreciate this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made what I thought was a very important point, which is, in going through the weeds of the Bill—and some people have been involved in it for many years, looking at the detail—I appreciate that it can be easy to forget the free speech point. It is important that it has been raised but it also constantly needs to be raised. That is the point: it is, as the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, admitted, a speech-restricting Bill where we are working out the balance.
I apologise to the noble and learned, Lord Hope of Craighead, for not acknowledging that he has constantly emphasised the distinction between free speech and free expression. He and I will not agree on this; it is that we do not have time for this argument now rather than me not understanding. But he has been diligent in his persistence in trying to at least raise the issues and that is important.
I was a bit surprised by the Minister’s response because, for the first time ever, since I have been here, there has been some enthusiasm across the House for one of my amendments—it really is unprecedented—Amendment 162 on the public order offences. I thought that the Minister might have noted that, because he has noted it every other time there has been a consensus across the House. I think he ought to look again at Amendment 162.
To indicate the muddle one gets in, in terms of public order offences and illegality, the police force in Cheshire, where I am from, has put out a film online today saying that misgendering is a crime. That is the police who have said that. It is not a crime and the point about these things, and the difficulty we are concerned with, is asking people to remove and censor material based on illegality or public offences that they should not be removing. That is my concern: censorship.
To conclude, I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, that of course free speech does not mean saying whatever you want wherever you want. That is not free speech, and I am a free speech absolutist. Even subreddits—if people know what they are—think they are policing each other’s speech. There are norms that are set in place. That is fine with me—that multitude.
My concern is that a state body such as Ofcom is going to set norms of what is acceptable free speech that are lower than free speech laws by demanding, on pain of breach of the law, with fines and so on, that these private companies have to impose their own terms of service, which can actually then set a norm, leading them to be risk-averse, and set a norm for levels of speech that are very dangerous. For example, when you go into work, you cannot just say anything, but there are people such as Maya Forstater, who said something at work and was disciplined and lost her job and has just won more than £100,000, because she was expressing her views and opinions. The Equality Act ran to her aid and she has now won and been shown to be right. You cannot do that if your words have disappeared and are censored.
I could talk about this for a long time, as noble Lords know. I hope that at least, as the Bill progresses, even when it becomes an Act, the Government could just stamp on its head, “Don’t forget free speech”—but before then, as we end this process, they could come back with some concessions to some of the amendments that have been raised here today. That would be more than just words. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.