European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 16th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, as we have been told, Clause 38 is essentially meaningless. It is declaratory, I think it was said; a sop to the ERG. Indeed, the Explanatory Memorandum makes clear that the clause makes no material difference to the scope of Parliament’s powers.

However, it is not just neutral. The problem, as we discussed on Tuesday, is that, by having this clause but failing to refer alongside it to the Sewel convention that the UK Parliament will not normally use its powers to legislate in devolved matters without the agreement of the National Assembly—or indeed the Scottish Parliament—it appears to our colleagues there to undermine the devolution settlements.

It is for that reason, as we discussed in relation to Amendment 45 on Tuesday that the Welsh Government wish the Sewel convention to be restated alongside what is in this clause, if it really must remain in the Bill, although it is in fact otiose and it would probably be best for it to go altogether. I see the Chief Whip in his place; he always likes to know what we will return to. That is one point to which we shall return next week.

For the Opposition, however, there is a different problem with the clause, which is that the rest of the Bill does the exact opposite to what it says in it. Virtually all the rest of the Bill dilutes parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis the Executive: it takes powers from us, not to give them to Wales or Scotland but to give them to the Government.

Future historians will puzzle over why this clause is here. We are particularly grateful to the noble Lords for giving notice of their intention to oppose that Clause 38 stand part, because it gives us the opportunity to write that into Hansard, so that when future historians—I am a historian—look at why on earth this clause was there, they can say it was there to keep the ERG of the Tory party happy. That does not seem to us to be a very good reason to have it, but if it really must remain, without the reference to the devolution settlements it is in fact unhelpful, rather than neutral.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this part of the debate. I express some concern that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, wishes to concertina hard ideologues of the right, English nationalists and Brexiteers into one uniform group. That is regrettable shorthand and, indeed, the very fact that his party has adopted that sort of attitude towards the issue of our leaving the European Union might go some way to explaining why it returned after the general election with a total of 11 Members in the House of Commons. There are many, many people in the United Kingdom who are not English nationalists but voted to leave the European Union. There are many people in the United Kingdom who are not hard ideologues of the right who voted to leave the European Union.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is well known that, latterly, Dicey developed views on home rule for Ireland that differed from what might be regarded as the mainstream at the time. Be that as it may, his works on the principles of the constitution stand the test of time and are worthy of being revisited by the noble Lord.

I shall deal shortly with the point advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about the scope of the present clause. The Sewel convention is not itself a matter of constitutional law; it is a political convention, as the Supreme Court made clear in the first Miller case. It is a political convention into which the courts would not intrude. Be that as it may, it has of course been restated in statutory form and therefore does not require repetition. Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 and Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017 restated it expressly in statutory form. So it is there on the statute book and does not invite repetition. What is not contained in any of the devolved legislation, for obvious reasons, is a restatement and recognition of the fundamental principle of our constitutional arrangement, namely that Parliament is sovereign, and there is therefore a desire to see that made clear.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, suggested that there was some deficiency in the drafting of the clause, but I resist that suggestion. It says, in terms, that the principle of our constitutional arrangement—namely, parliamentary sovereignty—is recognised. It is universally recognised, and that is an appropriate way to express the position of our constitution. In other words, nothing in the Bill derogates from the sovereignty of Parliament, and this clause makes that clear.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Does the noble and learned Lord therefore accept that if there was an addition to restate the convention, that would not detract in any way from what is in the clauses at the moment?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It would not detract from the clause but it would be an unnecessary repetition. We do not normally put precisely the same provision into statutes two or three years apart. Here we have the provision with regard to the Sewel convention in Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, and again in Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017. It is there. It is on the statute book; it exists. That is why there is no need for repetition.

As I say, leaving the European Union is a matter of some significance in the context of our constitutional arrangements, in particular, the repeal of the ECA. It is therefore appropriate in this context that there is an explicit recognition of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, as the Bill implements the withdrawal agreement so that we can leave the legal order that is the European Union, it is appropriate, when disentangling ourselves from those international obligations, that we ensure that there is no concern about the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. It is for Parliament, acting in its sovereign capacity, to give effect to the agreement in domestic law—that is the duality principle, and nothing in the Bill derogates from that principle as recognised by this clause. In these circumstances, I submit that it is entirely appropriate that this clause should stand part of the Bill, and I invite the noble Lord not to oppose it doing so.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I too am not a lawyer, and I will not even attempt to add to the legal arguments, which have been so well set out by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf, Lord Judge, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, as well as by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and others, as to why any decision on the interpretation of retained EU law should be taken at Supreme Court level, as envisaged in the 2018 Act, and why ministerial regulations are simply not appropriate in this matter.

I will say three things. One is that it is a really bad way to make law suddenly, with such a clause, with no consultation either with the judiciary—if this was the consultation that has happened today, I think we can take it as, “No thanks”—or, indeed, with the devolved nations, which we discussed earlier. I will answer the question put by my noble friend Lady Taylor about what the Government have in mind. At a briefing, it was very clear that they already had something in mind, a sunset clause at the end of this year, and my answer is simply that there is something that is not oven-ready at the moment that is waiting to come in. There is a closed envelope somewhere, and it is appropriate that we should be told what exactly is in it, so perhaps we could hear about that later.

Secondly, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has said, Clause 26 could result in the divergence of approach within and between the jurisdictions of the UK on matters where a common approach is essential: things that are fundamental to our UK-wide single market. On Monday, the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, recalled that for 40 years EU legislation

“ensured that there was a large amount of similarity and coherence in how these laws were interpreted in the various parts of the United Kingdom. The question that arises now is: will we require to maintain that level of coherence in order to operate as a single national economy? This will be particularly true for food, farming, fishing … in Scotland and … the devolved Administrations.”—[Official Report, 14/1/20; cols. 530-1.]

Harking back to the earlier discussion about the all-United Kingdom economy, this seems a crucial issue. Allowing lower, non-UK-wide courts to interpret the regulations that the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, mentioned, environmental matters, as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, or VAT or duties, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, mentioned, could open a wide door to divergence on issues within our own single market.

Thirdly, there is obviously a fear that this provision risks undermining workers’ rights, given that the political declaration makes no mention of the rights previously protected by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its key principles which have found their way into EU case law. Employees in the UK benefit from the ECJ’s sometimes more generous interpretation of employment rights, such as the right to paid holidays, the requirement for employers to keep records of hours worked to comply with the working time directive, and the ruling as to whether overtime is factored into holiday pay. These have been essential and are now part of UK law—of course via case law. Without a guarantee to uphold the body of case law on workers’ rights, the Prime Minister’s commitment to protect our employee rights after Brexit will sound more hollow than any chimes of Big Ben, whether on 31 January or any other day.

Clause 26, which has been dropped in with no rationale, prior debate, consultation or Green Paper, diminishes the Bill while introducing uncertainty into our laws. It has no place here. We will seek to remove it, although, as other noble Lords have said and as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, urged, it would be much better if the Government were to do this.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for moving the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I will seek to offer some explanation and reassurance with regard to the clause in question.

As has been noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, we are concerned here with retained EU law. For clarity, Clause 26 draws a distinction between retained EU law and relevant separation agreement law, which is applicable as a consequence of the withdrawal agreement and is untouched by any of these proposals, given our international law obligations. Retained EU law will form part of the law of the United Kingdom. It is then a question of how we approach the interpretation and application of that law, which, in turn, takes us to the question of precedent and the binding force—at present—of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in this context.

Provision has already been made, pursuant to Section 6(5) of the 2018 Act, to confer upon the United Kingdom Supreme Court the power to depart from previous decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The idea that one can depart from such a body of case law is hardly novel. It has been a feature of common law since at least the 1960s, when the judicial committee of the House of Lords expressed its intention to depart from previous case law as and when it felt it was necessary to do so. Therefore, we are not, as it were, moving into novel territory in this context.

The intention behind this clause is to give a power to make regulations to ensure that the United Kingdom courts are not inappropriately bound by retained EU case law as part of the body of United Kingdom law after we have left the European Union. It goes no further than that. These courts may choose to follow that case law, but the point is to ensure that they are not bound to do so in circumstances where they form a view that it would be inappropriate to the development of UK law for them to do so.

The Government are sensible in the manner in which they will seek to exercise the regulatory power. The Bill requires that Ministers must consult the senior judiciary across the whole of the United Kingdom before making any regulations, and indeed may consult other appropriate persons, and any regulations will be laid before Parliament under the affirmative procedure. Those safeguards are clearly in place.

We want to ensure that United Kingdom law after we leave is consistent and clear. The power will be employed in a way that is consistent with our own constitutional norms and traditions: judicial independence, the doctrine of precedent and the separation of powers. Any regulations will respect these long-established principles but will also allow that retained EU case law is not the sole preserve of the court of final appeal, be it the United Kingdom Supreme Court or, in the context of criminal matters, the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The Minister says that this will be done under the affirmative procedure. Should that come here, we have always had the right to negate such an order. However, should this House do that, given the advice it has had, it would not be challenged as a constitutional outrage but would be a proper use of this House’s power.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It would always be a proper use of this House’s power, albeit there are constitutional norms that apply. However, it is not just this House; the House of Commons would also have the opportunity to address the terms of any regulations. I have no doubt that, having regard to our constitutional norms, this House would have regard to the determination of the House of Commons on that point, but would not be absolutely bound by it. I fully accept that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not consider that this clause in any sense violates the principle of the separation of powers.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Given that that Minister has not answered my noble friend’s question and given that there is a sunset clause on this, there must be something ready to go. Can he not explain what it is?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No. What is ready to go is a consultation process. That is why we have not reached a conclusion. The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, asked two questions, the first of which was, “Are the Government going to use this power?” We are going to use it in order to consult with appropriate parties. May I give examples? Examples have been given by noble and learned Lords. One example is a reference system to the Supreme Court. Another example is to extend this power to the Court of Appeal. That is what we want to determine by virtue of the consultation process we wish to take forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble and learned Lord, we seek to consult on the appropriate test to be applied in taking this matter forward. We intend to do that in consultation with the senior judiciary.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, given that the existing law has now been in place since 2018 and all that time could have been used for this consultation, why has this suddenly gone in now with the power to make changes by ministerial decision? If it was not felt at the time that the 2018 position was correct, why has this consultation—which could take place without an Act of Parliament—not already taken place?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, in the interim there had been certain distractions, including a general election—the outcome of which the noble Baroness will be familiar with.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Monday 13th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the powerful maiden speeches delivered by my noble friend Lord Barwell and the noble Lord, Lord Mann, in whose speech there was nothing with which I could have possibly disagreed. I believe that every Member of this House would embrace both the content and sentiment that he expressed.

This Bill is of the highest importance and consequence for the country and is vital in delivering our withdrawal from the European Union at the end of this month. In opening, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, was candid and—I would venture—generous in acknowledging the position in which we stand since the general election. This Bill is not about whether or not we will leave the European Union; it is not about determining the terms of our departure from the European Union; it is not about the future relationship. The Bill ensures that the withdrawal agreement and the associated agreements under the EEA, EFTA and Swiss separation agreements are implemented in domestic law in order that they can be given full effect and thereby allow the Government to fulfil their obligations under international law.

