Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Dear

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dear]

My Lords, I wonder if I might put a different gloss on the matters that we are debating in this group of amendments. We know that there is a strong likelihood that there will be a national crime agency some time in the next calendar year. We already have a discussion document about that. It refers to tasking, which I am confidently assured means direction from the centre. That means that there is bound to be tension between local and national issues, which is a good thing. It is democracy in action. It is inevitable that the inspectorate will become involved, at the behest of local or national figures. That is what it is there for and that is my experience, having served in it for more than five years, albeit some time ago.

I am concerned that the Bill is in grave danger of becoming overprescriptive. We are covering detail, which is good as far as it goes. However, to put it in the Bill rather than take it as a matter of good sense or encompass it in regulation stretches too far the issue of what should be in the Bill.

I shall refer to Amendment 235A. Having followed an all-encompassing definition of national crime, we are then invited to put in something about children, vulnerable adults, members of minority groups and so on. I do not at all underestimate the threat to those groups; terrible things are done to and with them. However, if we are to pick out those groups, why do we not put in something about drugs, counterterrorism, and the theft of high-value motor vehicles and plant, all of which happen on a European—if not a more international—scale? Why do we not put in something about cybercrime or identity theft? I shall sit down soon because I want to brief, but my point is that we should not drop into the trap of being overprescriptive. Valid though all the comments from speakers so far have been, it is asking the Bill to accept too much.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, is saying about the risks of overprescription. However, we are talking about strategic policing requirements. This is a matter of national importance. My noble friends have argued very well for their respective amendments.

No election will be won by a police and crime commissioner on issues to do with national policing. They will be won on local manifestos. Almost every candidate will promise more police on the beat. The question will be an auction over just how many police will be on the beat at any one time. That is fair enough and clearly responds to a general view held by many members of the public, who like the police to be visible. I do not argue with that. However, it will have some consequences. It will put the squeeze on the specialist units that the police forces have developed. It will also put the squeeze on each force’s responsibility to the national policing requirement. In some way or other, without being wholly prescriptive, we need to find a way in which to reassure Parliament that the national strategic policing requirement will be carried out as effectively as possible. It is not just terrorism; it is also about serious organised crime. My noble friends Lord Harris and Lord Foulkes were absolutely right to develop the argument about the threats that we face. We are in no position today to be complacent about those threats.

In their approach to the Bill the Government have really rather pooh-poohed the current tripartite relationship. They have criticised police authorities for a lack of visibility—although I have yet to hear any conclusive evidence put forward on why they ought to be visible. Furthermore, they believe that the tripartite arrangement is at fault because Home Secretaries have indulged in too much target-making. There will be a debate about targets and their place but there should be no doubt that in the end the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament and ought to be accountable to Parliament for national policing strategy and the effectiveness of police forces in making a contribution to that strategy.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dear, about the implications of the national crime agency. I also agree with him that some tension will be constructive—but tension could also be destructive. In the Bill we see that the requirement in relation to the strategic policing requirement is placed on chief officers of police. In exercising the functions, they must have regard to the strategic policing requirement. In other words, they can ignore it, because “have regard to” is a very weak use of parliamentary language. They have to have regard to it, alongside other matters that are placed in the Bill.

We then look to page 2 of the Bill and see that in Clause 1(4) that the,

“police and crime commissioner must … hold the chief constable to account for”,

a series of actions, but also,

“the exercise of the duty under section 37A(2) of the Police Act 1996 (duty to have regard to strategic policing requirement)”.

All we have in statute is a requirement on the police and crime commissioner to hold the chief constable to account. Then we find that the actual requirement is simply to have regard to. What if the police and commissioner does not effectively hold the chief constable to account? What if the chief constable has regard to but does not take the necessary action? Where are the safeguards and sanctions? There are none. That is really our concern.

The amendments seem to be helpful and constructive. My noble friend Lady Henig asks for a report to be prepared assessing the extent to which the strategic policing requirement has been met in each police area. That does not seem overprescriptive; it is simply giving an assurance to Parliament that there will be a process by which Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary has a means of looking at each police force area and reporting on how they are doing in their contribution to the strategic policing requirement.

My noble friend Lord Harris has another constructive amendment around the inspection programme. In our first debate the Minister was very helpful, although I did not really follow her arguments. She was very constructive in being willing to engage in the area of the acting police and crime commissioner. Nothing is more important than the national strategic policing requirement. I hope that the noble Lord, who, I suspect, is going to respond to the amendment, will be able to be as constructive as his noble friend.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Dear

Monday 4th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am conscious of the hour and the fact that our Benches are filled to hear this debate, but this is a very important group of amendments. My noble friend Lady Henig and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, have raised some important points about that come back, really, to the consequences of having a corporation sole, in which one person has enormous power and responsibility.

My amendments relate to the powers exercised by the police and crime commissioner. Under Clause 39, “Appointment, suspension and removal of chief constables”, huge authority is given to the police and crime commissioner to appoint a chief constable and to require their suspension, resignation or retirement. When it comes to the appointment, there are some safeguards, because the police and crime panel has a veto power on the appointment. We may disagree about the number of the panel voting in favour, but it has a veto power. When it comes to suspension, retirement or requirement to retire, the safeguard is much less. Although the police and crime panel can undertake a scrutiny process, as set out in Schedule 8, in the end, the police and crime commissioner can ignore the panel's recommendation.

My worry is that the police and crime commissioner who is seeking re-election when year two or year three is coming up and who is in some trouble may well consider sacking the chief constable as a visible sign to the public that he or she is doing something. There are circumstances—my noble friends have hinted at them—where that would be a jolly good thing to do, but at other times it will not; it will be a political action by a police and crime commissioner. Where are the safeguards? In the end, there are none because, whatever the panel says, the police and crime commissioner can ignore it.

