EV Strategy: (ECC Committee Report)

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Wednesday 16th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, it was a great privilege to serve on the committee under the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter. Like her, I am no longer in it. Her departure is greatly missed; I suspect that mine, since I was the grit in the oyster on that committee, was much welcomed by its other members. It is also a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Woodley. He made some important points, which I hope I will be able to suggest—probably to other people’s surprise—are not quite as much of a worry as he suggested.

One of the problems with most Select Committee reports is that they tend to be all words and no numbers. Committees show an extreme reluctance to discuss the costs of their proposals to the taxpayer or the consumer. I was originally trained as a scientist; drilled into us was Lord Kelvin’s remark:

“When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it. When you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind”.


It may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the stage of science. That is even more true in economics. If you cannot even estimate the costs or benefits of a policy, you can scarcely claim to have advanced to the stage where you can make policy recommendations.

Happily, this report is not devoid of numbers, albeit that most of the important ones are well hidden and the obvious conclusions that might be drawn from them have not always been drawn. I will focus on some of the key numbers in this report, but none of them appear in the initial recommendations. The upfront conclusions on page 4 use all sorts of euphemisms and verbal circumlocutions to avoid mentioning that they will cost money.

Perhaps I might translate what the report actually says. The first recommendation is:

“Tackle the disparity in upfront costs between electric and petrol and diesel cars”.


That means subsidising or, as the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, remarked, penalising the sale of petrol and diesel cars. The second recommendation is:

“Turbo-charge the charging infrastructure rollout”.


That means subsidise it. The third is:

“Ensure charging is reasonably priced, convenient, and reliable”.


That means subsidising fuel costs further. The report goes on to say that

“the Government must explore options for equalising the discrepancy between the VAT rates for domestic and public charging”.

Now there is no conceivable likelihood that the Government will put up VAT on domestic electricity, so that is a call for VAT on public charging points to be reduced, further increasing the subsidy on fuel costs for electric vehicles. I will return to the important fifth point later, but the sixth point is:

“Enhance UK manufacturing and battery innovation”.


That means more subsidies. The seventh is “Invest in UK recycling”—a new area for government subsidies. And so it goes on.

The problem is that the existing level of subsidies is very high, before we add to them from any of the proposals in this report. You have to get to page 33 or 34 to find out how much the subsidies are. They reveal that a privately owned EV is already subsidised, relative to petrol cars, to the tune of £5,000 over 10 years—it actually says £5,000 on page 34 and €5,000 on page 33, but I think the former is correct. However, corporately owned vehicles are subsidised to the tune of £10,000 in just four years. Those are big subsidies, particularly the latter. No wonder the vast majority of sales are to company fleets. If we are to subsidise EVs, it baffles me why the bulk of the money should go to those owned by companies—but so it is.

The main subsidy for private vehicles is, of course, the fact that they pay no duty on their fuel, which is electricity. You have to reach page 36 to find the total costs of this as EVs gradually replace fossil-fuel vehicles. The OBR has pointed out that fuel duties raised £23.4 billion last year, equivalent to £867 per household. That means that, if we forge ahead and succeed in phasing out those vehicles by 2030, we will have created what we might call a black hole in the nation’s finances, heading towards £23 billion as older vehicles are retired and used less.

The committee mentions the important issue of road tax in its fifth recommendation. It simply says that we should:

“Begin an urgent review of road taxation”.


It calls for an honest conversation with the public—quite right. Sadly, the committee did not agree to initiate this honest conversation by honestly admitting that the only option to replace this revenue is to introduce road charging. If we in this House, who do not have to get re-elected, do not have the courage to be honest enough to say that we are going to have to introduce road charging to replace fuel duty, how can we expect the people in the other House, who do have to get re-elected, to broach the subject until that black hole in the public finances is upon us?

The penultimate figure from the report is highly relevant to the decision on whether to phase out the sale of non-EVs sooner or later. There was much criticism of the previous Prime Minister’s decision to postpone the date beyond which sales of fossil fuel cars would be banned—delaying it from 2030 to 2035. There is rather less criticism now. The car companies seem rather relieved he did that, since sales are slower than was anticipated. We were told by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders—which is of course largely a society of traders, and largely represents foreign companies exporting cars to this country—that this had a damaging effect on British manufacturers, who would not have the incentive to develop EVs. However, this ignores the strange nature of the British car market.