I echo the sentiment of my noble friend Lord Callanan in acknowledging the work of all our Select Committees, including that of the Constitution Committee; the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, indicated that it would deliver its report tomorrow, and we appreciate the speed with which it has addressed these matters. I also thank all noble Lords who contributed to today’s debate and discussion, although it will clearly not be possible for me in the time available between now and midnight to respond to each and every point that has been made.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, my noble friend Lord Cope and other noble Lords raised the question of the prohibition the Bill places on the extension of the implementation period. The general election has clearly shown that the public want no further delay in our exit from the European Union, let alone potentially the 40 years’ delay of Exodus, as cited by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. The prohibition in this statute binds the Government to their manifesto commitment not to extend the implementation period beyond December 2020.

However, I reassure noble Lords that all parties have committed to using good faith to secure agreement on our future relationship by the end of 2020, and we will work with great energy to achieve this. Indeed, article 184 of the withdrawal agreement refers in particular to the obligations on all parties and, in turn, refers to point 135 in part five of the political declaration, where the parties themselves express the intention to have the agreement in force by the end of 2020.

The matter of citizens’ rights has been raised by a number of noble Lords, in particular by the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Oates, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson—I will come on to the particular point he raised in a moment. EU citizens in the United Kingdom are our neighbours, colleagues and workplace friends, and of course we value the contribution they make to the United Kingdom and wish them to remain here. We have already provided certainty to over 2.5 million people who have been granted status through the EU settlement scheme. The scheme is free, there is plenty of support for applicants, and they have until at least 30 June 2021 to apply to it.

I understand that the issue of presettled versus settled status has generated concern in some quarters. I make it clear that presettled status is a pathway to settled status, because those with presettled status can move straight to settled status by making an application once they reach five years’ continuous residence in the United Kingdom. I hope that puts some minds at rest. Indeed, we are taking a very pragmatic approach in trying to deal with applications, both of presettled and settled status. If an applicant needs to use the full five years of their presettled status, they will also receive an automatic reminder to apply for settled status before their leave expires. There is therefore no question of people being overlooked in this context. To that end, I understand that the Home Office’s automatic status checker uses the government database to help applicants secure the right form of status in a smooth and effective manner.

Reference was made by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, to the status of UK citizens in the EU. However, that is of course not a matter of domestic law and is therefore not a matter for the Bill, which is intended to implement the international legal obligations which we have undertaken pursuant to the withdrawal agreement. Therefore, the status of UK citizens in the EU will be the subject of the future relationship negotiations.

Questions were asked, particularly by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about the status of the IMA. I assure noble Lords that the Bill guarantees that the IMA will be fully independent of government. As the Bill sets out, the IMA will be run by an independent board and contain the appropriate expertise on citizens’ rights, and the Government will have no role in its day-to-day running or in its decisions. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, suggested that, pursuant to the provisions in Schedule 2 to the Bill, the IMA could be abolished. That is simply not the case. There can be a transfer of the IMA’s functions at some point, but those functions must be continued and carried on. After a period of eight years, it will be possible for the UK to negotiate with the EU on the matter of whether the IMA is still required, but the obligation to maintain it is one that we have undertaken in international law, pursuant to the withdrawal agreement, and one to which we as a Government will adhere. So, there is no question of the unilateral abolition of the IMA.

I listened to the concerns expressed across the House, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, in relation to the delegated powers in the Bill. The original sifting mechanism introduced in the EU withdrawal Act was a response to the exceptional circumstances we then found ourselves in. The situation now is quite different and it would not be appropriate to include a sifting mechanism in the Bill in this instance.

I listened also to the concerns expressed in relation to the power contained in Clause 21 to implement the protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland. I also took note of the comments of noble and learned Lords on the DPRRC in this regard. But we in this space must be aware of what occurred in the other place and have regard to the response from the Government Benches to the concerns raised there. The Government have stated that providing certainty and reassurance to people and businesses in Northern Ireland is of paramount importance to them. The power contained in the Bill to implement the protocol provides that reassurance.

Furthermore, as my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out at the beginning of the debate, the Bill’s approach to implementing the protocol is the best way to ensure that the United Kingdom can fulfil its international obligations and make the necessary arrangements to implement the protocol in the time available. Any other approach would risk jeopardising the Government’s ability to fully implement the protocol and would inevitably send a negative signal to both businesses and individuals in Northern Ireland. I hope that the House will agree that the fulfilment of these two aims—namely, ensuring that the Government can fully implement the protocol and reassuring businesses and individuals in Northern Ireland—should not be undermined.

Noble Lords asked about Parliament’s oversight of the future relationship negotiations. It was interesting to observe the different views that came from different sides of the House. For a while, many noble Lords expressed concern about the removal of parliamentary oversight. I believe that I noted both my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley and the noble Lord, Lord Darling, expressing the view that, at the end of the day, negotiation of such matters as international relations had to be a matter for the Executive, essentially, and not one for Parliament to be directly involved in—albeit that, at the end of the day, myriad pieces of legislation will require to be approved by Parliament and put in place in order that the future relationship can be established and maintained.

The political declaration agreed by the Prime Minister as part of our exit negotiation sets out the framework for a comprehensive and ambitious free trade agreement with the EU. The general election result has clearly shown that the public support that vision and we consider that we have been given the mandate to begin negotiations on that basis. As the Prime Minister said in the debate on Second Reading in the other place, Parliament will be kept fully informed on the progress of these negotiations. Both Houses will have access to all their usual scrutiny tools, including Select Committees and the questioning of Ministers, and I have no doubt that the House will take full advantage of them. So, in these circumstances, we do not consider that there is a requirement for any additional statutory role. Furthermore, we are giving the EU Committee the ability to trigger debates on new pieces of law proposed by the EU that raise matters of national interest during the implementation period.

I turn now to the matter of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, which was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and mentioned by a number of other noble Lords. Of course, concerns have been raised over family reunion for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. I wish to make clear that the Government are fully committed both to the principle of family reunion and to helping and supporting the most vulnerable children. The Government, as my noble friend Lord Callanan observed, have a record of providing protection for vulnerable children, receiving 15% of all asylum claims from unaccompanied children in the EU.

Clause 37 does not represent a change to that existing government policy. It removes the statutory requirement to negotiate. This is appropriate as the Government have demonstrated their intentions by already writing to the European Commission to commence negotiations on this issue. It is vital that the Government are not legally constrained in those discussions. We are restoring the traditional division of competence between Parliament and the Executive when it comes to international negotiations. This clause fulfils the essential function of allowing us to continue negotiating a comprehensive agreement and rightly ensuring that Parliament is informed of the Government’s policy intentions in respect of our future arrangements.

I shall move on to deal with the question of the case law of the CJEU. I have noted the concerns that have been expressed here. While clearly EU case law is a defined body of law, it is important that our courts are not eternally bound by historic decisions of the EU Court of Justice after the implementation period has expired. Let me provide some important points of reassurance. First, the approach that we have taken is consistent with our international obligations. Clause 26 already provides for how the separation agreements must be interpreted and nothing that we do here will cut across that. Secondly, we want to approach this matter in a sensible way.

Let me be clear that there is no intention to extend the divergence from retained EU case law to every court and tribunal in the United Kingdom. We must consult with the senior judiciary before making any regulations, and the clause provides for the Minister to consult with others as is appropriate. What we intend is that the power will be used to ensure that retained EU case law is a living law rather than one preserved in aspic. There will be legal clarity at the point when any case concerning this body of law is heard. The power can be used only until the end of the implementation period, and the courts will be interpreting retained EU law only after that period. So we have the period of the implementation time in which to address this issue and it will then apply from the expiry of the implementation period. But I repeat that there is no intention on the part of the Government to extend the power to every court and tribunal in the land. We recognise the uncertainty that would be a consequence of such a move.

I turn to matters pertaining to devolution, which arose in a number of different contexts. First of all, the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, raised questions about the CAP and an agriculture Bill. I assure noble Lords that the CAP will continue to the end of the implementation period, by which time we will have taken forward the agriculture Bill. The noble Duke also referred to the frameworks, and perhaps I may remind noble Lords of the importance of these frameworks in the context of our relations with the devolved Administrations. Between October 2017 and March 2018, we published what was termed a common frameworks analysis, which set out about 153 areas in which EU law intersected with devolved competence. After discussion we have reduced that number, but have carried on an analysis of these areas with the devolved Administrations and continue to work closely with them on these issues.

One example of that is fisheries, which have already been mentioned in this debate, where we proposed a new UK framework to ensure access for UK fishing fleets throughout UK waters. That has been taken forward through discussion with the devolved Administrations and has been governed by principles agreed at the joint ministerial conferences. I give the detail of that just to underline the extent to which we are engaged with the devolved Administrations in this context.

As was suggested early on, the engagement between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations over the Bill has been rather unusual, because the recommendations coming back from the devolved Administrations have been principally concerned with reserved matters. The devolution settlement involved the reservation of specific matters to the United Kingdom Parliament. It was never intended that in the conduct of such reserved matters—for example, international affairs—the United Kingdom Parliament could be inhibited or frustrated by the devolved Administrations. That would not be normal under our devolution settlement, and that is reflected in the terms of the Sewel convention. For our part, the Government have followed the spirit and letter of the devolution settlement throughout the process pertaining to this Bill. The engagement of the devolved Administrations—

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Does the Minister accept that while the negotiations may indeed be for reserved matters, in many cases the implementation is not reserved? That is why they are particularly worried about the lack of consultation.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There are clearly circumstances in which the implementation of the withdrawal agreement will impact on the scope of executive competence of the devolved Administrations, and they are well aware of that, but those are not the issues they have sought to address with the UK Government in this context. They have sought to address matters that are reserved. As I say, the fundamentals of the devolved settlement, going back to 1998, never intended that where the UK Government were exercising a reserved function they should be inhibited or prevented from doing so by the devolved Administrations. It is important to bear that in mind.

As I say, we consider that we are taking appropriate steps to engage with the devolved Administrations, and we will continue to do so. Indeed, we continue to hope that the Welsh Government in particular will reflect on this and revise their recommendations to the National Assembly on legislative consent. At the end of the day, what we are doing here is implementing an international treaty obligation; that is the role of the United Kingdom Parliament.

I will now touch on one or two additional points in the limited time remaining. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, raised a number of issues with regard to health. Clearly, nothing is going to change before the end of the implementation period, and thereafter it will be a matter for the negotiation on the future relationship. It is not a matter for this Bill, which is intended to implement the present withdrawal agreement. She also made reference to the clinical trials directive. I should observe that the new EU clinical trials directive has not yet been adopted, so we do not even know where the EU will be with regard to that. Of course, once we do know, it may form the subject of negotiations on the future relationship.

The noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, made a powerful point that, after 46 years of being subject to EU law, women have still not secured equal pay. I certainly hope that we will do better after we leave the EU.

The noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, referred to animal welfare. At the moment, we cannot prohibit the movement of live animals because of EU law. But when we leave, let us hope that we can address that, because we have expressed an intention to do so.

The noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, referred to UK worker rights. I notice that, in many respects, UK worker rights are much higher than the norm within the other EU 27 states. One has only got to consider such issues as paternity and maternity leave, and other related issues, to appreciate that what we may hope for after exit is that the EU is able to catch up with us.

I look forward to tomorrow’s Committee stage, where we can enter into more detailed scrutiny and debate on the issues that have been raised today. This Bill ensures that we honour the result of the 2016 referendum and leave the EU on 31 January, on the terms of the withdrawal agreement. It ensures that the agreements have full effect in domestic law and that, accordingly, the Government can discharge their obligations in international law.

Once the Bill is passed and the withdrawal agreement ratified, we will proceed to the completion of a free trade agreement with the EU by the end of December 2020. We can then go on to focus on other national priorities, such as the National Health Service, education and skills, and ensuring that we make our country safe. I commend the Bill to the House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) (Amendment) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Wednesday 27th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I just wondered whether the noble and learned Lord was speaking on behalf of the Government, who were threatening that we should be leaving the day after tomorrow with no deal.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

When I am at the Dispatch Box, I always speak on behalf of the Government; that at least is my understanding. I am addressing not the matter of the policy of the Government, but the matter of the amendment and where it would lead us. On that, my respectful view is that it would be a wholly reckless course of action for this House to adopt. I invite noble Lords to consider very carefully the precise terms in which it has been expressed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, raised a number of issues about the position of the ECA and the matter of its repeal, in the context of the statutory instrument. Indeed, this touched upon points then made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: that the 2018 Act had been enacted but a number of provisions had not yet been commenced, having been deferred from Royal Assent. I accept that his analysis of the commencement provisions is, as I understand it, entirely accurate. In particular, there has been no commencement provision in respect of Sections 1 to 7, albeit that there has been commencement provision in respect of a number of other parts of the Act.

I confess that this can lead one into difficulty; certainly, it led me into difficulty on an earlier occasion in this House when I observed, in response to a question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, that the provisions with regard to European elections were repealed because that is expressly provided for in the 2018 Act—without appreciating that those provisions had not been commenced. I have some sympathy for the need for a detailed analysis of what has been commenced and what has not. That said, I want to be clear that the reason for not commencing Sections 1 to 7 is that as a general rule such commencement provisions are brought in only as and when the relevant statutory provisions are going to be required, and it is not for the reason suggested by the noble Lord. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that any withdrawal agreement Bill may amend the withdrawal Act provisions with regard to retained EU law to reflect what is or may be agreed in a withdrawal agreement. Therefore the withdrawal agreement Bill may well address a number of features of the existing 2018 Act.

A number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Robathan, alluded to the Prime Minister having expressed the opinion on a number of occasions that we would leave the EU on 29 March 2019. However, as I believe Keynes once observed, “When the facts change, I review my opinion. What do you do?” In light of the facts having changed, it is hardly surprising that that opinion has changed.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked whether the European Council determination was a matter of EU law. It is a decision under EU law but, obviously, one that is recognised at the level of international law. It is therefore a matter of EU law, as an expression of determination that is recognised by Article 188 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as binding upon any member to which it is directed, but is also a decision of determination that would be recognised at the level of international law. That is why, although we have agreed these dates at the level of international law, having regard to the duality principle we have to ensure that they are also recognised and implemented at the level of domestic law.

There were a great number of other observations but perhaps I can touch upon just two. First, my noble friend Lord Forsyth suggested that this Government had achieved the impossible, and I am obliged to him for his suggestion that we are capable in that regard. Nevertheless I would have to draw back a little from that proposition, which he mentioned in the context of the functioning of the Joint Committee. The point that I simply make is that it is not for the Executive to direct these committees on how they function and discharge their functions. As it transpired, that committee very helpfully, readily and appropriately brought its proceedings forward, but it was not for the Executive to try to bind it to do so.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Again, I am very pleased at my noble friend’s acknowledgement that we have achieved something that was otherwise regarded as impossible. It is encouraging that we have such support, at least from our own Benches. [Laughter.] Those opposite are the Opposition, not the enemy. We must do something about knife crime.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, repeated, as he has done often before, his uncompromising advice on what we got wrong and how to put it right—but on this occasion he did it, as he said, with humility, so some things are beginning to change. The other observations that were made in this invigorating debate really had nothing to do with the instrument or with the Motion that has been tabled. I therefore shall not pursue them at this time of the evening.

I finish by begging to move that the instrument should be approved and again encouraging noble Lords to look carefully at the precise terms of the Motion that is to be moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. We cannot have a situation in which the Executive are purportedly bound to any Motion that has not yet passed in the Commons. That way lies chaos, which is the one thing we do not need at this point in time. I am obliged to noble Lords.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

That is not fair. How can I follow that? I will say two things to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. He mentioned Robert Peston; of course, when I first came here, his father Lord Peston was sitting behind me. I think he would have enjoyed today’s proceedings, maybe for all the wrong reasons.

I should also say to the noble and learned Lord that using the example of the Baron amendment, which called for a no-deal exit, does not come across well from a Government who have been threatening that we would leave with no deal the day after tomorrow. New paragraph (b) in Regulation 2(2) of the statutory instrument still says that we could leave without a deal at 11 pm on 12 April. That was probably the wrong example to use.

We had some interesting interventions on my amendment from the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who reminded us that this was an ideological choice at the beginning. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, reminded us about the cost of all this, as did the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton and Lord Robathan. From the feed coming through, I understand that the Prime Minister’s resignation will be dependent on getting the deal through, in which case the Conservative Party leadership contest will start on 22 May. I am already hearing about all sorts of cabals going on, but that is not for us.

There were interventions on the SI itself, rather than my amendment, from the noble Lords, Lord Forsyth, Lord Pannick, Lord Warner and Lord Cormack, the noble Viscounts, Lord Ridley and Lord Waverley, and my noble friend Lord Adonis. The noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, also spoke. He told us that he is normally an optimist, but is now nearing despair. In an earlier debate—I think it was when we were doing the Bill—we had Hope, Pannick and Judge. As the hope is rather fading, we are closer to the panic than we were at that stage.

I think my amendment has provided an opportunity for the House to express its concern about the chaotic way we got here and where the blame lies. Even if there was not complete agreement on the last bit of the amendment, I think it served its purpose in allowing the House to express its views, without having to divide. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Brexit: Powers of EU-UK Joint Committee

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Wednesday 20th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Given the Government’s appalling record—ignoring both this House and the Commons; failing to influence either the mandate for their negotiations or, indeed, the outcome; and ignoring twice the view of the Commons on the deal—can the Minister assure the House that the joint committee’s work will be more accountable to Parliament than what we have witnessed so far? While I am on my feet, we have heard that the Prime Minister’s letter possibly arrived in Brussels too late to be discussed by the Council tomorrow. Can the Minister confirm whether that is the case?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not in a position to confirm or deny the position with regard to the postal service. However, I can say that, as always, Ministers will be accountable to Parliament for matters undertaken by the joint committee under the withdrawal agreement.

Further Discussions with the European Union under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Wednesday 27th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord’s observation is utterly irrelevant in this context. Let us be clear as to what the legislation provided. Ultimately, it provided that we would leave the EU on 29 March 2019. This Parliament determined that date—not the Prime Minister, not the Executive. Let us bear that in mind, shall we? It is in that context that you have to look at where we are going.

I come on to some of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Newby. I am a little concerned for him, because he appeared to proceed on the basis that purgatory has its limits. I am terribly sorry to inform him that, as and when he arrives in purgatory, he may find that it is actually indefinite. He had better proceed with a degree of care in that context. He made an allusion to Mr Corbyn as a “schoolboy”. I do not want to take the allusion too far, but I will refer to one well-known fictional schoolboy called William, who said you cannot have a referendum if you do not know the question. We all know that. The point is that Mr Corbyn may be in favour of a referendum, but we have no idea what question he might or might not have in mind. Other members of his party have advanced questions, of course, but Mr Corbyn himself has not told us what his question is or is going to be. It appears that it is hidden in his allotment at present.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I know Cabinet responsibility has gone a little awry on that side, but we actually still have it. We have made it clear—Keir Starmer, Emily Thornberry and I have made it clear—

Brexit: Negotiations

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Tuesday 20th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I must say I am a Burkean as far as representative democracy is concerned. That is how our constitution operates. There are exceptions so far as referenda are concerned.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Your party had the first one.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is suggested that my party had the first one. I believe Harold Wilson had a referendum over the EU rather before my party, but I may be mistaken about that. I am obliged to the noble Baroness.

It is said by the noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan, that we have arrived at an impasse. We have not. We have arrived at an agreement, and it is one that will go before the House of Commons in the near future.

The noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, talked about crashing out without a deal, and we have had references to car crashes and catastrophes. Such arguments are not improved by overstatement. That, with respect, is what has been happening, perhaps at both ends of the spectrum, with regard to the debate on this matter and it takes away from the factual issue. It plays into what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, referred to as the “storytelling” that can sometimes fog proper decision-making in this context.

The noble Lord, Lord Steel, also referred to “a defective deal, at great expense”. Again I remind him that the sum of £35 billion to £38 billion is not a great expense; it is a negotiated means of meeting our outstanding obligations under international law, and that is what we intend to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Belmont, also raised the question of Northern Ireland. Again I emphasise that the issue of the backstop, even if it comes into play, will be subject to the obligations of “best endeavours” and to the independent arbitration process provided for in the withdrawal agreement. I also note that there is no limitation at all upon the movement of goods from Northern Ireland to the remainder of Great Britain. That movement remains wholly unimpeded by these terms.

My noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley referred to the political declaration. Of course, as he later observed, it is not yet complete, which is why we must wait to see the outcome of further discussions regarding the political declaration in order to see where we are going to be. It is certainly not the time to anticipate what that outcome might be.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note what the noble Lord says about national trade union membership, and no doubt the unions will try harder to recruit more widely. One of the obvious benefits they can hold out is the provision of legal advice and assistance for those who become members. I accept that there is a balance to be struck.

Amendments 47 and 48 seek to restrict the increase in the small claims track limit for whiplash injury claims to a maximum of £1,500, as opposed to the proposal that there should be an increase to £5,000. They also seek to restrict the ability of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to make further amendments to the upper limit. As we have indicated before, motor insurance premium costs are increasing as insurers pass on the cost of dealing with the continuing high number and cost of whiplash claims. I referred earlier to the 2017 election manifesto provision that the Government were committed to cracking down on these claims and ensuring that the money saved was returned to consumers through lower premiums. These amendments would maintain the burden on ordinary motorists by restricting the flexibility of the Government to reduce the costs of civil litigation through changes to the Civil Procedure Rules.

Whiplash claims are generally straightforward and do not routinely require legal advice. The small claims track is suitable for such claims. It is designed to be accessible to litigants in person, and the Government are working closely with stakeholders to develop a comprehensive package of guidance and support for users.

