(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate the Minister on his promotion. As I am sure he has already found out, the Home Office poses challenges of an entirely different order from those of other departments. I wish him well in his responsibilities. I join in the tributes paid to my noble friend Lady Browning, who performed her ministerial duties in this House, as she did in the other place, with very great distinction.
It is common ground in all parts of the Chamber that the best thing to do in respect of those who are suspected of involvement in terrorist activity is to prosecute them. We would all like that to happen. I welcome the fact that the Government are going some way towards making the process of prosecution easier by introducing post-charge questioning, which is something which I have advocated for some time. My noble friend Lady Hamwee mentioned at the end of her remarks the possibility of introducing intercept material as evidence in terrorist cases. Later in the debate the House will have the great benefit of hearing the wisdom of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. Although I am not privy to what he is going to say, and I anticipate it at my peril, I should be astonished if he did not make at least some passing reference to the desirability of introducing intercept material as evidence.
I have the dubious privilege of being a member of the advisory committee of privy counsellors charged with overseeing the work being carried out by Home Office officials in an attempt to achieve that objective. I was appointed to that committee by the previous Administration and reappointed by the present Administration. I joined the committee with a strong predisposition to making that evidence admissible. I had read the speeches of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, been impressed by them and largely agreed with them. I was extremely keen to see that the law was changed to make this possible. It may still be the case that that goal can be achieved, but I must tell the House that the difficulties in the way of achieving that objective are enormously greater than those that I had appreciated before I joined the advisory committee. Although I hope that we will be able to overcome those difficulties, I cannot pretend that I have enormous confidence that we will be able to do so. Therefore, the question the House has to consider, and the question which gives rise to the Bill, is: what do a Government and a society do in respect of people suspected of being involved in terrorist activity on the basis of material which is not admissible evidence in a court of law? I do not imagine that many people would suggest that that material can be ignored and that that society can be left at risk from those whom that material identifies as posing that risk.
Of course, this is not a dilemma which is particular or special to our country; other countries face it as well. The President of the United States campaigned three years ago on a promise to close Guantanamo Bay within a year. Those who are detained in Guantanamo Bay are there because they cannot be prosecuted under the ordinary laws of the United States of America. Three years later, Guantanamo Bay has not been closed, not, I am quite certain, because of any lack of good faith on the part of President Obama, or because of any lack of desire on his part to make good his campaign promise, but because of the very real difficulties of the dilemma that I have identified, which, indeed, was posed aptly and eloquently by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford.
Therefore, what every Government have to do in the face of that dilemma is to strike a balance between the need to protect the public from the risk that these people pose while at the same time minimising the extent to which there is any interference with the individual liberty of those who have not been prosecuted and convicted in a court of law, which is the course of action that we would all desire, were it possible. To that question of striking the balance, there is no single absolutely correct answer. It is a question of judgment, and that judgment is always the outcome of discussion, debate and argument.
That is why I was not as impressed as perhaps he would have liked me to be by the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that the Bill is in some way to be regarded as less than ideal because it is the product of the coalition Government. The truth is that there will be in any Government—whether they be a single-party Government or a coalition—arguments, debates and discussions between different members of that Government as to where the balance should be struck. I was obviously not privy to the debates and discussions around the Cabinet table that led to the production of this Bill, but I would be very surprised if there were arguments simply between the Conservative members of the coalition on one side and the Liberal Democrat members on the other. I would suspect that there was a difference of view on both sides. That is the way in which our Government work, it is the way in which they should work and decisions emerge as a result of those debates, discussions and arguments. Those decisions are frequently compromises between the different positions, and they are none the worse for that. So there is no merit in the point that the Bill should in any way be criticised because it is the outcome of the debates, discussions and arguments that took place within the coalition.
My Lords, I cannot resist. The point that I am making is that, as a result of the clear divisions, we have come up with a flawed process of a Bill with emergency legislation as a potential back-up because I am sure that there is an understanding among some members of the Government, and certainly in the security and police forces, that the Bill as it stands may not be sufficient. It is extraordinary legislation that gives the Home Secretary power, during a certain period, to use the enhanced provisions. The problem is the product of those discussions.
The noble Lord is, of course, perfectly entitled to criticise particular provisions in the Bill. What I am saying is that those provisions should be dealt with on their merits. It really should be no part of the argument that the Bill in its present form should be regarded as inferior or unsatisfactory because it is the outcome of the processes that took place within the coalition. As to the emergency provisions to which the noble Lord referred, an emergency gives rise to special needs and special circumstances, and it does not seem entirely unreasonable that the Bill should provide for those circumstances in the way in which it does.
I believe that on balance, and with one important reservation that may give some comfort to the noble Lord, the Government have got the Bill right and have struck the right balance between the various competing needs that have to be considered.
Is the noble Lord aware of any other country in the world which has control orders or anything like them? He referred to Guantanamo Bay, but that, of course, is not part of the United States.
Of course it is technically not part of the United States, and that is why it can exist as it does, but it is a product of the Government of the United States. It is the Government of the United States who have put in place the regime which exists in Guantanamo Bay, and I do not imagine for one moment that the noble and learned Lord would suggest that we should establish a regime similar to that in Guantanamo Bay in place of the measures contained in the Bill. The trouble is that you have to have something. It is true that every country proposes different ways to deal with the matter, but I do not think that ours is in any way the most draconian.
In answering the question asked by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, perhaps my noble friend would be mindful of the power in the United States to impose executive witness detention, never mind executive suspect detention. He might also be mindful of the arbitrary powers used in a number of other countries, for example, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, to detain people without any proper legal process and of the power, for example, in France, to charge people with association de malfaiteurs, something we are probably all doing in this House this afternoon, and then hold them in custody for months and months, quietly releasing them without charge.
I hope that my noble friend in that intervention has not exhausted the number of examples of that kind that I am sure he is able to give to illuminate the House. The truth is, I suspect, that if one conducted an extensive examination of the way in which other countries have faced up to this dilemma, one would find that the measures contained in the Bill are less draconian than those that exist virtually anywhere else in the world.
