Health and Social Care Bill

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Excerpts

Monday 13th February 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

20: Schedule 1, page 275, line 13, at end insert “with the consent of the Health Select Committee of the House of Commons”

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I shall refer also to Amendments 21, 21A and 22. The amendments take us to a number of other matters in relation to the national Commissioning Board. I think that we are all agreed that the board will have an important role to play within the new arrangements, and its governance is a matter of considerable interest. My amendments, which follow closely amendments that I tabled in Committee, invite the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to give further consideration to how we can ensure that the governance of the national Commissioning Board is as effective as possible and that due parliamentary processes are involved.

The amendment would ensure that the chair of the national Commissioning Board was appointed only with the consent of the Health Select Committee. I am well aware that Professor Grant, the excellent chair of the board, gave evidence to the Health Select Committee and I am glad that that occurred. I should like to put the matter beyond doubt by putting this provision in statute for when future appointments of chairs need to be made. The noble Earl will know that I have followed precedent because this Government’s legislation that established the Office for Budget Responsibility makes it clear in statute that the appointment of its chair has to be agreed to or approved—or consent has to be given—by the appropriate Select Committee. My argument to the noble Earl is that the national Commissioning Board is as important as the Office for Budget Responsibility. I realise that one could look at a hierarchy of these organisations and I would understand if the noble Earl were to say that we cannot apply this provision to all bodies in a similar position. However, the responsibility of the national Commissioning Board is immense and there is a case for putting this in statute.

I sense that my Amendment 21 may not be necessary, but perhaps the noble Earl can confirm that the vice-chair of the national Commissioning Board would always be a non-executive appointment and that that person would always be the senior independent director.

Amendment 21A concerns public health specialist input. I should like some assurance from the noble Earl that the national Commissioning Board will have public health expertise. I understand that it is to have a medical director—and that is of course welcome—but, given the need to ensure that in the NHS, through the Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups, there is a good tie-in to the public health function, it would be good to know what arrangements the board will make to ensure that there is a strong enough link with public health. Having public health expertise around the board of the national Commissioning Board would, I should have thought, be very welcome indeed.

I come, finally, to my Amendment 22, which would remove the requirement for the appointment of the chief executive to be approved by the Secretary of State. I said in Committee that I had no problem with the provision that ensured that the first chief executive should be appointed by the Secretary of State. That is normal practice when new bodies are established. In order to get on with it, you clearly need to have a method by which the chief executive is put in place as soon as possible. I quite understand why it should be the Secretary of State in the first instance, but I do not understand why future appointments of chief executives should have to be approved by the Secretary of State.

Back in our debates on bureaucracy and the issue of the concurrent power of the national Commissioning Board with the Secretary of State in relation to the crucial parts of Clause 1, the noble Earl emphasised that the relationship between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board should be seen principally through the mandate and the standing rules. He resisted my efforts to give Ministers powers of intervention other than the extreme power given under the Bill. If that is so, I cannot for the life of me see why the Secretary of State would want to approve the appointment of the chief executive. Surely the relationship should be between the Secretary of State and the chairman of the national Commissioning Board. Why must the Secretary of State have a veto on the appointment of the chief executive? That seems inconsistent with the general points that the noble Earl has been making about the need for the Secretary of State to have a hands-off approach.

The noble Earl may repeat what he said in Committee, which is that that is to do with the accountable officer status of the chief executive. With the greatest respect, is that very different from the accountable officer status in relation to many organisations within the NHS where the Secretary of State does not have to approve the appointment of the chief executive? I hope that at least on this one the noble Earl will recognise that Secretary of State approval for the appointment of a chief executive is wholly inconsistent with the general thrust of where the Government say that they are going, and will be sympathetic. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I trust that my noble friend will not object if I claim at least parliamentary paternity of Amendment 21A—influenced, I must say, by the Faculty of Public Health and others interested in the public health dimension of the Bill. The Faculty of Public Health is a very respectable body, characterised, along with other opponents or critics of the Bill, by Mr Simon Burns, the Minister of State for Health, as zombies, a term that I cannot imagine emerging from the lips of the noble Earl. It is concerned about the degree to which the public health service and its interests and needs will be reflected in the structures that are being created. That interest is shared by the Health Select Committee.