The Government have chosen to increase the small claims limit for road traffic accident personal injury claims to £5,000 for good reason. This limit, as I said, has been set at £1,000 since 1991 and, as compensation levels have risen, the small claims track no longer covers the same breadth of claims as it once did. Following consultation, the Government believe that increasing the limit for RTA personal injury claims to £5,000 is a careful and proportionate increase, particularly having regard to the fact that the limit for other claims, with the exceptions I mentioned earlier, is now £10,000. A level of £5,000 will facilitate early and expedited settlement under the proposed tariff structure and will encourage insurers to challenge unmeritorious claims, many of which are not now challenged because of the potential legal costs.

A decision to tie such limits—currently, for good reasons, enshrined in secondary legislation—to a restrictive primary legislative process would be inflexible. The Civil Procedure Rule Committee, under the leadership of the Master of the Rolls, sets out the rules of procedure to ensure that the civil justice system is fair, open and effective. It is the body that sets the financial upper limits for the current three tracks of the civil justice system following consultation. That system has operated effectively for some time. It is flexible and it is appropriate that procedural changes should be made in this way to the civil justice system.

However, we listened to points made earlier about the position of those who are considered to be vulnerable road users. Noble Lords will be aware that they are already excluded from the provisions of Clause 1, and it is proposed that they may be exempted also from the £5,000 limit on the small claims track. We are giving further consideration to that at the present time.

Amendment 48 seeks assurances as to the recoverability of the cost of a medical report in respect of whiplash injury claims, notwithstanding the increase in the small claims track limit. That has been addressed already. The amendment also seeks to change the nature of the small claims track itself by permitting a claimant to recover their legal expenses. We consider that, given the nature of the small claims track for personal injury claims, it would be wholly inappropriate to introduce the recovery of legal expenses. The small claims track was designed to be a low-cost process accessible to litigants in person. The rules have been purposefully and carefully drafted to ensure that both parties share the financial burden of litigation and pay their own legal costs—or, in the case of a union member, have them met by the union. That is a key advantage of the process.

A number of noble Lords have questioned why insurers do not do more to challenge potentially inflated or fraudulent claims, particularly whiplash claims. Part of that answer lies in the cost of defending a claim in the fast track. Increasing the small claims limit so that more of these straightforward whiplash claims—where the insurance industry tells us that liability is admitted in around 90% of cases—are heard in a small claims court will encourage insurers to challenge unmeritorious claims. By contrast, challenging a claim in the fast track is an expensive process that insurers not unnaturally seek to avoid. So there are very clear cost advantages overall in increasing the limits for the small claims track. Where a case is considered to be of a degree of complexity such that it would not lend itself to the small claims track, clearly the court can direct that it should go on to the fast track.

Therefore, in respect of Amendment 48 in particular, the idea of having different cost rules in the small claims court based on the type of claim would create confusion, would undermine the whole purpose of the small claims track and would potentially be unfair to all users of the court system. In these circumstances I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank not the Minister but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I will get him to move things in future. He is so much more effective than I am.

I was very disappointed by the tone of the response. I stand here as the shadow Consumer Minister, talking about consumers, and we get a sort of suggestion that this is all about keeping trade unions happy. As my noble friend Lord Bassam said, sadly there are only 6 million people in trade unions—I wish it was more. It is exactly the low paid and the people who are most vulnerable to this who are not represented by trade unions—but, even if they were, I do not accept that that makes putting up the limit somehow acceptable.

I will not take up time. I acknowledge a movement on vulnerable passengers—for which, as a cyclist and a pedestrian, I am grateful—but I am afraid that the Government’s own figures show that, by their changes, one in four of the people compensated today would no longer be compensated. If on that basis the Minister thinks that we will save costs—in other words, it is injured people who will pay—I do not think that that is good enough. It should be done not behind the scenes but in the Bill. I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, the wonderful thing about devolution is that it happens within our political parties, just as it happens across the UK.

There is still time for some finessing. Perhaps we can, in the coming months, find an alternative way forward to the approach now proposed, particularly before any draft regulations are laid before this House— maybe from some of the ideas going around today. If we can find a way forward that commands the support of all the devolved Administrations and thus preserve the spirit of the Sewel convention—which those of us who care about devolution rightly believe is of huge importance—we on these Benches would welcome it. For now, we judge that the package in front of us is a positive way forward, and is thus no barrier to our agreement to a Third Reading.

I should add a word about the clauses on devolution and Northern Ireland, given that, very regrettably, it was not possible to have the same level of political engagement from there as was available to the Scottish and Welsh Governments and their legislatures. Cross-UK frameworks have particular relevance to Northern Ireland, given the Government’s welcome commitment,

“to uphold the Belfast Agreement in its entirety, to maintain a frictionless border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, with no physical infrastructure”,


while ensuring that any regulatory continuity in Northern Ireland to maintain a frictionless border would not threaten Northern Ireland’s place in the internal market of the UK. The future developments of the frameworks envisaged in this package have to respect the wider demands of upholding the Good Friday agreement. We trust that will remain uppermost in the Government’s mind.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions in this debate. We may be repeating some of the ground that we covered at Report, but these are important matters and they deserve full attention. I appreciate that noble Lords want to consider the points made during the debates on the Motions in the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales yesterday.

I understand the intention behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, but I do not accept that the amendment adds anything that is not already achieved by the Bill and by the intergovernmental agreement. This amendment pertains only to Wales, although I appreciate the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, as to the position in Scotland. It seeks to remedy what is essentially already a firm political commitment that we have made, in line with the intergovernmental agreement, that we will not normally put Clause 15 regulations before this Parliament without the consent of the National Assembly for Wales.

I would put it to the noble and learned Lord that the sincerity of this commitment—and the process and agreement that underpin it—is, it would appear, sufficient for the Welsh Government to agree to these provisions, and it is sufficient for the National Assembly for Wales to agree to these provisions, as it did yesterday. There must be a genuine cause for action in the interests of the whole of the United Kingdom if the UK Government ask the UK Parliament to approve regulations without consent from the devolved legislatures. I note what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern said as to the legal position, but of course it goes beyond that. We are concerned to ensure that moves that have a UK-wide impact have the consent of the devolved Administrations.

The intergovernmental agreement that we have made with the Welsh Government makes this clear. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to paragraph 6 of that agreement which states that we, the UK Government, will not normally ask Parliament to approve draft regulations in the absence of a devolved legislature’s consent. It is also why we will be under a duty to fully explain any such decision to Parliament and to provide the reasons given by the devolved Administrations for why consent has not been given, so that in considering this matter Parliament will be able to take an informed decision on what is right for the United Kingdom as a whole, based on full information. Ultimately, as we have debated fully in this House, it is for the UK Parliament to decide whether to proceed in putting a temporary freeze on the common approaches we have now under EU law. This amendment, while well intentioned, would undermine that. It risks making it a decision for the courts as to whether that question can be put to Parliament. Moreover, the noble Lord himself observed that where you have the issue of what is normal or not normal in the actions of a Minister, it may be amenable to judicial review if he proceeds without the appropriate consent. It would introduce uncertainty because in that context there are no clear grounds on which the courts can consider whether the requirement set out in the intergovernmental agreement has been met.

I am happy to repeat the commitment set out in the noble Lord’s amendment and in paragraph 6 of the intergovernmental agreement. The implementation of that agreement will result in the UK Parliament not normally being asked to approve Clause 15 regulations without the consent of the devolved legislatures. The UK Government have committed to making regulations through a collaborative process. That puts a similar commitment on the Welsh Government that they will not unreasonably withhold recommendations of consent. These are political commitments which apply to both of our Governments so that the intergovernmental agreement carries greater weight. For the reasons that I have given, I would suggest that there is nothing to be gained, and indeed something to be lost, by putting those words on the face of the Bill. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. Perhaps I may come on to the legislative consent Motion process of yesterday in a moment because he raised questions directly pertinent to that point.

In relation to the amendment spoken to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, I recognise that he raised this point during Report and that he is doing so again through his amendment today. I am grateful for this opportunity to clarify these provisions on the record. The noble and learned Lord has made an important case for why we should seek to provide the utmost legal clarity. Given the extent of the Clause 15 changes, this sort of fine detail can easily be lost, but it is no less important that these provisions should deliver the right outcomes. As I confirmed in response to the noble Lord at Report, the reference to principles in sub-paragraph (b) of the reporting requirement is indeed intended to cover those principles that are the subject of his amendment; that is, those principles which were agreed between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations at the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations meeting on 16 October 2017 and published in the communiqué of that committee, to which the noble Lord referred. But I ought to be clear that while this reference covers the same ground as the amendment, the current wording also includes any revisions agreed to those principles and to new principles on the same subject that are put in place to supplement them over time.

I am sure that noble Lords will agree that it is right that as the work on the frameworks progresses—and it continues to progress—and as circumstances may change, we, the UK Government, and the devolved Administrations should continue to review the principles to ensure that they remain fit for purpose. I do not believe that it is the noble and learned Lord’s intention that the duty to report on any agreed revisions to the principles should be lifted from the Government or that we should be under a duty to report on the principles as drafted only in October 2017, even where these may have subsequently been revised or updated; but that, on one view, would be the effect of his amendment. In these circumstances, I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify what is covered by the reference to the principles, but again for the reasons given, I invite the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, the House has heard the pleas of the heart if not of the head. I think I have said before that, although I was born in Germany, I sadly do not qualify for a German passport or else I would be doing the same as many others. So many people are doing it because they fear and regret losing their EU citizenship. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quite rightly said, in the treaties EU citizenship is an add-on. Only people who are citizens of a member state have EU citizenship, with all the rights, protections and consular protections that brings. They have to be a citizen of a member state. Sadly, that change will come and we will not be EU citizens.

I would like to leave a thought with the Minister. We have not treated the whole of this aspect sufficiently seriously. We have not reached out to EU nationals living here and to people who are losing their rights as EU citizens. We have still not told EU citizens living here—unless I missed it—whether they will be able to continue to vote in our local government elections. We know they will not be allowed to vote in the European Parliament elections—that is fairly obvious—but there are other changes that the Government have been very lax and slow in spelling out.

The plea behind some of the feelings that we are having is to listen to the current EU citizens. If there is one plea that I would leave with our negotiators, it is that we need a withdrawal deal that puts citizens at its heart, not as an add-on, and that we should do everything that can be done to keep the links that we already have with agencies, education and so on. That would help to make a withdrawal deal that would enable British citizens, even if they will not have that lovely treasured purple passport, still feel as if they are continentals—full associates, if you like—with the rest of the EU.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this is of course an important issue that has already been covered in depth, both in this Chamber and in the other place. I welcome the opportunity to discuss it further with the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, when we exchange views on the interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, particularly Article 70 thereof. I acknowledge fully his interest in this area, the depth with which he has examined it and the importance that he underlines with regard to this matter.

Nevertheless the position remains, as summarised eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, that there is no provision in EU law for the concept of associate EU citizenship. It is clear that EU citizenship is tied to citizenship of a member state. The European Commission itself has referred to the additional rights and responsibilities attributed to the nationals of EU member states by virtue of EU citizenship, which they automatically attain under the provisions of the EU treaties. I emphasise the EU treaties because to take such a matter forward it would be necessary to contemplate the amendment of the EU treaties in a quite radical way, in order to attempt to confer on citizens of non-EU members the status of EU citizenship or something connected to it. However, we are willing to listen. Noble Lords may recollect that the European Parliament mentioned the idea of some associate citizenship; it has never elaborated upon that but if it wishes to, we are listening, and we would listen to that. I wish to make that clear.

