Lord Jackson of Peterborough
Main Page: Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Conservative - Life peer)
Robert Neill
I am grateful, Mr Speaker.
I will encapsulate the technicalities as swiftly as I can, but it suffices to say that these amendments are necessary to ensure that those commercial activities that are undertaken by the GLA are done so within a taxable environment. As a local authority, it would normally have tax-exempt status, but some of those activities are not of a local authority nature but more of a commercial nature and so have to be properly taxable. There is a long-established tax principle in that regard to ensure a level playing field between the public and private sectors in relation to commercial activities. That is particularly important in this case because the GLA will inherit, as a consequence of our devolution measures, a significant portfolio of land interests, some of which operate on a commercial basis and are subject to corporation tax and capital gains tax. It is not a new state of affairs. Section 157 of the 1999 Act made like provision in relation to the activities of Transport for London. That is the background to what we are doing.
In a nutshell, the list of specified commercial activities, which will be set out in a detailed order, will be worked up by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the GLA during the passage of the Bill, but essentially the activities of the London Development Agency and Homes and Communities Agency will be transferred to the Mayor. That is how new clause 20 kicks off the whole proposition.
New clause 21 introduces new schedule 2, which will neutralise certain tax consequences—the other side of the coin—that might otherwise arise from the transfer of various property, rights and liabilities from the Office for Tenants and Social Landlords, the Homes and Communities Agency and the London Development Agency to other public bodies. There is a measure to enable the Treasury to make similar tax provisions for future mayoral development corporations. As we know, one is proposed, and we will come to that in a moment, but the provision will technically permit others to be set up and, therefore, embrace properly, within a legal framework, all those related activities.
Essentially, every Government new clause and amendment with which we are concerned relates to that process. The Opposition have tabled a couple of amendments, which I can deal with conveniently either now or in due course once they have been spoken to, but suffice it to say that the only Government amendments that do not form part of the tax treatment provisions are amendments 212 and 213. They relate to the mayoral development corporation, which is proposed for establishment, and I hope that we can find some common ground, because in Committee there was a discussion and Members generally accepted as desirable both the idea that the Mayor of London should have the power to establish a mayoral development corporation, and the current Mayor’s intention to establish such a corporation broadly relating to the Olympic park in east London.
The provision is more widely cast than that, for good reasons, and it will permit the establishment of other mayoral development corporations. None is envisaged by the current Mayor and I am not conscious of any envisaged by potential Mayors, either, but it would be on the books for the future.
The question that arose, and which the Government seek to address with the proposed changes, was what are the appropriate means of holding the Mayor to account for mayoral development corporation proposals. If a future Mayor—I am sure that it would not be the current Mayor—were to come up with a proposal for a mayoral development corporation which was thought objectionable, by what means would a control or brake be put on that process?
Mr Stewart Jackson (Peterborough) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the anecdotal evidence from the Thames Gateway is that the level of accountability and the funding streams were often indistinct, that there was an insufficient level of democratic accountability through boroughs outside London, London boroughs and the mayoralty, and that the proposed changes before us seek to rectify that situation?
Robert Neill
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There is a history to the incremental growth of the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, which did not prove satisfactory, and as he knows the Government are looking at the matter in a different context.
We seek to introduce proper accountability to the London mayoral development corporation. There was a debate about whether it would be appropriate to give the boroughs a veto, and that possibility has foreshadowed an Opposition amendment. The Government have reflected on the matter, and we take the view that it probably is appropriate and sensible to include a check and balance in the system, but we conclude that, because the Mayor of London is a strategic authority and charged with the economic development policy and oversight for London, the check and balance should not be through any one London borough or group of London boroughs, as they have their own important role, are in any event the statutory consultees on these matters and would have the opportunity to put their views forward anyway.
It is more appropriate if the check and balance mirrors other checks and balances in the GLA’s governance scheme, so that the London assembly, which is democratically elected and represents all Londoners, is able to veto a proposal for a mayoral development corporation by a two-thirds qualified majority vote.
Robert Neill
Yes, the corporations could act in that way. They do not have to, because we have not been as specific as was the case in the past with the old-style development corporations as to exactly what they have to include. The likelihood, it is fair to say, is that they would, because part of the objective of a development corporation generally is to bring the development function and the planning function for a particular area together to speed up development. In practice—I hope that this will reassure my right hon. Friend—the east London MDC that was proposed for the Olympic park area has been involved an iterative process, with a degree of discussion between the Mayor and the five London boroughs affected. There has been some negotiation, which is probably a mature thing to have in the current circumstances. The upshot is that we now have a proposal to which the Mayor and the London boroughs are satisfied they can sign up. The boroughs accept that they cede some planning power for a period, but now do so by agreement with the Mayor. I think the same process can be achieved in other cases.
