Health and Social Care Bill

Baroness Williams of Crosby Excerpts

Monday 13th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I trust that my noble friend will not object if I claim at least parliamentary paternity of Amendment 21A—influenced, I must say, by the Faculty of Public Health and others interested in the public health dimension of the Bill. The Faculty of Public Health is a very respectable body, characterised, along with other opponents or critics of the Bill, by Mr Simon Burns, the Minister of State for Health, as zombies, a term that I cannot imagine emerging from the lips of the noble Earl. It is concerned about the degree to which the public health service and its interests and needs will be reflected in the structures that are being created. That interest is shared by the Health Select Committee.

The Health Select Committee also referred to its recommendation that the local director of public health should be a member of each clinical commissioning group. Having regard to the number of clinical commissioning groups, that is possibly asking a little much, although it would be sensible for clinical commissioning groups to consult the director or his representative from time to time in the course of their work. However, my noble friend is absolutely right to stress the importance of having a qualified public health professional on the national Commissioning Board. Public health is an enormously significant area of public policy, and we will discuss other aspects of it later this evening and subsequently during Report. The Health Select Committee was very clear that there should be a qualified public health professional on the NHS Commissioning Board and that the Commissioning Board should routinely take advice from qualified public health professionals when taking commissioning decisions.

The Government’s response to the Select Committee’s report is, to put it mildly, not very encouraging. While the board will be required to obtain clinical advice from a broad range of professionals, including those in public health—and the Government have stated their intention that there should be clinical and professional leadership on the board—they state explicitly that,

“it is an important principle … that it”—

that is, the board—

“should have autonomy of decision-making on matters such as its own membership and its structures and procedures, as far as possible, to determine how best to exercise its functions”.—[Official Report, 14/11/11; col. 514.]

That seems, frankly, to put an unnecessary degree of power in the hands of the national Commissioning Board. It again raises the issues of accountability that my noble friend dealt with so well earlier this evening. It is surely not acceptable to permit an organisation with this degree of power and influence—and, indeed, with the substantial resources at its disposal—simply to decide on its own membership, particularly when public health is not just a health service or Department of Health issue but goes much wider than that. It is important that those wider implications of the work of public health, which we will touch on later, are reflected in the board’s deliberations as a matter of course.

I hope that the Government will take the strong advice of the Health Select Committee and reconsider this position. I have no doubt that there will be a queue of other organisations wanting a place on the national Commissioning Board, but this is, in a sense, a unique function because of its reach into other areas of policy and administration, including, for that matter, other government departments. That voice, reflecting all those interests, is not likely to be represented directly in the way that other clinical interests probably will be in relation to the board. Therefore, I strongly support Amendment 21A, as well as the other amendments in the name of my noble friend. I hope that the Government will see their way to rethinking this matter and come back at Third Reading with a different position.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, I agree strongly with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. Public health has always been the Cinderella of the health services, yet it should not be. It is obviously crucial to the whole attempt to reconfigure services, and it is crucial to the emphasis on preventive health that we badly need if we are to stop things such as the very rapid increase in the incidence of diabetes in this country, especially diet-related diabetes. It is important that the public health service is seen by the whole of the public as central to the Government’s proposals for bringing services together. It is essential that we now publicly recognise the very great importance of the public health service and raise it to a level at least equal with other parts of the health service, including clinical commissioning groups.

As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said—I thought rather modestly—we accepted that it was too much to expect to have a public health officer on every commissioning group, although there is a very strong case for having one where a commissioning group is happy to have him or her. However, in the case of the board, which after all overlooks the whole CCG structure, it is absolutely vital that a public health officer should be present and should be able to put emphasis on preventive health. It would also be a signal to the health and well-being boards at the local level to follow that lead and themselves put a great deal of emphasis on preventive rather than only curative health.

I think that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, should get the support of all parties in the House as he has put forward something perfectly sensible and moderate. What the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was saying about this group of amendments is important, particularly on Amendment 21A, and I hope that the Minister listened very carefully, as I believe that he has a great deal of sympathy with the importance of public health. This will be a very important way in which to underline that in the manifesto.

