Sentencing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 124A tabled by my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, I shall speak also to Amendments 124B to 124F. I note that there is also a Clause 35 stand part notice in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which has the same aims—we have just taken different routes to the same intended outcome.

These amendments are linked with one aim. If we are serious about reducing reoffending and rebuilding lives, we cannot allow public humiliation to be smuggled into the justice system through the back door—but that is exactly what Clause 35 does. It proposes giving Probation Service providers the power to publish the names and photographs of people carrying out unpaid work as part of their sentence. What could be the purpose of this measure? What problem is it solving? It does not support rehabilitation. It is not going to reduce reoffending. It appears to make humiliation part of the sentence given to the offender, and not just the offender but the people around them—their family and friends, potentially. This is a significant departure from evidence-based practice and threatens to undermine the goals that we claim to be pursuing.

I note that the Chief Inspector of Probation has warned that naming and shaming offenders is likely to act as a disincentive to rehabilitation and that, instead of encouraging compliance, it risks pushing people away from engagement entirely. If someone is planning to turn up, do the work and meet the terms of the order, why on earth would we introduce a measure that is likely to be an active discouragement for that? The evidence tells us that reintegration into their community, into employment, is what prevents reoffending. Public exposure will have the opposite effect. Probation officers, through their union, have raised alarm about the outcome for families, especially for children, who can bear the weight of a sentence for a crime that they did not commit. We know of cases where children have been bullied, harassed and even forced to change schools because a parent’s offending has been publicly exposed.

This is not just the view of a few organisations; 24 charities and experts, people who are working day in and day out with children and families affected by the justice system, have put out a joint letter opposing this clause. They warn about photographing people on unpaid work and publishing the images online, where they may remain indefinitely. We now have photo recognition software, so we can expect this only to get worse in future, and that will follow people for life. It risks making it harder to get a job or secure housing; it risks vigilantism and violence, and it risks damaging the children. We have international obligations to uphold the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We should consider the best interests of a child in every policy decision, yet this clause very clearly does not.

I can see that some other noble Lords wish to speak, so I will stop now, but I think there are very strong and unanimous feelings on this clause and the wrong direction that it is heading in.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Parliamentary draftsmen have been appropriately euphemistic in the title of Clause 35, but they could have drafted it: “Naming and shaming of offenders in the community”. I oppose Clause 35, and therefore support the amendments in that vein, because it is contrary to the ambitions of the Bill as a whole, undermines rehabilitation and therefore the prevention of further crimes and is outwith the philosophy of the Bill. I hope and believe that the Government are better than Clause 35, and I know that my noble friend the Minister is better than this. With his characteristic humility, he described himself as a simple entrepreneur who ran a business to mend shoes, but he also ran a business to mend humans—in both cases attempting to save “soles”.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry. It is nearly Christmas, and it is late.

There are policies that sit on shelves in Westminster and Whitehall for many years, and over the years and the decades people reach for the shelf and pull them off. It is very easy to blame civil servants, but the special adviser class—a cross-party class—have their files on the shelves too, and this naming and shaming thing has been doing the rounds for decades. Our lovely friends the special advisers are not here in the Chamber at this time; they are at the Spectator party or the New Statesman party or whatever it happens to be this evening, but naming and shaming of offenders is a really bad idea.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. The one point of difference is that, if one were to be charitable, one would say it is really important that the public have faith and confidence in community orders. I agree with that, so I would support a slight alternative to this approach, so that we are not naming and shaming particular offenders but taking other steps to make very clear in the community that this was built, cleaned or done by offenders serving sentences in the community. That would achieve the best ambitions of this policy without the cruelty and humiliation that the noble Baroness rightly identifies. That is what I ask my noble friends the Ministers to take back to the department and reflect upon. I think that would be something the Government could think about before Report.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I oppose this clause standing part of the Bill. It seems to me that everything that has been said by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Chakrabarti, is right. I also agree with the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that there is nothing at all wrong with saying that work of a particular kind was done by offenders as part of their community order. What I object to is, as she says, the naming and shaming.