We export the overwhelming majority, more than 80%, of the cars we manufacture, and more than 80% of the cars we consume are imported. Indeed, on page 22 of the report you will discover that no less than 97% of the electric vehicles sold in the UK in the last quarter were imported. Most of the EVs produced in this country are presumably exported. So these changing rules only really have a major effect on EVs and other vehicles sold in the UK. Given that 80% of our vehicles are exported, the effect of these rules on our production falls on only one-fifth of the production, 20%. They are mainly affected by the rules of the countries to which they export, so I hope the damage that it does to British manufacturing will be less than the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, fears.

I am reasonably sure that electric vehicles will, eventually, displace petrol and diesel cars without subsidy, when their upfront price comes down to equal that of petrol and diesel cars, when the range of batteries is sufficient so that a normal journey would never require recharging, and when recharging is rapid. Actually, recharging is probably less of an issue than we imagine in this report. For the 60% of people who can keep cars off-road, the normal thing they will do after they use their car and come home is plug it in. The next morning it will be charged. They will not have to stop at the gas station as they would in a petrol car because they will have a fully charged car—so it is actually better. But for the 40% who do not have off-road parking, there is a problem we did not really find a solution to.

When will the price of electric vehicles come down to that of petrol and diesel? In the report, we quote people as saying that

“Other predictions for when average EV prices will meet those of petrol and diesel vehicles range from 2025–27”,


so, apparently, it will be quite imminent. So why are we subsidising people to buy expensive vehicles when they could have them at more or less the same price as the alternatives in a couple of years’ time? It is forecast that, by 2025, the price would be down to about £21,000 for an EV in Europe. Actually, you can get one for £22,000 now in the UK, so they are coming down to a similar price.

We should remember Dieter Helm, the great energy expert, who was asked by the Government to analyse their energy policy. He concluded that the big failure was that we had invested in immature technologies. He said that investing in technologies—which were going to become mature and cheap—when they were still immature and expensive had probably cost us the best part of £100 billion. So why are we encouraging people to do that in the EV market?

I suggest that we should look at this report and the figures, and draw conclusions from them. We might be a little more optimistic than some of the pessimists and a little more realistic than some of the super-optimists.

King’s Speech

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the new Ministers to their posts. I wish them well and sincerely hope that they will succeed in their mission to promote economic growth.

The great advantage of speaking in this Chamber is that we can speak perfectly frankly in the certain knowledge that nothing we say here will ever leak out to the world outside, so I want to take advantage of the privacy of this Chamber to offer some advice to Ministers opposite and to tell them some possibly inconvenient truths that we, or I, certainly would not be allowed to voice on the BBC and which they may not even hear from their officials. That is not to impugn the integrity of officials. My officials over 10 years in government were wonderful. Only twice in 10 years did two very virtuous officials succumb to the “noble lie” temptation of concealing information from me or distorting it because they thought that if I knew the truth I might misbehave. I hope it will be rare in the Minister’s department for that sort of thing to happen, but unfortunately virtuous enthusiasm and groupthink go together, so he may find that it is a bit more prevalent than it was in my days.

I met recently an official from my old department who said that they were initially very disconcerted when I took over, because when they gave me some facts or arguments that they were convinced would be absolutely in line with my prejudices, my instant response was, “But is it true?” I urge Ministers to take the same attitude, not least in this area.

The Government promise that tackling climate change and accelerating the move to net zero will lower energy bills and generate economic growth, but is it true? There is no doubt that cheap energy is a prerequisite for growth. America has proved, relative to Europe, that because it has cheap energy it is growing far faster. Equally, we know that expensive energy kills growth. I became an energy analyst in the early 1970s. In 1974, the quadrupling of oil prices killed growth—the end of Les Trente Glorieuses, as the French say. The 30 years of rapid growth after the war was signalled by that and we had much slower growth thereafter. We tend to forget that, in 2009, the great financial crisis was triggered by a rise in oil prices, and growth worldwide has been slower since then.