As I said, I believe that the Government have struck the right balance, with one not insignificant exception. When I gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee, I said that in my personal view the Bill would be better if it contained the relocation provisions, and I do not resile from that view. I believe that the relocation provisions would make it easier for the Security Service to carry out its responsibilities and would enhance the protection of the public. On that single point, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, but for the rest of it, I believe that the Government have struck the right balance and that the Bill should be supported.
I am of course delighted to try to defend the Bill on behalf of the Minister, although I suspect that the Minister will do a very good job of that in a moment. However, my interpretation of the provision is that it is about very specific locations and particular areas—for example the Olympic park, or whatever else it might be. It is not clear that it will permit the prevention of that individual living in the city that had previously been his home. That is the point that needs to be made.
Is not the point that there is an enormous gap between preventing someone entering a particular area, which is what the schedule permits, and requiring them to live in a particular area where the Security Service can maintain constant surveillance of them? That is the difference between the two, is it not?
My Lords, as ever I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Howard, for his helpful intervention. My point is simple. This was a power that previous Home Secretaries and the current Home Secretary found necessary. It is one that the security services and police said was necessary. However, we are now told that the fresh air of the West Midlands conurbation and its bucolic atmosphere have so changed this individual’s personality that he now poses much less of a threat. That is frankly implausible. The reality is that this power was necessary. The present Home Secretary, knowing of the proposal that she would bring before Parliament, chose to exercise the power. The power remains necessary.
Of course, all Home Secretaries had access to this information which we do not have, so I cannot name a single Home Secretary in that regard. That does not mean that all Home Secretaries in history have always been right about everything. I say that with as much modesty as I can muster. Why is it that in many other countries intercept evidence is used when the same difficulties surely apply?
Can the noble Lord name a country with an adversarial system of evidence which is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights? There are countries with adversarial systems that have allowed limited intercept evidence but are not subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. There are countries that do not have an adversarial system but an entirely different system which have allowed limited admissibility of intercept evidence and are subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Can the noble Lord name a country that has both?
I am obviously well outside my comfort zone on this. I am not sure whether the Republic of Ireland meets the condition of the noble Lord. I believe that it uses intercept evidence, comes under the European Court of Human Rights and has a legal system similar to ours. I put that forward without the certainty that I am absolutely right—but I do not think that I am wrong. Given the silence of the noble Lord when I said the Republic of Ireland, I think I have got him there.
I am sorry that I have taken so long in getting away from what was meant to be my main argument. Those were just some preliminary points. I had no idea that they would cause so much excitement.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I have been privileged to be a member, has consistently expressed doubts about the control order regime and whether it is compatible with human rights. That is clearly the starting point for considering the changes being brought forward in the Bill. In fairness, the Bill modifies some aspects of the control order regime, for example moving the threshold from reasonable suspicion to reasonable belief and imposing a maximum time limit of two years—although it could be renewed if further evidence came to light about terrorist involvement. The restrictions imposed are also a bit less severe than the previous ones and there is a renewed emphasis on investigation and prosecution, although I would argue that it does not go nearly far enough because very serious concerns remain.
A main concern is that the priority should be the criminal prosecution of those suspected of involvement in terrorism. When people are involved in terrorism, the bottom line must be an attempt to use the criminal justice system and go for prosecution. Clearly nobody says that we will not do that, but when we have a system of TPIMs there will be a temptation to say, “Let’s go down that path rather than the more cumbersome process of getting the evidence and going for a prosecution”. There could be such a temptation—and, clearly, because we would all want to use the criminal law rather than an administrative process, we have to be careful that we do not drift into using TPIMs more widely.
In recent years, there has been a significant fall in prosecutions for terrorist offences. I wonder why that is. Certainly, there have been some important ones, but I am told that there has been a fall. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, who will speak after me—and I do not want to jump the gun, because he is an expert—in his report on the Government’s review of counterterrorism powers argued very clearly that restrictions on the freedom of those suspected of terrorism can be justified in constitutional and human rights terms only if they are part of a continuing criminal investigation. We are restricting individuals’ rights very seriously even under this new TPIM regime. The noble Lord’s fundamental criticism of the Bill, which I totally share, is that any replacement of control orders should be brought firmly within the criminal justice system. The Bill does not go nearly far enough in this respect.
It is true that the Government have restated their commitment to the priority of prosecution. However, as the Bill stands, the purpose of the new provisions seems to be more prevention than investigation and prosecution. I am confident that there will be a good debate on this in amendments to be brought forward in Committee.
I have one or two other points. Before imposing a TPIM, the DPP or the relevant prosecuting authority should be satisfied that a criminal investigation is justified and that investigation will not be impeded by any of the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures. Clearly, if a TPIM is imposed on an individual, as was the case with control orders, that individual is totally alerted to what is going on. Even if surveillance is still carried on, that becomes much more difficult. So I can only assume that if we think that we have got somebody and there could be some evidence, we will not impose a TPIM because that would alert the individual and surveillance might be a better way in which to get the evidence—although, as we have discussed, intercept evidence would not be available.
I also believe that there should be judicial supervision in relation to any criminal investigation under this Bill. While the Bill provides that TPIMs can be imposed only with prior permission from the court and provides for an automatic review hearing, the Human Rights Committee recommended a widening of the court’s powers to look at whether the conditions for imposing a TPIM had been met and, at a review hearing, whether they continued to be met. Those would be additional safeguards that the Bill does not have. The Human Rights Committee is also keen that the Secretary of State should be required to provide the individual subject to a TPIM notice,
“with sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions”.
I agree that there is a balance to be struck there, because one cannot give all information away without revealing how it has been obtained. But in terms of the balance I would be happier if a little bit more information could be provided to the individual. I think that we could go further in that direction.