It is fair to say that the board should make its own decisions on some of the membership, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that the sheer significance for all the reforms of public health is such that this should be on the face of the Bill and that it should not be left entirely to the members of the board to decide on. There is plenty of room for them to reach their own decisions, but this involves the whole of the Government’s strategy. I very much hope that my noble friend will suggest that the Bill could carry this amendment in it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to this group of amendments. We are very pleased that there should now be acceptance of the detailed suggestions of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. That gives a much stronger underpinning to parliamentary accountability, which we appreciate.

I should like to ask my noble friend a couple of questions. At this hour of the night I may be misinterpreting some of the wording in the amendments but I should like to address two of them in particular. The first is Amendment 35, to which I have added my name. I simply want to ask a little more about the effect of this amendment on inclusivity. As my noble friend will know, there have been many attempts to make inclusivity part of the Bill, and from time to time we on these Benches have expressed concern on the issue. I should be grateful if he could explain the effects of the Secretary of State’s ability to have a commissioning group determine when a patient can be excluded from the overall effect of the directions under Amendment 35. I assume that that would be because they come under the board rather than the CCGs but my noble friend may be able to give me a slightly purer view of the exact meaning.

My second question relates to Amendments 137, 138, 139 and 140. What are the effects of the Secretary of State’s ability, as I understand it, to proceed with orders and regulations without that effectively being the case in the Bill? In other words, could the Secretary of State, in certain circumstances, simply override what is in primary legislation by passing orders and regulations or would he effectively have to fall back on regulations and orders at a later stage?

I apologise for asking these two questions at this late hour but they are asked in all good faith. I think it is important that the public and Parliament understand exactly what is intended by the amendments. Because they are rather complicated, I may have got it wrong but I hope that I have not.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, on Amendment 35, Section 3 of the National Health Service Act 2006, as amended by the Bill, states that CCGs have responsibility for persons provided with primary medical services by a member of the group and persons usually resident in the group’s area who are not provided with primary medical services by a member of any CCG. Regulations under subsection (1D) enable the Secretary of State to specify that this would not apply for persons of a prescribed description, or in prescribed circumstances—for example, for persons registered with an English GP who were resident in Scotland. As currently drafted, these regulations would be subject to the negative procedure in Parliament. Following the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the amendment would make these regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendments 137 to 140 are linked to Amendment 39. They would make clear that the Secretary of State is not able to delegate his function of making orders or regulations specifically relating to the provision of primary medical, dental or ophthalmic services and any functions relating to local or other pharmaceutical services to the NHS Commissioning Board, a CCG, a Special Health Authority or to such other persons or bodies as may be prescribed. The amendments would make it clear that the Secretary of State cannot delegate the function of making orders or regulations to other bodies under Clause 48.

If that short explanation represents an over-abbreviated one, I shall be happy to write to my noble friend after this debate, but I hope that that is helpful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 41, 46, 48 and 293.

On a number of occasions, the noble Earl has spoken about the mandate to be issued to the national Commissioning Board. In our debates we have given a great deal of focus to the relationship between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board, and the role of the mandate. When the noble Earl has been pressed to say how the Secretary of State would be able to bring influence to bear in relation to particular issues, he has referred on a number of occasions to the role of the mandate and indeed to standing rules. There is no doubt that the mandate assumes considerable importance. My amendments are seeking to give Parliament a stronger role in scrutiny of the mandate.

I have taken as my reference point the procedure for national policy statements in relation to major infrastructure planning applications. The noble Earl will be aware that the Planning Act 2008 introduced a parliamentary procedure to deal with major infrastructure planning applications. Essentially, it goes back to the issues that have bedevilled infrastructure planning decisions in this country, which mean that very often when there are public inquiries into applications, much of the public inquiry debate has been around the principle of whether a particular infrastructure should be developed in the UK rather than actual local planning matters. The classic for me was the Sizewell B application, where I think there were roughly 300 days of public inquiry, of which only about 10 to 20 were concerned with local issues; the rest were concerned with whether nuclear power should be developed in the UK.

