Finance: Eurozone

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Tuesday 19th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the Government are not the least complacent about the very serious situation in the eurozone, as evidenced by not only the continuing discussions around the next stage of the programme for Greece but also the situation of Italy as regards the capital markets and its interest rates recently. The most constructive things we can do are, first, to make sure, as the FSA and the Bank of England are doing, that the UK banks are subjected to stringent stress tests; and secondly that they continue to build up, as they have done satisfactorily so far, their capital liquidity positions. In his discussions with the eurozone, my right honourable friend the Chancellor has made it quite clear how supportive the UK is not only of the short-term measures in which we are not directly involved—the Eurogroup discussions around Greece—but also through ensuring that Europe presses ahead with the structural adjustments that are needed to bring sustained growth to Europe. At the same time, we also make it abundantly clear that it is for the eurozone itself to finance further bailouts and that the UK, as has been agreed in the context of Greece, is not going to be a direct participant in these bailouts.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, is it not clear, as the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, has pointed out, that while we all obsess about Rupert Murdoch and News International, there is a much more serious crisis actually brewing on the European continent? Is it not clear that two paths are open to the eurozone? One is to recognise a default by Greece now; or if that is judged too risky to the banking sector, for the eurozone then to come up with what it has always promised, which is to do whatever is necessary to stop the bickering among the 17 Governments, to stop the arguments for the European Central Bank and to come up now with a comprehensive solution rather than delay it until the autumn, which will be immensely damaging to Italy and not least to other countries both inside and outside the eurozone?

[Lord Sassoon]

I certainly agree with my noble friend about the relative seriousness of different crises that are going on at the moment, and I repeat that the crisis in the eurozone is extremely serious. As to prescriptions and questions about what the eurozone would do, my noble friend speaks words of wisdom. However, it would not be appropriate for a UK government Minister to lecture the eurozone as to what to do. We shall look with considerable interest at what the meeting of eurozone leaders over the next two days comes up with. It is important that they make further considerable progress.

Greece: Default Contingency

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Monday 20th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am not sure that I entirely accept my noble friend’s starting premise. The position is that Greece is a member of the eurozone, and the eurozone will continue to be the eurozone. We want to see the strengthening of fiscal and economic discipline within that zone. When the IMF put together and led the programme that Greece signed up to—which had elements of fiscal consolidation, structural fiscal reform and wider structural reform—it was done precisely in the context of Greece continuing to be a member of the eurozone, and that is the continuing position. The package has been put together and the new Government have some decisions to take. The IMF is coming up to its regular review before the next drawdown of the package, but that is entirely in the context of Greece being able to finance itself on an ongoing basis within the eurozone.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Has my noble friend seen the extraordinary anti-German graffiti and the slogans being shouted by the crowds in Athens? Does that not illustrate what Professor Martin Feldstein, the Nobel prize-winning economist at Harvard, has always said—that the euro, far from bringing countries together, increases tensions between them? Can my noble friend also explain what sense there is in Ireland and Greece borrowing more money to lend to Portugal, and Ireland and Portugal borrowing more money to lend to Greece?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I have not been on the streets of Greece or seen what is going on in Athens, but clearly it is regrettable if anti-German sentiments are being expressed on the streets there. However, I have not been following the detail of the riots. The main thing is that we need to support the Greek Government and encourage them, as the eurozone Ministers have done in their statement today, to progress their package and enable the IMF to complete the upcoming assessment. As for the second-order effects of who needs capital where in order for loans to flow, my noble friend reinforces the point that this is a very interconnected system and the ongoing work on the short-term and medium-term stability of the eurozone has to be mindful—as we have been reminded already this evening—of the interconnectedness of the systems at every level.

EU: Financial and Monetary Co-ordination

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Monday 6th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

