Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Designated Activities) (Supervision and Enforcement) Regulations 2024

Lord Livermore Excerpts

Tuesday 17th December 2024 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Livermore]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Designated Activities) (Supervision and Enforcement) Regulations 2024.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, with the leave of the Committee, in moving this instrument, I shall speak also to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Ring-fenced Bodies, Core Activities, Excluded Activities and Prohibitions) (Amendment) Order 2024 and the Short Selling Regulations 2024. Noble Lords may be aware that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee raised the ring-fencing and short selling regulations as instruments of interest in its secondary legislation report, published last month.

The regulations being introduced today will ensure effective, proportionate regulation for the financial services sector in three ways: first, by reforming the ring-fencing regime to be more flexible while upholding financial stability safeguards; secondly, by creating a new framework for the regulation of short selling; and, thirdly, by enabling better supervision and enforcement of designated activities under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.

I will first address the reforms to the ring-fencing regime for banks. As noble Lords will know, ring-fencing was introduced following the global financial crisis, on the recommendation of the Independent Commission on Banking, and came into full force in 2019. It requires large complex banks to separate the services that they provide to households and small and medium enterprises from investment banking activity.

In 2022, an independent statutory review of the regime recommended updates to ensure that it operates as intended and is proportionate. This statutory instrument improves the regime and implements changes from the review. The reforms that it contains will improve competition in the banking sector, reduce costs and support economic growth. They have been developed with the Prudential Regulation Authority, which is content that they also maintain appropriate financial stability protections.

The reforms will ensure that, in future, only the largest and most complex banks are subject to the regime, with two key changes. The first of these is an increase in the primary deposit threshold—the amount of core deposits a bank can hold before it is required to ring-fence—from £25 billion to £35 billion. This accounts for growth in the deposit base and other relevant economic indicators since ring-fencing was introduced, and supports competition. The second is the introduction of a new secondary threshold that exempts retail-focused banking groups from the regime where investment banking activity accounts for less than 10% of common equity tier 1 capital.

This statutory instrument also makes changes to the way in which banks within the regime can operate. It introduces measures to encourage more investment by ring-fenced banks in UK small and medium enterprises and to reduce the compliance burden associated with the regime. It also creates significant new flexibilities to allow ring-fenced banks to operate globally, subject to Prudential Regulation Authority rules, as well as to provide a wider range of goods and services to their customers.

I turn now to the Short Selling Regulations 2024. Short selling is the practice of selling a security that is borrowed or not owned by the seller with the intention of buying it back later at a lower price to make a profit. Short selling plays a role in the proper functioning of financial markets. It provides essential liquidity to markets, which drives investment in British companies; it helps drive economic growth; and it helps ensure that investors pay the right price when investing in shares.

This statutory instrument introduces a more streamlined UK short selling regime, which focuses on equities rather than both equities and sovereign debt. The new regime also includes a reformed public disclosure regime for short selling to ensure that there is transparency over short selling activity, without the issues identified with the current regime through the 2022 call for evidence.

There can, however, be risks associated with short selling. As such, it is important for the Financial Conduct Authority to have the tools necessary to monitor short selling activity effectively and to intervene. This statutory instrument provides the Financial Conduct Authority with broad rule-making powers in relation to short selling. This will allow the Financial Conduct Authority, in effect, to oversee short selling in UK markets. It will also mean that the UK’s short selling rules can be adapted and updated by the Financial Conduct Authority in a more agile way in the future—for example, to better adapt to new global standards or to take account of market innovation and new business models.

This instrument also retains the Financial Conduct Authority’s powers to intervene in short selling activity in UK markets in exceptional circumstances—an important feature of the current regime.

Finally, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Designated Activities) (Supervision and Enforcement) Regulations 2024 give the Financial Conduct Authority the broad rule-making power for short selling that I have just mentioned. The new short selling regime operates under the designated activities regime introduced into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.

The designated activities regime allows the Treasury to designate certain activities to be regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority without the requirement for those carrying on the activities to become full authorised persons, such as banks or insurers. This enables proportionate regulation of activities where it would be inappropriate to require full authorisation.