The Health Select Committee also referred to its recommendation that the local director of public health should be a member of each clinical commissioning group. Having regard to the number of clinical commissioning groups, that is possibly asking a little much, although it would be sensible for clinical commissioning groups to consult the director or his representative from time to time in the course of their work. However, my noble friend is absolutely right to stress the importance of having a qualified public health professional on the national Commissioning Board. Public health is an enormously significant area of public policy, and we will discuss other aspects of it later this evening and subsequently during Report. The Health Select Committee was very clear that there should be a qualified public health professional on the NHS Commissioning Board and that the Commissioning Board should routinely take advice from qualified public health professionals when taking commissioning decisions.

The Government’s response to the Select Committee’s report is, to put it mildly, not very encouraging. While the board will be required to obtain clinical advice from a broad range of professionals, including those in public health—and the Government have stated their intention that there should be clinical and professional leadership on the board—they state explicitly that,

“it is an important principle … that it”—

that is, the board—

“should have autonomy of decision-making on matters such as its own membership and its structures and procedures, as far as possible, to determine how best to exercise its functions”.—[Official Report, 14/11/11; col. 514.]

That seems, frankly, to put an unnecessary degree of power in the hands of the national Commissioning Board. It again raises the issues of accountability that my noble friend dealt with so well earlier this evening. It is surely not acceptable to permit an organisation with this degree of power and influence—and, indeed, with the substantial resources at its disposal—simply to decide on its own membership, particularly when public health is not just a health service or Department of Health issue but goes much wider than that. It is important that those wider implications of the work of public health, which we will touch on later, are reflected in the board’s deliberations as a matter of course.

I hope that the Government will take the strong advice of the Health Select Committee and reconsider this position. I have no doubt that there will be a queue of other organisations wanting a place on the national Commissioning Board, but this is, in a sense, a unique function because of its reach into other areas of policy and administration, including, for that matter, other government departments. That voice, reflecting all those interests, is not likely to be represented directly in the way that other clinical interests probably will be in relation to the board. Therefore, I strongly support Amendment 21A, as well as the other amendments in the name of my noble friend. I hope that the Government will see their way to rethinking this matter and come back at Third Reading with a different position.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I will attempt to answer the noble Baroness in a moment. She is right that the chief executive designate, Sir David Nicholson, was appointed before the establishment of the NHS Commissioning Board Authority. My right honourable friend felt that not only was it a sensible and good appointment, as we think very highly of Sir David—as most people do—but that it would provide continuity for the NHS. I hope that the noble Baroness accepts that it was a rational decision. As I outlined, Malcolm Grant, too, was the Secretary of State’s appointment, as was appropriate. I will probably have to come back to the noble Baroness on the non-executive directors because I am not aware of the precise timescale or mechanism for doing that, but I will enlighten her as soon as I possibly can.

The noble Lord, Lord Rea, asked me about the relationship between the board and Public Health England. Public Health England will be an executive agency carrying out functions of the Secretary of State with relation to public health. Those functions are conferred on the Secretary of State primarily through Clause 10. As regards the relationship between the two bodies, the simplest way of putting it is that they will work very closely together on public health issues. I have no doubt that there will be a number of ways in which Public Health England will commission public health services from the board in one or other of the aspects of its health protection role.

To get back to what I was saying before the intervention, the Official Opposition at one moment want the Secretary of State to be hands on and at another moment to be hands off, so perhaps I am entitled to feel a little confused about the direction that they are coming from here. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, questioned the rationale for the Secretary of State appointing the chief executive. As I said in Committee, the requirement for the Secretary of State to consent to the appointment of the chief executive of the board is included for the very important reason that the chief executive of the board will be the accounting officer for the commissioning budget—more than £80 billion of public money—for which the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament. It is entirely appropriate in our view that the Secretary of State should approve his or her appointment. It is quite usual for chief executives of non-departmental public bodies to be designated as the accounting officer by the department to which they are accountable.

I hope the noble Lord will agree on reflection that we have struck an appropriate balance between autonomy and accountability in the current provisions for appointments to the board and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Howe. He thinks that I am being inconsistent with some of my amendments, but I still believe that at this stage it is appropriate to put forward probing amendments. If I am inconsistent, I am trying to point up the inconsistency in the Government’s approach, which is that on the one hand we are told that the national Commissioning Board is to be at arm’s length from the Department of Health and Ministers, but then we find that it is at such arm’s length that the chief executive has to have his appointment approved by the Secretary of State.