It has already been mentioned that under the Bill TPIMs are not subject to annual renewal by Parliament, but will be permanent. I hope that during its passage the Bill will be amended to require annual renewal. We are still talking about a serious erosion of the liberties of an individual. That requires proper scrutiny at intervals and a debate on the continued necessity for such exceptional measures.
Finally, I share the concern that the Government have a draft Bill that will enable them to give effect to exceptional measures. While in theory it may be attractive to say, “We have some more legislation and if we need it we can ratchet up the powers”, in practice we all know that it would be very difficult for Parliament to debate such a new measure at a time of national emergency—because there would have to be some crisis for this to happen. I am very nervous about the suggestion that, “We may need new powers and we will bring them forward to Parliament as and when they are necessary.” It is a difficult thing to conceive Parliament dealing with in that way.
I finish as I started, on intercept evidence. I have urged it, but it is not a silver bullet. I just believe that it would be helpful. I do not know what to do about the argument put forward by my noble friend that I cannot name any Home Secretary who has gone down that path, except to say humbly that I still believe that there is a case for considering it further.
I entirely accept what the noble Lord says, and I am sure he is right about that. Of course, if the controlees had been confined for 24 hours in Belmarsh or even in their homes, it would have been far more difficult for them to abscond, but the control order system that we had existed largely as a result of decisions made by the courts. My point is that this control order system, as it came to be, may not in a serious sense have been protective of the public because it was so easy to abscond and because so many controlees did just that. My more substantial point is that I think that only one was ever prosecuted with a substantive terrorist offence so if the Home Secretaries were right that these people had been involved in terrorist activity, that would appear to be a failure of public policy in that terrorists in those circumstances were escaping justice.
My view is that, given the nature of the control order regime, this was not surprising. One clear finding of the review, accepted by all sides so far as I could tell, was that the control order regime was inimical to prosecution. That resulted from the reality of control orders, which amounted to the warehousing of suspects under the aegis of the Security Service and the consequent destruction of the normal routes and possibilities of evidence gathering. This was not the intention of the control order regime but it was one of its effects, and it was absolutely clear to me from material that I examined during the review that the process of building prosecutions against controlees was weak and had low priority. In fact, it almost never occurred.
For very understandable reasons, when a man was put under a control order the police would simply move on to other cases, satisfied that that individual was adequately quarantined under watchful eyes. That low prioritisation of prosecutions will always be evident so long as the system of restrictions is positioned outside criminal justice. If I am right about that—I shall expand a little in a moment—it means that to situate TPIMs outside criminal justice is not only possibly offensive to principle; it is also, finally, offensive to public safety because it lets people get away with terrorism and escape justice.
Let me say straight away that TPIMs appear to represent an improvement on what went before. The most offensive features of the previous regime from my perspective—those closest to house arrest—have gone. Relocation and long curfews will be a thing of the past. Individuals will be permitted to use electronic communications, including computers and phones, and the orders themselves will be time-limited to two years. Yet in my view the Government have failed to grapple with the central issue: the nature of the orders themselves and the appropriate space for them to occupy within our constitutional arrangements. In my report on the review, presented to Parliament alongside the review, I called for TPIMs to be attached quite explicitly to criminal investigations. That would facilitate the prosecution of serious criminals and deal with the constitutional objections that have bedevilled control orders and will, I am sure, continue to bedevil TPIMs. This stance has since been supported by the JCHR and noted by the Constitution Committee of this House. It deserves more serious consideration than the Government have so far shown it.
I understand that it will not always suit the Security Service, for which I have the greatest respect, to have law enforcement authorities crawling all over suspects under its control. That no doubt explains in part the strong support that the Security Service has given to the control order regime but it is nothing to the point. The public interest is not always and inevitably to be equated with the policy of the Security Service. Sometimes, Governments need to stand back. It is patently absurd that individuals certified by the most senior figures in government to be active terrorists are not constantly and relentlessly under criminal investigation. I do not accept for one moment that because the material against an individual is presently inadmissible for one reason or another—many identified by my noble friend Lord Howard—the investigation should stop. On the contrary, it should be redoubled and have TPIM conditions attached to it for its duration. Let there be relentless investigation into people who are suspected of terrorist activity but let it be criminal investigation and let TPIMs be tied to that investigation—to facilitate and assist it so that no opportunity is lost to bring violent extremists to justice—in a manner consistent with our rule of law.
What would happen under the regime that my noble friend is suggesting if the police and prosecuting authorities came to the conclusion that there was simply no evidence that would justify the continuation of the criminal investigation? Under his proposals, would that mean that the restrictions currently under discussion would inevitably fall?
If my noble friend does not mind my saying so, I am not sure that the example that he posits is one that I recollect from my period as DPP. Let us imagine the situation that would exist here: presumably the police or the Security Service would have in their possession something like an intercept that could not be used—for example, a suspect having a conversation with another individual about a plan to place a bomb on the Tube. With respect, that is not the end of an investigation; it is the beginning of one. The investigation that then takes place is into that individual, into the plan as described in the phone call, into the individual he has spoken to and into the associates of all.
The noble Lord will know from his time as Home Secretary that the sorts of powers and abilities that the law enforcement authorities in this country have, which we will not go into here, are considerable and significant. I do not recognise a situation in which a law enforcement investigation stops simply because the deeply incriminating material that you have until that time is the only material that you have and you do not anticipate discovering more.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving this amendment, I will also speak to two other amendments in my name in this group. We come to the question of pilots on which we had a good discussion in Committee. The introduction of police commissioners alongside police and crime panels is a new departure. The House will know that we on this side of the House have many worries about the impact of unelected police commissioners in terms of the potential politicisation of the police force. We think that it would be worthwhile testing this out in a number of police force areas to see the benefits and potential pitfalls.
We discussed this in Committee, as I said, and I was struck that a number of our former commissioners of the Metropolitan Police expressed some reservations about pilots. I well understand the kind of reservations that they were expressing. Essentially, they were saying that pilots create uncertainty among the other forces and chief constables. I have seen government proposals in relation to other public services where proposals are made and you have what are sometimes called pathfinders. You then implement changes in some areas over a couple of years. People in other areas are then not sure when they will come on to the tranche that will introduce changes to their particular part of the country, and clearly there are therefore some uncertainties. But this is such a major departure from the current arrangement that some uncertainties are worth it.