The position of the Republic of Ireland emerges as the consequence of bilateral treaties that predate our entry into what was then the EEC and Ireland’s entry into the same, and that is not directly affected by our exit from what is now the EU. My understanding is that those arrangements continue in force.

With regard to the wider issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—the matter of voting rights, for example—during the course of the earlier negotiations we attempted to negotiate with regard to the exchange of voting rights, but at that stage the Commission declined to do so. That is something that we would wish to carry forward but the Commission was not prepared to engage in that discussion at that stage of the negotiation. Again, we remain open on these matters.

The citizens’ rights agreement reached in December, which is now set out in the draft withdrawal agreement, provides certainty for UK nationals in the EU regarding their rights following our exit. The agreement with the EU protects the rights of EU citizens and their family members living in the UK on exit day and indeed vice versa. To that extent, it will give citizens certainty about a wide range of rights including residence rights, healthcare rights and pension and other benefit rights. That will mean that UK nationals who are legally resident in the EU by the end of the implementation period will continue to benefit from most of the rights that stem from their EU citizenship today. As I say, associate EU citizenship does not make up part of the citizens’ rights agreement, and indeed by attempting to make it a negotiating objective we would be setting ourselves what is, frankly, an impossible target. The consequence would be that, should the amendment pass and the Government fail to adopt such an impossible negotiating position, our entire post-exit statute book would be put at severe risk. There would appear to be no sensible point in attempting to do that.

I stress that with regard to this matter we are in listening mode. Reference was made to the suggestion of further litigation in this area. A case is going on in Holland at present. It was referred by the Dutch Government to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has heard the appeal and is due to deliver its judgment later in June. We do not believe that is going to affect the matter at all but we await the judgment of that court. At present, though, we must proceed with the ultimate goal: to deal with Brexit in the easiest manner possible so far as citizenship is concerned.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 18th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, as has been said, this is an issue for which the Government simply have to produce a solution. For once I am quite glad that I am at the Dispatch Box on this side of the Chamber so it is not my problem—but I do know that it is a problem that the Government absolutely must solve. Let us consider some of the subjects covered by the list in the amendment: safeguards for child suspects in criminal proceedings; the recognition of professional qualifications, which will be extraordinarily important for business; health and safety; and the trademarks directive. We cannot afford to have gaps, particularly with something such as trademarks. This list covers issues that are already our policy and have been adopted with our consent, so we need to find a way of getting them into our legislation. How that can be done, I hope the Minister will now tell us.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by apologising to the House, and to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for not having been in my seat when she moved the amendment. I can attribute that only to my oversight, and to a disappearing group of amendments.

We addressed this matter in Committee. As has often been said during the passage of the Bill, it is intended to create a snapshot of EU law as it applies in the United Kingdom immediately before exit day, and then to retain it in our domestic law following our departure. That has always been the necessary mechanism. It is crucial that this snapshot is taken accurately and with certainty, to ensure that, as far as possible, the law we have before exit will be the same as the law after exit. This is not merely a dry technical or legal point. It is fundamentally important to people, businesses and other organisations throughout the country that we should have that degree of certainty.

Keeping that in mind, I turn first to Amendment 8 and the questions that have been raised in that context. Unlike other EU law such as regulations, decisions, and tertiary legislation, EU directives are not intended to form a part of a member state’s domestic law. Instead they require member states to bring forward their own national measures within a certain period of time, in order to implement their intended effect domestically. It is these domestic measures which are part of our law, and will be saved under Clause 2.

Questions have been raised about a series of directives that have been adopted, which have been helpfully listed by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, suggested that there was an anomaly in the situation when directives had been adopted at EU level but not implemented. However, with respect, where they have been adopted, so be it. Where they have been implemented we have a different scenario: they form part of our domestic law.

There are two developments that I wish to mention, because they impact on the amendment and the questions that have been raised in this context. First, the Government have reached agreement with the EU—subject to everything having to be agreed before anything is agreed—regarding an implementation period that will begin on 30 March 2019 and last until 31 December 2020. It is proposed and agreed that for the implementation period the United Kingdom will continue to follow and implement EU law, and that the existing EU mechanisms for supervision and enforcement will continue to apply. The proposed final agreement with the European Union will include the implementation period and its domestic effect. As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, anticipated, that will be provided for by the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. That has an impact on the series of directives to which the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, refers in her Amendment 8. Before I turn to those directives, I should observe that at least two of them are directives in respect of which we have opted out; in other words, as member states can do, they can secure an opt-out from a directive and it is never implemented in their national law, nor is it intended that it should be so implemented. Those directives in the noble Baroness’s amendment are: at paragraph (d), the legal aid (suspects, accused persons and those under European arrest warrant proceedings) directive; and, at paragraph (g), the safeguards for child suspects in criminal proceedings directive. In respect of those, there is already an opt-out in place; it was never intended that we would opt in and implement those directives—that is simply the position at the present time.

On the remaining directives listed in the amendment, there is a confusing reference to the websites and mobile applications directive, which I believe should be a reference to a 2016 directive. However, putting that to one side, I can say that all but two, or possibly three, of these directives will be implemented during the implementation period running up to 31 December 2020. That will be provided for by the withdrawal and implementation Bill, which is the instrument that will be employed for that purpose. Those directives will be addressed. There are exceptions. There are instances, for example, in which a directive can have a divided implementation period, where it may be only partially implemented before the final implementation period date of 31 December 2020. Essentially, we must come back to the fundamental requirement for an identifiable point at which we have ring-fenced and identified retained EU law. That is subject to what will go into a withdrawal and implementation Bill in the event of the implementation period agreement being implemented. That will cover all such legislation.

Amendment 32, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, would amend Clause 7 so that it would extend the correcting power of Ministers to include legislation arising after the snapshot had been taken. As set out before, Clause 3 seeks to convert direct EU legislation—regulations, decisions and tertiary legislation—as it applies in the UK immediately before our exit from the EU into our domestic statute book. This provision is a reflection of the snapshot approach taken by the Bill and is to ensure that our law stays as similar as possible following our departure to what it was immediately before our exit.

While most direct EU legislation will apply shortly after it is adopted, certain provisions within the legislation may be stated to apply in a staggered way on different dates. If the date falls after our exit from the EU, these provisions will not be retained by the Bill in our domestic law. That cut-off provides the necessary clarity for individuals and businesses to understand what the law is both pre and post the exit date.

Instead of seeking to change this clear cut-off point, the noble Baroness’s amendment would amend how such staggered implementation within direct EU legislation may be treated for the purposes of the correcting power within Clause 7. As will be discussed in much greater detail on later days, the power contained in Clause 7 is designed to correct the “deficiencies” arising within retained EU law as a result of our withdrawal from the EU, thereby helping us to provide a functioning statute book from day one. As I understand it, the noble Baroness’s intention in tabling Amendment 32 was to widen the definition of “deficiency” to include the provisions within direct EU legislation which are stated to apply after our exit from the EU, thereby giving Ministers the ability to use Clause 7 to bring them into our domestic law. That is currently prohibited by Clause 7(4).

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions at this stage of the debate. I appreciate, as do other Members of the House, that when I move the government amendment to Clause 11, we will embrace a debate about the consequences of that amended clause and the significant change it makes to the way in which we are going to deal with, among other things, devolved competences. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, his amendments are consequential in a sense on what is going to happen with regard to Clause 11. In that context, I point out that we had already indicated our intention to move the amendment to Clause 11 and then withdraw it, in order that the consequences for the schedules to the Bill can be addressed more properly when we reach Report. However, there is a more fundamental issue underlying this, which has been highlighted by the use of the terms “consult” and “consent”. It is really rather fundamental. Because these are probing amendments, I will just outline the Government’s thinking with regard to this area of the Bill and how it will work. I am sorry if I am going to appear somewhat repetitive about some matters of history that have been touched upon already, but perhaps your Lordships could bear with me, if but for a moment.

In 1972, the UK Parliament of course transferred certain competences to the EU. Having done so, it limited its competence to legislate for the United Kingdom. When it came to the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, that Brussels competence, as I will term it, had already gone. When it came to considering the scope of the divorce settlement, the matter of the powers held by the European Union in Brussels was not in scope for consideration as part of devolution. They had gone, by virtue of an international treaty implemented in domestic law pursuant to the ECA 1972. The devolved settlement was determined by reference to the competence that remained in Westminster in 1998 and in 2006.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am going to elaborate on what happens to the competences in Europe. I wonder whether the noble Baroness will bear with me just for a moment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

But I wanted to challenge what the Minister just said. The competences were not actually removed from us. We agreed to operate within the framework, but the idea that we actually gave up those competences in the way described would perhaps not be accepted, as such. We agreed that the EU had rights to make laws in certain areas, but that is not the same as saying, “This is no longer our responsibility”.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, pursuant to our international treaty obligations, we bound ourselves at the level of international law to allow the EU to exercise competence in areas where previously the UK Parliament would have exercised it. That was then implemented in domestic law by virtue of the 1972 Act. Of course a sovereign Parliament is always able to repeal the 1972 Act, as it is now doing, but so long as it remained in place, and so long as we remained party to the relevant treaty—which became treaties—we were bound in that context. I do not entirely agree with the analysis, but I do not believe it is material for the present purposes, if I may respectfully say so.

Once Brussels had certain competences, it then exercised them. It was important that Brussels should exercise them in one area in particular, which was the development of the EU single market, as no one else could have exercised jurisdiction over a single market in the EU. The idea that 12—now 28—individual jurisdictions could have maintained the single market is self-evidently untenable, so Brussels exercised that jurisdiction, for very good reason. When we leave the EU, we will find ourselves in the position where we want to maintain an internal single market in the United Kingdom; the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to that, while the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said we are looking forward to the internal market in the United Kingdom. We have to bear that in mind. What Parliament is in a position to legislate for a UK single market? The answer to that is the Parliament that has jurisdiction for the whole United Kingdom. I will come on to the issue of devolved competence in a moment, but generally speaking if you are going to maintain a single market you need a legislative power that is able to do that for the single market.