But it goes further than that—it is, by definition, naming and shaming of offenders under supervision, because it is only offenders who are undertaking an unpaid work requirement who will be subject to this clause. I suggest that the compulsory photographing of such offenders—by probation officers, if you please—and the publication of those photographs and the offenders’ names, would be profoundly damaging. I, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, regard this clause as likely to damage relationships between probation officers and their clients, undermine offenders within their communities and make it more difficult for those offenders to integrate within those communities. The clause is overwhelmingly unlikely to do anything to rehabilitate offenders or reduce reoffending. It is, in short, largely vindictive only. Since one can expect the publication of names and photographs mostly to be by local media outlets, such publication is likely to fuel hostility to offenders whom we are trying to rehabilitate among their community and likely to encourage what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester earlier today called “penal populism”, with what, I suggest, could be only damaging effects.

We completely accept the position put by the noble Lord that community sentences are punishment and are intended to be punishment. They are punitive in the sense of restricting an offender’s liberty and imposing requirements that may be onerous on offenders, but they are also primarily directed at enabling rehabilitation and reducing reoffending. For such sentences to work, friendly and constructive relationships between probation officers and offenders, their clients, under their supervision and efforts to enable those offenders to be settled in their communities are vital. These proposals are, frankly, inimical to those ends. I have come across no evidence whatever that this kind of naming and shaming will do any good or reduce reoffending in any way. I believe it can only do harm. For that reason, I oppose this clause, and I invite the Government to abandon it.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

140: After Clause 41, insert the following new Clause—
“Removal of power to remand in custody for a person’s own protection or welfare(1) Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 (persons entitled to bail: supplementary provisions) is amended as follows.(2) In Part 1 of that Schedule omit paragraph 3.(3) In Part 1A of that Schedule omit paragraph 5.(4) In Part 2 of that Schedule omit paragraph 3.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would repeal the power of the courts to remand a person in custody for their own protection or, if they are a child or young person, for their welfare.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish I could offer every Member of the Committee who is still here an espresso at this point. Instead, I will try to be short and lively.

This amendment is the only amendment that I have tabled to a Bill that I broadly support, for reasons that need little explanation at this point, but Amendment 140 in my name—by the way, I also support Amendment 147 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Foster of Bath and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames—has been on my conscience. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for signing it. Of course, she was the first and distinguished chair of your Lordships’ Justice and Home and Affairs Committee.

This amendment concerns a provision in the Bail Act 1976 that, to my shame, I was unaware of until relatively few weeks ago, notwithstanding working in this area of law and policy for over 30 years. It really is on my conscience, and I think it should be on the conscience of the Government and the Committee. The provision states that vulnerable people may be remanded in custody for their own protection, even when they are charged with non-custodial offences. I would like to know from my noble friend the Minister’s reply, among other things, how this is conscionable and how it squares with the Government’s commitment to Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which sets very tight criteria for detaining people.

I was extremely grateful, as always, for a conversation about this with my noble friend the Minister and his officials two weeks ago. However, as a former government lawyer, I am always concerned about the danger of resistance to amendments because they “weren’t invented here”. I plead with my noble friend and other Members of the Committee to engage with a scandal. It is not a scandal on the scale of IPP. I did not speak in that debate to spare the Committee’s time, but I associate myself with all those who spoke on the IPP amendment. This is not indefinite detention, with all the lost hope, but it is about detaining vulnerable people who should not be detained for their own protection on remand in the criminal justice system.

I am advised by a coalition of NGOs—noble Lords in the Committee will have received their joint briefing—and Justice in particular. I am grateful to Emma Snell, a brilliant young lawyer at Justice, who has educated me about this provision. The coalition is broad; it includes Nacro, Inquest, the Centre for Women’s Justice, the Prison Reform Trust, the Howard League and so on.

Most of the people who appear to be detained for their own protection, including when charged with a non-custodial offence, are being detained because they have an acute mental health crisis, are suffering from addiction or are homeless. Some of them are at risk from others; that could be reprisals in the community or it could be from criminal gangs, and so on. However, none of that is justification for taking someone’s liberty, as opposed to keeping them safe and helping them. This is not something that we would do to witnesses. We would surely put a witness in a safe house rather than detain them for their own protection. I am incredibly concerned that we persist with this.

Furthermore, the Labour Party spoke against this in opposition only a couple of years ago, and it has been criticised by all the experts in the sector: the independent non-governmental bodies, the chief inspectors, et cetera. To my mind, it is unconscionable that we should detain somebody for their vulnerability and not for a danger that they pose to others. The classic and other grounds for remanding in custody, rather than on bail, are, “You will reoffend”, or, “You will interfere with witnesses”, and so on, but the idea that you should be detained for your own protection or, in the case of children, for your welfare is something that needs to be addressed.

