Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Taverne

Wednesday 15th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Is not one difference between having a referendum on an issue such as the National Health Service or local government reorganisation and a transfer of power and competence from the UK to the EU that in the case of the latter it is almost irreversible? It is extremely difficult to reverse.

[Lord Taverne]

The noble Lord has made a point which on the face of it is plausible. It very much ties up with the argument put by the Front Bench that the case of transfer of power in Europe is different because there is a special problem about British trust in the European Union, which can be restored only by giving people a say. Then by some extraordinary leap of logic, it is suggested that they should have a say on issues such as appointments to the European Court of Justice or the protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, because that would apparently restore trust—because in the pubs they talk of nothing else.

As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, revealed in Monday's debate, the European Union is not the only body that has lost people's trust. Parliament is distrusted even more than Brussels—by 66 per cent, he revealed, as compared with only 64 per cent in the case of Brussels. The Government are mistrusted by 67 per cent. What is the answer to this mistrust of Parliament and Government? According to the Government's logic, the answer is more and more referendums—more power to the people. Who are the most mistrusted of all by miles, by 82 per cent? The political parties are. What should they do? Obviously, the answer is to promise more and more referendums in their election manifestos because people would have more say and, as Rousseau preached, the will of the people must prevail. I am amazed that speech after speech from Conservative supporters of the Bill echoed the cry of Rousseau; the inspiration of Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety. They abandoned the philosophy of John Locke, one of the architects of parliamentary government, who also inspired the founders of the American constitution—and, of course, goodbye Edmund Burke.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, and others have told us that we will not have referendums in this Parliament. If there is a referendum in a future Parliament it will not be a separate referendum on each individual item in the list of the 56 but on a whole batch of changes together. We will be given a choice of saying yes or no, in a single vote, to a licorice allsorts collection, including perhaps the decision on a new Advocate-General, on new tasks relating to prudential supervision by the European Central Bank, on a multiannual financial framework and so forth, as if any such choice of one yes or no vote to cover the lot could possibly make any sense.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, said that it will be no different from voting for party manifestos in elections with their long list of promises. Personally, I do not subscribe to the general belief in the sanctity of the manifesto mandate. Parties should make fewer promises and grade their commitments at election, with some as aspirations and others as commitments that they can safely undertake irrespective of changed conditions. Manifestos are too detailed and they do not allow for events. As Macmillan said, “Events, dear boy, events”, affect you.

At least manifestos relate to issues with which voters are familiar. Nothing could be more remote from their experience of everyday concerns than most of the items in the list of 56 possible referendums in the Bill. Essentially, the vote at elections is for something that people understand: choosing a new Government. The analogy of the noble Lord, Lord Howell, does not stand up.

The Bill is highly dangerous for two reasons. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and others with great experience of European negotiations have argued, it may lead to immobility and sclerosis on many occasions when what we need above all is flexibility. Just as serious—I would argue even more so—are the crucial constitutional issues in the Bill that undermine the system of parliamentary government and are a major move towards government by plebiscite, California-style.

Some of the Bill’s supporters seem positively to welcome this. With others, it seems that the hostility of Eurosceptics to Brussels is so strong that it outweighs concern for parliamentary government, which has served this country so well. I hope that some of them will recognise that our system of parliamentary government matters even more.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Taverne

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

It is not a question of not using the powers; they are there to serve a purpose. The Government have indicated that they will not move further forward in any of these areas and they are enshrining in legislation obstacles to this ever happening in the future. Given the competence creep and the way in which power has seeped directly and indirectly, openly and less openly, to Brussels, I totally support the Government’s objective, and I have given the best answer that I can think of to the noble Lord.

[Lord Taverne]

If my noble friend is saying that the present Government are not going to use these powers, the conclusion is surely that the Bill is intended to affect not the present Parliament but a future Parliament. Is that not totally unprecedented?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I do not accept that. I agree that it is designed to have an impact on the future and to prevent the creep of powers to Brussels. That is wholly right, because we have seen again and again how power has gone to Brussels, sometimes by indirect means and sometimes by means that some of us regard as questionable. We have seen again and again how referenda results have sometimes been rejected, and questions have been put again and again to the people of other countries until we had the right answer. This Bill is trying to say that we should not have a further transfer of powers, that we have had enough of those transfers, that there are plenty of powers to deal with problems that arise, and that we do not need any more powers as all the tasks of the European Union can be addressed through existing powers. We are therefore drawing a line in the sand, as long as there is a Conservative Government or a Conservative-Liberal Government. Future Governments can, of course, choose to repeal this legislation if they want to. That is their prerogative. We will, no doubt, address the sunset clauses later, but I do not go along with them. It is perfectly legitimate to state, “We are passing this legislation now and we intend it to remain”.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Taverne