I therefore support the production of energy from whatever sources are cheapest for this country—I welcome the removal of barriers on offshore wind, for example—but I am sceptical, to say the least, as to whether the Government’s commitment to double onshore, triple solar and quadruple offshore will give cheaper energy. My scepticism has nothing to do with global warming. I studied physics at Cambridge and did the online course on climate change at Chicago University, so I know that the science of global warming is rock solid. My concern is about the costs and economics of the ways we are trying to tackle it.

I was just as sceptical about the claims that achieving net zero would give us cheaper energy and faster growth when they came from Boris Johnson as when they come in the Labour manifesto—indeed, I never expected to find Boris being comparatively a paragon of honesty and understatement until I read the Labour manifesto.

There is a respectable case for saying that we must incur higher costs and forgo cheap energy to prevent the impact of climate change on future generations, but it is surely unlikely that this will be costless, let alone miraculously provide a cornucopia of cheap energy and rapid growth. I therefore urge Ministers to ask their officials why, if it is cheaper, renewable energy needs subsidies. I urge them to ask why, if renewable energy is cheaper, UK electricity prices have risen in 22 of the 27 years since we started the transition to renewables.

If officials say that new offshore fields will provide electricity at below £50 per megawatt hour, Ministers should ask them why the recent contracts for difference, in March this year, offered more than £100 per megawatt hour for offshore wind fields and £89 per megawatt hour for onshore fields. They should ask too why they claim that gas is more expensive than offshore wind. They have set offshore wind at more than £100 per megawatt hour, yet the DESNZ energy generation costs document of last year shows that the cost of a new gas-fuelled plant, excluding tax, is only £60 per megawatt hour.

How come wind is supposedly cheaper when it is more expensive? They will say, “Oh, it’s because if you include in the cost of gas the social cost of carbon, that raises it”. And so it does; that is a perfectly reasonable argument. But it is generally accepted that the social cost of carbon is about £50 per tonne—that is about £10 per megawatt hour—so gas is still cheaper if we include that. But then the officials will come back and say, “Oh, well, we don’t use the social cost of carbon. We impose a tax called the appraisal tax”. That is the tax necessary to make gas uneconomic, so it is a self- referential conclusion. Ministers should therefore ask them some hard questions about that sort of thing.

Ministers should also ask why officials always quote costs as levelised costs of energy and do not take the advice of Dieter Helm, the leading energy economist in this country who was asked by the previous Government to do a review, and compare firm costs: the cost of providing energy, including some of the cost of providing back-up power—in the case of wind and solar when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining. Why not include some of that cost? It is the obvious and logical thing to do.

If the back-up is gas, we have to include not only a share of that back-up cost but the carbon capture and storage that will be necessary to extract the CO₂ from the gas in the back-up. Incidentally, I welcome the fact that this Government are proposing to maintain a fleet of gas plants and accept that gas and oil will be needed well into the future. They might also ask officials why they rely on figures from think tanks—and, indeed, their own officials—rather than on the costs of fields, which are produced and published in companies’ documents that are certified by accountants, who would go to jail if they were lying. Those figures show that there is no significant decline in the cost of offshore oil; it remains high, and higher than that of gas.

The second item in the Government’s rosy outlook is that green investment will generate growth. For the sake of argument, let us put aside the impact on growth of higher energy costs. How will the move to green investments produce growth? The noble Lord, Lord Vallance, formerly an impartial adviser and now a Labour Minister, claims in the Labour manifesto that growth will come from selling technology abroad. He says that we can treat this

“like the vaccine challenge … exporting our solutions worldwide”.

However, he says that that will work only if we do it rapidly because

“if we choose to go slowly, others will provide the answers, and ultimately we’ll end up buying these solutions rather than selling them”.

But what are we going to sell to the rest of the world as a result of this great revolution? It is not going to be generators, wind vanes or towers, and it is not going to be batteries. Unless the Government can tell us what it is, we had better invest in things where we have a comparative advantage, rather than one where the rest of the world is overinvesting already.