To be fair to the Government, they are already proposing in the Mental Health Bill that this should not be on mental health grounds alone. That is progress, necessary and to be commended. But necessary is not sufficient, because there are other vulnerable people who will not be diagnosed as being vulnerable because of a mental health condition. That could include vulnerable women, homeless people and people who fear reprisals from criminal gangs. They should be made safe, and there are provisions to make them safe in other ways. I think the Committee would want to move away from the idea that we as a political community and a society can only care for and protect people through detention and coercion, and certainly the Bill, in its general thrust, is attempting to do that. I beg to move.

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[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her amendment and for taking the time to discuss her related concerns with my noble friend Lord Timpson. I also thank her for her support for the Bill and its overall intentions—that is very much appreciated coming from someone with her track record.

Amendment 140 would remove an important safeguard which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, is very rarely used but remains an option for the courts as a measure of last resort and out of concern for the defendant. Eliminating this provision could leave vulnerable individuals without any viable protection, particularly where alternative care arrangements were simply unavailable or could not be implemented swiftly enough. We fear that those may be the consequences. Examples where it may be used include where it is the only option available to the court to keep someone safe, such as in cases where the defendant is a member of a gang and could be subject to repercussions if they were not protected.

I hope it will also reassure your Lordships that the Mental Health Bill, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to, is now in the other place. It includes a reform to end the use of remand for one’s own protection under the Bail Act where the court’s sole concern is the defendant’s mental health. This reform should ensure that remand for one’s own protection is, therefore, used only as a last resort in the circumstances I have outlined.

At this stage, repeal would leave a gap in the available provision. Courts must retain the flexibility to act decisively in safeguarding individuals when no other option exists. The amendment would risk unintended consequences for vulnerable defendants and undermine the protective function of the justice system.

Amendment 147, which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster, for tabling, seeks to allow prisoners held on remand to access rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support before the start of their sentence. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary, given that remand prisoners can already access those programmes where prisons run them.

There is also an important legal distinction here that I should highlight to your Lordships. Remand prisoners are held in custody pending trial or sentencing, and some have not yet been convicted. Of course, we recognise that people are spending more time on remand; therefore, as I have said, where these services are available and in the right circumstances, they should be able to access them. However, remand prisoners are legally distinct from sentenced prisoners, and we have to reflect that in the priorities for resources.

There are already mechanisms in place to support remand prisoners, including access to healthcare. At the moment, the Government have no plans to expand all rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support to remand prisoners. This would require substantial changes to prison operations and resourcing, and could divert resources from those already convicted and serving sentences. We recognise, however, some of the changes in the remand population. My noble friend the Minister and I would be very happy to continue to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about these matters but, given what I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am so grateful once more to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but, I have to say, I am disappointed in the responses from both Front Benches on this occasion. They were uncharacteristic, knee-jerk responses that do not display a broader understanding of the other laws of England and Wales that deal—or should deal—with vulnerable people.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, mentioned children. There are ample measures for protecting children under the Children Act 1989 and looking after them in more appropriate circumstances than in criminal justice detention. I remind the Committee that we are talking about defendants who are being detained not for the classic justifications that they would commit further offences, interfere with witnesses and so on, but for their own protection. Of course, the criminal justice estate is not a place of safety or protection for anyone.

I did not hear a reply to my question about how this can be justified under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but perhaps my noble friend the Minister could drop a note on that and offer it to other Members of the Committee. There will not be too many to send it to because there are not many Members here, but I would be hugely grateful for that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, had it right when she talked about a Victorian hangover. There are too many Victorian hangovers in this area of law and policy, and I know that my noble friend Lord Timpson is well aware of that. The thrust of the Bill, in general, is about departing from such Victorian hangovers, such as social death and locking people up and throwing away the key. I urge further reflection.

If I am a member of a criminal gang who wants to turn King’s evidence but I am not charged with a minor offence, I will have to be put in a safe house, and there are schemes and measures to do that. But if I happen to be charged with a low-level offence that does not attract a custodial penalty, I am told that it is a last resort and that I am going to be locked up in a prison system where I will be more at danger from the criminal gang than I ever would be in a safe house. These are rather disappointing arguments from members of the Committee who, on reflection, may think again. I shall certainly return to this on Report, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 140 withdrawn.