I preface my answer by thanking the noble Lord and other noble Lords for their participation in the recent report of your Lordships’ European Union Committee on the future of economic governance in the EU, which provides an excellent commentary and analysis on these matters. The UK has submitted what we were required to submit as part of our national reform programme, and that will be the subject of the next round of debate along with all the other members of the EU 27. Critical to the whole construct and its various strands is ensuring that there is much greater transparency throughout the fiscal architecture. The UK will play its full part in ensuring that we not only contribute to getting the architecture right and submitting the data that are required but, equally, are clear that any budgetary information that we submit comes here to Parliament first and that we are not held to sanction, as are members of the eurozone.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Does my noble friend agree that, as well as greater co-ordination, greater observation of the existing rules would also be welcome? Does he agree with the statement by Christine Lagarde, the French Finance Minister, that the first bail-out mechanism violated the rules of the EU treaties and, if so, that this would mean that Britain was dragged into supporting the euro by an illegal mechanism? Does he also agree that if the rules had been observed in the first place, Greece would never have joined the euro?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the Government have secured a very clear agreement with the European Council. Whatever the analysis of Article 122 has been in the past, the Council of Ministers has been completely clear that Article 122 will not be used in the future. That is the critical thing. It is probably not right to go on raking over decisions about who was not in the eurozone in the first place. We have to make it work now, and one way of doing that is to get a proper interpretation of all the relevant articles in the treaty.

European Financial Stability Mechanism

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Thursday 12th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harrison]

My Lords—

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

This side!

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that there is widespread surprise that the original financial stability mechanism was allowed to be established under Article 122 of the European Union treaty, which deals with natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods, not sovereign defaults, and that that was done despite Article 125, which specifically prohibits sovereign debt bailouts? Although my noble friend is absolutely right that the new stability mechanism is to come into place, that requires unanimity. If that is not achieved, is it not possible that Britain may be dragged into bailing out not just Ireland, for which there was an argument, but Portugal and Greece? If those provisions of the treaty are going to go on being ignored, surely the only result will be more scepticism and cynicism about the way in which the EU operates.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, my noble friend embedded a number of questions in what was apparently one question. As to the use of the different articles, another key part of the agreement at the European Council in December 2010 was that Article 122 would unequivocally not be used in future for these purposes. Without going into the debate about whether Article 122 should ever have been used for this sort of operation, it will not be used in future—that is agreed. As to Article 125, that is used for loans for medium-term financing under things such as the balance of payments facility and quite other purposes, and that will continue. As to the UK’s participation, the new mechanism has been agreed by the Council. Its resolution is completely clear. A treaty amendment will bring in the new mechanism. That position could not be clearer. As to Portugal, my right honourable friend the Chancellor has made it completely clear that as the negotiations go forward to completion, the UK will not participate in any bilateral loan to Portugal. Ireland was a special case, and the same considerations do not apply in the case of Portugal.

Loans to Ireland Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Tuesday 21st December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I begin by asking the Minister a question. I would have intervened on him earlier, but since I was hoping to speak in the debate I did not want to interrupt him unnecessarily. I think I heard him say that this potential transaction by which we lend three point something billion pounds to the state of Ireland will not increase our borrowing, because the Irish have an obligation to repay. I see the Minister shaking his head, so perhaps I misheard him. If I misheard him, I apologise. Clearly it may not increase net borrowing, because we have a corresponding asset—the Irish obligation to repay—but government borrowing figures are always stated on a gross basis, otherwise they would not be positive at all, because we always have substantial net assets. I thought that there was some confusion about that one phrase that the Minister used, but perhaps he will deal with that in his response. I am grateful to him.

I am very much in favour of the Bill. It seems to me to be absolutely the right measure for two reasons. One reason, which the Government seem rather to dismiss, is that Ireland is a neighbour, a great friend for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Bew, set out, and a member of the European Union. I believe in the notion and the value of solidarity among nations, as in other branches of human affairs. I believe in soft power as well as hard power, in friendship and in good will. I believe in the value of these things, in the value of creating and maintaining them and that it is a mistake if you throw them away. That is an important consideration and I shall come, in a moment, to what I think of the Government’s attitude on that subject.

Secondly, I approve for the reasons that the Government appear to approve of it, which is that we have a very specific, practical and concrete interest in avoiding the kind of systemic crisis which could well be generated by a default by the Irish Government on their bond and other financial obligations, or, indeed, a default by the Irish banks, which are currently being guaranteed by the Irish Government. One default could well trigger another. Clearly, that would create a very difficult situation for us.

My regret about the Bill, how it has been brought before the two Houses of Parliament and the way in which the whole issue has been conducted by the Government is that the Government have given away a lot of the good will that might have been achieved by this gesture by an extremely grudging approach to this transaction. As my noble friend Lord Liddle pointed out, we deliberately decided that we do not want to be part of a collective solution; we want to do these things individually and bilaterally. The Government’s is a rather strange gesture to make, a rather strange signal to send. The Chancellor has been at pains to make clear that he was not responsible for Alistair Darling's agreement that we should join the stability mechanism back in May. Indeed, the Chancellor said in another place:

“I am doing everything I can to ensure that the UK is extricated from the commitment that was entered into, and we are making good progress”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/12/10; col. 944.]

