Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Designated Activities) (Supervision and Enforcement) Regulations 2024

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Tuesday 17th December 2024 Grand Committee

I have to say, on my favourite subject of consumer collective investments, that there was a substantial response to that consultation, which the Government not only ignored and said very little about but then did precisely the opposite of what was said. There is an interesting contrast between the way in which that was dealt with—I know that the noble Lord was not necessarily the Minister at that time—and the more sympathetic way in which the consumers were dealt with. That is all I have to say at the moment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to these three statutory instruments in the order in which they appear on the Order Paper. I know the Minister spoke to them in a different order—three, one, two—but I am much more simple-minded, I am afraid, so will go with one, two, three. I am also speaking without the professional experience of my colleague and others who are present in this debate, even if not participating, so there is an element of “man-on-the-street reaction” to some of the questions I have around these various statutory instruments.

I will start with the designated activities regulations. I would like to understand much better the circumstances under which this first of the three SIs allows the FCA to exempt businesses or persons from being an authorised person when they are carrying out activities such as short selling and credit default swaps. Indeed, the language is quite loose, so it may well include other complex financial structuring and sales.

The reason that I would like to understand those circumstances is that I remain very exercised by the 2008 financial crash. It is an experience from which we all have to learn, and which we must be careful not to forget, but it was, to a significant extent, triggered by the ignorance and negligence of businesses and people who were carrying out structured finance. Indeed, credit default swaps in particular were at the heart of much of the crisis. Short selling, which is wrapped into this SI, particularly uncovered short selling, is definitely a risky activity. Why should these risky activities be carried out by people who have not been through an authorisation—in effect, an approval process?

I understand that the industry often says that this is an onerous process but, having been on the committee that first recommended that process, the heart of the authorisation process is to verify that the person carrying out the activity meets the test of being fit and proper. Indeed, the core of the process is a criminal records check and a process to verify that the expertise and experience that has been claimed by the individual or the business is actually true. Neither of those can ever be taken for granted. People who have been involved in financial mis-selling over and over again turn out to be serial offenders whose history was never checked and who are shown to have been involved in previous mis-selling practices. We saw that extensively with the mini-bond scandal but it has a much wider history than that.

Firms have told me that, since they have had to go through the authorisation process, they have been shocked to find how many of their decision-makers were hired not on the basis of their expertise or CVs but because they were a friend of somebody who was important in the organisation who had highly recommended them. When they started checking the CVs, as the Minister may be aware, they discovered that many people had gravely exaggerated; the experience and expertise that they had claimed turned out not to have a whole lot of substance behind it.

In an industry where there is so much at stake and so much capacity to manoeuvre and do the wrong thing, why are we limiting the authorisation process? I want to understand better the circumstances in which the FCA will make the decision that the authorisation process need not apply. It is a pretty significant decision. I understand the industry push-back; all the organisations feel that they are virtuous, so why should anybody look over their shoulders?

On the whole I am comfortable with the second SI, which focuses on short selling, but I do not understand—here, I am in a different position from my colleague, my noble friend Lady Bowles—why individual firms will no longer be required to publish net short positions above 0.5% of issued capital. I should have thought that investors would like to have this information, but I understand that, from a systemic perspective, an aggregate number may be sufficient for the regulator. However, it concerns me that we are reducing transparency in this area and I should like to understand much more clearly why transparency has been such a problem that it has to be removed. It does not take a lot of activity for this information to be public, so it cannot be particularly onerous to publish it. What are the harms that the industry feels exist because of publication? Perhaps we could have some examples of where a firm has been harmed. Presumably, that evidence has been put before the FCA or we would not have the drafting of this SI.

Why can the Treasury arbitrarily change the threshold for reporting net positions to the FCA? To me, the Treasury does not need to be accountable to anybody for changing that threshold and I just do not understand why that is and what the circumstances are.