The designated activities supervision and enforcement regulations enable the Financial Conduct Authority to supervise and enforce rules that it makes under the designated activities regime. They do this by extending the Financial Conduct Authority’s existing supervision and enforcement powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, so that they can be used in relation to designated activities, even where those carrying out the activities are not authorised persons. The extension of these powers applies, in the first instance, to designated activities covered by the Consumer Composite Investments (Designated Activities) Regulations 2024 and the Short Selling Regulations 2024. This will enable effective supervision of the regimes that those regulations introduce.

In closing, these SIs ensure that our financial services industry is subject to a rule book that is fit for purpose, more proportionate and tailored to UK markets. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, first I declare my interests in financial services, as in the register—just in case. I will speak to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Designated Activities) (Supervision and Enforcement) Regulations and then to the Short Selling Regulations.

The set of rules and provisions under which the FCA can give directions is important. Every time something is the subject of such a direction or supervisory action, there is an opportunity to go to a tribunal. I wonder whether the Minister has any statistics, from looking at the FCA’s present powers and at when tribunals can be invoked, on how frequent that is. I am trying to get at one of the things that has irritated me, which, as the Minister knows, is that the FCA seems quite slow to respond when something is going on in the market. One’s instinct, if we know that something is going wrong, is to want quick action. These provisions allow that, but they could always be subject to challenge. So how might that interfere? The question is a little theoretical, but is anything already being done in that way with which we might compare it? I realise that that information might not be to hand; if it is not, I would be happy to have a letter.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to address these three significant pieces of legislation, which collectively aim to refine and enhance the regulation of our financial services sector. The measures come at a pivotal time for not only our financial services industry but the broader economy, as we navigate the challenges and opportunities presented by our post-Brexit regulatory autonomy.

My overall concern is that we are moving too slowly and too modestly to reduce the constraints that existed in the EU regime, and to encourage the competition and dynamism that we need for growth. This means that the US financial services industry and the industry in newer markets, such as Singapore, are eroding our prime position despite our dual advantage of time zone and the English language. Questions have been asked about the effectiveness of our stock market; indeed, that was highlighted today by the reaction to the Canal+ listing in London, which, obviously, we all welcomed. We look forward to debating the reforms announced in the Mansion House speech.

In the light of all this, the instruments demand careful scrutiny. I will also follow the sequence on the Order Paper. The first measure under consideration deals with the supervision and enforcement of designated activities. This legislation builds on the regulatory framework of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, empowering regulators to oversee specific activities that pose systemic or consumer risks. From our perspective, this is a necessary and prudent step. By focusing regulatory attention on designated activities rather than institutions alone, we can ensure that oversight remains targeted and proportionate.

Yet it is vital that this power is exercised judiciously. Overzealous enforcement could stifle innovation and deter smaller players and start-ups from entering the market at all. We would like to see a regulatory approach that provides clarity and certainty, enabling businesses to thrive while protecting consumers and market integrity. We also want to keep compliance costs down for business, especially smaller business. Historically, that has not always been the way of the financial regulators—nor, I am afraid to say, of the Treasury. Does the Minister agree that financial regulation should be more careful about the costs that it imposes? I know from the Mansion House speech that the Chancellor wants to be more competitive; I would like to see that reflected in financial regulation.

Incidentally, I was surprised to see this in paragraph 9.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum:

“The government does not generally assess successful enforcement action—such as fines levied after a breach of rules—as a cost to firms”.


From my experience, enforcement can be very costly to a firm: in legal fees, to fight any unfairness and possible reputational damage; in diversion of management time and talent; and in finding money from tight budgets for any fine. That is a good reason for a firm to comply with the established rules but it is also a reason for our regulators to work hard, in order to make compliance with the law easy, and not to judge themselves on the amount of fines they levy.

There is a related point on which I would very much welcome a response. The Minister may be aware of the huge concerns raised by the financial services sector about the FCA’s proposals earlier this year to name and shame firms involved in FCA enforcement action. It is consulting again, I am glad to say, on modified proposals. Can the Minister say whether the FCA intends to apply these new rules to the persons who are within the designated activities regime, which is at issue today, rather than, or as well as, the authorised persons regime? I know that the Chancellor, like her predecessor, has expressed concerns about naming and shaming. Clearly, we need to tread with great care in this area.

