(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes a very important point. I reassure him that the UK continues to engage with China at all levels in Beijing, London and the United Nations to make clear that the world is watching what China chooses to say and do and whether its actions contribute to peace and stability or it chooses to fuel aggression. We expect China to stand up for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to uphold its commitment to the United Nations charter. It has an important role to play and we want to be sure, as a sovereign state, that we keep open the lines of communication so that we can convey the very relevant points to which my noble friend refers.
My Lords, as a once young naval soldier in Germany and a former Defence Minister, I fully support western Governments in providing arms to Ukraine. Since membership of NATO involves mutual obligations well beyond this, will the Government publish a paper spelling out the pros and cons if NATO membership is granted to Ukraine?
As the noble and learned Lord is aware, the United Kingdom is sympathetic to Ukraine’s desire to join NATO. We are supportive of that aspiration, in line with the 2008 Bucharest summit declaration. However, at the end of the day, any decision on membership is for NATO allies and for aspirant countries to take.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is with pleasure that I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. It has been a long campaign since I first initiated a series of debates following the case of Sergeant Blackman for murder. I also note, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has said, the proposals of the Lord Chancellor to embed the right to trial by jury in his reforms, as was referred to this morning. It would be gravely inconsistent of the Government to declare this right in statute while denying it to service men and women.
The right to trial by jury—the right to trial by one’s peers—goes back to Magna Carta, with all the protections that have been hammered out over the years for majority verdicts, announced publicly, with everyone knowing exactly what is happening and the careful directions that are given to juries. It should be the right of every serviceman and every servicewoman, too.
I rise to support Motion A1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. The key issue is trial by jury. I completely accept the improvements in the service justice system—I saw them in my former role as Lord Chief Justice. However, the Minister does not grapple with the fundamental issue: why take away the right to trial by jury? It is important, because sometimes Ministers misspeak on the “Today” programme, to see what the Deputy Prime Minister wrote in this morning’s Times:
“Trial by jury is another ancient right, applied variably around the UK, that doesn’t feature in the ECHR, but will be in our bill of rights. We should be proud of our history of liberty—and preserve a human rights framework that promotes it.”
It seems inconsistent with that declared policy of Her Majesty’s Government that the Ministry of Defence opposes the fundamental right of trial by jury for those who put their lives at risk for our country. That is what this amendment has at its heart.
It seems to me that by their support of this amendment in the course of debate, the Opposition have accepted that a mistake was made in 2005 when the right to trial by jury was taken away from those in the armed services for these very serious offences. Why does the Ministry of Defence not have the courage to admit that a mistake was made and restore the fundamental right of every member of the Armed Forces to trial by jury for these most serious offences?
I will address the noble and learned Lord’s point in a moment, but if I may continue with my tribute, it is very important for this House to send a message to our Armed Forces that we absolutely value everything they are doing. I am particularly conscious of that at this time. Their contribution is extraordinary and invaluable to the country, and we would want them to know just how much we appreciate that.
The noble and learned Lord will be aware that the jury system is not part of the service justice system. It is the view of the Government that the service justice system is robust, that this Bill will make distinct improvements to it and that it has to operate in a manner which makes it fit for purpose both overseas and across the United Kingdom. That is what this Bill does. I beg to move.
If the Minister will allow me, will she deal with the inconsistency between the Lord Chancellor’s remarks this morning that he seeks to embed the right to trial by jury in statute and the fact that, at the same time, this is being denied to service men and women?
I think the noble and learned Lord overlooks the tradition of the service justice system and why we have such a system. That has been one of its characteristics over decades: that is the character of the system. It exists to serve a particular purpose, which most people in this Chamber acknowledge, and that is why it has different characteristics from the civilian justice system.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberObviously, I misheard the noble Baroness. I will continue. As I said on Report, I am not aware of any murders committed in the UK by service personnel that have been tried by court martial. Of course, that could have happened only since 2006, when the novel change to concurrent jurisdiction was introduced. I have noted two cases of manslaughter arising from deaths at the Castlemartin range in west Wales, in live firing exercises, which involved the organisation of training activities, but I am not aware of any trials of sexual offences at court martial in the UK where the victim was a civilian. If there were any, I shudder to think of the effect on a civilian complainant of giving her evidence in intimate detail, against a serviceman, to a panel of uniformed officers, at a court martial.
Until now, the verdict of a court martial in such a case would have been by a simple majority, but I welcome the changes in this Bill that lead to a different situation. Imagine the difficulty of a junior service woman or man making a complaint of rape to her or his commanding officer, particularly if the alleged offender is senior to them in the chain of command, as is often the case. In addition to all the stresses and strains that already dissuade many women in civilian life from complaining, she, a servicewoman, has to face the effect on her career, an appearance before a board of senior officers, very low chances of conviction and the possibility that, in the event of an acquittal, the terms of her service will keep her in contact with her attacker. At least in a civilian court, the jury, to whom she would give her sensitive and difficult evidence, is 12 anonymous people drawn from the public. They will have no effect on her career and she is most unlikely ever to see them again—contrast that with giving evidence of sexual offences before a court martial.
Sir Robert Neill, with all his experience and wisdom, pointed out in the other place on Monday that the normal safeguards that apply in these cases in civilian courts are not yet available in the courts martial, in both the investigatory and procedural stages. Again, I draw the Minister’s attention to the effect upon the recruitment and retention of women in the Armed Forces. Would you expose your daughter to the probability that she will be subject to sexual harassment and worse, without the protection of a satisfactory service justice system?
I listened to the debate in the other place, and my amendment in lieu has changes. Objection was made to the role ascribed to the Attorney-General. The Minister has made a similar objection in this House, and I have to admit that I had assumed that the Ministry of Defence and the Members in another place appreciated the constitutional position of the Attorney-General. It is one of his functions to supervise the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Service Prosecutions and to be answerable in Parliament for them and their decisions. Hence it was Judge Lyons’ recommendation that the AG’s consent should be sought for the trial by a court martial of murder, manslaughter, rape and serious sexual offences committed in the UK. I agreed with his position: it represents the correct status of the Attorney-General in this country.