On parliamentary hearings, the noble Earl said that the Office for Budget Responsibility is rather different from the national Commissioning Board because it has a unique role in being dually accountable to government and to Parliament. My argument is that the national Commissioning Board is different from many other public bodies because of the concurrent powers it is given in Clause 1 and the fact that, unlike many bodies, it does not have a straightforward ministerial power of direction, as we have discussed. The Government have deliberately sought to put it on a different plane. For that reason, it would have been useful for them to have followed the example of the Office for Budget Responsibility and given the appropriate Select Committee a veto over the appointment of the chairman. As I said earlier, I accept that the Government have certainly gone halfway in the sense that Professor Grant appeared before the Health Select Committee. That is very welcome, and I am sure it sets a precedent for the future.

On public health representation on the board, for which my noble friend Lord Beecham and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, argued, I hope that the national Commissioning Board will take account of the views expressed in your Lordships' House to ensure that there is strong public health input at the NCB level.

The first point the noble Earl made was that the national Commissioning Board is to have as much autonomy as possible. If it is, then it jolly well has to show that it is going to be accountable. I hope that the NCB will give parliamentarians a regular opportunity to discuss with it its programmes and the way that it is going to work in the future. I would be very concerned if, through the autonomy philosophy, Ministers in one way or another resisted debates or interventions in relation to the actions of the NCB and the NCB itself proved not to be open to having debates with parliamentarians. That is where the problem may well arise.

We will have to see but I for one hope that the national Commissioning Board will accept that it has been given enormous power—albeit with some constraints, which we have discussed today—and that it has to show it is going to be properly accountable for it. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 20 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

38: Clause 19, page 13, line 20, leave out “Regulations may” and insert “The Secretary of State must draft regulations not less than annually, and shall submit them to the relevant committee of the House of Commons not less than two months before the regulations are to be laid before Parliament.
(1A) Such regulations shall”

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 41, 46, 48 and 293.

On a number of occasions, the noble Earl has spoken about the mandate to be issued to the national Commissioning Board. In our debates we have given a great deal of focus to the relationship between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board, and the role of the mandate. When the noble Earl has been pressed to say how the Secretary of State would be able to bring influence to bear in relation to particular issues, he has referred on a number of occasions to the role of the mandate and indeed to standing rules. There is no doubt that the mandate assumes considerable importance. My amendments are seeking to give Parliament a stronger role in scrutiny of the mandate.

I have taken as my reference point the procedure for national policy statements in relation to major infrastructure planning applications. The noble Earl will be aware that the Planning Act 2008 introduced a parliamentary procedure to deal with major infrastructure planning applications. Essentially, it goes back to the issues that have bedevilled infrastructure planning decisions in this country, which mean that very often when there are public inquiries into applications, much of the public inquiry debate has been around the principle of whether a particular infrastructure should be developed in the UK rather than actual local planning matters. The classic for me was the Sizewell B application, where I think there were roughly 300 days of public inquiry, of which only about 10 to 20 were concerned with local issues; the rest were concerned with whether nuclear power should be developed in the UK.

The Planning Act brought in a new procedure where it was accepted that issues to do with nuclear power—or High Speed 2, for instance, if it were not going to go through the hybrid legislation process—would be decided by Ministers because those are national decisions, and the local application would then be decided very much around the impact of an actual planning consent.

What is the connection between this and the mandate? It is the parliamentary scrutiny, because a national policy statement has to be debated in your Lordships’ House in Grand Committee, Members of the House having every opportunity to ask questions, and then brought before your Lordships in the Chamber where it is open for debate. My proposition is that the mandate is of such importance that a similar approach could be taken in your Lordships’ House and in the other place, providing a real process of questioning and debate. Although, ultimately, it is, in my view, a ministerial decision, I argue in Amendment 46 that such a process of parliamentary scrutiny and ministerial consideration followed by an affirmative order to approve the mandate would provide a robust approach that would give much more parliamentary comfort to the nature of the mandate between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board.

I do not believe that the current provisions in the Bill allow for that kind of parliamentary scrutiny and I hope that at the very least the noble Earl might be prepared to take this back to see whether there are ways in which we could beef up parliamentary scrutiny of what all of us acknowledge is probably one of the most important processes between the Minister and the national Commissioning Board. I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, I shall address Amendments 38, 43 and 49 in this group but, given the lateness of the hour, I can reassure the House that I shall not be lengthy on any of them. My comments will follow fairly closely some of the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and will therefore fit in well with our brief debate.

Amendment 38 in essence is the suggestion that the Secretary of State should issue regulations at least once a year. In addition, those regulations should be shown within an adequate timeframe of about two months to the Select Committee, presumably before they pass through the affirmative or negative procedure. This issue is quite close to the amendment addressed at the beginning of our proceedings by the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy. Members in the Chamber will remember that the noble Lord raised the issue within the context of our discussions on constitutional matters when he suggested that any regulations should be subjected to scrutiny by the Select Committee before proceeding to either the affirmative or the negative procedure.