He said elsewhere in that debate that we will certainly not be part of the permanent mechanism when that is established.

I regret all those things for two reasons. The first is the practical and concrete reason of hard financial national interest; the other relates to my point about good will. In the first instance, there may well be other crises in future. It would be idiotic to exclude the possibility of our need to take part in such support operations in future to avoid some systemic crisis. It is always foolish in life to give up any flexibility. You want to maintain flexibility to respond in different ways. Excluding the idea of being part of a collective mechanism in the EU makes no sense. The other reason, as I said, is that it sends quite the wrong signal, and to my mind reduces the good will created by our decision to support Ireland in this way.

All that reflects an uneasy compromise in the coalition Government. I suspect that the Lib Dems in the Government very much take the view that I take and would have been in favour of this whole operation instinctively on principle in the first place, would then have wanted to negotiate details with our EU partners jointly, and would have had no inhibitions about doing that because they are European partners or members of the eurozone.

I suspect that the advice that the Government received from officials in the Foreign Office was that it would be disastrous, particularly after the centuries of Anglo-Irish history to which my colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Bew, referred—many incidents that are very much to the shame of this country. If we were the only major EU country that declined to take part in the support operation, it would have the most appalling effects on our relationship with Ireland. I imagine that the Foreign Office took that line—at the official level, at least. I imagine that the Treasury and the Bank of England were concerned with the potential systemic crisis and therefore urged the Government to take part.

I suspect that, against that, there were the Tories who, for Eurosceptic and chauvinistic ideological reasons, were reluctant to become party to this transaction and were certainly very keen to ensure that it had nothing to do with our European Union membership or the existence of the eurozone.

That uneasy compromise is reflected in the very grudging way in which the money has been advanced and the very grudging statement that I have just cited from the Chancellor, which I very much regret. I am sorry that I cannot come up with entirely effusive, uncompromising congratulations for the Government on this move, but I am glad that they have taken the right decision, however grudgingly, and I shall be delighted to support them if there is a vote on the subject, which I doubt that there will be.

I have a couple of remarks to make about the general context. So much complete nonsense, and dangerous nonsense, has been talked about the relationship between the euro, the banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that we have faced over the past year or two that I feel inspired to comment on it in this debate. It has been said openly and frequently in the Eurosceptic press in this country and by a number of Conservatives in the House of Commons that it shows the weakness of the euro system. It has also been suggested that the solution would be the break-up of the euro and that the countries with substantial debt should leave the eurozone. I regard both those comments as either completely incompetent, if people really do not understand what the logical consequences would be of the actions that they are urging, or frankly irresponsible and unpatriotic, because they do not take into account the interests of this country or are willing to sacrifice the interests of the people of this country for purely ideological, emotional or symbolic reasons.

Of course, the euro had nothing whatever to do with the banking crisis or the sovereign debt crisis. In fact, the sovereign debt crisis would almost certainly have been worse if the euro had not existed. I should be the first to admit that the fiscal rules in the Maastricht treaty—the maximum 3 per cent fiscal deficit unless there was the consent of the Union, and so forth—have not been enforced sufficiently strictly. We all know that now, and we need a tougher and tighter regime with proper monitoring and sanctions in future. Nevertheless, if that regime had not existed at all, people would have had even greater deficits. There is no doubt about that.

There was possibly some accounting fraud in the case of Greece, but if there had been no rules, constraints or restrictions at all, the situation would have been a great deal worse. The euro, far from contributing to the crisis, might—albeit too modestly to have greatly affected the outcome—have had a benign influence. As for the idea that the solution lies in breaking up the euro, my noble friend Lord Liddle has already commented on that. I thoroughly agree with him that that would be an astonishingly self-destructive, and therefore I say advisedly irresponsible and unpatriotic, view.

Undoubtedly, if the countries that are affected by the sovereign debt crisis—Spain, Ireland, Portugal or Greece— were to leave the euro, their currencies, whatever they might be, the successor drachma or punt No. 2, would suffer the most tremendous devaluation. As their liabilities are largely denominated in euros, they would find it completely impossible even to begin to meet the burden of that indebtedness. The result would be defaults or a massive restructuring that was far greater than any restructuring that might take place in an orderly fashion in the context of agreement within the EU or the eurozone. That would mean that our banks would have to write off substantial assets, reduce the size of their balance sheets and reduce their credit creation in this country; that the economy would suffer; that jobs would be lost; and so forth. That would be a deeply regrettable state of affairs and it is thoroughly irresponsible to wish that to happen.