However, if the consent of the Attorney-General is the problem, this amendment in lieu leaves decisions about trial venue in the hands of the Director of Public Prosecutions—but only after consultation with the Attorney-General. The DPP would naturally consult the DSP, but, as the Minister, Mr Leo Docherty, made clear on Monday evening, it is the DPP’s decision in the end.
I say to the Conservative Benches that, if they vote against my amendment, they would be voting merely for the stubborn man in the alleyway, in Johnny Mercer’s words. They would be voting against the views of the officials in the Ministry of Defence and the departmental Ministers at the time that this was first considered, against the leading recommendation—number 1—of Judge Lyons and, above all, against the passionate findings of the Conservative Member of Parliament and her cross-party committee. Sarah Atherton—the only women in history to have risen from the ranks of the Armed Forces to become a Member of the House of Commons—knows what she is talking about. I ask those opposite not to vote against this amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am disappointed that the Government are maintaining their opposition to civilianising the courts martial for serious cases, such as murder, manslaughter and rape. The conviction rate for rape alone is 16% in the military courts, as reflected in the remarks from Mr Johnny Mercer in the other place. The Minister has given certain other figures for the last six months. I am very interested in this. Perhaps she could give me the size of the sample when she is winding up? Perhaps we could have a bigger sample, perhaps of a year. I would have thought that these figures alone would cause concern that something was wrong.
Service personnel do not have the statutory protection that other people have when they are tried in ordinary criminal courts or the statutory protections that are embedded in law to ensure that, where there is a majority direction, it is made known, the numbers are made known, and everyone knows where they stand. Nothing of that kind happens in courts martial. According to the Minister on a previous occasion, in some cases—they may be small in number—a verdict of 2:1 is certainly not in conformity with modern criminal jurisprudence.
Yes, but with all respect, I say to the noble Lord that that is not the essence of the issue. The essence is instead how you create a service justice system which can operate across the United Kingdom and ensure that, when discussions take place with the appropriate civilian prosecutors, appropriate decisions are reached on the correct jurisdiction for the case. That might be, within the service justice system, convening in Scotland, but under the noble Lord’s amendment there is clearly a desire to bias the whole service justice system in respect of England and Wales to the civilian system, and I am saying that that introduces a disparity or fracture of the United Kingdom service justice system. That is what the Government find unacceptable.
The noble Lord, Lord Burnett, raised an important point—
If there is any technical difficulty regarding the extension of the jurisdiction to include Northern Ireland and Scotland, surely it would not be beyond the wit of the Government, if they accepted the principle of civilianisation, to deal with that matter in an appropriate way.
I say to the noble and learned Lord that, as I understand it, the difficulty is that constitutionally we cannot extend this amendment to cover Scotland and Northern Ireland. That gets right to the heart of whether we have a service justice system for the United Kingdom, operating across it, or we do not. That is the difficulty with this amendment.
Turning to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, on the Richard Henriques recommendations, I know he was particularly interested in a defence representation unit. In recognition of the remarks I made in Grand Committee when I undertook to keep the House informed of progress on these Henriques matters, I explained then and when the amendment was tabled on Report that we have to analyse and assess these recommendations. We are not yet sure how they could be implemented and what measures would be necessary to implement them, but I am very happy to repeat my assurance to the noble Lord that I will keep the Chamber informed of progress.
Central government, as I have indicated previously, is bound by a wide spectrum of obligations. Some of these obligations exist because of parliamentary and government obligations, some exist because the MoD is an employer of the Armed Forces, and some exist because, under the covenant—which is a concept, as I have said—we want to do the best we can.
What I did explain was that to make this work—I hope it is clear from the text of the Bill in relation to the three functions we have identified—you need to have an identified body and detailed functions. That is why the Government feel that it is premature to take this step at this time. I appreciate that the noble and gallant Lord disagrees with that interpretation. He feels that the Government should absolutely accept that they are bound under the covenant. I would say that they are bound under the covenant as a concept in terms of a moral responsibility, and they are certainly accountable not just to Parliament, as they rightly should be, but to their own Armed Forces and to their veterans, and to public opinion.
I have tried to explain why we feel that to take this step at this stage is both precipitate and premature. I appreciate that there is not agreement on that view, and that is what democracy exists to serve. But I have endeavoured to explain to your Lordships the position of the Government and why they hold to their views in these circumstances. Again, I respectfully ask the noble Lords to withdraw their Motions A1 and B1.
Before the Minister sits down—I hope she will forgive me—I asked specifically about the size of the sample for rape cases, an issue which my noble friend Lord Coaker also raised. The figures are quite different and much more encouraging than those given by Mr Johnny Mercer in the other place. Can the Minister tell me—I did give notice of this in the course of my short remarks—what is the size of the sample?
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg to move my Amendment 1, which would add my own words to the Government’s insertion of “or a Circuit judge”, and to speak in the same group to Amendment 2, which I support, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and other noble Lords.
My amendment seeks to put on the face of the Bill the type of circuit judge that can be nominated to sit as a judge advocate. My understanding is that, at present, the Lord Chief Justice is able to nominate a High Court judge to do so and, in practice, from time to time does so. High Court judges have wide experience to try a whole range of cases, and those of the Queen’s Bench Division from time to time try the most serious offences, such as murder, manslaughter and rape, while they are on circuit. Circuit judges do not as a rule try such cases, save for those who are licensed by the Lord Chief Justice to do so. They are very senior and experienced judges. Trying a murder case can be a challenge, although those experienced to do so have the custom and practice to do it extremely well.
I hope that we can have a clear view that the type of judge who should sit is one who is licensed to try murder and manslaughter cases. I have the assurance of the Minister that they would be very experienced judges. I am grateful for her remarks but I emphasise that, administratively, in future there is no guarantee that what she says on paper now will mean that only those who are licensed to try in the criminal courts try such cases.
Turning to Amendment 2 to Clause 7, I racked what one of my mentors, the late Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Chancellor, used to call my brain for a suitable amendment that would be in order for Report to revisit the proposition, which I argued for in Committee, to civilianise the court martial system in certain serious criminal cases. My poor offering is the new clause proposed in Amendment 25 on page 8 of the Marshalled List. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has shown greater ingenuity than me, and I now give notice that I will not move my amendment and will instead support his.