Quite simply, the reason for this, which I think we all recognise, especially those of us who served for some time in another place, is that the negative procedure is extremely weak. Unless one or two Members of Parliament are particularly concerned about a matter, the regulations pass through with not much more than a nod from the House of Commons. In the case even of the affirmative procedure, unless one can organise a substantial group of people who are deeply concerned about the regulation, debates are not profound. Little scrutiny is offered and very often the procedure is little more than routine.

I am not so concerned about the first part of Amendment 38. I do not think that one should necessarily hold the Secretary of State to having to produce regulations annually, but I am very interested in the second part, which refers to passing it to the Select Committee for scrutiny, presumably of its merits, before it passes on to the fixed procedures. There is of course a fairly close parallel with the Select Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments as distinct from the older Select Committee on the vires of statutory instruments.

This is an interesting idea. I am one of those convinced that it is important to strengthen parliamentary accountability, not only on health but across the whole front. Therefore, Amendment 38 is well worth consideration. I hope that the Government will consider it carefully because it would be a substantial and interesting step forward. It would enable the regulation to be looked at carefully instead of in effect just being passed on the nod.

Amendment 43 is about the mandate, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has already referred. We on these Benches see the mandate as a first-class way for the Secretary of State to indicate his most important priorities for the health service for the coming year or so. As such, we put considerable weight on it. The issue that I should like simply to underline is that the role of the mandate is so important that I hope that in it the Secretary of State would be able to address the known priorities of the Bill, including such issues as the narrowing of inequalities and the proper provision of care for the elderly and those who are chronically sick. The mandate could be a very important instrument for setting before the House, and more widely the public, the goals that the Secretary of State hopes the health system would be able to prioritise.

Finally, Amendment 49 is also in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Warner and Lord Patel, both of whom are unable to be here as late as this. They have asked me to apologise on their behalf. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, is particularly interested in this amendment, which sets out in considerable detail the need for audited accounts and for the careful comparison of those accounts for the levels of performance and for comparison with one another. Given his substantial experience in the field of accountability for health issues, this deserves careful consideration. It would at least enable us to be closely concerned with differential performance in the health service and allow people to make a good judgment of the quality of the care being given. I therefore hope that the Government will look sympathetically at Amendment 49.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, let me begin by setting out what we intend for the standing rules. We intend to use the rules to replicate core elements of the current system that need to be maintained in the future. For example, the standing rules will be used to provide the legal basis for certain patient rights as set out in the NHS constitution. Amendment 38, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will do three things. First, it seeks to require the Secretary of State to make standing rules as opposed to enabling him to do so. Secondly, it would require rather than enable him to update the standing rules no less than once a year; and finally, the Secretary of State would be obliged to share the standing rules with the relevant committee of the House of Commons for consideration at least two months before they are laid in Parliament. I hope that I can help the noble Lord here.

It is already our intention to make standing rules and to review them on an annual basis alongside the mandate. Where it is necessary, the Secretary of State would update the standing rules. Imposing a requirement on him to produce regulations regardless of whether an update is necessary will introduce what I believe is a needless administrative and bureaucratic burden on the system, and we surely do not want that. The amendment would also set out a requirement in legislation for the Health Select Committee to examine the proposed standing rules. I hope that I can reassure him that the committee would have the opportunity to examine proposals, and that Ministers in the department would engage constructively with the committee on any inquiry. However, I do not think that it is usual practice for legislation to set expectations as to the subject that Select Committees should examine or what areas committees should focus on. I should also remind the House that any regulations laid in Parliament are also considered by the Merits Committee of your Lordships’ House, as well as the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.

I turn now to the remaining issues. I think that it would be helpful to set out what we aim to achieve with the mandate. The mandate will bring with it an unprecedented degree of transparency, scrutiny and accountability to government policy for the NHS. For the first time, the Government’s core objectives for the NHS commissioning system will be subject to full public consultation.

A number of the amendments in this group, both government and from your Lordships, focus on the parliamentary scrutiny of the mandate. Amendments 41 and 46, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would make the mandate subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and require the Secretary of State to lay the mandate in Parliament in draft. I hope that I can reassure your Lordships that we have already built in sufficient parliamentary scrutiny of the mandate to render the amendments unnecessary.

Following the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s recommendations, the Government have tabled Amendments 45 and 47, to which I now speak, to allow specific parliamentary scrutiny of the “requirements” within the mandate by providing that they can be brought into effect only by regulations subject to the negative resolution procedure.