Overall, we do very well by our police service. There are issues and problems in some areas and there are no doubt areas where the efficiency of the force could be improved, I do not doubt that. But many advances have been made in the past 10 or 20 years, not least in the effectiveness of the forces and the strong relationships that they have built between themselves and their communities, particularly at neighbourhood level. There are considerable risks in moving away from that. Pilots would be a great chance to try this out, see what some of the problems are and see, too, some of the advantages. We could learn from that and then look to general introduction.
I hope that I will find some sympathy around the House for this suggestion. After all, if one were looking for a way through the potential disagreement between this House and the other place, I would have thought that pilots might be one way in which we could find some agreement. I beg to move.
First, I take the opportunity of associating myself with the remarks just made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about the improvements in the effectiveness of the police over, I am very glad he had the grace to say, the past 20 years—otherwise, it might have been a little more difficult for me to agree with his sentiments. He started off by saying 10 years, but he modified that to 20 and he got it right in the end. I am happy to associate myself with that tribute, but of course there is always room for improvement. The purpose of the measures before your Lordships is to improve the accountability of the police.
I am opposed to pilot schemes for two reasons. First, I very much doubt, and I think it is difficult to make the case, that pilots will prove any true test of the effectiveness of the measures contained in the Bill. The Bill proposes to introduce an element of democratic accountability into the way in which the police operate. The essence of democracy is that it does not lead to uniformity. Democracy is the enemy of uniformity. In a democratic system, some elected police and crime commissioners will be more effective than others: that is in the nature of a democracy.
It would be very difficult to draw general lessons, which is presumably the purpose of pilots, from a few pilots, whatever attempts are made. I recognise that attempts have been made in the amendment to make them representative, but there is no such thing. There cannot be any such thing as representative arrangements. Whatever arrangements are made and whatever areas are chosen, it will not be possible to draw general lessons from whatever happens in the particular pilot schemes that would be set up.
Secondly, there is the element of uncertainty. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, had the grace to refer to this. Amendment 7A proposes that these pilots should last for at least four years and then there should be an independent review of them. I hesitate to suggest that this is simply a delaying tactic or that the noble Lord has in mind, in effect, a wrecking amendment. Far be it from me to make any such suggestion but this is to contemplate a delay of some six years—taking “at least” four years, then adding an independent review and the time to examine and reflect upon the consequences and results. That is six years of uncertainty for the police service. That would not be doing it or the community at large any kind of favour. For both those reasons, I urge your Lordships to reject these amendments.
My Lords, I rise in very much the same vein. I have this flight of fancy when I see the word “pilots”. I think of pilots, then test pilots, wind tunnels, test flights, circuits and bumps, and all the risky business that goes on in the world of aviation. This is a risky business as well, even in an allegorical sense. I am deeply opposed to the concept of pilots. Having the greatest possible respect for the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, I know that this is not a wrecking amendment. It is advanced for the best of reasons but, as has already been alluded to, it would effectively be a wrecking amendment to the Bill. It would certainly not be helpful.
I, too, could come up with a number of reasons why we should not pursue the course that is suggested in the amendment. I will go through four or five quickly. For a start, would the areas that are selected for the pilots welcome or resist the attention? Either reception would skew the result. Those who welcomed it would make sure that it worked; those who did not would probably go in the opposite direction. That skewing of the result is certainly something to which one should pay attention.
Despite the standpoint that they take, would the areas welcome the change and the possibility of then going back to square one if the pilot was unsuccessful? It would be change and more change, all over a period of four or six years. What of the uncertainty in the remainder of the country? I will not labour the point because it has already been clearly made by the previous speaker. What does it say of the parliamentary process as a whole? Is it that we cannot make our minds up here and get the job done correctly in your Lordships’ House the first time?
The most important point has of course been mentioned several times in Second Reading, in Committee and again now. What of the effect of the uncertainty on the police service itself? The service is struggling hard—and well—to come to terms with all the pressures of modern life and the current economic situation that we find ourselves in. ACPO has not declared a position on this, quite correctly. I respect its diffidence but I would put private money on the fact that the police service does not want to see a pilot. It wants certainty, to know where it is going and to know that now. In any case, it has enough uncertainty swirling around its ears.
I will not weary your Lordships any longer on this. I have made my position quite clear. We should strive very hard in your Lordships’ House to get the Bill right first time and implement it in whatever form is eventually, democratically decided upon. A pilot would be a retrograde step.
My Lords, I have made it clear throughout that I want to see the model that is in the coalition’s programme for government implemented in full. My noble friend Lord Shipley quoted the relevant section from the agreement earlier, including the reference to the “strict checks and balances”. I fear that that term is losing its potency with repetition, but I say again that checks and balances are essential because of the dangers of the concentration of power in the hands of an individual.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said that he hoped to find some sympathy around the Chamber. He certainly finds that from me, but he also finds a little surprise. I do not know whether this was due to relaxing over supper, but he made a very low-key introduction to the issue. Perhaps this debate has come upon us at an unexpected point.
Now that we have seen the Government’s proposals in response to the very thoughtful and powerful points made in Committee, we have seen that the Government have moved, and I am happy to acknowledge that. It is always gratifying, and sometimes disconcerting, to see one’s own name linked with that of the Minister on an amendment, but there has been a good deal of movement. However, there has not been movement on the range of issues about which concerns have been raised, nor in many cases do the government amendments go far enough.
I am speaking personally for myself and for my noble friend Lord Shipley, rather than for the I know not how many who are ranged behind me at the moment—attendance is not bad, actually, for 8.50 pm —but this is, I stress, very much a personal viewpoint. Many of the checks and balances that are needed centre around the police and crime panel’s scrutiny role, on which our amendments at this stage of the Bill, as at the previous stage, would spell out what we believe that scrutiny should comprise.