My campaign to civilianise the court martial system goes back a long way, to the time of the controversy concerning Sergeant Blackman’s case. The Minister was particularly kind to refer to my interest then. Following a number of debates that I was fortunate to initiate, the Ministry of Defence, with unaccustomed speed, set up an inquiry led by His Honour Shaun Lyons, and we are grateful to him. I am sure that this action owes a great deal to the then Minister, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie. Regrettably, Shaun Lyons’s recommendations for murder, manslaughter and rape have not been accepted by the Government.
I am glad that the protocol that I initiated and signed in the agreement between the Attorney-General’s office and the military prosecutors has stood the test of time. The ultimate authority in the Bill is the Director of Public Prosecutions, who works under the supervision of the Attorney-General, and, from my reading of the Bill, there is no undermining of the system. The Government were loath to accept my amendment in Committee. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, does exactly what I had hoped would be plain sailing at Committee stage, and I congratulate him.
(3 years ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the two proposals before the Committee in this group have the same aim: so far as serious crime is concerned, to make the procedures similar to those in our criminal courts. The first amendment was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, supported by two other members of the Committee. We are indebted to him for his historical analysis, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for his unrivalled experience, which will be of great assistance to the Committee. The second proposal is the new clause tabled under my name and that of the noble and learned Lord; I am grateful for the support I have received.
My proposed new clause does not go so far as Amendment 5, but imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to commission a panel to review the courts martial and, in particular, to consider bringing courts martial into line with specific Crown Court procedures. I would be content if either amendment or my proposed new clause were accepted. On reflection, I find the mandatory terms in Amendment 5 very attractive.
I first raised my concern about the court martial system for serious offences as far back as 2016. The Ministry of Defence moved with unaccustomed speed to set up an independent inquiry led by ex-Judge Advocate Shaun Lyons. We are indebted to it, and to Ministers, for their speedy action. It was the case of Sergeant Blackman, already mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, that aroused my interest; many in the Committee will recall the case. My experience of courts martial is limited. I was a young officer newly arrived in BAOR, and it became known to alleged wrongdoers that there was a barrister in their ranks. To my adjutant’s dismay, there were other priorities, with the South Wales Borderers preparing to go to Malaysia. Little did my potential clients know how wet behind the ears I was, not having yet done a pupillage. Apart from a few courts martial then, I had nothing to do with the system when I returned to a lifetime of criminal practice. Since then, I have kept an interest in well-published cases, both as a Defence Minister and as Attorney-General. When I put in place a protocol for various prosecuting authorities, including the military, involving the supervision of the Attorney-General, I was in fact not troubled by the military.
My proposals are not concerned with the courts martial that deal with minor offences; they concern only some of the most serious offences. However, a verdict of 2:1 in any case does not fit particularly well the standards and needs of the 21st century. I propose that serious consideration be given to bringing courts martial that are trying specified serious crimes into line with ordinary criminal procedures. I do so for the following reasons. First, our Armed Forces—I am proud to have served in them—are today much less separate from ordinary civilian life than in the past; indeed, some civilians are tried by court martial. Secondly, our forces are mostly based in the United Kingdom and live in, or close to, civic communities. They are not the press-ganged sailors and soldiers of bygone centuries.
Thirdly, trials of serious cases are comparatively rare. Perhaps the Minister can remind us how many murder, manslaughter or rape cases we had in the last year. I think we are all concerned with the rate of conviction in rape cases, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, mentioned. Such trials should be presided over by experienced judges who try such cases day in, day out. Even then, only a minority of the circuit judges are licensed to try cases such as murder or rape. Although I was a Crown Court recorder for many years, with the powers of a circuit judge, I would not be given such responsibility. Those who are licensed to try such cases are very experienced. I know that sometimes, maybe fairly regularly, Judge Advocates sit in our criminal courts, but that does not mean they are licensed to try such cases.
Fourthly, there are now well-hallowed procedures in our criminal courts for trial and the taking of verdicts. I confess that I had my doubts when the proposal for majority verdicts was first put forward, but long experience at the criminal Bar has proved beyond doubt that the procedures are both just and efficient to render justice without undue delay. In such cases, the judge should be nominated by the Lord Chief Justice and the jury should comprise 12 jurors. Soldiers, sailors and airmen should have the same rights as ordinary citizens. The number 12 was hallowed by the eminent jurist Coke many centuries ago.
When a criminal jury now retires to consider its verdict, the judge gives a direction that it should seek unanimity. It is then given considerable time to achieve this. Only when sufficient time has elapsed and there appears to be no prospect of reaching such a verdict is the procedure put in place whereby a verdict by fewer than 12 of its number can be accepted. It is told again to try to achieve unanimity, and only then, when it fails, is a verdict by at least 10 of its number acceptable. The numbers required for a majority verdict speak for themselves; it is the overwhelming majority. When the verdict is delivered, the numbers are announced publicly in court—quite different from a court martial.
The Minister has sought to justify a 2:1 verdict as arising only in minor offences, but such a verdict can have serious consequences for the individual. I have my doubts about a practice in courts martial that I am told of, whereby the most junior member of a court martial is expected to announce his decision first, and so on in the military hierarchy. If I am right—I may be wrong—it could be quite intimidating, in particular for a junior member sitting for his first court martial.
If our proposals are not accepted today, I hope the ground has been laid for the inevitable reform next time the legalising of our Armed Forces by Act of Parliament is considered. Every soldier, sailor and airman should have the same right as an ordinary citizen of a trial by a jury numbering 12.
My Lords, I start my first contribution in Committee by thanking the Minister and her officials for the courteous briefing and the informed and courteous way in which she has conducted the Committee and this work. It is extremely helpful to us all, so it is worth publicly thanking the Minister for that and for the way she has tried to engage with us.
I had a great speech written—well, I do not know if it was a great speech, but I had one written—in support of Amendment 5. However, one of the important things that the Minister does is to try to respond to the debate, and I want to pick up on what I think have been some brilliant contributions to this discussion. We all support a covenant. We all support the Armed Forces Bill and what is in it. We all believe that this is a step forward, we are all pleased that the Government are putting a legal duty on local authorities to do this, and so on. We all agree with the Bill so the discussions taking place here are about how we can make it even better, and to get the Government to clarify some of their thoughts and put their intentions on record for people to read.
