European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 16th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, the EEA relationship has been, and, indeed still is, one that suits its member states exceedingly well. It enables certain non-EU member states to take full advantage of their geographical proximity and their historical trading and cultural relations with the EU to the benefits of both sides of the various borders. It is a model, as we have heard, that our negotiators would do well to follow, not necessarily on the exact detail, which is, after all, tailor-made for the various parties, but in its aim: to retain the alignments that foster trade, and to build on our different natural resources, strengths, patterns of exchange, labour needs, service expertise and investment potential. The negotiations should build on those strengths, just as the EEA has managed to achieve. That, we think, would be to the benefit of the EU as well as ourselves.

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in the debate, but we have been very clear in the political declaration, and indeed in our election manifesto, on our vision for the UK’s future relationship with the EU, which is based on an ambitious free trade agreement.

As I always do, I enjoyed the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Quin. We share an interest in the north-east of England. She is an experienced former Minister, doing some aspects of the job that I do now, and I always listen very carefully to what she has to say because she speaks a great deal of sense. She asked about the impact on the north-east of England, something I am of course very interested in. The answer will depend on the future trading arrangements that we negotiate, so I say: come back and ask me again at the end of this year. We have been very clear that we want an ambitious free trade agreement. We want trade to be as free as possible and we will be negotiating hard to bring that happy state of affairs about.

The election has clearly shown, in my view, that the public support the vision that we put forward. It was extensively debated in the election campaign and we won our majority on that basis. To answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Lea, directly, I say that it is only by leaving the single market that the UK will be able to obtain an ambitious free trade agreement and to strike new trade deals with new and existing global partners. Attempts to remain in the EEA agreement beyond exit is by no means a simple as many noble Lords would have us believe. The EEA is an arrangement that exists at the moment between the EU and a number of EFTA countries—

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[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, the objective of Amendment 41 is to require the Minister to present, both to Parliament and to the devolved legislatures, an economic impact assessment of the potential outcomes of negotiations so that we may know where we are heading.

First, over the past three years, numerous prophecies have been made as to the economic implications of Brexit, most of which were based on guess-work at the time as to what would be the outcome. All those guesstimates are now largely irrelevant. We now know three basic dimensions of our way forward. We know that we shall be leaving at the end of this month and that the implementation period will last until next December.

Secondly, the Government, presumably, know exactly what they want in any agreement reached with the European Union. They therefore will have made their own assessment of the economic impact if they get their way. The House and the devolved Governments have a right to know the detail of any such assessment, as well as a right to know the implications for each of our four nations and for the standard regions—in the amendment this is covered by virtue of a reference to the NUTS areas.

Thirdly, the Government have made it clear that, if they fail to reach and to achieve their negotiating objectives, they will choose to leave without a deal. Again, they have presumably estimated the effect of any such course of action. The implication could be disastrous for manufacturing, exporters, hill farmers and many others. However, surely the Government have, at the very least, a duty to make known the detail of any such estimates. Anyone in the world of trade, agriculture, manufacturing, industry or finance will clearly want to know, at the earliest time possible, what are the official forecasts for these implications, for the basic reason that they are quite fundamental to making any future investment decisions.

If the Government have their own estimates, they are surely duty-bound to share them, and if they do not, they should step back from negotiating a trade deal until they have the basic tools needed to make such a major and far-reaching decision, and to have those tools and the information on a logical and quantified basis. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, perhaps it is a symptom of the way that Brexit has been handled that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, even needs to table this amendment; we would have hoped that all this work had been done, published and debated well before any decisions were made. Indeed, I think reference was made yesterday to the Room 101 experience we had when we were called to be shown in secret the so-called sector-by-sector analyses of the impact of the withdrawal. They were of course no such thing—they were A-level descriptions which could have been got from published documents. Now we find that the Government want to head into negotiations on the future of the UK and its constituent parts with no prior appraisal of the impact of a range of outcomes, either on sectors or on geographical areas, and importantly, with no debate with either the industries concerned or with elected representatives of the geographical areas. Yet as we heard in the debate yesterday, important trade-offs and difficult judgments are going to have to be made as we struggle to find a workable trade relationship with the EU.

This should not be done in the dark. We should have full knowledge of the likely impact of each possible approach. The Government should have done this work, but I have little confidence that they have, which is why the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is so relevant.

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[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, as we have been told, Clause 38 is essentially meaningless. It is declaratory, I think it was said; a sop to the ERG. Indeed, the Explanatory Memorandum makes clear that the clause makes no material difference to the scope of Parliament’s powers.

However, it is not just neutral. The problem, as we discussed on Tuesday, is that, by having this clause but failing to refer alongside it to the Sewel convention that the UK Parliament will not normally use its powers to legislate in devolved matters without the agreement of the National Assembly—or indeed the Scottish Parliament—it appears to our colleagues there to undermine the devolution settlements.