As for checks, I think that a body needs the ability not just to say politely, “We don’t agree”, nor to say, “and we require your reasons”, but sometimes to say, “No”, if it is to act as a check. When any model is working well, there is no need to use the whole armoury, but I do not believe that it is possible to legislate for harmony and co-operation. One tries to set up the model to encourage such co-operation, but one cannot require it. Mechanisms are needed to provide that no.
Of course, it would be impertinent to suggest that we have identified all the necessary, or even desirable, checks and balances, but I must say that I would feel more comfortable if more were proposed in the Bill. Therefore, as an alternative, I think that we need to look to experience. The noble Lord, Lord Howard, said that we cannot draw general conclusions because of the diversity across the country, but it seems to me that, unless the framework is robust enough to cater for these matters—
With great respect, my noble friend misunderstands me. It is not because of the diversity around the country but because of the nature of democracy, and the diversity that democracy inherently produces, that I do not believe that general lessons can be learnt. That is an important distinction.
My Lords, I would accept that: democracy is quite untidy. Liberal Democrats have often said that it is not a bad thing to have a patchwork, with different arrangements for the delivery of service in different places and to different communities, which may be geographic or may have other characteristics. For instance, with regard to Wales, we have heard that it is important to have similarity because the provision of the service crosses the border. I think that we need to be reassured that the underlying framework, which may then grow different bits, is robust enough to serve the whole of England and Wales.
I tabled an amendment on pilots at Committee, and I acknowledged that the proposals could be approved. For instance, to have an independent review and report would be a good thing, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rightly suggested. He also made the point—this is a question to him—that, if the experience from the pilots was to be utilised, there would have to be a mechanism whereby the Secretary of State, probably, could tweak the arrangements within the Bill. I am not sure that I have found that in his amendment, but he may be relying on the arrangements around commencement; I do not know.
At the previous stage, I asked the Minister whether there was any other mechanism that the Government might suggest for—to use the words that I used then—assessing and evaluating the model, but she did not answer the question. I am not sure whether she was unable to answer it, but for me that question still remains. I understand that there is a concern about certainty, but I do not understand that there is a concern to achieve certainty about a model over which there still hang so many anxieties. Speaking for my noble friend Lord Shipley and myself, we support the amendment.
My Lords, one reason I so enjoyed 16 years of being involved in the governance of policing was that it gave me the opportunity to debate a range of issues with senior police officers and to disagree with them on a number of occasions. Indeed, I disagree with them on this occasion and that holds no terrors for me because that is one of the things I most enjoyed about it. In case noble Lords suspect that I overstep the mark on occasion, I should tell them that the governance arrangements in Lancashire were, according to the inspectorate, the finest in the country. We had an equilibrium of discussion, if I can put it in those terms, and I would want to have the same sort of equilibrium this evening because there are some strong arguments to be put in favour of pilots.
While hearing the arguments that my police friends and others have advanced, there are some counter-arguments. First, the believers who support this reform have been very few in number. On this major area of change, I think I am right that six people on the Benches opposite, at most, have engaged in supporting this change, apart from the Ministers. With honourable exceptions, people have in general not joined in this debate. I except the noble Lord, Lord Howard, who has indeed spoken out in favour of these reforms. He apparently had a great conversion in 2005. I am not sure whether that was before or during the election of 2005 but clearly there was a great epiphany and a conversion took place.
May I assist the noble Baroness? It was the product of long examination of the operation of the police authorities, which were set up pursuant to the legislation for which I was responsible, and the acute sense of disappointment I felt at their failure to live up to my expectations.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, conjures up a fascinating prospect of former Home Secretaries and Secretaries of State standing for election as police and crime commissioners. Given what the Minister has told us today with regard to the bar on Members of this House standing for such positions, we can look forward to the possibility of the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, becoming the elected police and crime commissioner for Kent.
I rather thought that the noble Baroness was inviting me to a contest.
I am sure that if the noble Lord were to move to Lancashire, that could be arranged. Although I think that that would be an interesting and enticing prospect, and no doubt incredibly scary for the chief constable of Kent, I wonder whether the damascene conversion that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, has described to us several times would not have been made easier had his original proposals for police authorities been subjected to a series of pilots. He could then perhaps have discovered at an earlier point that the model he initially favoured was flawed.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 1A and the two other amendments in this group come to an important matter that goes to the heart of the Bill: the relationship between the elected police and crime commissioner and the chief constable. Whatever one’s view of the Government’s proposals, no noble Lord will underestimate the importance of this relationship or of ensuring that it is appropriate, proper and constructive.
The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, who is now not in his place, spoke eloquently about the meaning of direction and control of a police force under a chief constable. We know that there are inevitable tensions between police authorities and chief constables. That is healthy and entirely proper. The risk is if an unhealthy tension is created. On the one hand, there is the risk that an elected police and crime commissioner—with clearly more authority from being elected—will seek to interfere unduly in the performance of the duties of the chief constable. Equally, I am sure that some chief constables might resist the proper use of the powers of the police and crime commissioner and seek to keep them away from discussion on issues that are perfectly legitimate.
The relationship between the PCC and the chief constable is very important. The Minister has kindly shared with us some of the discussions and draft papers that lie behind the production of a draft protocol or memorandum of understanding between the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner. I am grateful for that. When we discussed this matter in Committee, I asked whether such a memorandum of understanding or protocol should be placed on a statutory footing. The Minister accepted that this was an important matter and agreed to consider it and come back to the House at a later stage. I would be interested in her response.
I fully accept the point made by a number of noble Lords that if chief constables and police and crime commissioners have to have recourse to a document to interpret whether a particular behaviour is in accordance with the memorandum of understanding or protocol, the relationship has already broken down. It is rather like the partnership agreement between general practitioners. Once they get that out of the safe, they have reached a stage where a break-up is only too likely. However, a protocol or memorandum of understanding provides at the very least a backcloth to this important relationship. Even if it does not have to be taken out of the drawer, both the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner will be aware of its existence and the principles that it seeks to underpin. Given the importance of that protocol or memorandum of understanding, I would have thought that it might have benefitted from having a statutory basis. That would give it the important signal of parliamentary legitimacy, and would be helpful in setting up the relationship as constructively as possible. I hope the noble Baroness will be able to come back with a positive response. I beg to move.