I was particularly moved—I say this with trepidation because I am neither a lawyer nor a military person, but I think it is important in these debates to speak from where the public would come from—by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said: this element of the Bill, on how the military deals with sexual offences and some of the most serious crimes, goes to the heart of the confidence that the public have, or do not have, in the Armed Forces. You can see that as an analogy with the police at present; I come from a police family so I understand that issue. Surely that is the point that the Bill is getting at.
I know the Minister will point to the reforms that are going to be made, the welcome introduction of the tri-service serious crimes unit and so on, but we all agree that some of the things that we read about—and I intend to quote some because it is important to put some of the statistics before the Committee—are truly shocking. We saw a particularly horrendous example in our papers at the weekend. I know that the vast majority of the military, whether they be privates, sergeants, officers, Royal Navy, airmen or soldiers, want this dealt with as well.
The challenge for us in the Committee is how the system that we set up will best reassure the public that these matters are being dealt with—how it will help with the reputation of the Armed Forces but also allow service men and women to get the justice that they too deserve. That is the purpose of Amendment 5, which I put my name to and was moved so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
If it is not to be done in the civilian courts, which is what the amendment is pushing for, how will we know—and how will the public be reassured—about some of the things that they are reading about, where terrible, unacceptable sexual crime, rape and murder take place and have no consequence, or where people do not believe that the system works and therefore do not come forward? That is the challenge. As noble Lords have said, the amendment is all about jurisdiction. What jurisdiction would best deal with these offences in the way that I have outlined?
It is not just me. Judge Shaun Lyons and Sir Jon Murphy recommended that the most serious crimes should be removed from the military justice system; the recent report by the Defence Select Committee recommended the same; and Johnny Mercer MP, who was a Defence Minister, has now said he believes that should happen. These are serious bodies of opinion supporting the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, as well as other issues that have been raised.
I know much of this will come forward when we talk about the tri-service serious crimes unit, but I want to put on record the recent Times article that I was particularly struck by, which said:
“Complaints of rape and sexual assault made by girls under 18 in the military have risen tenfold since 2015, Ministry of Defence figures reveal.”
That is shocking—and it is from the MoD’s own figures, unless the Minister says that the Times has got it wrong. The article says that
“girls under 18 in the armed forces have made 41 complaints of rape and sexual assault to the military police since 2015 … equivalent to one report for every 40 girls. This makes girls in the armed forces more than twice as likely as their civilian counterparts to report a rape or sexual assault to police.”
The amendment is intended only to pose the question, given the statistics being reported, of whether a change to the jurisdiction would, first, give more confidence to people to come forward; and, secondly, give more confidence to the public, because such horrific incidents and cases, which we all abhor, are best dealt with by the civilian courts.
On the point about circuit judges being allowed to try these very serious offences, will they be of a similar calibre to those judges who are licensed to try rape and murder cases? Maybe the Minister will not be able to deal with this now, but perhaps she could later.
The noble and learned Lord makes a good point. Obviously at the heart of this is making the service justice system as good as it can be. Clearly I cannot give a specific undertaking as to what criteria would be adopted in making such a selection, but I hear what he says and it will be given careful consideration. I cannot be more specific about that just now.
I was saying that I hope the noble and learned Lord is reassured that we have considered this matter in detail, having regard, as we have been discussing this afternoon, to the military and operational environment in which our armed services function. In these circumstances, I hope he will not press the amendment.
I omitted to answer a specific question posed by the noble and learned Lord about the most junior member of the court martial voting first. I am informed that the most junior member of the court martial does vote first.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too congratulate our Armed Forces on their conduct in the evacuation from Afghanistan. During my national service—there cannot be many of us still around in Parliament—my command in Germany was a platoon of 30 men. From time to time, I was deputed to take a section of 10 men fully armed on the overnight train from Hanover to Berlin, with all blinds down, in order to maintain our right to travel from the British zone to the British sector in Berlin. Our limited training was for war and the maintenance of peace on the border with the Russians. I make this point to emphasise that our young men had no training in crowd control, let alone receiving babies in arms across wire fencing. I therefore congratulate them even more.
I once prepared a speech for your Lordships’ House detailing the history of British Forces fighting in Afghanistan. I did not make the speech because there were Welsh regiments fighting in Afghanistan at the time and we lost a large number of men, and many lives were permanently changed, including that of the commanding officer of the Welsh Guards.
I want to concentrate on the court martial system. I give notice that I intend to move an amendment to set up an inquiry into the merits of bringing the system into line with civilian courts without endangering military discipline. I first raised my concerns about courts martial as far back as 2017, following the case of Sergeant Blackman. The noble Baroness responded with a speed unaccustomed in the Ministry of Defence and announced an independent and more in-depth look at the service justice system. We are indeed indebted for the report of His Honour Shaun Lyons and Sir Jon Murphy. However, I fear that the report and the Government’s conclusions in the Bill are a missed opportunity to bring courts martial into line with our civil courts.
I am not concerned with the bulk of the work of the courts martial in their dealings with minor offences. The first point I want to make is that the Armed Forces are considerably smaller than in my day as a young soldier, and life in the forces for soldiers and their families is now much closer to life for their civilian counterparts. When I was Attorney-General, I set up a protocol that, if any difficulties arose in prosecutions, the differences should be finally resolved by the Attorney-General. I welcome Clause 7 on the role of the Director of Public Prosecutions; it places him in the senior role and, of course, he will be guided by the Attorney-General.
My concern is with the more serious offences of murder, manslaughter, rape and serious injuries. In the courts, in my professional life, I have had to deal with many of those. I suspect that they are in the minority of cases dealt with by courts martial, and probably quite rare. Judge advocates who preside over courts martial have only limited experience of dealing with such cases in their own courts, although, of course, they sit from time to time in the civil courts. The Bill empowers the Lord Chief Justice to nominate a circuit judge to preside over courts martial as only a minority of circuit judges are licensed to try murder and rape cases. May I be reassured that this power will be exercised in the same way whenever a circuit judge is nominated?