However, making the mandate as a whole subject to the affirmative procedure would go too far. Parliament will set the parameters that the NHS will operate within, through this Bill and the legislation that will support it. This is a Bill that takes many powers away from Ministers and gives them back to Parliament, but it should be for the elected Government of the day, not for Parliament, to set specific policy objectives within that legislative framework following full consultation.

Of course, parliamentarians will have an interest in the mandate, and will have the opportunity to debate and influence it in the usual ways. As Clause 1 of the Bill makes clear, following our debate last week, the Secretary of State retains his responsibility to Parliament for the health service; and Parliament has the right to hold him to account for the health service, including the setting of the mandate.

Amendment 43, tabled by my noble friend Lady Williams and three of my other Liberal Democrat noble friends would require the Secretary of State to explain how the mandate supported his cross-cutting duties. I think that part of the motivation for the amendment is a concern to ensure that the mandate is not simply about financial issues. I hope that I can reassure my noble friend Lady Williams in particular on this point. It is our firm belief that the mandate should focus on the strategic outcomes and policies that the Government wish the NHS Commissioning Board to achieve. At the heart of this should be objectives for improvement against the NHS outcomes framework. The mandate will also be an opportunity for the Government to set specific objectives about the policies that we have set out in the NHS White Paper and the government response to the NHS Future Forum; for example, about extending patient choice and enabling clinical commissioning groups to flourish.

While the mandate will set the budget for the board and could include objectives relating to efficiency or financial management, it definitely will not be primarily about financial controls. Of course financial controls are essential, but the Bill has separate provisions for these under Clause 23. The mandate will not be a narrow and technical financial document which requires a separate justification of how the Secretary of State has fulfilled his legal duties; rather, it will visibly embody his duties. So I do not believe that an extra reporting requirement in the Bill is necessary.

Amendment 49 would require the board in consultation with the Secretary of State to set standards for the management of commissioners’ and providers’ accounts to enable efficiency comparisons. This comparison would be published annually by the Secretary of State. I understand the concerns which have led to the tabling of the amendment, but it would be an unnecessary and perhaps bureaucratic imposition on NHS providers and commissioners, distracting them from improving outcomes for their patients and the wider QIPP challenge.

It is important to be able to make comparisons of efficiency, but the board and, in turn, CCGs should be given the autonomy to decide whether and how to do this. I happen to know that work is currently proceeding in this area.

Monitor’s role currently includes the oversight of the financial management of foundation trusts, and the Trust Development Authority will do the same for non-FTs, so this information is already available for providers.

My noble friend Lady Jolly referred to HealthWatch England. It is specified in subsection (8) of new Section 13A as someone the Secretary of State must consult in developing the mandate. HealthWatch England will be able to feed in the views of local healthwatch as well.

Amendments 48 and 293, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would require parallel mandates to be set for Monitor and the Care Quality Commission. Again, I hope that I can persuade him that that is not necessary.

Monitor and CQC are independent regulators, with clearly defined statutory functions. Their core role is unchanging and regulatory, rather than about achieving a series of evolving policy objectives. Therefore, there is far less reason for the Government to set them a specific mandate. The fact that there is a statutory mandate in the Bill for the Commissioning Board reflects the different nature of the board’s role.

As with any arm’s-length body, there is a framework agreement between it and the sponsor department, which is used as the basis for monitoring the body’s ongoing performance. That is the approach that the department uses and will be using for all of its arm’s-length bodies, including CQC and Monitor. That will be underpinned by formal reviews of each organisation’s capability, at least every three years.

The department will retain overall stewardship, system leadership and accountability for ensuring that the different national bodies are working as Parliament intended. As I have mentioned on previous occasions, the Secretary of State will have formal powers to intervene in the event of significant failure. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord, and that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for a comprehensive response to the interesting amendments that have taken us to the duly appointed hour. He has given quite some assurance about the fact that parliamentary Select Committees will have an opportunity to scrutinise both the mandate and the standing rules, and that is to be welcomed. I urge him even now to reflect on whether the parliamentary scrutiny might not be beefed up somewhat by some reference in the Bill alongside some of these amendments.

The noble Earl has said that the process will be transparent. That is to be welcomed. But in the end, if Ministers are determined to hand off power to the national Commissioning Board, it seems only sensible and right that the mandate in the standing rules under which that should be done should be subject to decent parliamentary scrutiny. I very much hope that the Government will give that further consideration.

This has been a good debate to round off tonight. I am most grateful and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 38 withdrawn.