It is for that reason, as we discussed in relation to Amendment 45 on Tuesday that the Welsh Government wish the Sewel convention to be restated alongside what is in this clause, if it really must remain in the Bill, although it is in fact otiose and it would probably be best for it to go altogether. I see the Chief Whip in his place; he always likes to know what we will return to. That is one point to which we shall return next week.

For the Opposition, however, there is a different problem with the clause, which is that the rest of the Bill does the exact opposite to what it says in it. Virtually all the rest of the Bill dilutes parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis the Executive: it takes powers from us, not to give them to Wales or Scotland but to give them to the Government.

Future historians will puzzle over why this clause is here. We are particularly grateful to the noble Lords for giving notice of their intention to oppose that Clause 38 stand part, because it gives us the opportunity to write that into Hansard, so that when future historians—I am a historian—look at why on earth this clause was there, they can say it was there to keep the ERG of the Tory party happy. That does not seem to us to be a very good reason to have it, but if it really must remain, without the reference to the devolution settlements it is in fact unhelpful, rather than neutral.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this part of the debate. I express some concern that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, wishes to concertina hard ideologues of the right, English nationalists and Brexiteers into one uniform group. That is regrettable shorthand and, indeed, the very fact that his party has adopted that sort of attitude towards the issue of our leaving the European Union might go some way to explaining why it returned after the general election with a total of 11 Members in the House of Commons. There are many, many people in the United Kingdom who are not English nationalists but voted to leave the European Union. There are many people in the United Kingdom who are not hard ideologues of the right who voted to leave the European Union.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is well known that, latterly, Dicey developed views on home rule for Ireland that differed from what might be regarded as the mainstream at the time. Be that as it may, his works on the principles of the constitution stand the test of time and are worthy of being revisited by the noble Lord.

I shall deal shortly with the point advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about the scope of the present clause. The Sewel convention is not itself a matter of constitutional law; it is a political convention, as the Supreme Court made clear in the first Miller case. It is a political convention into which the courts would not intrude. Be that as it may, it has of course been restated in statutory form and therefore does not require repetition. Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 and Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017 restated it expressly in statutory form. So it is there on the statute book and does not invite repetition. What is not contained in any of the devolved legislation, for obvious reasons, is a restatement and recognition of the fundamental principle of our constitutional arrangement, namely that Parliament is sovereign, and there is therefore a desire to see that made clear.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, suggested that there was some deficiency in the drafting of the clause, but I resist that suggestion. It says, in terms, that the principle of our constitutional arrangement—namely, parliamentary sovereignty—is recognised. It is universally recognised, and that is an appropriate way to express the position of our constitution. In other words, nothing in the Bill derogates from the sovereignty of Parliament, and this clause makes that clear.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Does the noble and learned Lord therefore accept that if there was an addition to restate the convention, that would not detract in any way from what is in the clauses at the moment?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It would not detract from the clause but it would be an unnecessary repetition. We do not normally put precisely the same provision into statutes two or three years apart. Here we have the provision with regard to the Sewel convention in Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, and again in Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017. It is there. It is on the statute book; it exists. That is why there is no need for repetition.

As I say, leaving the European Union is a matter of some significance in the context of our constitutional arrangements, in particular, the repeal of the ECA. It is therefore appropriate in this context that there is an explicit recognition of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, as the Bill implements the withdrawal agreement so that we can leave the legal order that is the European Union, it is appropriate, when disentangling ourselves from those international obligations, that we ensure that there is no concern about the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. It is for Parliament, acting in its sovereign capacity, to give effect to the agreement in domestic law—that is the duality principle, and nothing in the Bill derogates from that principle as recognised by this clause. In these circumstances, I submit that it is entirely appropriate that this clause should stand part of the Bill, and I invite the noble Lord not to oppose it doing so.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

46: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Regulations: extension of EUWA 2018 sifting provisions
(1) Schedule 7 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 1(3), after “8(1)” insert “, 8A(1), 8B(1) or 8C(1)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures the sifting provisions in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 apply to regulations made under inserted sections 8A to 8C.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

In moving Amendment 46 I will speak to the other amendments in the group, which essentially have the same effect. Under the Bill there will be no extra sifting procedure of the sort that we established in the 2018 Act, which was able to act as a further check on the Brexit statutory instruments that were laid using the negative procedure. Quite a large number of instruments were recommended for upgrade to the affirmative procedure, and the process helped to identify a variety of drafting errors that could otherwise have left the statute book inoperable in the event of a no-deal Brexit.

