Loans to Ireland Bill

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Tuesday 21st December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I begin by asking the Minister a question. I would have intervened on him earlier, but since I was hoping to speak in the debate I did not want to interrupt him unnecessarily. I think I heard him say that this potential transaction by which we lend three point something billion pounds to the state of Ireland will not increase our borrowing, because the Irish have an obligation to repay. I see the Minister shaking his head, so perhaps I misheard him. If I misheard him, I apologise. Clearly it may not increase net borrowing, because we have a corresponding asset—the Irish obligation to repay—but government borrowing figures are always stated on a gross basis, otherwise they would not be positive at all, because we always have substantial net assets. I thought that there was some confusion about that one phrase that the Minister used, but perhaps he will deal with that in his response. I am grateful to him.

I am very much in favour of the Bill. It seems to me to be absolutely the right measure for two reasons. One reason, which the Government seem rather to dismiss, is that Ireland is a neighbour, a great friend for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Bew, set out, and a member of the European Union. I believe in the notion and the value of solidarity among nations, as in other branches of human affairs. I believe in soft power as well as hard power, in friendship and in good will. I believe in the value of these things, in the value of creating and maintaining them and that it is a mistake if you throw them away. That is an important consideration and I shall come, in a moment, to what I think of the Government’s attitude on that subject.

Secondly, I approve for the reasons that the Government appear to approve of it, which is that we have a very specific, practical and concrete interest in avoiding the kind of systemic crisis which could well be generated by a default by the Irish Government on their bond and other financial obligations, or, indeed, a default by the Irish banks, which are currently being guaranteed by the Irish Government. One default could well trigger another. Clearly, that would create a very difficult situation for us.

My regret about the Bill, how it has been brought before the two Houses of Parliament and the way in which the whole issue has been conducted by the Government is that the Government have given away a lot of the good will that might have been achieved by this gesture by an extremely grudging approach to this transaction. As my noble friend Lord Liddle pointed out, we deliberately decided that we do not want to be part of a collective solution; we want to do these things individually and bilaterally. The Government’s is a rather strange gesture to make, a rather strange signal to send. The Chancellor has been at pains to make clear that he was not responsible for Alistair Darling's agreement that we should join the stability mechanism back in May. Indeed, the Chancellor said in another place:

“I am doing everything I can to ensure that the UK is extricated from the commitment that was entered into, and we are making good progress”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/12/10; col. 944.]

He said elsewhere in that debate that we will certainly not be part of the permanent mechanism when that is established.

I regret all those things for two reasons. The first is the practical and concrete reason of hard financial national interest; the other relates to my point about good will. In the first instance, there may well be other crises in future. It would be idiotic to exclude the possibility of our need to take part in such support operations in future to avoid some systemic crisis. It is always foolish in life to give up any flexibility. You want to maintain flexibility to respond in different ways. Excluding the idea of being part of a collective mechanism in the EU makes no sense. The other reason, as I said, is that it sends quite the wrong signal, and to my mind reduces the good will created by our decision to support Ireland in this way.

All that reflects an uneasy compromise in the coalition Government. I suspect that the Lib Dems in the Government very much take the view that I take and would have been in favour of this whole operation instinctively on principle in the first place, would then have wanted to negotiate details with our EU partners jointly, and would have had no inhibitions about doing that because they are European partners or members of the eurozone.

I suspect that the advice that the Government received from officials in the Foreign Office was that it would be disastrous, particularly after the centuries of Anglo-Irish history to which my colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Bew, referred—many incidents that are very much to the shame of this country. If we were the only major EU country that declined to take part in the support operation, it would have the most appalling effects on our relationship with Ireland. I imagine that the Foreign Office took that line—at the official level, at least. I imagine that the Treasury and the Bank of England were concerned with the potential systemic crisis and therefore urged the Government to take part.

I suspect that, against that, there were the Tories who, for Eurosceptic and chauvinistic ideological reasons, were reluctant to become party to this transaction and were certainly very keen to ensure that it had nothing to do with our European Union membership or the existence of the eurozone.

That uneasy compromise is reflected in the very grudging way in which the money has been advanced and the very grudging statement that I have just cited from the Chancellor, which I very much regret. I am sorry that I cannot come up with entirely effusive, uncompromising congratulations for the Government on this move, but I am glad that they have taken the right decision, however grudgingly, and I shall be delighted to support them if there is a vote on the subject, which I doubt that there will be.