Mr Stewart Jackson
Setting aside the sui generis nature of London governance, does my hon. Friend agree that the level of direct accountability of these Government proposals is greater than that which existed hitherto in, for instance, West Northamptonshire Development Corporation, North Northants Development Company and most of, if not all of, the housing market renewal areas? This is indeed an improvement in terms of direct accountability for regeneration policy.
Robert Neill
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, for two reasons. First, the power to set up the corporation is devolved, and a directly elected regional figure, in the shape of the Mayor, takes that decision. Secondly, there is the veto, which did not exist in relation to the other, earlier-style development corporations. There is therefore a significantly enhanced degree of accountability.
Heidi Alexander
I will not repeat them because I am under strict instructions to keep the debate moving as quickly as I can.
Mr Stewart Jackson
I am interested in the hon. Lady’s views and I am listening to her with great attention. Does she not feel that her proposals are a recipe for institutionalised impasse? Having served on such benign bodies as the London Ecology Committee, the London Waste Regulation Authority and the London fire and civil defence authority, I know that it is almost impossible to get all the boroughs to agree. Therefore, if one borough has a de facto veto, there would never be any major progress on housing and regeneration across Greater London.
Heidi Alexander
That is quite a negative view of politics in London. I do not think that my proposal would lead to institutionalised impasse. The proposals on the ability to set up an MDC in any area are incredibly important. The things that an MDC could do, such as granting planning permission for different developments, compulsorily purchasing land and agreeing plans for an area, are significant matters for people who live in the neighbourhood. Local councils and councillors would also have views on those matters. I would hope that all parts of London government could come together and agree whether an MDC was an appropriate vehicle in a local area. I therefore question whether retaining the powers with the Mayor and the Secretary of State in the Bill is true localism. That was my reason for tabling amendment 352.
As the Minister said, amendment 351 to clause 158 proposes the establishment of a new London housing and regeneration board. With the winding up of the London Development Agency and the London part of the Homes and Communities Agency, many powers will be transferred to the Mayor of London. We also see in chapter 3 of part 6 that provision is made for the devolution of local authority housing finance. That will mean an enhanced role for local authorities in providing, commissioning and funding affordable housing in London.
Simon Hughes
I shall make a brief contribution to what is an important debate for London, which I am happy to take part in once again.
I agree with the hon. Member for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander) that the two biggest issues that affect my constituents and hers, and that fall directly or indirectly within the remit of local government, are jobs and housing. Most people are most concerned about those two issues most of the time. I am afraid that I come to this debate with long experience in this place. When I was first elected, Lady Thatcher’s Government had just set up urban development corporations throughout the country, of which the London Docklands Development Corporation was one. Indeed, that was the backdrop to my by-election, because my predecessor, Bob Mellish, was appointed as vice-chairman of the LDDC. That was not uncontroversial in Bermondsey, because people in general, and particularly those in the Labour party, did not think that a quango should be given the powers over Southwark, Newham and Tower Hamlets that the LDDC was given, so appointing a Labour MP to the LDDC was not consistent with Labour party policy.
That handover of powers to the UDCs was very controversial, because it meant that planning decisions were taken by a group of unelected people. It was possible to influence the people who took the decisions, but never possible to hold them directly accountable. I used to go to planning committee meetings following lots of community activity—they were not always in Southwark: sometimes, for major planning schemes in the Surrey docks or along the riverside, meetings were held at the LDDC in the Isle of Dogs or elsewhere—but communities often felt alienated afterwards. The legacy is the feeling of remoteness when decisions are not taken by locally elected representatives.
I am not saying that the local community comes away feeling deliriously happy after every local council planning committee meeting. I have seen enough local planning committees in Southwark over the years make controversial planning decisions—under Labour, Liberal Democrat and Liberal Democrat-Conservative coalition administrations. However, at the end of the day, the public at least know that they can kick those people out at the next election if they want to do so. My premise, therefore, is that the starting point should always be accountable decision making, particularly on planning matters, and particularly on the big planning matters that “urban development” by definition implies. This is not about whether someone can have a bedroom in the mansard roof of a flat or house, or whether someone’s garage can be an extra bedroom; this is about schemes for industrial sites and other things on that scale.