My Lords, may I take this early opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, in her absence, for immediately withdrawing any suggestion that she sought to confer a halo upon me? I am not sure I can be quite so fulsome in my comments on the remarks of my noble friend Lord Carlile, but there we are.
I have observed with a great deal of amusement the numerous accolades, including those from the lips of the noble Baroness earlier this afternoon, which I gather have been often repeated during the course of proceedings in this Bill—usually, alas, in my unavoidable absence—on my proposals nearly 20 years ago, which form the basis of the current provisions and current constitution of police authorities. I do not think that anyone has yet drawn attention to the fact that when I brought forward those proposals they were bitterly opposed by your Lordships and your Lordships’ predecessors. To listen to the words that have been expressed on them now, anyone would think that they had been welcomed with open arms by your Lordships and seen by those on all sides of the argument as a long-awaited answer to the problem.
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Is it not the case that while his additional proposals were deeply controversial—I think he had some master plan for lord lieutenants of counties assisting in the process of appointing independent members—it was when they had been improved by your Lordships' House that we reached the eventual outcome that we are all so in favour of?
Convenient though that rewriting of history is for the noble Lord’s arguments, it is very far from the case. He need look no further than the recently published memoirs of my noble friend Lord Ferrers to see that your Lordships remained obdurate, even when I was prepared to amend my original proposals. If my recollection is correct, it was only after a protracted game of ping-pong that I was eventually able to get my proposals on to the statute book in the face of persistent and continued opposition from your Lordships' House. But that is ancient history. I wanted to put the record straight.
The fact is that when those proposals found their way on to the statute book I was very hopeful that they would provide the basis for strong police authorities who would carry out the functions, which I am sure we would all want them to carry out, and who would be recognised in the areas that they served as the voice of the public in relation to policing. Alas, despite the splendid efforts of many of those who have served with distinction on police authorities during the nearly two decades that have passed since those proposals became law, my expectations have been disappointed. The proposals that have been put in place have not led to the kind of police authorities that I hoped they would. It is because of that that I am an enthusiastic supporter of these proposals. Indeed, I do not want to embarrass my noble friend on the Front Bench, but I think that in some ways I can claim to be their author, although it will not do me much good in the eyes of your Lordships, and I remain an enthusiastic supporter of them.
As to this particular amendment and the proposal put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, there is no difference between the term “direction and control” used in the protocol and the term used in existing legislation. That is the answer to the point made a few moments ago by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan. The question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is whether the protocol should become statutory. We know that ACPO has said—I think absolutely rightly—that it would be wrong to seek to define operational independence in the statute. If you gave the protocol statutory force, you would in effect arrive at a statutory definition of operational control. That would be a mistake for the reasons given by ACPO. It is for that reason that I oppose the amendment proposed by the noble Lord.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has served us well by this amendment. The arguments remain finely balanced as to whether or not the protocol or memorandum of understanding should have a statutory footing. Having been privileged to be in some of the earlier discussions about whether there was indeed a need for a protocol at all, the journey has been a very interesting, and very supportive, iterative process. Certainly in the meetings that I have been privileged to attend, there has been an acceptance on the Government’s side that a document of this nature or something like it was necessary to reassure and to confidence-build around operational independence and the legacy of operational independence, which is so important to the model of British policing. We have now reached decision point: should it have statutory footing or not?
My own journey on this route was that I was hopeful that as much as possible that came out of these discussions should be in the Bill. Whether it should be in the Bill in penny packets, at the relevant point, or in one comprehensive document of a protocol or a memorandum of understanding is a finely balanced question. However, I accept that ACPO is concerned that if it has a statutory footing, a once and for ever attempt to define operational independence will be a formidable task. The arguments are very finely balanced and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, does a service by raising this. If it is pushed to a Division, I am still uncertain which way I will vote and I look forward to further discussion. It is so important but it is very finely balanced, and the arguments on both sides are very strong.
My Lords, first, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Harris, on the sense of realism which infused his contribution to your Lordships’ debate. He recognised that we are likely to see elected police commissioners in place next year and that the Government are likely to reverse the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Harris. I rise with a degree of reluctance to oppose this amendment, not only because it is proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, with whom I had many enjoyable disputes many years ago, even long before I was Home Secretary. It was always a great pleasure to see him across the table when we were negotiating.
My Lords, I remember attending the shortest ministerial meeting I had with the noble Lord when we were allowed just seven minutes to consider the matter.
There were many other much longer meetings. The noble Lord talked about the characteristics of Roman emperors. When I faced him across the negotiating table, it always seemed to me that he took upon himself many of the attributes of Roman emperors—he still perhaps to some extent does so today—and therefore greatly adorns the contributions which he makes to your Lordships’ House. I am even more reluctant to oppose the amendment because it is also supported by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington. I did not sit across the table from the noble Lord and negotiate with him. I had the great pleasure of working very closely with him when I had the privilege of holding the office of Home Secretary. I have enormous respect for his views and it is therefore with particular diffidence that I oppose this amendment.
My question is: what would the board of non-executives do which the panel would not do? The police and crime panel is particularly established by the provisions of this Bill to scrutinise and advise the police and crime commissioner. I repeat that it is established to advise the police and crime commissioner. What is the function of non-executives but to advise the police and crime commissioner? Do we really want to provide by statute a cumbersome bureaucratic panoply of organisations to perform the functions set out in the Bill?