I trust that people will be guided by a rational assessment of the national interest rather than by an emotional desire to see the eurozone collapse irrespective of the consequence for either our partners in the eurozone or us. There is no doubt that the euro is not a part of this crisis. It is not a part of the problem and it is not a contributor to the problem. It has been at least a minor reducer of the scale of the problem. It must be an essential part of the solution.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I do not disagree with much of what the noble Lord has said, but I think he is slightly overstating his case. It reminds me of when I went to Brussels and the European Commission told me that absolute disaster was going to follow when the rouble broke up into individual countries. The Commission sounded just like the noble Lord. However, let us leave that aside.

The noble Lord slightly overstated his case. Does he not think that the convergence of bond yields within the eurozone was a contributor to what happened, because the bond markets ceased to look at countries individually and the convergence of yields encouraged countries to spend too much and to borrow too much? The failure of the markets to distinguish between countries and that convergence of bond yields, which came from the view that Germany would ultimately bail out the other countries, was a contributing factor.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I agree entirely with the noble Lord’s indictment of the financial markets and a lot of lenders. I should say that I was a banker myself and sat on the board of a bank, Morgan Grenfell, which had a considerable lending book as well as being an investment bank at the time, and frequently sat on the credit committee meetings we had. I am appalled by the mistakes made by professional bankers in not wanting to look at the nature and unravel the packages of a class of asset—securitised debt packages, essentially, which were becoming very important as a class of their assets. I equally quite agree with the noble Lord that the bond markets were failing to price risk correctly in exactly the way that he describes. The rating agencies bear a tremendous part of the failings, the fault and the guilt for creating this crisis. Many bankers’ excuse is, “We thought we were buying paper with an AAA credit rating and in fact the credit agencies weren’t doing their job properly in unravelling these packages and seeing that what was in them was absolutely rubbish”.

I agree totally with—I think of calling him “my right honourable friend”—the noble Lord in what he said in indictment of the financial markets. I think that is the problem. It is not an indictment of the currency in existence at the time any more than you can say that the enormous failings of the American banking markets, the American bond markets or the American rating agencies were the fault of the fact that they have a currency called the dollar.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I hesitate to remind the noble Lord, but I remember him making speeches telling us that if only we were in the euro, we, too, could enjoy these very low bond rates.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Undoubtedly had we been in the euro—and I totally agree with the noble Lord that I was, and remain, a partisan of our joining the euro—as a result we would have had to adopt tighter fiscal policies. The noble Lord may feel that the result of that might not have been entirely unfortunate for the future history of the country. Nevertheless, we would have done, and the counterpart to that would have been that we would have had lower nominal and real interest rates throughout that period. I happen to think that that would have been a good thing as well.

Comprehensive Spending Review

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Monday 1st November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I welcome the comprehensive spending review. The noble Lord, Lord Myners, made a point of saying that there were choices open to the Government. Indeed there were. I particularly welcome the choice that they made to stick more or less to the ratio of 75 to 25 per cent in the balance between expenditure cuts and tax increases. I believe that the emphasis had to be on public expenditure cuts in order to correct at least part of the overspending of recent years.

Undoubtedly this was a bold set of announcements, for which praise is therefore due. Bold it may have been, but the idea that this was the biggest fiscal consolidation since the dissolution of the monasteries seems somewhat overdone. We are cutting spending by 7.4 points of GDP, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, said, compares with what Canada did in the early 1990s. Sweden, after its banking crisis in the early 1990s, reduced expenditure by nearly 15 per cent, as did Finland. Spain and the Netherlands at the same time reduced spending by much the same amount as the Government are reducing it today. The early 1990s were not at that time a benign environment internationally. Indeed, there had been other fiscal consolidations, such as that of my noble and learned friend Lord Howe in the early 1980s, of a similar magnitude. In this country, from 1993 onwards, we moved from a deficit of 7 per cent of GDP in five years to a surplus. All these fiscal consolidations were achieved without Armageddon arriving.