I am also concerned that the financial services industry has been playing the growth mantra in order to move to a lighter-touch regulation environment. Whenever there is a debate on short selling on the Floor of the House, many people stand up and argue for uncovered short selling to be allowed far more extensively on the grounds that it will bring more players to invest in high-risk projects. The argument is made continuously that uncovered short selling will increase the liquidity in the market and offset any increased risk. I regard uncovered short selling as a risky activity, and I am not clear how this SI impacts on the FCA’s scope—without reference to Parliament, scope increases to allow a much greater range of uncovered short selling. As I was reading the language, I could certainly see that interpretation as possible.

--- Later in debate ---

She also asked about transparency. Public disclosure of short selling is important to provide investors with information and transparency on how it affects the price of shares. This, in turn, provides certainty and confidence to the market. Feedback to the call for evidence on the Short Selling Regulations highlighted significant issues with the current public disclosure regime. This new aggregated net short position disclosure regime will continue to provide transparency on short selling activity, while avoiding the potential distortive impacts of the current public disclosure regime. The Financial Conduct Authority will continue to have access to data on individual net short positions to monitor short selling activity effectively. I will also write to the noble Baroness on why the Treasury has control of the disclosure threshold.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Can I ask the Minister for clarification? It would seem that, if individual entities are disclosing their net short position, it is possible for an investor to understand whether the price is being affected by one institution that is making a very big play or by a series of institutions that are making a similar play. That is important information, and I have no idea how you can get it once everything is aggregated —unless I have misunderstood all of this completely, which is perfectly possible.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

Since I am going to write to the noble Baroness on those other two points, it is probably best that I write to her on that one, so that we can be absolutely clear.

In the meantime, I move on to the questions on the ring-fence from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. She spoke about a return to casino banking, but she will understand that I disagree with her on that point. These are sensible, technical reforms on which the Treasury has undertaken detailed work with the PRA. The PRA is satisfied that they maintain the appropriate financial stability safeguards. The Treasury has considered the combined overall risk of reforms to the sector, alongside detailed cost-benefit analysis through an impact assessment. That impact assessment concluded that the reforms will improve outcomes for banks and their customers by making the ring-fencing regime more flexible and proportionate, while maintaining appropriate financial stability safeguards and minimising risks to public funds.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Neville- Rolfe, asked which specific banks will be removed from the ring-fence as a result of these measures. The reforms create significant new optionality for banks, with the eventual benefits depending on their commercial decisions. It is for the banks to announce how they will utilise the new flexibilities created in the regime and the Government do not comment on specific firms.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also asked about firms being taken out of the ring-fence as a result of the primary threshold. No firms will leave the regime as a result of increasing the core deposit threshold.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, in contrast to other noble Lords, spoke of these reforms being too slow and modest. She also asked what assessment the Government had done on the impact of these SIs. We published impact assessments alongside both the ring-fencing and short selling statutory instruments, which set out their estimated impacts on firms. Both these statutory instruments are estimated to result in a net cost saving for industry.

The noble Baroness also asked how these SIs will deliver growth. There are several measures in the ring-fencing SI that have an impact on growth. We are increasing the core deposit threshold at which banks become subject to the regime, allowing them to grow, as well as exempting retail-focused banks from the regime. We have also introduced new flexibilities for ring-fenced banks to invest in UK small and medium enterprises. The Short Selling Regulations introduce a streamlined short selling regime, which reduces costs for firms and improves UK competitiveness, while still effectively protecting against the risks of short selling.

The noble Baroness also asked about the powers that the supervision and enforcement statutory instrument provides. Those regulations extend the normal powers that the Financial Conduct Authority already has over designated activities. They will allow the Financial Conduct Authority to supervise designated activities even where those carrying on the activities are not authorised persons. They mean that it will be able to gather information on and launch investigations into persons carrying on designated activities, and to enforce its designated activity rules, by publicly censuring or imposing financial penalties on persons who breach them. The Financial Conduct Authority will also be able to restrict or prohibit persons from carrying on the activity if necessary. I will write to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, on the broader FCA enforcement approach.