Our thoughtful and highly experienced Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has recommended a sifting mechanism for this Bill along the lines of the 2018 Act. It would be able to recommend an upgrade from the negative to the affirmative procedure where the regulations were seen to be significant. That recommendation has been endorsed by our Constitution Committee, given the importance and potential breadth of powers in the Bill. It has also recommended that the sifting mechanism should be added as part of parliamentary scrutiny. In particular, the committee concurs with the recommendation of the DPRRC that the powers in Part 1, which are not accompanied by a sunset provision and are thus particularly important, should be subject to a sifting mechanism, as well as those in Part 3 and for the Clause 18 powers.

Rather than duplicate unnecessarily the provisions laid out in the 2018 Act, the amendments tabled in my name seek to make clear that the relevant delegated powers would be subject to these provisions. Given that we are in Committee, I hope that the Minister will understand that any issues in the drafting are the result of not having gone through all detail before, and that he will focus instead on the principle that the wide-ranging powers allowed for under the current Bill should be subject to a greater level of scrutiny. That, as I say, is not only for the sake of Parliament but to protect the Government from any errors.

I know that there may be some noble Lords who will probably disagree, having spent many a long afternoon in the Moses Room, but actually the sifting mechanism in the 2018 Act did work really well, and I think that that was the view of Ministers as well as those doing the scrutiny. Given that, it is slightly hard to see why the Government have not thought to repeat that process in this Bill, particularly given that it has been recommended by the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, my name is attached to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, and in addition to those I will speak to Amendment 66A, which is on a more specific question. I endorse entirely what the noble Baroness said. I find it extremely difficult to understand what change of circumstance has made it necessary to depart from the very effective system that we produced in 2018 for sifting. At that stage I was a member of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and we were strongly in favour of the process because it did a good job.

I noticed just now that the noble Lord, Lord Duncan, who sadly is not in his place, when responding I think to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, referred to “a change of regime” between the Administration of Mrs May and Mr Johnson. Regime change has a certain curious association in our minds, but if that is the real reason why there has been a change between 2018 and 2019 in the treatment of these matters, then of course that has wider significance because it is well known that the new Government take what I should perhaps call a more cavalier attitude to the role of Parliament, not least because they have a large majority in the other place.

I was contemplating just now the final part of Clause 38, with which my noble friend Lord Wallace was dealing. I did not intervene in the debate because it was so erudite that it went way above my head, but I thought that the final sentence—

“nothing in this Act derogates from the sovereignty of the Parliament of the United Kingdom”—

was a bit optimistic. Frankly, there are all sorts of relatively small items that refer to the role of Parliament, which is why the sifting issue comes in. It is rather like arriving at the pearly gates and thinking that it would somehow ease one’s passage to say to St Peter, “Look, I know I’ve committed all sorts of sins, but they’re all relatively minor, and in any case I went on record just before I arrived here and swore that I was actually very much against sin.” I notice we have two representatives of my church here so I hope that they will endorse that. It is really what this clause is saying: “Take no notice of the fact that throughout the Bill there are all sorts of examples where the Government are not really giving Parliament its proper role. Do not worry about it because we say that we are against that.” I find that not very consoling. The sifting mechanism is well tried. It has worked and we find it very difficult to understand why it has been ruled out in these circumstances.

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[Lord Callanan]

The clause that the noble Lord quoted comes under the consequential provisions. As I just said, the consequential power is construed strictly by the courts. I am advised by departmental lawyers that there is an extremely narrow focus; they are amendments that can be made only as a direct consequence of the Bill when it is enacted. I do not think that it in any way provides leeway for a Minister to make things up on the spur of the moment and amend primary legislation. The powers are very strictly constrained to consequential amendments, and this is not an unusual provision. It exists in many other Acts, including those I quoted earlier. We believe that moving the consequential provision to the affirmative procedure would frustrate the ability of departments to make consequential changes before exit day.

As I said also on the other amendments, I am sure that the noble Lord will agree that the use of the negative procedure does not prevent parliamentary scrutiny taking place. Members will still have the opportunity to pray against regulations should they consider it appropriate—and, as I said, there are the restrictions on the use of that power that I mentioned earlier.

I hope that, with the reassurances I have given noble Lords and a fuller explanation of the powers we propose to take, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Let it never be said that we think the Minister would make up something on the spur of the moment.

I have only two things to say. First, I am sure that both our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and our Constitution Committee considered the points that the Minister has just made and nevertheless recommended a sifting procedure, but be that as it may. Secondly—this does not actually affect these particular amendments, because we are talking about the negative procedure here—the Minister said that there would be fewer SIs under this Bill. He also said that it has “narrower powers.” I do not think our noble and learned Members who spoke the other day would see the power it gave, albeit of the affirmative, to Ministers to alter the way ECJ rulings are heard as a “narrow power.” But that, as I say, is not covered by this, although some of the powers in the Bill are rather large.

However, the point the Minister makes about the ability to pray against negative draft orders is significant. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 46 withdrawn.