Of course there are risks, but there are risks also in not acting. The Government were for several reasons right to move more quickly than the previous Government to reduce the deficit. First, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe has altered the balance between the merits of delay and the merits of action. Secondly, as the Minister said, Britain has one of the largest structural deficits in the world. It is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Myners, said, that we compare quite well with other countries in terms of the stock of debt, but the size of our annual deficit means that we are adding considerably to the stock of debt each year. Indeed, the predictions have been that this would top off somewhere at 80 or 90 per cent of GDP. However, if we go on adding at a rate of 10 per cent—or, if it is modified, at a rate of 7 or 5 per cent—we shall increase it considerably, at great risk.

As the Minister said, debt interest is taking an increasing proportion of total public expenditure. After the CSR, there will be savings in debt interest payments, but debt interest is to go on rising during the whole of the expenditure period. With an uncorrected deficit, we would see more and more public expenditure silted up with interest payments. Ken Rogoff, the former chief economist at the IMF, has argued that the relationship between interest rates and debt is not a linear one. Interest rates can rise quite suddenly when a country hits its debt ceiling and he has demonstrated in his work time and again that, when a stock of debt reaches a certain point, it is a dampener on the growth of that economy. We have been running a deficit that is something like one and a half times the level of deficit run by Franklin D Roosevelt in the 1930s, which his own Treasury Secretary at the time confided to his diaries had not done much good or made much difference.

These cuts will not come into effect until next year and they will take four years in total to implement. How long do noble Lords opposite think we can take? What are their criteria for when we should act? One answer that is often given is that we should act when the economy is showing signs of recovery and that recovery is firmly established. It is not easy to say what “firmly established” means, but so far the economy has recovered remarkably quickly. Growth in the past three quarters has been 0.4 per cent, 1.2 per cent and 0.8 per cent, which surprised the markets in general. The ONS has said that the difference between the first and second quarters in underlying growth was much the same, implying that the economy is growing at an annualised rate of 3.2 per cent, which is above its long-term trend rate of growth of 2.35 per cent as found by the previous Government. I am the first to say that there are risks to this growth rate—it may well slow down—but the recovery is faster than that following the recessions of either the 1980s or the 1990s. We have recovered 40 per cent of the loss between the first quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009.

An answer that we sometimes get to the question how we should judge when it is appropriate to tighten policy is that we should wait until the output gap is closed—that is, the difference between output as it is now and where it would have been had there been no recession and the economy had grown during that period at the long-term rate of growth. But how does anybody know what the output gap is? It is a concept that is extremely difficult to measure precisely. Also, it might take years to close the output gap, in which case we would go on adding to the structural deficit by 10 per cent or 5 per cent, or whatever the chosen rate was each year.

There is much concern, understandably—the noble Lord, Lord Myners, referred to this—about the loss of 490,000 jobs in the public sector. That is to be spread over four years but it also has to be seen in the context of a labour market of nearly 30 million people. That labour force increased by over 315,000 in the period between December/February and June/August. If the economy continues to grow—and of course there are risks and huge uncertainties in this—there is every prospect that this sort of redundancy in the public sector can be absorbed.

The noble Lord, Lord Myners, seemed to see the cuts ideologically as part of the desire for a smaller state. Indeed, there have been a lot of headlines about rolling back the state. However, they seem somewhat wide of the mark when one realises that public expenditure in money terms is going to go on rising every year to the end of the survey period and that, at the end of that period, spending in real terms will be where it was two years ago. Spending as a proportion of GDP is going to fall from 47 per cent back to 41 per cent, where it was for much of the 1980s and 1990s. With all due respect, that does not seem to be a radical restructuring of the state but rather a common-sense reversal of part of the overspending that we have seen in recent years.

The right reverend Prelate talked about fairness. There never will be consensus on fairness; fairness is in the eye of the beholder. Some noble Lords opposite think that the entire burden should be shouldered by the better-off, but any objective person will see that the Government have laboured long and hard to try to spread the misery and the pain around. Any cuts proposed in welfare would lead the Opposition to say that this was unfair. Perhaps they should remember what James Purnell said when he was Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, specifically about housing benefit, which was that he wanted to consult in order to see that

“people on benefits do not end up getting subsidies for rents that those who work could never afford.”

This has been a difficult package to assemble. I believe that it will gain acceptance by having been assembled by a coalition Government of two parties and that the exercise of doing it has strengthened the coalition. I welcome the CSR. After a decade of recklessness, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the coalition have laid the foundations for a decade in which we could earn our prosperity in the future rather than borrowing it.