We are proposing to have the police and crime commissioner, which I fully support, and the police and crime panel, precisely to provide the strong and robust governance arrangements which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, is so keen to see introduced. I share his view that it is important to have good and strong governance arrangements but that is what the police and crime panel would provide. To have this non-executive board in addition would at best be duplication of functions and, at worst, confusion and a proliferation of bureaucracy, which I suggest is the last thing that your Lordships should be seeking to foist upon the new arrangements provided by the Bill.
Therefore, despite my long and happy memories of my negotiations with the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and my enormous respect for the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, I would respectfully advise your Lordships to reject this amendment.
My Lords, I support the amendment. Far be it from me to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, who I have said publicly I believe to have been one of the most successful Home Secretaries during my time in policing and beyond, but on this occasion I have to disagree with him. Perhaps I may take noble Lords back to the setting up of the Metropolitan Police Authority, along with the London Assembly and the new appointment of the Mayor of London. A year before that, with the agreement of Paul Condon, the commissioner when I was the deputy commissioner, we set up a committee. It consisted of various people from the Home Office, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, was a member. We thrashed through and gradually teased out a new structure for London. It was going to be extremely complicated and difficult to bring in. It had a conflict of interest that involved the national responsibilities of the Metropolitan Police, and specifically the commissioner, and it had to take account of the new London Assembly, the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, and not least the police authority itself, before which the commissioner would appear on a regular basis—at least once a month.
Part of the discussions related to that was the independent elements necessary to ensure proper governance, independence and expert advice. Going back to some of the excellent things introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, as Home Secretary, one of those was the independence of the police authority and a widening of its knowledge, expertise, delivery and holding the chief constable to account. I believe it is necessary to have in place a process that can be dealt with by a non-executive director in relation to the new set-up with police commissioners and their panels. Perhaps I may take noble Lords through the three reasons for that process.
Financial decision-making and the creation of a corporation sole will be responsible for major decisions such as the placement of contracts, financial allocation and a number of other serious financial matters, including audit. It is imperative that within the police panel and outside of the official responsibilities of the Chief Constable and Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, there is expert independence in terms of advice and good governance. The second reason is staffing. Again, it is important that the approach taken is that of best practice. Many noble Lords are involved in private business and they know that non-executive directorships constitute best practice in terms of good governance, independent advice, and ensuring that the vision of the company they are involved with is taken forward. If we are going down the line of corporation sole in relation to police commissioners and their panels, surely it is good governance, common sense and best practice to ensure that there is an element of non-executive directorship on the panel.
The third but by no means the least reason is that of equality of opportunity and diversity. The contribution made by a collective as opposed to an individual should always be noted in relation to what is on occasion an extremely difficult matter. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, will know, as others on the Metropolitan Police Authority and the police assembly of the time will know, that on a number of occasions during the implementation of the Lawrence report—my deputy commissioner, the noble Lord, Lord Blair, was part of this—the implications of driving forward and turning the recommendations into action needed individual expertise from independent members of the Metropolitan Police Authority, members of which would on occasion come to see me or the noble Lord, Lord Blair, individually. To throw away that is to throw away extraordinary expertise which is necessary in the world in which we now live.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Soley, talked about torpedoes and water-lines; I think that we are talking about horses and carts. We are trying to design a cart without knowing whether one, two or four horses will be drawing it. We know where we are, and it is a confusing state for your Lordships' House. I sincerely hope that the opinion of the House will not be tested on this amendment. I take this opportunity to make a few if not random then certainly general, comments. The general thrust of the measure we are discussing is helpful, tidies up some of the framework and deserves the close attention of officials. It does not seek to dilute power but to channel and harness it and—to use the word again—to check capricious behaviour. All in all, I do not think that it is unduly prescriptive. I sense that noble Lords are generally trying very hard to be helpful to the Government. The latter find themselves in a difficult position although I will not go into the horses and carts scenario again. In broad terms, I support what is being said. As I have said before, I support the principle of the elected commissioner, but checks and balances need to be reassessed and strengthened. I trust that the Government will do that in due course.
My Lords, I rise only because my name was prayed in aid by the noble Lord, Lord Soley. I do not believe for a moment that these amendments are necessary to prevent the commissioner taking control of the police because the Bill in its original form makes it absolutely clear that the operational independence of the police is protected. Therefore, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Soley, is completely wide of the mark.
However, I was intrigued—since I am on my feet I shall make a further point—by the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and his attempt to draw parallels between the discussions that took place in this House yesterday and the discussions that we are having today. I had assumed that the whole thrust of the proposals which were put forward yesterday emanated from the devotion of the Liberal Democrat Party in particular to the principle of democratic elections. I thought that that was at the heart of the proposals which were put before this House yesterday. However, the fact that a significant number of Liberal Democrats were not prepared to accept the principle of democratic election in respect of police commissioners has resulted in the difficulties which have also been discussed today. That is the most significant and odd lesson to be drawn from the contrast between our discussions yesterday and our discussions today.
I do not want to turn this into a little contest between lawyers but I do not know from where my noble friend derives the assertion that I am in some way opposed to democratic elections. As a lawyer like him, I am in favour of tidy and comprehensible solutions—that is my concern about yesterday—but perhaps we should move on to today.
It was the noble Lord who brought yesterday into the discussion in the first place. I did not introduce the subject of yesterday, he did. I just thought that I would point out the beginning of a discrepancy between the approach of the Liberal Democrats to what we were discussing yesterday and the approach of at least some of them to what we are discussing today.
I will not intrude on family grief on the government Benches, but the decision taken last week was a decision of the House. It involved Members from all sides of the House, including a significant number of Cross-Benchers. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, has singled out one group, or part of a group of Members, for his animadversions. I am also a lawyer although a much humbler one than either of the noble Lords who have just spoken—I am a journeyman solicitor, not an eminent silk. However, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Howard, he slightly misreads the nature of the amendment, which is not at all about controlling chief constables. The amendment deals with the function of the panel. In many ways, it is an amendment for all seasons because, as other noble Lords have said, it would fit with any structure—an elected commissioner; a commissioner appointed in the way described by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig; or any structure as long as it has a panel. I think it is commonly accepted that that will be part of the final structure that emerges from all this.