I have a couple of remarks to make about the general context. So much complete nonsense, and dangerous nonsense, has been talked about the relationship between the euro, the banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that we have faced over the past year or two that I feel inspired to comment on it in this debate. It has been said openly and frequently in the Eurosceptic press in this country and by a number of Conservatives in the House of Commons that it shows the weakness of the euro system. It has also been suggested that the solution would be the break-up of the euro and that the countries with substantial debt should leave the eurozone. I regard both those comments as either completely incompetent, if people really do not understand what the logical consequences would be of the actions that they are urging, or frankly irresponsible and unpatriotic, because they do not take into account the interests of this country or are willing to sacrifice the interests of the people of this country for purely ideological, emotional or symbolic reasons.

Of course, the euro had nothing whatever to do with the banking crisis or the sovereign debt crisis. In fact, the sovereign debt crisis would almost certainly have been worse if the euro had not existed. I should be the first to admit that the fiscal rules in the Maastricht treaty—the maximum 3 per cent fiscal deficit unless there was the consent of the Union, and so forth—have not been enforced sufficiently strictly. We all know that now, and we need a tougher and tighter regime with proper monitoring and sanctions in future. Nevertheless, if that regime had not existed at all, people would have had even greater deficits. There is no doubt about that.

There was possibly some accounting fraud in the case of Greece, but if there had been no rules, constraints or restrictions at all, the situation would have been a great deal worse. The euro, far from contributing to the crisis, might—albeit too modestly to have greatly affected the outcome—have had a benign influence. As for the idea that the solution lies in breaking up the euro, my noble friend Lord Liddle has already commented on that. I thoroughly agree with him that that would be an astonishingly self-destructive, and therefore I say advisedly irresponsible and unpatriotic, view.

Undoubtedly, if the countries that are affected by the sovereign debt crisis—Spain, Ireland, Portugal or Greece— were to leave the euro, their currencies, whatever they might be, the successor drachma or punt No. 2, would suffer the most tremendous devaluation. As their liabilities are largely denominated in euros, they would find it completely impossible even to begin to meet the burden of that indebtedness. The result would be defaults or a massive restructuring that was far greater than any restructuring that might take place in an orderly fashion in the context of agreement within the EU or the eurozone. That would mean that our banks would have to write off substantial assets, reduce the size of their balance sheets and reduce their credit creation in this country; that the economy would suffer; that jobs would be lost; and so forth. That would be a deeply regrettable state of affairs and it is thoroughly irresponsible to wish that to happen.

I trust that people will be guided by a rational assessment of the national interest rather than by an emotional desire to see the eurozone collapse irrespective of the consequence for either our partners in the eurozone or us. There is no doubt that the euro is not a part of this crisis. It is not a part of the problem and it is not a contributor to the problem. It has been at least a minor reducer of the scale of the problem. It must be an essential part of the solution.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I do not disagree with much of what the noble Lord has said, but I think he is slightly overstating his case. It reminds me of when I went to Brussels and the European Commission told me that absolute disaster was going to follow when the rouble broke up into individual countries. The Commission sounded just like the noble Lord. However, let us leave that aside.

The noble Lord slightly overstated his case. Does he not think that the convergence of bond yields within the eurozone was a contributor to what happened, because the bond markets ceased to look at countries individually and the convergence of yields encouraged countries to spend too much and to borrow too much? The failure of the markets to distinguish between countries and that convergence of bond yields, which came from the view that Germany would ultimately bail out the other countries, was a contributing factor.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I agree entirely with the noble Lord’s indictment of the financial markets and a lot of lenders. I should say that I was a banker myself and sat on the board of a bank, Morgan Grenfell, which had a considerable lending book as well as being an investment bank at the time, and frequently sat on the credit committee meetings we had. I am appalled by the mistakes made by professional bankers in not wanting to look at the nature and unravel the packages of a class of asset—securitised debt packages, essentially, which were becoming very important as a class of their assets. I equally quite agree with the noble Lord that the bond markets were failing to price risk correctly in exactly the way that he describes. The rating agencies bear a tremendous part of the failings, the fault and the guilt for creating this crisis. Many bankers’ excuse is, “We thought we were buying paper with an AAA credit rating and in fact the credit agencies weren’t doing their job properly in unravelling these packages and seeing that what was in them was absolutely rubbish”.