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I want to make one simple and brief point, but before I do that perhaps I may respond partly to what the noble Lord, Lord Taverne, said because I was a little puzzled by it. He is a former Treasury Minister and chairman of a think tank in the City. He was referring to the two aspects of the banking system in crisis being capital and liquidity, with which I totally agree. But he was, I think, arguing that perhaps we need more European attention to capital. That was quite a surprising thing to suggest because, as he will remember, not long before the Irish banking crisis struck and the Irish banks were revealed as hopelessly undercapitalised, we had stress tests carried out on the European banks—a separate exercise in the European Union and in Britain. The European Union banking tests revealed that no bank had a problem with capital other than one bank in Germany. That was shortly before the crisis was fully revealed in all its horror in Ireland.

I agree with the noble Lord that there is a separate aspect of liquidity which the European Central Bank has, in a skilful and constructive way, provided to the European banking system. Equally, the Bank of England has also exercised its national function well. He did not make the case for further European competence or the transfer of power or competence from this country to Europe by merit of that alone.

The noble Lord went on to make the familiar point about the eurozone and whether we were marginalised by not being in it. It is of course true that eurozone Ministers may make certain decisions affecting themselves in which we do not participate. We do not participate in meetings of the Federal Reserve Bank, although its decisions affect us. However, anything that eurozone Ministers decide to do that is governed by the rules of the single market or competition law continues to be governed by the rules of the single market and competition policy. He was careful to say that issues would arise if we were proposing to join the euro but the implication of his argument was that in order to gain influence we should join the euro, which I am sure he does not really subscribe to. Very few people will own up to arguing that we should join the euro today.

[Lord Taverne]

I was not arguing that we should join the euro today. On the earlier question, I defer to my noble friend’s greater experience in these financial fields. However, a large number of economists have taken the view that what is needed at the moment are much more effective stress tests for European banks on a euro-wide basis. For example, I dare say my noble friend has read economist Willem Buiter’s considerable contribution to Citigroup’s paper on the subject. He is not alone in this because a large number of economists are concerned that only through a much more rigorous euro-wide stress test system will the banking liquidity part of the problem be adequately resolved.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I think the stress tests refer to capital rather than liquidity, which is a slightly shorter-term issue. I agree with the noble Lord and Willem Buiter that we need proper stress tests. However, the previous stress tests that were applied within the EU were revealed in all their nakedness as thoroughly inadequate.

As the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said, we should remember that the regulations that govern these issues are not only European but worldwide. The BIS has a crucial role—in fact the lead role—in determining the capital ratios of banks. I do not think that the argument about the failure of the banking systems is an argument per se for why the UK, which is outside the eurozone, ought to contemplate further integration in this field than has already been provided for. This area has to be addressed internationally and through many agencies.

The main point that I want to make about the debate is this. We have had some amazingly excellent speeches but there is confusion, or insufficient distinction, in these debates between the European Union acting to legislate or make a policy decision and it altering its own constitution—if I can use the word “constitution”; I know people who might object to that—or its own rules. People have made eloquent speeches about human trafficking, piracy and the environment, but not all the speeches have distinguished between the EU’s ability to act and to have a policy and its need for more powers.

The noble Baroness, who made a tremendously moving speech about human trafficking, did not actually demonstrate that more powers were needed. More agreement might be needed, and might be achievable within existing powers, but she did not demonstrate that more powers were needed. Equally, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke about piracy but did not demonstrate that we could not have an EU policy on piracy within the existing competencies and powers of the EU. I appeal to the Minister to make that distinction when he addresses all these areas.

Where there are political and human problems—piracy, the environment, energy, human trafficking and all the other issues listed in the amendments—can the Minister distinguish between the EU’s ability to act, to legislate under its own rules and, quite separately, the need to change its own constitution? The people speaking for the amendments ought to have argued for a change in the European Union’s rules. With great respect to all those who spoke so movingly on the issues that mattered to them, not all of them made the case for a change in the rules of the EU. That seems to be the crucial point in this group of amendments.