I come to my main point: the Secretary of State should set up an inquiry to consider bringing the whole system of murder, manslaughter, rape and serious offences into line with court procedures. Courts martial now reach their decisions by a majority verdict of their lay members. It is proposed in Schedule 1 that where there are three members of a court martial their decision can be made by a majority of two to one, and appropriately where there are other numbers. I do not think that a majority of two to one is fit for purpose in this modern age—or, as the Minister said as far back as 2017, when she set up the inquiry—as effective as it can be for the 21st century.
Why cannot our servicemen have the same rights as ordinary citizens and have a jury of 12 persons with the detailed control of a majority verdict, whereby it is set out in public how many people have voted one way for a conviction and how many have not? As I understand it—the Minister can confirm this—courts martial do not announce whether there is a majority or whether the verdict is unanimous. In all those circumstances, given the time available I wish to return to the issue in Committee so that we can have a definitive view on why soldiers cannot have the same privileges as their counterparts in civilian life.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak briefly in support of Amendments 1 and 6. There is little I need to add to the words of my noble friend who moved Amendment 1 and the particularly forceful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
As a criminal law practitioner all my professional life, I spell out my concern that, whatever the circumstances, there must be a fair trial in accordance with the principles of our criminal law. Defendants can be materially prejudiced by the passage of time and, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, prosecutors take this into account every day in their decisions. Certainly, in authorising prosecutions that came within my particular field as Attorney-General, I took this into account as a prosecutor. This is my concern. I hope it is the concern of Her Majesty’s Government regarding the current backlog of criminal trials in our courts.
I will give a simple illustration of what can happen in practice. First, memories fail. Secondly, circumstances are embroidered, sometimes innocently. Ask two or three people for their recollection of a fairly simple set of circumstances, and they frequently vary. I have spent many happy hours in our courts pointing out discrepancies in the accounts of different witnesses of very simple circumstances. The deeper one dug, the greater the rewards. They were frequently meat and drink to a defence lawyer who did not have much greater ammunition.
I will mention rape trials as an example. Whenever the defences consent, in my experience, the chances of a London jury convicting when no complaint is made within three weeks are not high. This is a very serious matter, which we will have to address at some stage. Time is of the essence in seeing that justice is done to both complainant and defendant.
I hope that the drafters of the Bill, in particular this clause, have sufficient experience of the dangers of justice not being done when there has been a passage of time. I support these amendments and believe that they are sufficiently important to be put in the Bill.
I support both Amendments 1 and 6. In the light of all that has been said, I need not add anything in respect of Amendment 1, but will make some brief remarks on Amendment 6. Investigating offences and prosecuting them are inextricably intertwined. To ensure fairness to all concerned—complainants, victims, defendants and prospective defendants—an integrated approach is essential.
By and large, in our civilian justice system, the CPS and police forces have, over the years, come to work very closely together to the benefit of all. In the military justice system, there can be no doubt that the creation of the post of DSP has, particularly through the work of the highly respected holders of that independent office, greatly improved the quality and fairness of service prosecutions. It is now clear that the conduct of investigations has given rise to most of the issues and, in that respect, reform is needed. This amendment is therefore greatly to be welcomed.
The amendment does not deal with instances in which there has been an error in failing to identify cases where there is evidence of criminal conduct but nothing has been done. It is not appropriate to address that at this stage; no doubt it can be covered when Sir Richard Henry Henriques has reported. However, in cases where the investigator has concluded that there is evidence of criminal conduct, the interposition and proposed role of the Director of Service Prosecutions should bring significant improvement.
In my experience of the military justice system, there are many reasons why delays in prosecution occur, but often the causes are lack of focus, insufficient concern about timeliness, and a lack of accountability—particularly the latter. It is clear that the delays that occurred in relation to Iraq arose in large part from these factors, although, as the Minister pointed out in Committee, there have been great improvements since and in the work of IHAT. The risks of a lack of focus, a failure to act with expedition and timeliness, and a lack of accountability remain, as they are endemic to any system. This clause should address those issues.
I will make one last observation. I particularly welcome the provision for the Judge Advocate-General to give practice directions to investigations of overseas operations. Although that would not be usual for a judge in the civilian system, the Judge Advocate-General has a unique role. This was particularly demonstrated by the highly successful and distinguished tenure of that office by Judge Blackett. When holder, he ensured that changes were made to keep the service justice system in line with modern procedure. The power to make practice directions for investigations is consistent with the Judge Advocate-General’s unique role and, I hope, will ensure that problems are promptly addressed as the way in which cases are investigated changes, with changes to the way in which matters should be done as well as the advent of technology.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, as well, indeed, as my noble friend Lady Kennedy in the arguments they have put forward. The House has enormous respect for the Minister. I share that respect but it is noticeable that, despite her arguments, she had no support in Committee. I looked at her closing arguments then and found this one:
“In the course of their duties on overseas operations, we expect our service personnel to undertake activities which are intrinsically violent in nature. They fight, they use force”.
That seemed to be the justification for this provision: that force has to be used. I do not believe that force is the same as torture. If there were to be confusion between the two, it would be up to the courts to make a decision. It would not be up to a government Minister to say whether an action was unacceptable or, indeed, appropriate for it to be excused altogether by the provisions of this Bill.
In her closing remarks—she was trying to be helpful—the Minister also said:
“I undertake to consider with care the arguments that have been advanced and to explore if there is any way by which we can assuage your Lordships’ concerns.”—[Official Report, 9 /3/21; cols. 1575-77.]
I am not sure that anything has happened about that commitment. I understand why Ministers make such commitments and why she did so; perhaps she was not comfortable with the Government’s whole argument. However, I am not clear what she has done to assuage our concerns; I do not believe she has.
As has been said before, the reputation of this country is at stake. One thing we surely value very much is our reputation for adhering to the rule of law—for having a proper system for considering it and, indeed, being implacable in our opposition to any breach of it. That reputation is surely worth preserving, yet it is now at stake. We deal all the time with countries that do not observe the rule of law, be it Hong Kong, China in respect of the Uighurs, or Myanmar in respect of the Rohingyas—or, indeed, of their own citizens. There are too many examples of the rule of law being breached; we can ill afford to join the ranks of countries that breach it. We have had severe warnings that we might find our service men and women up before the International Criminal Court—which would be mortifyingly embarrassing and absolutely appalling were it to happen.