I look forward to hearing the answers to the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, about tribunals and speed. I should like to say that her grasp of technical aspects of financial services law is extremely helpful to this Committee in the scrutiny of complex SIs such as these; we owe her a great deal. However, I have to say, I am not sure that I completely agree with her on FCA objectives, as I think that responsible growth and dynamism need also to come through in the way the FCA behaves.

That brings me to the second measure, which addresses short selling—an activity that has long been a point of contention in financial markets. Short selling, when responsibly undertaken, contributes to market liquidity and price discovery, as the Minister explained. Personally, I would have been more radical in moving away from the EU regulation, and perhaps in giving the FCA narrower rule-making powers. However, the proposed regulations seek to establish a robust framework for managing the risks of short selling while preserving its legitimate role, for example in times of crisis; I think that “exceptional circumstances” was the term the Minister used.

Moreover, on public disclosure, I welcome the move to a list of securities that are within the scope of the rules—this is in paragraph 5.11 of the second SI’s Explanatory Memorandum—rather than having a list of shares the FCA considered to be exempt. This will be clearer and easier. However, I urge the Government to ensure that the reporting and compliance burdens on market participants arising from this new instrument remain proportionate. Excessive red tape hinders the competitiveness of our financial markets, and I believe that we still have too much of it.

I say in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that I, too, have learned a lot from history. She mentioned what I think she called “casino banking” but, as a former bank non-executive director—long after the financial crisis—I can vouch for the thoroughness of the checks that are made on personnel with responsibilities. My only concern is that this might be a less leisurely process because, obviously, personnel changes are often needed to run organisations well.

The third and final measure relates to amendments to the ring-fencing framework established in the wake of the global financial crisis. Ring-fencing was designed to protect retail banking operations from the risks associated with investment banking. Although this principle remains sound, the financial landscape has evolved considerably since the original provisions were enacted.

The proposed amendments rightly seek to introduce greater flexibility into the ring-fencing regime. This is a sensible response to changing market dynamics and the need for regulatory frameworks to evolve. Having said that, I think that increasing the limit from £25 billion to just £35 billion is timid, especially given recent inflation. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I would like the Minister to remind the Grand Committee which of our banks will need to be ring-fenced going forward and to name some of those that will escape and be able to grow and diversify, both here and overseas, more easily.

In other respects, I say to the Minister and his officials that the Explanatory Memorandum and de minimis assessment on this instrument were very thorough and helpful.

As Conservatives, we understand the critical importance of maintaining the UK’s status as a global financial hub. This requires not only robust regulatory frameworks but a willingness to adapt and innovate in response to new challenges and opportunities, such as AI. I urge the Government to continue the processes of dealing with retained EU law and of engaging with industry stakeholders in order to ensure that domestic measures are implemented effectively and without unnecessary burdens or delays. In doing so, it should be possible to foster a competitive financial services sector that drives economic growth and innovation, creates jobs and enhances our nation’s global standing.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken—specifically, the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Kramer and Lady Neville-Rolfe—for their comments and questions and for, as others have observed, the extraordinary level of expertise that they bring to this debate and, as a result, the level of scrutiny that they are able to provide. I apologise for speaking to the instruments in an order other than that on the Order Paper.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, began by focusing on the designated activities SI. She asked about the direction power. The designated activities regime provides a power of direction to the Financial Conduct Authority. The Treasury can, by regulations, switch on that direction power for the Financial Conduct Authority’s supervision of any given designated activity. This statutory instrument sets out additional procedure for how that power may be exercised, but it does not create or switch on the direction power itself.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, also asked for some statistics on the frequency of tribunals. I will write to her on that, as she requested. If she does not mind, I will also write to her on her second question, which was about the differences in the power of direction between CCIs and short selling.

