Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Baroness Chakrabarti

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I agree with much of the discussion about this important group, but I remember that this is Report. While I share particularly the concerns about cumulative disruption, because it is Report, not Committee, I will confine my remarks to one speech in this group, with no interventions, and focus on Amendments 369 and 369A as briefly and succinctly as I can.

I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger, Lord Pannick and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about Amendment 369A. These arguments were rehearsed with great precision in Committee. The example was given of an Iranian dissident protesting and being concerned about reprisals—and you could substitute other countries and their embassies for Iran, that was just the one that came up that day.

In the clause, the Government acknowledge that there should be some defences to the offence of wearing a mask on a protest—I have concerns about the offence itself because it presupposes that protest is a slightly dodgy thing to begin with, and I do not agree with that—and included health, religious observance and work as justifications for concealing identity, but fear of reprisals was not included. The reasonable excuse defence proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and his colleagues is a proportionate one, given what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said earlier about balancing rights. I urge my colleagues in government to think seriously about the noble Lord’s amendment because the defences currently to the offence of concealing your identity at a protest do not include the fear of reprisals, whether you are a battered woman, someone who disagrees with their employer or, crucially, a dissident outside the embassy of your homeland. I urge my noble friends in government to think again about that.

Just briefly on Amendment 369—I am still at just over two minutes—and enshrining the right to protest as a free-standing clause, even though it is acknowledged by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that we have Articles 10 and 11 of the convention incorporated into the Human Rights Act, I say in friendship and gently to him that I think this kind of duplication may be a mistake we would come to regret. He is quite right, of course, as are the Government on other matters to do with Article 8, that you can, and should, be more precise in your domestic legislation when attempting to safeguard rights and freedoms, but this is not that much more precise. In effect, this proposed new clause pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11 of the convention but for the removal of morals. Frankly, I think that morals is a dead letter these days.

As a fellow human rights person—I have been working with the convention and with some Members of your Lordships’ House for over 30 years—I say that that kind of almost duplication is dangerous in legal terms. I urge the noble Lord not to press that one, just as I urge my colleagues in government to support him and others who have signed up to broaden the defence in Amendment 369A to the offence of wearing a face covering at a peaceful protest.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, can I ask her gently to explain why she does not accept that the margin of appreciation permits the Government to do things outside what we would want to see? I know that she and I both are great advocates for the ECHR, and she knows that, but the problem is that the margin of appreciation can be taken advantage of to allow restrictions we would not want to see. The first and principal point I might make in relation to the duplication point is that having the right to protest enshrined in domestic statutory law does away with the possibility that the margin of appreciation should allow restrictions that this Parliament would not wish to see.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I was trying to be brief—this is Report—but, with the leave of the House, I will answer, again as briefly as I can. I know that not everyone agrees and not every jurist agrees, but as far I am concerned, the margin of appreciation was always intended to be an international concept for an international court. Once you get to Strasbourg, it is quite right that a margin of appreciation applies so that Strasbourg respects the legislation and the jurisdiction of domestic legislators and judges.

I do not see it as a domestic legal principle at all, so I do not see that it is for even the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to be operating a margin of appreciation when it applies the Human Rights Act domestically. I do not see that as the problem that the noble Lord does. The way that you put meat on the bones of human rights protections is with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, with the detail of the public order statute book; hence I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, about having a proper defence to face concealment. That is the detailed meat on the bones, not drafting a right to protest that pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11.

If the concern—and I would understand this—is that a future Government will come in and scrap the Human Rights Act and pull out of the ECHR, why then have colleagues piggy-backed on to Section 6 of the Human Rights Act in the way that they drafted the right to protest? That is a mistake. I do not want to give up on the Human Rights Act and the ECHR; I will defend them as long as I have breath in my body. That is the approach because it is a hostage to fortune to have free-standing replication of particular rights in particular statutes, when we have the precious protection of an overarching Human Rights Act that applies to the interpretation of all law.

Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry. It is nearly Christmas, and it is late.

There are policies that sit on shelves in Westminster and Whitehall for many years, and over the years and the decades people reach for the shelf and pull them off. It is very easy to blame civil servants, but the special adviser class—a cross-party class—have their files on the shelves too, and this naming and shaming thing has been doing the rounds for decades. Our lovely friends the special advisers are not here in the Chamber at this time; they are at the Spectator party or the New Statesman party or whatever it happens to be this evening, but naming and shaming of offenders is a really bad idea.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. The one point of difference is that, if one were to be charitable, one would say it is really important that the public have faith and confidence in community orders. I agree with that, so I would support a slight alternative to this approach, so that we are not naming and shaming particular offenders but taking other steps to make very clear in the community that this was built, cleaned or done by offenders serving sentences in the community. That would achieve the best ambitions of this policy without the cruelty and humiliation that the noble Baroness rightly identifies. That is what I ask my noble friends the Ministers to take back to the department and reflect upon. I think that would be something the Government could think about before Report.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I oppose this clause standing part of the Bill. It seems to me that everything that has been said by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Chakrabarti, is right. I also agree with the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that there is nothing at all wrong with saying that work of a particular kind was done by offenders as part of their community order. What I object to is, as she says, the naming and shaming.

But it goes further than that—it is, by definition, naming and shaming of offenders under supervision, because it is only offenders who are undertaking an unpaid work requirement who will be subject to this clause. I suggest that the compulsory photographing of such offenders—by probation officers, if you please—and the publication of those photographs and the offenders’ names, would be profoundly damaging. I, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, regard this clause as likely to damage relationships between probation officers and their clients, undermine offenders within their communities and make it more difficult for those offenders to integrate within those communities. The clause is overwhelmingly unlikely to do anything to rehabilitate offenders or reduce reoffending. It is, in short, largely vindictive only. Since one can expect the publication of names and photographs mostly to be by local media outlets, such publication is likely to fuel hostility to offenders whom we are trying to rehabilitate among their community and likely to encourage what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester earlier today called “penal populism”, with what, I suggest, could be only damaging effects.

We completely accept the position put by the noble Lord that community sentences are punishment and are intended to be punishment. They are punitive in the sense of restricting an offender’s liberty and imposing requirements that may be onerous on offenders, but they are also primarily directed at enabling rehabilitation and reducing reoffending. For such sentences to work, friendly and constructive relationships between probation officers and offenders, their clients, under their supervision and efforts to enable those offenders to be settled in their communities are vital. These proposals are, frankly, inimical to those ends. I have come across no evidence whatever that this kind of naming and shaming will do any good or reduce reoffending in any way. I believe it can only do harm. For that reason, I oppose this clause, and I invite the Government to abandon it.