I agree totally with—I think of calling him “my right honourable friend”—the noble Lord in what he said in indictment of the financial markets. I think that is the problem. It is not an indictment of the currency in existence at the time any more than you can say that the enormous failings of the American banking markets, the American bond markets or the American rating agencies were the fault of the fact that they have a currency called the dollar.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I hesitate to remind the noble Lord, but I remember him making speeches telling us that if only we were in the euro, we, too, could enjoy these very low bond rates.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Undoubtedly had we been in the euro—and I totally agree with the noble Lord that I was, and remain, a partisan of our joining the euro—as a result we would have had to adopt tighter fiscal policies. The noble Lord may feel that the result of that might not have been entirely unfortunate for the future history of the country. Nevertheless, we would have done, and the counterpart to that would have been that we would have had lower nominal and real interest rates throughout that period. I happen to think that that would have been a good thing as well.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, I am sorry to press the noble Lord, but is he really saying that the predicaments in which economies such as Ireland or Greece, which would have kept their own currency, which would have over a period of years—in Greece’s case, 10 years—floated down on the international markets and which would have their own interest rates and exchange rates, find themselves now have nothing to do with their participation in the euro?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am very happy to give, I hope, a very unambiguous answer to that as well. I do not believe that there is any virtue in the fluctuation of exchange rates. I believe that exchange rate markets, like other asset markets, fluctuate quite irrationally. They swing far too far, an enormous amount of damage is created, they are never at the theoretical point of equilibrium which some people read about in their textbooks 50 years ago and enormous economic costs are caused by these fluctuations. If you can replace them with a stable currency system, as we did before 1914 with gold, as the eurozone has done, as the United States has done with the dollar and so forth, that is a very good idea, all other things being equal. We can get into the “all other things being equal” on another occasion perhaps. I think that if you take the long 20-year view, Greece, Ireland and Spain have all benefited enormously from their membership of the European Union and the eurozone, and that will continue to be the case. We now have a momentary crisis, which looks very grim at present, but we should not throw the baby out with the bath-water.

[Lord Tugendhat]

My Lords, like other noble Lords who have spoken, I applaud the Government’s decision to offer Ireland a loan, and I also applaud the manner in which it was done. I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, that it was grudging or anything of that nature. I rather agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bew, that the Irish reaction has shown that they recognise that this was done in a full-hearted and generous fashion, and I am very pleased about that. It was done without strings, it was done quickly and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was quite right to emphasise that it was done in the British interest. Britain and Ireland are two neighbouring countries, their economies are very much bound up with each other, what is good for Ireland in terms of prosperity is good for Britain, and it is right that this should be recognised. Others have spoken of the extent to which Ireland is a major export market, of the way that the economies of Northern Ireland and the Republic are very much bound together, of the number of British companies that operate in the Republic and, of course, of the exposure of British banks, especially the Royal Bank of Scotland, to the Irish financial sector. In helping Ireland, the Government are not diverting money from worthy causes in the United Kingdom, but are acting to safeguard British jobs, British interests and British taxpayers’ money. The sooner Ireland can return to prosperity, the better for us that will be.

I got the impression, but perhaps I am wrong, that the Minister felt that the measures that have been taken would secure that. I hope he is right, but I have to say that I am not so sure. I feel that further pain may be on the way and that some of the pain may be felt by private lenders. That remains to be seen, and I certainly hope that the measures taken by us and by the other participants in the rescue operation have the desired effect. Like the noble Lord, Lord Bew, I see this very much in the context of the Anglo-Irish relationship, both present day and historical.

There are some who suggest—it may even be that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, will express this view—that because Ireland is a member of the eurozone, and we are not, we should somehow stand aloof from it. I think that is absurd. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as well as the Minister this evening, have repeatedly said that it is in Britain’s interest that the eurozone should be a success. Of course, that does not mean that we have the same responsibilities towards each other as the members of the eurozone, but it does mean that we should recognise the nature of our links with it and the existence of our exposure to it. We are not an offshore island in that sense with a financial system separate and distinct from that of our European neighbours. The whole apparatus of British financial services and the City of London as a great international centre are intimately bound up in the wider European financial system. They are, of course, intimately bound up in the global financial system, but most intimately and most directly they are bound up within the European, and through the European, in the global financial system. The two are not mutually inconsistent. This has been a great source of profit to the United Kingdom. It continues to be so, and Mayor Boris Johnson never ceases to point out the benefits that accrue to London as well as to the United Kingdom.

It is very much in our interest that we should participate, but I part company from the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, so far as the permanent mechanism is concerned, and I find myself much closer to the position of the Minister. As I said, we do not have the same obligations and responsibilities to the members of the eurozone as they have to each other, so I feel it is right for us not to sign up to something that would involve us in a permanent obligation. I do not mean by that that we would necessarily wish to stand apart on some future occasion. We might, or we might not. I felt that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, drew too much on the Irish example. Our relationship with Ireland is quite different from our relationship with any other European country. However, I can well imagine that circumstances might arise—

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

It is not surprising that as a man of the world and a former European commissioner, the noble Lord is not someone who is so foolish as to want to exclude any possibility in the future and lose flexibility, but does he not agree that if we are not part of the permanent mechanism, we will not be part of the conversations, we will not be part of the analysis and we will not be part of the decision-making mechanism? We might have the opportunity to come in later on to a deal that has already been put together by others or to try to find some bilateral solution in the face of a much bigger multinational arrangement, but surely that is not a very sensible way of conducting our country’s affairs.