The noble Baroness then went on to focus on the short selling SI. She asked how the views of consumers were considered. These reforms were informed by extensive industry engagement, taking into account views from a wide range of market participants, including consumers. The new UK regime will ensure that the regulation works effectively to protect against the risks of short selling while improving UK competitiveness.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Can I ask the Minister for clarification? It would seem that, if individual entities are disclosing their net short position, it is possible for an investor to understand whether the price is being affected by one institution that is making a very big play or by a series of institutions that are making a similar play. That is important information, and I have no idea how you can get it once everything is aggregated —unless I have misunderstood all of this completely, which is perfectly possible.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

Since I am going to write to the noble Baroness on those other two points, it is probably best that I write to her on that one, so that we can be absolutely clear.

In the meantime, I move on to the questions on the ring-fence from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. She spoke about a return to casino banking, but she will understand that I disagree with her on that point. These are sensible, technical reforms on which the Treasury has undertaken detailed work with the PRA. The PRA is satisfied that they maintain the appropriate financial stability safeguards. The Treasury has considered the combined overall risk of reforms to the sector, alongside detailed cost-benefit analysis through an impact assessment. That impact assessment concluded that the reforms will improve outcomes for banks and their customers by making the ring-fencing regime more flexible and proportionate, while maintaining appropriate financial stability safeguards and minimising risks to public funds.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Neville- Rolfe, asked which specific banks will be removed from the ring-fence as a result of these measures. The reforms create significant new optionality for banks, with the eventual benefits depending on their commercial decisions. It is for the banks to announce how they will utilise the new flexibilities created in the regime and the Government do not comment on specific firms.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also asked about firms being taken out of the ring-fence as a result of the primary threshold. No firms will leave the regime as a result of increasing the core deposit threshold.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, in contrast to other noble Lords, spoke of these reforms being too slow and modest. She also asked what assessment the Government had done on the impact of these SIs. We published impact assessments alongside both the ring-fencing and short selling statutory instruments, which set out their estimated impacts on firms. Both these statutory instruments are estimated to result in a net cost saving for industry.

The noble Baroness also asked how these SIs will deliver growth. There are several measures in the ring-fencing SI that have an impact on growth. We are increasing the core deposit threshold at which banks become subject to the regime, allowing them to grow, as well as exempting retail-focused banks from the regime. We have also introduced new flexibilities for ring-fenced banks to invest in UK small and medium enterprises. The Short Selling Regulations introduce a streamlined short selling regime, which reduces costs for firms and improves UK competitiveness, while still effectively protecting against the risks of short selling.

The noble Baroness also asked about the powers that the supervision and enforcement statutory instrument provides. Those regulations extend the normal powers that the Financial Conduct Authority already has over designated activities. They will allow the Financial Conduct Authority to supervise designated activities even where those carrying on the activities are not authorised persons. They mean that it will be able to gather information on and launch investigations into persons carrying on designated activities, and to enforce its designated activity rules, by publicly censuring or imposing financial penalties on persons who breach them. The Financial Conduct Authority will also be able to restrict or prohibit persons from carrying on the activity if necessary. I will write to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, on the broader FCA enforcement approach.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

Before the Minister goes on, I want to ask about naming and shaming. Is it to be done at the stage when enforcement becomes public? Can we be clear when the naming and shaming will take place? The Government are still considering exactly what they are going to do on naming and shaming, I think. It would be good to have confirmation on that because this area is of particular concern to the industry, for an obvious reason: the reputational hit of naming and shaming is substantial.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

If there is anything more that I can usefully add, I will include it in the letter that I will write to the noble Baroness.

A final question was asked about why we have increased the limit by just £10 billion. It was recognised when the ring-fencing regime was originally designed that the threshold would need to be adjusted over time to reflect the evolution of banking practices and growth in the deposit base. The Treasury considered several metrics, as well as financial stability and competition considerations, in proposing the £10 billion increase.

Increasing the deposit threshold will provide smaller banks with more headroom to grow before being subject to the requirements and costs of ring-fencing. This will support domestic competition in the retail banking market. A competitive and dynamic market improves outcomes for depositors. The reforms may also encourage inward investment in the UK, as new entrants to the UK banking market will have more room to grow and develop economies of scale before becoming subject to the regime.

I hope that I have covered all noble Lords’ questions. As I say, I will write on the points that I indicated.

Motion agreed.