Mr Stewart Jackson
I hasten to say that I do not know as much about the right hon. Gentleman’s constituency as he does, but surely the history of the LDDC is that the political administrations in, for instance, Tower Hamlets and Newham, which happened to be Labour-run at the time, were viscerally hostile to central Government, and refused to undertake any realistic action on regeneration or to face up to post-industrial decline in their boroughs. Central Government was therefore forced to step in to provide a template for regeneration and housing.
Simon Hughes
I shall not help the House to hold a seminar on London in the ’70s and ’80s, which would actually be very interesting. The hon. Gentleman is nevertheless right. Local authorities did not get on with development. There were frozen developments, including one in the Royal Docks and some in my constituency, after the closure of the London docks in the upper pool in places like Bermondsey, and their move down to Tilbury. That is why the Government intervened, and I understand why they did so. It was necessary to get something moving. Whatever else we say about it, the LDDC certainly did that. Its legacy has, in general terms, been very benign. The regeneration has been hugely successful. Southwark is as prosperous as it is, and the business rates that are collected in Southwark are as high as they are, because of the regeneration along the riverside from London bridge down to the end of my constituency at the other side of the Greenland dock, on the border with Deptford.
Simon Hughes
At the moment, of course, the legislation provides for how the Mayor chooses the people to be on the development corporations. That could be looked at again. I do not think that my colleagues would object to there being nominees either from the local authorities in the areas in question—whether from more than one or a single local authority—or from the community councils and elsewhere. I think the hon. Gentleman’s idea, which we need to consider, is a good one.
There needs to be good democracy in London whereby people can be held to account for the decisions they make. The fact that the London Development Agency is going is helpful, because it means that the Mayor will be responsible for London’s economic regeneration as a whole. That is what mayors of big cities should do. Whether people support mayors in big cities is a separate debate, but if we have them, that is what they should do. The Mayor should be held to account by the assembly, so I hope that we can say to the Minister that he is on the right track, but that he should remain alert to the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Lewisham East and her Front-Bench colleagues. If we can get it, we need to aim for consensus by the time the Bill completes its passage through the House of Lords and Parliament.
Mr Stewart Jackson
I am pleased to follow the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes). It goes without saying that I support the Government amendments. The Bill will disturb the equilibrium that we established in 1998 and the settled view of London governance. The right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Mr Raynsford) piloted the legislation on this matter through Parliament. I had the pleasure—generally speaking—of serving with him in the last Parliament on several Bill Committees, but in some respects he is resiling from earlier commitments. His proposals opposing the Government amendments and the views expressed ably and articulately by the hon. Member for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander) seek effectively to undermine the authority and autonomy of the boroughs. They would set up an institutionalised conflict between the boroughs and the Greater London authority, with the Mayor quite possibly acting as the de facto referee and invigilator. That is a serious concern.
On the hon. Lady’s amendment 351, we should acknowledge the consensus in the House on the need for more affordable housing, better-quality housing and aesthetically pleasing housing, and above all for regeneration to consolidate London’s position as the pre-eminent city in Europe. However, looking at what was delivered in the dozen or so years of the regional development agencies, when we had a centralised policy, and an over-prescriptive and—one may even say—draconian approach to housing targets, I am not convinced that instituting a pan-London borough body would achieve the key objectives that we all seek.
I mentioned earlier, albeit perhaps in a slightly irreverent way, that for eight years while I was a London borough councillor, I served on bodies that were largely non-political. To get agreement on waste transfer and ecology centres was difficult enough, so making value judgments as between different boroughs and in effect resiling from a strategic overview of what is good for a whole city or region probably would not work. Incidentally, I have to disabuse my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central (Gavin Barwell) of one notion. Peterborough is, in fact, the greatest city in the world, but we might have to beg to differ on that. However, with all due respect to the hon. Member for Lewisham East, while my heart agrees with her, my head says that her proposals probably would not work or deliver what we wish.
Let me briefly address the Government amendments and the points made by the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) and the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich. As the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark said, we would be returning to something like the situation that prevailed with the London Docklands Development Corporation, with the Secretary of State required to make the value judgment that neither the boroughs nor the GLA could sort something out, and therefore to impose a regeneration body. We have moved on from that. We now have a more mature and nuanced political culture. Once we establish the bona fides of London governance through the GLA and the Mayor, with the proviso that there will effectively be a two-thirds veto for the directly elected individuals, who will debate among themselves and with their boroughs, it would seem invidious to undermine that by putting so much potential power—again, effectively in the form of a veto—in the hands of the Mayor.