Lest anyone interrupt just yet, I add that of course by their very nature the devolved Administrations, parliaments and assemblies have responsibility for devolved powers in their respective nations. We respect that, of course, but there is an issue here that has not yet been mentioned. We identified, on the basis of analysis that was carried out with the devolved Administrations, that there were some 153 areas of competence where—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to rehearse the rhetoric that has been used by some members of the Scottish Government to feed populism. Terms such as “power grab” may have their place, but they do not have a place in the context of our looking at this legislation. Of course, it has been asserted that consultation is not enough—even though it may lead to agreement—and that there has to be consent and only consent. But if it is consent, that is, let us remember, a very material change to the devolved settlements. That will result in the devolved Parliaments and Governments being able effectively to veto matters that impact upon those outwith their area of devolved competence.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The Minister used a phrase—which is used also either in the Explanatory Note or in a letter, I cannot remember which—about the retention of this for the purpose of the internal market. It might be helpful if that wording appeared on the face of the Bill.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note that comment. The noble Baroness will appreciate that the amendment to Clause 11, which I will move in due course, seeks to ring-fence these powers to ensure that they are limited. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has also tabled an amendment regarding a sunset clause in that context. It is perfectly clear from the proposed amendment to Clause 11 that they are meant to have a very limited function—but I note what the noble Baroness said and I will take it forward.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

One has to be careful in the matter of language. We are at one with regard to the first part of what we want to do in the context of withdrawal, but we do not yet have an agreement that is binding in law with the other EU 27. For example, going forward, and during the subsequent negotiations, the EU may come and go as to the terms of the joint report. Indeed, we saw some indications of that when it came out with its draft recently, where issue was taken with the way in which it expressed some aspects of the joint report, particularly with regard to Northern Ireland. I appreciate that, if you want to construe the term “consensus” in that way, it involves “agreement”. The reason why I am trying to move away from “agreement” is that some see the word and infer that there is some legally binding concept. That is not yet what we have. We have a joint report and, therefore, we have consensus. We are moving on to the overall negotiations on what will ultimately be an international treaty.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

We all hope that this agreement, or whatever word it is, is fixed soon, but it could be quite late. We may not have the withdrawal Bill until sometime next year and it could be that we are due to leave a month or so afterwards. This part of the Bill affects individuals more than businesses and they will not know whether they can go to court until it is fixed—we may not get Royal Assent until a month or two before we leave. Is that really a good way to treat individuals?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, businesses affect individuals, so it is not appropriate to try to draw a distinction between citizens’ rights and businesses in that context. The right to work involves the right to maintain a business in various countries; you cannot simply draw them apart in that way. As regards regards timing, of course we are concerned to ensure that we achieve a withdrawal agreement sooner rather than later. That is why these negotiations are under way. If perchance no agreement is achieved—and I am not aware of anyone who wishes this, although others will perhaps assert the contrary—we will have to look at how we then deal with matters in the absence of that international agreement.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I agree: the Committee will be pleased to know that, had the letter ended like that, I would not be on my feet today. These are important measures for our international co-operation, and if the Government would say, “Yes, this is something that we are willing to do”, that would take us forward. I hope that the noble and learned Lord may be able to give us that assurance as he responds.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to all sides of the Committee for their contributions to this part of the debate, which began with an amendment concerning directives. I was not initially taken with the use of the word “fuzzy” by my noble friend Lord Deben but the term has begun to gain traction as the debate has continued. Let us try to be clear about one or two issues. The Bill seeks, for very clear reasons, to take a snapshot of EU law as it applies immediately before exit day. That is the cut-off point. Regulations emerging from the EU have direct effect on the domestic law of member states, so regulations that have taken direct effect by the exit date will be part of retained EU law. There is really no difficulty about that whatever.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we must make progress at this stage, if the noble Lord does not mind. We have to keep moving.

I come to the nub of the point. If there is a concern about the powers being conferred on Ministers to ensure that the retained EU law works after exit, that arises in the context of Clauses 7 and 5, which will be the subject of future debate in this House. As I say, it is not appropriate to try to represent the powers already set out in the Bill as extending beyond the boundaries set out precisely there about correction, regulation and making retained EU law work. I respectfully suggest that the route proposed by the noble Baroness is not one that we should go down as we would simply run into the sand. If we were to list technicalities and technical changes in all these areas of legislation, we would be here in 10 years’ time trying to produce such a schedule; let us be frank about it. Of course, many people may wish that we will be here in 10 years’ time attempting to achieve that. In that context, I invite the noble Baroness to consider withdrawing her amendment and invite the noble Lord, Lord Judd, not to move his.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I know the Committee will not believe this but the three noble Lords I most want to thank are the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Faulks, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. I thank the noble Lord, Lord True, for raising my spirits. I love the words “Labour Government”; I will use them again and again. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, because sometimes when you know what you are talking about, you assume that everyone else does. I had got something wrong and it was not clear. I was not talking about how, under this Bill, the current EU rules will be put into legislation by statutory instruments. We are content with that. We will in due course argue about whether the relevant word should be “necessary” or “appropriate”, but that is not the purpose of this amendment. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for giving me the opportunity to say that.

The purpose of the amendment is about looking way into the future and future-proofing what we are putting into UK legislation and to make sure that it cannot then be tampered with by means of statutory instruments. It is not about the current work that many of our colleagues on the statutory instruments committee are about to undertake. We are talking about the future. I again thank the noble Viscount for giving me the opportunity to discuss that.

I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that I said at the beginning of this discussion that we would come on to how we deal with the bigger issues involved in this matter. However, today, I want to discuss the human, environmental and consumer rights that we sometimes risk losing sight of when we get into the technicalities of law and how we are going to hold on to those. As I said, I absolutely accept that we may deal with the technicalities later.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that certain bits of retained EU law could possibly be dealt with by statutory instruments and others by primary legislation. Elsewhere in the Bill judges are allowed to deal with measures on a case-by-case basis. But in the case of retained EU law, we have a difficulty as I think he said that he was happy for the Government to decide which measures could be dealt with by secondary legislation. Perhaps that is the nub of the problem.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for the contributions that have been made to the debate. This short Bill has already invoked many hours of debate, so I intend to keep my remarks very brief.

I endorse the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, both as to the appropriateness of this amendment and as to the spirit in which it will be and is being received by the Government. As noble Lords will be aware, the Prime Minister gives a Statement to the other place following European Councils. We know that there will be a Council this month, and indeed quarterly thereafter. That means that a Statement will be made to Parliament at least once every quarter on European issues, and it will be repeated in this House. Of course, that is just the beginning of a much wider process over which this Parliament has control at the end of the day.

DExEU Ministers have responded to more than 600 parliamentary Written Questions, appeared at 13 Select Committees and given six Oral Statements to the House on developments regarding our exit. The Secretary of State has agreed to give evidence to the Exiting the EU Select Committee on 15 March, alongside the Permanent Secretary at DExEU, and will shortly afterwards give evidence to the Lords EU Committee on 22 March.

The Government are committed to parliamentary scrutiny, and Parliament will play a key role in scrutinising and shaping our withdrawal. As my noble friend Lord Bridges observed last week, we have had take-note debates, debates on Select Committee reports, debates in government time and Select Committee appearances. All this will continue in order that Parliament can scrutinise the development of negotiations in so far as is possible to put those in the public domain and in so far as they come into the public domain.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, referred to secrets, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to nasty secrets. This may reflect a difference of approach, but at the end of the day there will not be any secrets. You cannot conduct such a process in secret, ultimately, and then expect Parliament to consider that it is being kept properly informed, as it should be, if you have what are termed secrets. We are committed to keeping Parliament at least as well informed as the European Parliament as negotiations progress.

A Bill to repeal the European Communities Act will follow. There will be primary legislation on issues such as immigration and customs, and a vote at the end with regard to the process on the final deal to exit.

With all that in mind, I will pose a few questions. Is the Prime Minister already bound to give a Statement to Parliament after every quarterly European Council? The answer is yes.

Have the Government been willing to give frequent Statements to Parliament? The answer is yes.

Have DExEU Ministers and other government Ministers appeared in front of Select Committees? The answer is yes.

Have the Government listened to Select Committee reports? The answer is yes; we published a White Paper in February this year.

Do the Government aim to respond to the Select Committee reports about Brexit within two months? The answer is yes.

Have the Government said they will give more information to Parliament, so long as it does not undermine our negotiating position? The answer is yes.

Then there is the core question: what is the present Bill about? The Bill is about giving the Prime Minister the authority to give notice of withdrawal from the European Union.

With great respect to the House and to all noble Lords, let us proceed and pass this Bill. It will not be improved by unnecessary decoration and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has already observed, it is not appropriate that this amendment should proceed. As I believe all Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken would acknowledge, it is not necessary that this amendment should proceed in these circumstances. Therefore, I invite the noble Lords to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank the Minister and other noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. The most helpful exchange—I mean no disrespect to the others—was to hear the noble and learned Lord Mackay support the spirit of the amendment and then the Minister say that he agreed. If I could just bottle that, that will do me nicely.

I want to make only two other points. Although there are of course report-backs after the European Council, the UK will not be there when the European Council discusses our departure. Therefore, it is the other meetings that we are interested in.

My other comment is in response to the noble Lord, Lord Spicer, who said that if we dared to suggest that Parliament rather than the Crown should take the final decision, Mrs May might call an election. I am much older than my noble friend who spoke earlier and not only did I vote in 1975 but I remember the February 1974 election very well. Edward Heath basically called an election on who governs Britain. Mrs May would not be well advised to go to the country on, “Do you want the Government or Parliament to govern Britain?”. However, that is beside the point. I thank the Minister for the tone of his response and, on that basis, beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I can absolutely assure the noble Lord that we are taking into consideration not only the White Paper from Wales but the submissions prepared by the Scottish Government. All these matters have been taken into consideration in the context of our negotiating position following the triggering of Article 50. All the proposals outlined in these papers will be the subject of keen scrutiny by the Government. What we are considering today is a Bill to implement the referendum result and respect the judgment of the Supreme Court. We are not engaged in considering a vehicle for determining the terms or shape of the broader negotiations that will follow the triggering of Article 50. As has been said on many occasions, that will be a hugely important milestone for the United Kingdom but it is only a milestone, not a cut-off point. It is not the end of the process—it is merely the beginning.

Since the referendum result there has been regular and ongoing political engagement. I noticed that the Prime Minister’s very first visit following the referendum result was to Edinburgh, quickly followed by Cardiff and Belfast. I remind the House that the principles which underpin relations between the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations are set out in a memorandum of understanding. There is the joint ministerial committee which should operate—I say should—by consensus, because as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and the noble Earl have observed, it is not always possible to achieve consensus, but these bodies have that aim.

At the plenary session of the joint ministerial committee in October last year, the four Governments agreed to create a Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations, chaired by the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU. Under that structure, Ministers and officials from the UK Government and the devolved Administrations have engaged closely in the process of considering our exit from the European Union. That committee has been meeting monthly and a wide range of matters has been discussed on each Government’s requirements for the future relationship with the EU, and the future relationship between the devolved Administrations and this Government.

Over the autumn, we also undertook important work with the devolved Administrations to fully appreciate their priorities and interests. In that context we have taken account of the publication that the noble Lord referred to—namely, the White Paper from the devolved Administration in Wales, and the Brexit papers published by the Scottish Government—which was submitted to us for consideration in the context of that process.

Outside the formal processes that I have described, we have also engaged extensively with stakeholders in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to try to ensure that the interests of all these areas are reflected in our negotiations with the European Union. Ministers have regularly visited the devolved constituent nations of the United Kingdom on numerous occasions for the purposes of those discussions. They have met with a whole variety of stakeholders from SMEs to multinational companies. We have met with MSPs as well. We have tried to engage right across the areas of interest that will be touched upon by our departure from the EU.