I have a series of amendments which relate not only to the chief constable but to the circumstances where the same may be required of other chief officers and also to the situation in London. Essentially, this provision should apply only where it can be shown: that there is good reason—in other words, that it is in the interests of the force, for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness; that there has been appropriate consultation with the chair of the police and crime panel; that there has been proper investigation of the circumstances leading up to such an action; and that the approval of the Secretary of State is given. If Ministers consider that that gives the Secretary of State overweening powers, I must say that I have not been persuaded that the essential nature of the tripartite arrangement—the role of the Home Secretary, the police authority and the chief constable—should be so torn up that there are no safeguards to be undertaken by the Home Secretary if the police and crime commissioner decides to take such an action where, as I said, there is virtually no effective scrutiny other than the PCP recommendations.

This is a very important group of amendments. There is unease about the power to be exercised both by the police and crime commissioner in relation to the chief constable and other senior officers and then by the chief constable in relation to those employed by him as a corporation sole. We would look to the Government to recognise those concerns and to give some reassurance.

[Lord Dear]

My Lords, two amendments in this group, Amendments 189A and 192CA, stand in my name. One refers to the appointment of a chief constable and the other to the dismissal of a chief constable.

In Amendment 189A, I suggest that new words are inserted into Schedule 8:

“A police and crime commissioner should take advice from HMCIC before making any decision as to the appointment of a chief constable”.

I shall come back to the word “should” in a moment. This relates to the suggestion that the advice from an outside agency is taken prior to any decision being made by the PCC and prior to the subsequent discussion of that by the panel. We are looking at this in the context—we have talked a lot about context through the various stages of the Bill—of the fear of the untrammelled exercise of power by the PCC. There are a good many examples over the years of police authorities looking only around their own feet rather than at the broader horizon. The risk is somewhat greater when one has a fully elected individual who has very few of the constraints that police authorities have.

Although I am absolutely sure that, in the majority of cases, if PCCs come into being, they will exercise their power sensibly, in your Lordships' House we are often preoccupied with the thought that some of them might not. In this case, the lack of exercise of the sort of expertise that one would look for would lead to the risk of a blinkered mentality or, as has already been mentioned this afternoon, a silo mentality and a failure to take account of the talent that is available in the wider sphere nationally. Quite obviously, that would lead to a very insular approach from that PCC, the appointment of safe bets, perhaps the appointment of candidates who are personally known and favoured by the PCC, and the appointment of people who are locally or regionally accented. In other words, the whole thing would be driven inwards rather than outwards.

At the moment, there is no national pool of talent within the police service, which is managed in much the same way as some multinational corporations, national organisations or the Armed Forces manage their emerging top positions. The report by Mr Neyroud, which was published earlier this year, and the report that we expect to have from Mr Winsor, which is expected at the end of this calendar year, will have an emphasis on leadership within the police service and I dare bet will propose a whole raft of new developments, formalisation, and improvement of the present structure. I hope they do. On various occasions in your Lordships’ House, I have spoken at length about the crying need for better leadership and structured leadership within the police service.

The system at the moment involves a mixture of advice given to police authorities by ACPO, by the Home Office and by the inspectorate. The inspectorate, which I have included in the amendment, offers advice at varying stages prior to the shortlist being constructed by the Home Office and then offered to the police authority. It offers advice on the shortlisting carried out by the police authority itself and then at the interview stage. My experience of seven years as an inspector of constabulary was that I was asked by police authorities to sit on a large number of appointment interviews when chief constables were being considered. Usually, the advice that I gave was followed and sometimes it was not. I did not take it personally when my advice was rejected, but I saw it as an exercise of democratic accountability in the best possible sense.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Dear

Wednesday 18th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dear]

I wonder whether I might help the House with a personal set of experiences gathered over five years as chief constable in the West Midlands. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, has said that the new PCC will be all over the chief constable like a rash—and I think he would be. During my experience in the West Midlands in the 1980s, it is true that the police authority was rather different. Nevertheless, the individual as the elected chairman would broadly in this context replicate the PCC. It was in the era of extreme political interest in police forces. Noble Lords will remember how the press hung avidly around the doors of Greater Manchester and Merseyside police at that time, and the quite difficult relationships that those two forces had with their chairman or chairwoman. I found broadly the same thing in place when I took over the West Midlands in 1985. I found that I spent quite a lot of time talking to, being with, or walking around with, the chairman, but I did not find that it was a problem. I made it clear to him that the operational responsibility was mine and reminded him—not that he needed reminding—that all the buildings, the pay and rations, the precept and budget and so on, were his. He had a role to play. My experience of that situation, which required political acumen both sides, from him and from me, was that if we were successful on some operation or other, as we frequently were, he would want to be in the limelight as well. That was perfectly understandable. If things went wrong, as they frequently did, he was nowhere to be seen, and I carried the can, because it was an operational decision.

The only point that I make from that experience—and I do not want to try to prove the general from the particular, because that is always wrong—is that however we manage this in future there will always be the PCC that wants to swarm all over the chief constable. It is how those two individuals relate that is important, and there will be some bad cases when they do not get it right. However, it is quite likely that most of those sets of individuals will get it right and will hammer out a relationship with each other. One has to wait and see.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

As this is Committee and we are allowed to bounce up and down, can I respond to the noble Lord? He was, of course, an outstanding chief constable of the West Midlands and is long remembered for the work he did there. Of course, he is right that there is a normal relationship between the chairman and the chief executive, if I can put it like that, and I recognise that some chairmen like to take the credit but put the blame on their chief operating officer, although not all. The essential difference here is that the election under a manifesto and the appointment under a programme would change the relationship. That is what I am trying to focus attention on.