[Lord Tugendhat]

No, I do not agree with the noble Lord. He draws too clear a distinction between membership and non-membership. I do not want to get diverted, as others have, from the main theme of my speech, but I think that Britain is a substantial member of the European Union. Therefore, conversations do not take place in one room with Britain being excluded entirely. People need to know what Britain is thinking and there has to be a certain interchange.

There are people who thought that if we did not join the euro, we would somehow be excluded from a lot of discussions. There are certainly discussions in which we do not take part and it may be that Ministers are rather relieved sometimes that they do not have to. But Britain is too big an entity to be entirely excluded and only brought in at the end of the discussion when everything has been decided. If Britain is to play a role in a future crisis, people will want to know beforehand what our attitude is likely to be, how far we might be able to go and under what terms we might be able to participate.

That brings me back to my line of march. When perhaps future problems arise, we should look at each of them and take a decision on their merits—certainly recognising our considerable interests in the eurozone; certainly recognising the importance of our membership of the European Union; and certainly recognising our interests in the political stability of different countries. But we should look at these things on their merits, decide our position on each one as it comes along and ensure that the decisions we take are subject to parliamentary approval. We are much more likely to carry confidence in the country and have support from the electorate if we are seen to do it on the merits, rather than if we are seen to have signed up to a certain automaticity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sassoon]

These are all factors that mean that we need, with the EU 27, to make sure that the structural reforms are driven through and that we get the benefits of completing the single market project and so on. However, my noble friend Lord Tugendhat again got it exactly right—I would not agree with every nuance of his analysis, but he got the essential point right—in saying that just because we are very positively engaged at the centre of all those other issues does not mean that there are not critical differences, because we are not part of the eurozone and this Government will not take us into it. It is therefore for the eurozone to sort out its own permanent mechanism for dealing with any other issues that arise out of membership of the euro. That is the fundamental difference between the UK’s position and that of other of our partners in Europe. I genuinely fail to see why the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, seeks to paint the position in such stark colours. The fact is that we are in a different position from that of a number of the largest trading partners in Europe, which needs to be reflected in the permanent arrangements that will be put in place. My noble friend Lord Tugendhat explained that in much more masterly terms than I will ever be able to do.

Some questions were asked about the economic and market analysis of the situation, not only of how we got here but how we go forward. I listened with interest to the exchange between the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, and my noble friend Lord Lamont of Lerwick. The rather succinct and pithy remarks of my noble friend better encapsulated the situation in which Europe finds itself and in which it is clear that the fact of the euro cannot be ignored. That takes us back to why the eurozone needs to think about the consequences and the lessons of this crisis for a permanent mechanism.

In answer to the specific question of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, I restate that the loan to Ireland does not add to our deficit. It increases the borrowing on one side of the UK’s balance sheet, but we have an asset in terms of the money that will be owed to us by Ireland. There will be an increment to the fiscal position by the net interest margin, estimated at current interest rates to be some £440 million. That is the only element that should go through the current balance.

One or two comments were made on the process of the Bill. I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Cope of Berkeley and Lord Tugendhat for their endorsement and recognition of the fast-track approach that we have taken. It is necessary that we give confidence to our European partners and the IMF in putting this package together that the UK is ready at the earliest time to deliver on our commitments. I accept my noble friend Lord Cope’s analysis of the constitutional position in another place.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Perhaps may I press the Minister a little more on what he said about this Irish loan not adding to the fiscal deficit. I understand that he is saying that it does not add to the fiscal deficit because he is setting off one financial asset against a financial liability. Will he confirm, however, that it will add to the public sector borrowing requirement? Some £2.5 billion will have to be borrowed on the financial markets and be accounted for as part of the public sector borrowing requirement which otherwise would not.

[Lord Sassoon]

Indeed, my Lords, the money advanced to Ireland needs to be funded, but it is precisely because we have stabilised the fiscal position and secured the UK’s AAA credit rating that this matter is not a cause for particular concern.

I have already said why the Government believe that it is right that we should not be part of a permanent bailout mechanism—indeed, this is recognised in the recent Council conclusions. My noble friend Lord Newby asked about the process for adopting the treaty amendment that will be necessary. Parliament must of course give its approval to any treaty change that is agreed by member states, and ratification in the UK will be subject to the terms of the EU Bill that we are bringing forward. A treaty change will be subject to primary legislation. Since there is no question of transfer of competences in this case, the question of a referendum does not arise.