A point that was alluded to by a number of noble Lords was how the devolved Administrations will be engaged in determining where repatriated powers should sit in the future. It is a matter of interest to all of us. We must work carefully to ensure that, as powers are repatriated from Brussels back to Britain, the right powers are returned to the United Kingdom Parliament, and the right powers are returned to the devolved Administrations—whether in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland.

This will be a matter for further discussion. The Prime Minister has been clear that no decisions currently taken by the devolved Administrations will be taken from them. That is not the end point, but the starting point for this form of negotiation, and we appreciate and understand the importance of addressing how we deal with the repatriation of the acquis in due course. It is important to have these debates, but it is equally important not to tie the Government’s hands as they approach the forthcoming negotiations. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his response. My only response is to the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, where I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. The only agreement was about the way to talk and that wording is the JMC’s terms of reference at the moment. The Minister said the Government are trying to engage—I say let us try a little harder. The lack of pre-information, before the White Paper, caused a slight frisson, but maybe that is well behind us. I hope that we are marching forward on slightly firmer ground. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 27th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the Committee has heard quite enough from me so I will not speak on this other than to say that this will come up when we discuss the single market and I will reserve our comments until then. The Committee will probably know that we will not be supporting this amendment.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the amendment concerning the European Economic Area, which seeks to ensure that the UK remains a member of the EEA.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 180, 181, 197, 198, 205, 206, 231 and 232 relate to judicial commissioner approval of major modifications to warrants issued under Parts 6 and 7 of the Bill. They seek to provide additional clarity regarding the matters the commissioner must review when deciding whether to approve such a modification.

The Bill already provides for major modifications to such warrants. In the context of bulk interception, bulk acquisition and bulk personal dataset warrants, a major modification may be used to add or vary one of the operational purposes for which data may be examined under the warrant. As regards bulk equipment interference warrants, a major modification can additionally add to or vary any description of conduct in the warrant.

The Bill requires full double-lock authorisation from a Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner for any major modification to a bulk warrant. These amendments will not change that. Instead, they provide greater clarity about the matters that a commissioner must consider when determining whether to approve a modification to a bulk warrant.

The amendments specify that, for major modifications to add or vary an “operational purpose”, a judicial commissioner must review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to whether the modification is necessary, applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review and ensuring that the commissioner complies with the duties in relation to privacy set out in Clause 2, the so-called privacy clause.

In the context of bulk equipment interference, if a major modification proposes to add or vary a description of conduct, the judicial commissioner must also review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to whether the conduct authorised by the modification is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by it. The amendments are intended to ensure clarity and consistency across the Bill, and as such are to be welcomed.

The sharing of data and intelligence with our overseas partners is critical to the work of our security and intelligence agencies. Without working together with our allies, those agencies could not do their vital work of keeping us safe. Amendments 184, 185, 201, 202, 209 and 210 simply clarify the consideration that must be given by the Secretary of State before authorising the disclosure to overseas authorities of data acquired under the bulk powers in the Bill.

The Bill already places a duty on the Secretary of State to consider whether corresponding safeguards will be applied to the data that are to be shared with the overseas authority in relation to their retention and disclosure. These amendments make explicit that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the overseas authority has in place safeguards, to the extent appropriate, that correspond to those in the Bill not only in respect of the retention and disclosure of the data shared in bulk but in relation to their selection for examination. This group of amendments therefore makes absolutely clear that proper consideration will be given to the examination safeguards that are applied whenever bulk data are shared with another country. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for moving these amendments, all of which we are happy to support and some of which respond to concerns we raised in Committee.

It may assist the House if I outline at this stage the purpose of Amendment 185A, in the names of my noble friend Lord Rosser and myself, which is about safeguards for disclosing overseas-related material for our foreign allies and agencies. That is material, possibly including information sent overseas by UK residents, obtained by our security and intelligence services under bulk interception warrants. It is an amendment which we hope the Government will feel able to accept.

In Clause 142, before any information obtained under a bulk interception warrant is disclosed overseas, the Secretary of State must ensure that arrangements and safeguards are in place regarding the retention and disclosure of such material, as the Minister has outlined. These requirements correspond to Clause 141 safeguards for domestic arrangements: that is, requiring that the number of people to whom the bulk-intercepted material is disclosed, the extent of disclosure and the number of copies made is limited to the minimum necessary. These safeguards also require the destruction of such material where there are no longer grounds for retaining it.

However, unlike Clause 141 for domestic arrangements, Clause 142 for overseas disclosure provides a wide discretion for the Secretary of State, whereby she or he must ensure equivalent safeguards only,

“to such extent (if any) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.

It could, therefore, be possible for the Secretary of State to decide that no safeguards are required in a particular case.

We recognise absolutely that the UK will need to share intelligence with overseas agencies and our amendment does not undermine the ability of UK agencies to do that. We also accept that overseas disclosure may be of a different nature, with particular political, diplomatic or security implications, all of which the Secretary of State must consider. However, the present wording is surely too wide and, if I have understood it correctly, would not be subject to subsequent review. Amendment 185A removes this very broad discretion and requires that it must appear to the Secretary of State that safeguards corresponding to the requirements under Clause 141(2) and (5) will apply in relation to disclosure overseas.

The Minister will not be surprised if I make reference to the Szabó v Hungary finding that minimum standards should be set out in law to avoid abuses of power and that,

“it would be contrary to the rule of law … for a discretion granted to the executive in the sphere of national security to be expressed in terms of unfettered power”.

The judgment notes that,

“the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion … with sufficient clarity … to give … adequate protection against arbitrary interference”.

I hope that the Government will feel able to accept the amendment as, if anything, extra safeguards may, indeed, be required where sensitive information is being disclosed abroad. We look forward to the Minister’s response on this.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Like other noble Lords, I thank the Minister and the Bill team for the detailed discussions—perhaps negotiations is a better word—that they have had not only with us but with other interested parties. We have sought to balance our strong desire to protect clients’ confidentiality—their ability to speak openly and honestly with their lawyer, safe in the knowledge that information will go no further —with the need to safeguard the security of citizens and free them from the threat of terrorism or other risks to life. It would be wonderful if there were a nice, absolute and clear division between those two objectives but, sadly, in the real world there seldom is.

The Bill as drafted had not got the balance right. It was tipping towards the state’s ability to access or use legally privileged information. Since then, as the Minister outlined, the amendments to Clause 2, an overriding clause which should circumvent all the powers in the Bill, will significantly safeguard privileged material. It is not an absolute, but we acknowledge movement here and in other amendments, such as the public interest test needed before approving a warrant. It would require both the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner to be satisfied that the public interest in obtaining the information outweighed that long-standing public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of legally privileged communications, but also, importantly, that there were no other reasonable means of obtaining the required information.

Similarly, we welcome Amendment 25, by which, when a warrant is requested to prevent or detect serious crime, the exceptional compelling circumstances have to relate to national security or preventing death or significant injury, and do not, as with some of the other powers, include being in the interests of the UK’s economic well-being. We are also pleased that the commissioner would have to be informed when any privileged material is retained by an agency and note that, as has just been mentioned, it can be ordered to be destroyed or for conditions to be imposed on its disclosure.

We are, however, sympathetic to the desire of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—I cannot believe he really called himself less luminous—to allow the commissioner to differentiate between advice and, for example, the time when a phone call was made, which could be incredibly important but irrelevant to the content of the phone call. If there is a way to enable the commissioner to differentiate in that way, we hope that the Government will respond to that positively.

Finally, with regard to the so-called inequity exception, we note that any application for a warrant under this provision would have to set out the grounds for believing that communications are being made with the intention of furthering a crime, and we welcome that.

We are mindful that representatives of lawyers—speaking on behalf of their clients, because it is their interests that we are discussing—feel that the Government have not gone far enough to meet their concern. We acknowledge that, on paper, an enormous amount of progress has been made. Our concern is whether the resources, culture and mindset of the IPC will allow for the scrutiny and challenge that the words now on paper will require. I am reassured by the fact that the judicial commissioners are not just lawyers but very experienced and senior ones, so they will have a background of understanding the legal profession’s fears and long-standing views about this matter. Perhaps, when replying, the Minister, in addition to responding to the wider points made, can give an assurance that the commissioner and judicial commissioners will be appointed with a view to guaranteeing their complete independence and with sufficient resources to be able to look at these significant and demanding issues with due care and attention.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by looking at Amendments 27 and 88, which seek to insert the word “clearly” in the public interest test. On this point I concur with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, that there is a danger that this would simply muddy the waters and not clarify.

The test as set out in the government amendment is straightforward. The public interest in obtaining the information sought either outweighs the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of privilege or it does not. If the word “clearly” were inserted, that certainty would be lost. We would have to try to define what we mean by “clearly”. Logic suggests that it means that one public interest test should outweigh the other by a certain amount, as indicated by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but it is not apparent what that amount would be. This would undoubtedly lead to confusion and uncertainty. Given that such a warrant can be sought only in exceptional and compelling circumstances, where national security or life and limb are at risk, confusion and uncertainty are one thing that we cannot afford.

The government amendments set out in detail what is intended by “exceptional and compelling”. The test is explicit on the face of the Bill and it is one that works. We are also introducing a requirement for the codes to include additional information about when circumstances are to be considered exceptional and compelling, and requiring the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to keep that language under review. It is in these circumstances that I invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.

The second set of amendments in this group—Amendments 56, 57, 192 and 193—seek to change the power of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to determine what happens to legally privileged material when it has been obtained by an agency and the agency wishes to retain it. First, they would provide that the commissioner has the power to impose conditions on the use of the item as well as its disclosure. Secondly, they would also require the commissioner to direct that any privileged material that has been obtained must be destroyed unless there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify its retention. These amendments raise important issues in respect of legally privileged material that is inadvertently obtained and where the agency wishes to retain it. I would like to reflect further on our consideration of these points today and to return to this issue at Third Reading.

Amendment 107 deals with communications data and seeks to provide for judicial approval of authorisations for the communications data of a person who is or is likely to be a practising legal professional. It seeks to reflect the protections provided in Part 3 of the Bill for the identity of a journalistic source, but in practice this amendment goes much further by attaching the protections to the profession rather than to the sensitive information they manage. The debates in the House of Commons and at previous stages in this House have been clear that Parliament’s view is that protection should attach to the sensitive communication or to the function being carried out and should not simply apply to the person because they are a member of some profession. For example, there was consensus that protection should apply to the journalist’s communications with a source or the client’s communications with a lawyer. This amendment would go against that consensus by providing protection to a lawyer simply because he is a lawyer.

The Bill takes a reasoned and balanced approach. It applies additional protections where appropriate; provides for judicial authorisation of the most intrusive powers and for the use of less intrusive powers in the most sensitive circumstances; and provides a powerful and robust oversight regime to ensure that powers cannot be misused. The protections provided are specific to each power under the Bill, applying protection which is appropriate to the level of intrusion represented by each power. The draft Communications Data Code of Practice sets out the additional considerations that must be taken into account when any data relate to a member of a profession which routinely holds items subject to legal provision. Indeed, Schedule 7 to the Bill requires that the code shall include such detail. In addition, the current amendment to Clause 2 puts beyond doubt the importance of taking particular care in relation to sensitive information, such as items subject to legal privilege.