The Planning Act brought in a new procedure where it was accepted that issues to do with nuclear power—or High Speed 2, for instance, if it were not going to go through the hybrid legislation process—would be decided by Ministers because those are national decisions, and the local application would then be decided very much around the impact of an actual planning consent.

What is the connection between this and the mandate? It is the parliamentary scrutiny, because a national policy statement has to be debated in your Lordships’ House in Grand Committee, Members of the House having every opportunity to ask questions, and then brought before your Lordships in the Chamber where it is open for debate. My proposition is that the mandate is of such importance that a similar approach could be taken in your Lordships’ House and in the other place, providing a real process of questioning and debate. Although, ultimately, it is, in my view, a ministerial decision, I argue in Amendment 46 that such a process of parliamentary scrutiny and ministerial consideration followed by an affirmative order to approve the mandate would provide a robust approach that would give much more parliamentary comfort to the nature of the mandate between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board.

I do not believe that the current provisions in the Bill allow for that kind of parliamentary scrutiny and I hope that at the very least the noble Earl might be prepared to take this back to see whether there are ways in which we could beef up parliamentary scrutiny of what all of us acknowledge is probably one of the most important processes between the Minister and the national Commissioning Board. I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, I shall address Amendments 38, 43 and 49 in this group but, given the lateness of the hour, I can reassure the House that I shall not be lengthy on any of them. My comments will follow fairly closely some of the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and will therefore fit in well with our brief debate.

Amendment 38 in essence is the suggestion that the Secretary of State should issue regulations at least once a year. In addition, those regulations should be shown within an adequate timeframe of about two months to the Select Committee, presumably before they pass through the affirmative or negative procedure. This issue is quite close to the amendment addressed at the beginning of our proceedings by the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy. Members in the Chamber will remember that the noble Lord raised the issue within the context of our discussions on constitutional matters when he suggested that any regulations should be subjected to scrutiny by the Select Committee before proceeding to either the affirmative or the negative procedure.

Quite simply, the reason for this, which I think we all recognise, especially those of us who served for some time in another place, is that the negative procedure is extremely weak. Unless one or two Members of Parliament are particularly concerned about a matter, the regulations pass through with not much more than a nod from the House of Commons. In the case even of the affirmative procedure, unless one can organise a substantial group of people who are deeply concerned about the regulation, debates are not profound. Little scrutiny is offered and very often the procedure is little more than routine.

I am not so concerned about the first part of Amendment 38. I do not think that one should necessarily hold the Secretary of State to having to produce regulations annually, but I am very interested in the second part, which refers to passing it to the Select Committee for scrutiny, presumably of its merits, before it passes on to the fixed procedures. There is of course a fairly close parallel with the Select Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments as distinct from the older Select Committee on the vires of statutory instruments.

This is an interesting idea. I am one of those convinced that it is important to strengthen parliamentary accountability, not only on health but across the whole front. Therefore, Amendment 38 is well worth consideration. I hope that the Government will consider it carefully because it would be a substantial and interesting step forward. It would enable the regulation to be looked at carefully instead of in effect just being passed on the nod.

Amendment 43 is about the mandate, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has already referred. We on these Benches see the mandate as a first-class way for the Secretary of State to indicate his most important priorities for the health service for the coming year or so. As such, we put considerable weight on it. The issue that I should like simply to underline is that the role of the mandate is so important that I hope that in it the Secretary of State would be able to address the known priorities of the Bill, including such issues as the narrowing of inequalities and the proper provision of care for the elderly and those who are chronically sick. The mandate could be a very important instrument for setting before the House, and more widely the public, the goals that the Secretary of State hopes the health system would be able to prioritise.

Finally, Amendment 49 is also in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Warner and Lord Patel, both of whom are unable to be here as late as this. They have asked me to apologise on their behalf. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, is particularly interested in this amendment, which sets out in considerable detail the need for audited accounts and for the careful comparison of those accounts for the levels of performance and for comparison with one another. Given his substantial experience in the field of accountability for health issues, this deserves careful consideration. It would at least enable us to be closely concerned with differential performance in the health service and allow people to make a good judgment of the quality of the care being given. I therefore hope that the Government will look sympathetically at Amendment 49.