I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which made a detailed assessment of the Bill and its various provisions and produced a report. At paragraphs 63 and 64, the report says that
“we have significant concerns that the presumption against prosecution”
runs the risk of contravening
“the UK’s legal obligations under international humanitarian law (the law of armed conflict)”
and
“international human rights law ... It risks contravening the UK’s obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute and international customary law.”
The report goes on to say:
“At a minimum, the presumption against prosecution should be amended so that it does not apply to torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.”
Nothing could be clearer than that.
We have also heard quoted today Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. She said:
“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”
I can think of no clearer comments than those I have quoted. I fully support this amendment.
My Lords, we have heard some very distinguished speeches this afternoon and the passionate speech from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, destroyed any case that the Government might have. As an old soldier—a national serviceman—and a Defence Minister many years ago, I yield to no one in my concern to protect the armed services from vexatious investigations and prosecutions. As Attorney-General, I played a very small part in encouraging the late Robin Cook’s successful advocacy for the setting up of the International Criminal Court. As an active member some years ago, I advocated successfully at the IPA conference in Cape Town for the international recognition by all nations of the offence of torture. I believe I was kicking at an open door when the paper that I had prepared was accepted. All civilised countries now accept that the offence of torture is unique; likewise, of course, genocide.
My noble friend Lord Robertson comprehensively and eloquently moved the amendment. The Bill proposes a presumption against prosecution of torture and other grave crimes after five years, except in exceptional circumstances. As my noble friend states, this risks the creation of de facto immunity after that time. That is the bottom line. Unfortunately, the result is that our troops risk being open to prosecution by the International Criminal Court. The effect of the Rome statute is that the court can prosecute where there is no robust domestic civil process. Perhaps the Minister will say specifically what the danger is of our troops being brought before the International Criminal Court?
As a former law officer, I had the task of advising Her Majesty’s Government on international law; I cannot see how we can avoid process before the International Criminal Court. May I make a practical suggestion to the Minister? Before Third Reading, will she consult the law officers and get their views—if they have not given them already, as I suspect they may have—on the point raised by so many Members of this House, without opposition, that we are in danger of allowing our troops to be hauled before the International Criminal Court?
I strongly support the exclusion of the most serious crimes, such as torture, war crimes and genocide, from the immunity proposals. Put simply, in international law—I can only emphasise this—there is no expiry date for the prosecution of torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity. I am grateful to my noble friend for moving this amendment. The bottom line is that there is no expiry date for the prosecution of these offences. It may not have been the intention, but the unfortunate consequence is that our troops might find themselves before the International Criminal Court.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber [Inaudible]—that date will be either the date on which the act complained of took place or, alternatively, the date of knowledge of the cause of the action; for example, where a person is unaware of his right to sue or of the negligence which caused his injuries. Clause 11 introduces the concept of a cut-off date, whereby the judge loses any power to extend and the cause of action is extinguished for good.
This will be unique in the British system of justice, as we have discussed. A new category of claims arising out of overseas operations will be created. The rule set out in the Bill is that proceedings must be brought before the later of
“the end of a period of six years beginning on the date on which the act complained of took place”
or
“the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the date of knowledge”.
Whatever the cause of delay in starting proceedings may be, such as brain injury received by an injured serviceman, or the inherent problems that would face a victim living in some dusty village in Iraq or Afghanistan, about which I spoke at length on Tuesday and will not repeat, the rule is to apply not only in the courts of England and Wales, but in Scotland and in Northern Ireland.
Remember that the judge has power to strike out vexatious claims and that we are talking about claims against the Ministry of Defence, not the individual serviceman, who will never be called upon, whatever he has done, to pay the damages awarded. The worst that can happen to him is that, in the event of non-settlement of the case—I believe that over 90% of claims regarded as valid are settled—he might have to give evidence in the witness box and recall what he has done.
Amendment 24 refers to the definition of the date of knowledge. The Bill says that
“the ‘date of knowledge’ means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known, both … of the act complained of, and … that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence”.
Our amendment adds further definitions of the date of knowledge—first, the date of
“the manifestation of the harm resulting from that act”,
and secondly, the knowledge that the claimant was eligible to bring a claim under the Human Rights Act in the courts of the United Kingdom.
Amendment 47 and the other amendments in this group are consequential or extend that principle to Scotland and Northern Ireland. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have little to add to the brief but very pertinent analysis in the most persuasive speech by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I support Amendment 22 in particular as one of a series of amendments that change the relevant date from which the longstop starts to run to account for explicable delays commonly experienced by bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.
I shall be brief. My experience of overseas operations in the Cold War was limited. As an infantry subaltern, my tour of duty in Germany was very brief, taking part in exercises over German planes and Gatow airport in Berlin and being in charge of the overnight train from Hanover to Berlin to emphasise our rights to go through the Russian zone to the British sector in Berlin.
Given my very limited experience, which I emphasise, I can quite see the circumstances for delay when advice and witness are not readily available. When active service is involved, in very different and hazardous conditions overseas, the timing of knowledge that is the basis of this amendment goes to the heart of the matter. The mover of Amendment 22, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, seeks to put into the Bill some statutory flexibility around the date of knowledge. There is nothing that I can usefully add, but I support with great pleasure this amendment, because knowledge is vital.
It is always a pleasure to follow my noble and learned friend Lord Morris of Aberavon, who is ever youthful and eloquent, but of course it is the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, who is on a particular roll with these amendments, one that I do not want to impede for too long—save to say that Amendment 22 in particular reveals and reflects what a terrible disservice Part 2 does to veterans in the context of difficult and complex overseas operations. In particular, it highlights that it is not just the date of the harm that is an issue but the date of knowledge of causation, which can be so complex in the course of overseas operations. In the practical reality of a legal aid landscape, where most people including, tragically, veterans, have no ready access to advice and representation, it could be a very long time before a troubled veteran even knows that they had the right to bring a claim. That is a problem for everyone in a legal aid landscape that has been virtually decimated, but it is particularly shameful for any Government to be making it harder for their own veterans to claim redress against the MoD where appropriate and put an absolute bar up at six years.
The point about causation is so important; the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, describes it as
“the manifestation of the harm resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim”.