Our debate has already shown the importance that the Government place on the protection of legally privileged material, but I would suggest that it is not appropriate to introduce these additional protections within the context of authorisations for communications data. I invite the noble Baroness not to press Amendment 107.

Amendment 55A, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, seeks to amend government Amendment 55. This amendment would require the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to direct that any material obtained that is subject to legal privilege must be destroyed and allow the agency to retain only material that is incidental to that which is privileged.

I have already indicated in response to Amendment 57, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that I am minded to look again at whether there is more we might provide on the face of the Bill regarding the test that the commissioner should apply when making a decision about whether material can be retained. However, I would respectfully suggest that what the noble and learned Lord proposes with this amendment is not appropriate in the circumstances. It is the case that the vital intelligence that an agency may require could intrude not only on incidental material in a legally privileged communication but on the legally privileged communication in general.

I take up the example which the noble and learned Lord gave of the individual communicating with a lawyer and asking, “Can I be extradited from Greece?”. One might say, in a very straightforward fashion, that the relevant intelligence there is Greece, not that he may or may not be extradited. But what if the communication goes like this: “Can I be extradited from Greece or Albania?”, and the answer is, “You can be extradited from Greece but you cannot be extradited from Albania”. Just giving them Greece and Albania will not assist the intelligence services very much. On the other hand, the legally privileged information that he can be extradited from Greece but cannot be extradited from Albania might lead the reasonable intelligence officer to infer that the individual was more likely to be found in Albania than in Greece. It is in those circumstances that I suggest that one cannot easily divide between the two. As I have indicated, we are conscious that in these areas we can look again to see whether we can strengthen these matters. At this stage I would invite the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I was about to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Butler, on his excellent drafting of the amendments but he has slightly given away that it was not all done by his own fair hand. However, if the look on the Minister’s face is indicating that the Government might accept the amendments, we are delighted that the noble Lord’s influence from this House seems to be keeping pace with the influence that he had in his previous occupation. We are very content to support the amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we welcome the chance to revisit this important issue, which was debated in Committee.

In putting beyond doubt that deliberate wrongdoing in relation to the bulk powers will be subject to clear, criminal sanction, we accept that these amendments will provide clarity on a crucial issue. We also believe that they have been drafted in such a way that, rightly, they would not criminalise honest, well-intentioned mistakes by the staff of our security and intelligence agencies, who do so much to keep us all safe. As such, we believe they strike the right balance and are to be welcomed. Therefore, we are happy to accept the amendments.

Brexit: Role of Parliament

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Monday 18th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, the Government’s position is that there is no legal obligation to consult Parliament on the triggering of Article 50. That is, of course, the subject of challenge in the courts. Indeed, there will be a directions hearing in the Administrative Court tomorrow in respect of one of those claims.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, the referendum campaigns were both all-party. The challenge now falls to all of us to implement the result of that referendum. Will the Minister outline the Government’s plans to engage all parties, and indeed the Cross Benches, in the discussions that now need to take place?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The Prime Minister has been very clear that it will take time for the UK Government to agree their position for negotiations in respect of the exit from Europe. They will consult widely, not only with all Westminster governmental institutions but also with the devolved Administrations, including the Scottish Parliament.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin with Amendment 15, which raises the issue of creating a new criminal offence. This was initially discussed in the other place at earlier stages of the Bill’s passage.

In the other place the Government made it clear that each of the powers in the Bill is already subject to one or more civil penalties or criminal offences for misuse. Part 1 has always contained a number of privacy protections that are central to the Bill, and it now makes clear the existing offences and sanctions that apply in respect of the different powers, such as the offences that relate to the unlawful interception or unlawful obtaining of communications data. In addition to the strict safeguards that are explicit in Part 1 of the Bill, there are a number of other additional offences that exist elsewhere in statute but apply equally to any misuse of the powers.

In response to the concerns raised in the other place and with sympathy for the Intelligence and Security Committee’s desire for clarity, the Government listened carefully and tabled amendments that now more explicitly refer to the relevant offences set out in other statutes, such as the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which applies to equipment interference, and the Data Protection Act 1998. These put beyond doubt the penalties that would apply in the event of deliberate wrongdoing by a member of a public authority.

On the basis that there are existing offences that apply to every power in the Bill, the Government are reluctant to introduce a new criminal offence that would lead to confusion, as it would overlap or duplicate those set out elsewhere. Perhaps more simply, it would be unnecessary. The powers in the Bill are varied, each with their own distinct regimes. If we sought, as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, to create one offence to fit them all, it would either be too broad and catch too much, or by being too narrow actually miss something and result in a less effective sanction. It could also lead to a lack of legal clarity and potentially hamper the effective enforcement of existing offences. The point is that one size does not always fit all.

There is a further concern. The heads of the three intelligence agencies have written to the Home Secretary and to the ISC outlining their very real concerns about the inadvertent operational impact this proposal may have. The officers working within our intelligence agencies are entirely committed to the mission of keeping the country safe. They are professional and ethical in the way in which they conduct their work. We recognise the concerns raised about potential misuse of investigatory powers, but the creation of a new offence may unnecessarily inhibit agency staff and limit their ability to operate with confidence and at pace against the numerous threats we face.

We do not disagree that intelligence officers who are exercising these most sensitive and intrusive powers should consider their actions carefully before using them, but I have seen no evidence that the dedicated men and women of our security and intelligence agencies give such matters anything less than the most careful consideration. I can quite easily see that Parliament’s creating a new offence that appears to be targeted solely and squarely at our intelligence agencies could have a detrimental impact on the confidence, morale and willingness of those persons to carry out the often dangerous yet vital work we ask them to do on our behalf. Moreover, the Government are clear that if anyone in a public authority were to act contrary to their obligations under the Bill, the matter would be taken extremely seriously. The current commissioners already ensure that they investigate and report publicly on the very infrequent cases of errors which involve serious misuse. In appropriate cases disciplinary action may be taken, up to and including dismissal, or civil or criminal liability incurred.

When these points are considered collectively, I hope noble Lords will agree that this puts beyond doubt the severe penalties that would apply in the event of deliberate wrongdoing by a member of a public authority. A new criminal offence is therefore wholly unnecessary and potentially confusing, and would adversely affect the operation of the agencies.

Amendment 16 seeks to extend the criminal offence of unlawful interception to “private” postal services. This is aimed at capturing those services which cater to more specialist clients; for example, companies that provide services to banks or lawyers. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to DX as an example of such a company. I understand the reason for the amendment and support the principle that the offence should apply to this type of company. However, these companies are already caught by the existing provision. The Bill describes a “public postal service” as one that,

“is offered or provided to the public, or a substantial section of the public”.

This includes companies that specialise in providing services to bespoke sectors, such as the legal profession or banks.

Moving on to Amendment 17, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, Clause 3 sets out the offence of unlawful interception. This is a vital safeguard that relates to one of the most sensitive powers provided for in the Bill. It underpins the protections for privacy that are fundamental to the Bill. I am afraid I cannot accept an amendment which would limit or even undermine that safeguard. The amendment would limit the offence by setting out circumstances in which it would not apply; for example, it provides a public interest defence to the offence. It would not be appropriate to allow someone to intercept the communications of another—without lawful authority—because that person takes the subjective view that it would be in the public interest. I note and agree with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, in this regard. It would not be right to reduce this strong safeguard, which exists to protect individuals.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I should have come in on Amendment 16, but before the Minister moves on, the issue of the private postal service was raised by the Minister’s Scottish legal colleagues, who wrote to us. They felt that the definition of “public postal service” did not include DX. I wonder if he will agree to write to me so that the legal position is clarified, since it was good Scottish lawyers who raised the issue.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. It was raised by Scottish colleagues—Scottish colleagues with whom I do not agree—but I am quite happy to undertake to write to her. I should say it was raised by the Scottish Law Society, not the Scottish Bar.

Amendments 18 and 246 were spoken to very clearly by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady O’Neill, and the noble Lords, Lord Lipsey and Lord Oates. While I am quite happy to write on the matter of press regulation and the commencement of Section 40, press regulation is not the purpose of the Bill. I have to make that clear in this context because while I understand the points that are being made, they do not arise directly in the context of these amendments.

Moreover, the relevant amendments are not considered necessary. There is already a criminal offence where unlawful interception takes place on a public or private telecommunications system or a public postal service. There is also a cause of action which applies in a limited set of circumstances, where the criminal offence does not apply. Where there is an allegation that unlawful interception has taken place on behalf of a public authority, a person may seek recourse through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which has the power to provide redress, including awarding damages.

Where the conduct relates to an individual who does not belong to a public authority, there are other causes of action which may be applicable. I may have misunderstood the noble Baroness that the tort which currently exists in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—allowing an individual to take action against a person who has the right to control the use or operation of a private telecommunications system and who intercepts a communication on that system—has been added to the Bill by way of Clause 8, and that happened after the debate on the Bill in the other place. In these circumstances, we are not prepared to accept the amendments.

Turning to Amendments 20 and 21, Clauses 6(2) and 6(3) are important because they provide that where a public authority, or a telecommunications operator, is acting in accordance with a warrant properly obtained under the Bill, or the provisions of Clauses 42 to 50, they can be sure that they are not breaking any other law or required to obtain additional authorisations. This legal certainty is vital for those engaged in the essential work of keeping us safe.

The first amendment seeks to provide that future legislation could make that conduct unlawful for certain purposes. I understand the principle the noble Lords seek to achieve but I do not believe it is necessary. Nothing in the Bill prevents Parliament amending the legislation at a future date to make any of the activity unlawful or provide that some additional authorisation is required.

The second amendment seeks to amend subsection (3). The purpose of this subsection is to make clear that conduct undertaken in accordance with a warrant or which is authorised by any of Clauses 42 to 50 is to be treated as lawful. This is vital in providing companies with reassurance that by complying with a warrant they will not be acting unlawfully in relation to their regulatory obligations or other legislation. The effect of this amendment would be to provide that the conduct is lawful only for the purposes of the Bill. My concern, were we to accept this amendment, would be that we would remove the legal certainty that the companies and agencies rely on to do their job and to keep us safe. We therefore do not accept the amendment.

Amendment 84 relates to exceptions from the duty not to make unauthorised disclosures about warrants. It is absolutely right that the Secretary of State should be accountable to Parliament, even for the most sensitive decisions concerning the most sensitive powers. But when it comes to such matters, which necessarily must remain secret, it is absolutely right that Parliament provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to be held to account, while at the same time doing nothing to jeopardise national security. That is the very reason for the existence of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

To put beyond doubt that the Secretary of State is, and will continue to be, accountable to Parliament through the ISC for decisions relating to warrants, the Government amended Clause 54 and Clause 123 to make clear that the Secretary of State may disclose matters relating to warrants to the ISC. This will allow the ISC to carry out its statutory functions in holding the Government to account, while maintaining our security. It is right for the ISC to carry out this function and it would not be appropriate for disclosure to be made to Parliament as a whole. To do so would breach the long-standing principle of successive Governments to neither confirm nor deny matters relating to intelligence and security and could risk jeopardising our national security. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lords not to press their amendments.