A veteran may well know that they are injured and know that they have, for example, experienced a number of different traumatic and potentially harming events in a complex situation of warfare, but causation can be a very difficult thing to discover. This will be even more problematic in the context of psychological harm and, possibly, other physical harms—to hearing, for example. It may be very difficult to learn, let alone to prove, that it was friendly fire and not enemy fire, or that it was negligence in provision of equipment that caused the harm.
The absolute six-year bar put up in relation to veterans against their former employer would be shocking enough in the context of factory workers domestically. Given the Minister’s remarks on the previous groups, that we should be particularly sensitive to the difference between what he described as domestic litigation and the special issues around overseas operations, it seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has really hit the nail on the head in this group and some of those that follow.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. Part 1 of the Bill creates a presumption against prosecution after five years, and factors are spelled out in the Bill which require consideration before any later prosecution. I would have thought that those factors would in any event form part of any decision on whether to prosecute, but I have no difficulty with them being put on the face of the Bill. What is important to stress is that this part of the Bill does not give impunity to our Armed Forces, nor does it explicitly deal with the real problem that has faced them, particularly after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—namely, investigations and reinvestigations many years after the events.
This group seeks, among other things, to remove Part 1 from the Bill entirely, whereas the amendments in groups 2 and 3 at least attempt to amend and not wreck this part of the Bill. The reasons given for this drastic approach are the effect on our international reputation and, in particular, the risk that the International Criminal Court will or might become involved in circumstances where prosecutions would normally be left to our authorities. I am not at all convinced about the reality of this risk. Is it really suggested that if genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, as defined by Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome statute, were discovered five years after the original offences, they would not result in a prosecution? Nothing in this Bill would prevent one.
I hope that noble Lords who seek the removal of this part of the Bill have read the evidence that Major Bob Campbell gave to the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons. He said of the Bill that the principle of attempting to improve the lot of veterans and service personnel was welcomed, and that
“if the Bill were to be squashed it would send a very depressing message to the veterans community—probably one that has been felt quite harshly by the Northern Ireland veterans—that we are not important enough to get any type of assistance when facing legal assault.”
Major Bob Campbell was investigated and reinvestigated 11 times in relation to the same incident over 17 years. His view was that if the Bill had been enforced, his torment would at least have ended in 2009. Whether or not he is right about that, it is important to pay attention to his answers. When asked about the danger of the ICC becoming involved, he told the Committee that he had been repeatedly informed that if IHAT—which noble Lords will know about—was in anyway interfered with, the International Criminal Court would “swoop in” and
“clamp us in leg irons and we would all be off to the Hague.”
About ICC involvement, Major Campbell said:
“I decided to test that theory, and I wrote to the chief prosecutor of the ICC, Ms Bensouda, asking in exasperation whether I, SO71 and SO72 could surrender ourselves to the ICC rather than go through several more appalling years at the hands of the Ministry of Defence. Ms Bensouda responded that our allegation does not fall within her remit, because her job is not to prosecute individual soldiers; her job is to prosecute commanders and policy makers for the most grave crimes. In her orbit, manslaughter, which is what I was accused of, is not a war crime. It is a domestic crime—a regular crime, as opposed to what she would normally deal with. I reported that rejection to the Ministry of Defence, which continued to repeat that the ICC would fall in.
The second point I would make is what would be so terrible about the ICC being involved? We kept getting told that the ICC has a bit of scrutiny over IHAT and is keeping a very close eye on it. Personally, I do not have a problem with that. Like I said, the ICC was not going to ruin our careers, the ICC was not going to harass our families, and the ICC was not going to go and bully soldiers who had left the Army for a witness statement—not even a suspect’s. The ICC would conduct itself professionally, and it would have no incentive—no financial incentive—to drag things out for years, like Red Snapper, which provided most of the detectives to IHAT, did. Finally, the ICC would probably not use the investigative technique that IHAT used, which was to pay Phil Shiner’s gofer to be the go-between between them and witnesses because IHAT was too scared to go to Iraq.”
He continued:
“So regarding the whole spectre of the ICC, first, I do not find it remotely as scary as people make it out to be and, secondly, it is completely false, because I attempted, with my two soldiers, to surrender ourselves in order to spare us another several years of the MOD fannying about, and the offer was refused. So to answer your question, I do not see that as an issue at all.
What I would say, though, is that I think I understand why the Government would be reluctant for the ICC to be involved, because the scrutiny would not be on Tommy Atkins; the scrutiny would be on General Atkins and Minister Atkins.”—[Official Report, Commons, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Committee, 6/10/20; cols. 27-28.]
This part of the Bill is not a panacea. It does not of itself prevent investigations or reinvestigations, but it is something which will be welcomed by our own forces. I respectfully suggest that the spectre of the ICC as a reason for wrecking this part of the Bill is unsound. I invite noble Lords who have quite rightly emphasised their respect for our Armed Forces to look soldiers like Major Bob Campbell in the eye and say to them that these provisions are entirely inappropriate and would damage our international reputation. I strongly oppose all these amendments.
My Lords, I support Amendments 1 and 2. As I did not take part at Second Reading, I must resist the temptation to cover a whole range of subjects in my contribution to this debate.
As an old Defence Minister, and, indeed, an old soldier who served in Germany as an infantry subaltern and was involved in courts martial there, I broadly welcome the aims of the Bill to introduce a measure of protection against unfounded claims against military personnel, some of which go back many years. I deprecate the cottage industry in the growth of claims.
Let me say immediately that when there is wrongdoing, no person is above the law. Torture is a typical example where we should never propose exemption. I have argued before at the annual conferences of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Cape Town and, more recently, in St Petersburg to persuade all countries to accept the need to ensure that there is no exemption for this offence.
As a law officer, I played a very small part in encouraging the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under Robin Cook to create the International Criminal Court. As John Healey MP said in the other place on Third Reading of the Bill, the risks of
“British troops being dragged before”—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/20; col. 277.]
the ICC are there. There may be an argument about this, but that is what he said and we should always bear it in mind. Perhaps the Minister could give an assurance on that very point of what—if any—the dangers are of going before the ICC.
The wise words of Professor Michael Clarke, the former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute, on the dangers of an idea gaining
“international traction that the UK operates a ‘quasi-statute of limitations’”,
and hence might be in danger of being indicted before the International Criminal Court, should always be borne in mind. They need rebuttal, and they need clarification.
When the Government launched their consultation on the changes to the legal protection for our Armed Forces serving overseas, the consultation included proposals to create a statutory presumption for alleged criminal offences which occurred more than 10 years ago. I repeat: 10 years was the issue that went out for consultation.
The Bill is a major departure from the norms of our international obligations
“under international humanitarian law … international human rights law and international criminal law.”
These are not my words; they are the words of Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights. They are words that we should bear in mind and rebut if it is possible to do so.
That is the background, and hence it is a basic requirement that any provisions in the Bill need thorough justification. Therefore, I support Amendments 1 and 2 to change the presumption against prosecution from five to 10 years. My question, very simply, is: what is the Government’s justification for the change from 10 years in the consultation document to five years? I would like an answer before the end of this debate.
My Lords, before I start my remarks about the Bill, I would like to say that nothing I say over the next few days in any way impugns the integrity of the Minister. I have every respect for her, but I think that the Bill is a terrible piece of legislation—worse than terrible. It is actually quite shocking. It is the international version of the “spy cops” Bill, which granted broad legal immunity to state agents who commit criminal acts. How can that be right?
It is one of those Bills that I think is so bad that we need to scrap it entirely. That is why I am joining the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Massey and Lady Smith of Newnham, to oppose the question that Clauses 1 to 7 stand part of the Bill. If a “delete-all” amendment were in order, I would do that instead. I hope that we can build an alliance to oppose the Bill’s Third Reading.
It struck me listening to noble Lords who have spoken already that the support for the Bill is actually based on fake news. The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has written to our Joint Committee on Human Rights, chaired by Harriet Harman. In a letter, she says that the number of vexatious claims has been “exaggerated”—by our Government, obviously—to justify the proposed legislation. We do not have a whole heap of vexatious, baseless claims, which is what the Government seem to be suggesting.
The Bill clashes with the whole point of our justice system. I know that there are noble Lords in this Chamber who know a lot more about the law than I do, and I am sure they know that that is true. The whole point of our justice system is that the guilty are found guilty and the innocent are found innocent—that is obviously what we have to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, mentioned the strain of all these vexatious claims, but in fact they do not exist, so the argument for the Bill is extremely weak.
I consulted two ex-generals and an ex-admiral of my acquaintance about the Bill, and they all had severe qualms. They all felt that this could backfire quite seriously on our service personnel and that it would make things worse. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, demolished the argument for the Bill, but he said as well that service personnel could be brought to the ICC, which would be much worse than being dealt with here.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this order is what remains of what used to be an annual Army Act to legalise our Armed Forces—an important relic to reinforce our repugnance of military rule by Cromwell. Indeed, my first speech on the Front Bench was on the Army Act and the estimates. Looking across the world, particularly at Myanmar, one can see that nothing has changed and the patterns are still the same. Today we are fortunate in that our Armed Forces not only protect us but have provided such an important role in their assistance to the civil power—namely, the National Health Service—in the pandemic.
I welcome the enshrinement of the military covenant in legislation, as my noble friend Lord Reid has done. It is also appropriate that Mr Kevan Jones MP reminded the other place that the starting point was
“in 2008 with the Command Paper under the last Labour Government”,
which advocated not only
“putting the covenant into law but giving it teeth”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/2/21; col. 56.]
I welcome the reduced version in the new proposal mandating the covenant, despite a lack of enforcement proposals, again referred to by my noble friend Lord Reid of Cardowan.
Today in my few minutes I wish to concentrate on Clauses 2 to 7 and Schedule 1, which deal with court martials. As a young, inexperienced and newly called barrister and subaltern I appeared in quite a few court martials in Germany in the course of my national service. Even in your Lordships’ House there cannot be many ex-national service men still around. Other than that, however, I took no professional or other interest in court martials. That was until the case of Sergeant Blackman, which aroused considerable publicity in 2017, following which I secured a short debate in your Lordships’ House. I suggested the need for a review of the system, and the MoD acted with unaccustomed speed—I suspect encouraged by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, who was then Defence Minister—to set up an inquiry under the former circuit judge Shaun Lyons. We are grateful to him for his report. Former Judge Advocate-General Blackett had expressed concern about the working of the court-martial system. As I understand the Bill, it is a great loss of opportunity to fully take on board the anxieties expressed at the time.
Clause 3 provides for the Lord Chief Justice to nominate a circuit judge to preside over court martials. I had thought it was the President of the Queen’s Bench Division who allocated judges, but I may be wrong. From time to time—at present, indeed—a High Court judge has been nominated to preside on serious cases. I welcome this provision as I have appeared from time to time before licensed circuit judges in murder cases. The important point is that such cases in the court-martial system are rare. There are about six or seven a year, and it is experience in handling such heavy cases that matters, hence the need for a judge.
Schedule 1 makes minor amendments to the personnel and numbers in a court martial. In the numbers set out there remains the possibility that, in a serious case such as murder, a verdict by a majority of one—3:2—could achieve a conviction. The numbers are not announced following a court martial. Since our Armed Forces are now very much reduced in numbers and cases can involve civilian dependants, the chasm between the system prevailing in our civil criminal system and the court martial remains. When I discussed the anomalies and differences with one of the highest judges in the land, it was suggested that in such cases we should consider moving to a system that provides for ordinary citizens: that is, justice by trial by jury. I regret that I did not pursue this more radical measure more fully.
New Zealand, I am told, and as I told the House then, has moved to a system where the verdict has to be unanimous. I am conscious of the decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court under the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in the case of R v Twaite that the system is ECHR-compliant but, with respect to the court, a majority verdict as proposed needs very careful reconsideration. The proposals in Schedule 1 tinker with a system. A system that allows the finding of guilty of murder by a majority of 3:2 is not fit for the 21st century, particularly when the figures are not announced as they are in civil trials by jury in our country.
I welcome the statutory protocols in Clause 7 regarding the direction of service personnel and giving the DPP the final decision, but I hope that the supervision of the Attorney-General remains as it does for other court martials.