The amendment is a paving amendment. It is to strengthen the role of the panel. In Committee, we had the benefit of the protocol, which spoke of checks and balances. There is a widespread view in the House that those checks and balances were insufficient. The amendment is directed at strengthening the checks and balances and the role of the panel. That is something that I hope the Government will take seriously. It seems to me and to others who spoke last week that the Bill does not achieve what the protocol purports: that there are sufficient checks and balances on either the commissioner or, for that matter, arguably, the chief constable—but particularly the commissioner.
Let us regard this as a helpful and constructive amendment to reinforce the Government’s intentions, which I accept at face value, of having substantial checks and balances in the system. In that context, I hope that it will be widely accepted in the House.
I thank noble Lords who have participated in a most interesting debate. I particularly thank the Minister for her response. I also apologise—I must have been too close to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, because my voice is beginning to go. First, in speaking to these amendments I was trying to be constructive and attempting to build on existing good practice—that is very important. I said at Second Reading that I thought good governance was absolutely essential in the policing world. I am trying to ensure here that good governance is an essential element in any new structures that the Government introduce. That is one of my fundamental concerns.
I shall address one or two points raised by the Minister. There was an issue about the public holding directly elected people to account. I was a local councillor on a police authority and can assure the Minister that I was held to account by the electorate, as were fellow members of the police authority throughout Lancashire. There is a debate to be had on representative democracy as against direct democracy. If the Minister would like to have that debate, I am willing to join her. The fact is that in this country we have a system of representative democracy. We elect members of Parliament and they are then appointed to government jobs. We elect local councillors and they are then appointed to bodies. That is, as I understand it, representative democracy. If the coalition Government now suggest that we should have a system of direct elections, I hope that they are not just suggesting that for local government. If you want direct elections, that goes right across the board. We are then dealing with a very different system of government. As far as I am concerned, we have always had representative government in this country. That is why I feel so strongly when people say that local members of police authorities have not been held to account. That is not true.
The second point that I take exception to is that we keep hearing references to Derbyshire and what happened there in the 1980s. Here I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Howard. The fact is that the reforms of the early 1990s created police authorities that were very different from those that existed in the 1980s. Indeed, one of the issues facing police authorities currently is that because they work across party lines, work co-operatively and have a very corporate style, they have not attracted the headlines but have worked much more effectively. I can assure noble Lords that no police authority that I can think of in this country has operated in any sense like that of Derbyshire in the 1980s: that needs to be acknowledged. There was a sea change in the way that police authorities operated. I almost feel I am carrying the flag for the reforms of the noble Lord, Lord Howard. While he has changed his mind and is adopting the Labour policy of the 1980s, I am now advocating the changes that he effectively brought into being.
I seek to relieve the noble Baroness of her burden. Is not the point that the reforms put in place in the 1990s—she has been kind about them and their consequences—were a response to the problems of the 1980s? Some 20 years later, it is time to look at things again and see if we can improve the arrangements that have been in place for 20 years and institute a more effective way of dealing with the difficulties which have arisen.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak in support of the Bill. In the interests of brevity, I shall confine my remarks to Part 1. It is hardly surprising that I should be in support of Part 1 since I can claim a modest share in the paternity of that proposal. The proposal for elected police commissioners was in the 2005 general election manifesto of the Conservative Party, which I had the honour to lead at the time. I appreciate that that claim, judging by the speeches that we have heard so far, is not likely to endear me to all of your Lordships, but nevertheless that is the case.
At least that claim enables me to rebut conclusively one of the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Blair: this proposal does not originate in any attempt to emulate some model transported across the Atlantic from the United States of America. Rather, it is designed to remedy a weakness in the present arrangements in this country. That weakness can be summarised in one question: what is the name of the chairman of your police authority? That is the question to which, if you ask the ordinary man and woman in the street, not one in a thousand would be able to give you the right answer; indeed, most of the people you asked would not have the faintest idea what you were talking about. Your Lordships will have noticed that I posed the question in terms of the chairman of the authority. If you ask the man or woman in the street the names of the members of the authority, you would have an even more minuscule response.
Would the noble Lord be able to guess how many members of the public out of a hundred would know the name of the present Police Minister? Is that then an argument for the Police Minister to be directly elected?
Not at all. The whole point, as I am about to explain, is that the reason why this single question contains the nub of the case for change is that police authorities should be the means by which citizens hold their local police force to account. That is the point of police authorities, and the anonymity of those authorities is an insuperable obstacle to the achievement of that objective. The point of Part 1 of the Bill is to sweep away that obstacle to provide the basis for true accountability.
The election of the police and crime commissioner will attract a great deal of attention. I would not go so far as to say that everyone in the local community will know the name of the commissioner when he or she has been elected; after all, not everyone knows the name of their Member of Parliament, nor does everyone know the name of the Prime Minister. However, a large number of people would know the name of the commissioner, many more than know the name of the chairman of the police authority. That would provide the transparency that is necessary—this proposal is about transparency—if the holding to account of the police is to become more meaningful, more effective and much better understood by those on whose behalf that accountability is being exercised.
This, however, is a big change, and I recognise that inevitably it gives rise to some concerns. There is a concern that the change will have an impact on the operation and independence of the police, and I accept that it is essential that that operational independence is preserved. As has been pointed out, though, the language in the Bill, which provides that the chief constable has direction and control over his force and officers, is identical to the language in existing legislation. The Government intend to publish a protocol, which I understand they hope to have available by the commencement of the Committee stage in this House. As the right reverend Prelate said, the devil is in the detail, and it is right that that protocol should be exposed to great scrutiny by this House in Committee, as I am sure that it will be. However, I do not accept the view of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that chief constables, with the command that they have too of access to the media, the ability that they have too to put their case, will be so pusillanimous as to give way to any police and crime commissioner who oversteps the mark.
There are other concerns, including that someone dangerous or wholly unsuitable might be elected. I think it was Benjamin Disraeli, among no doubt many others, who said, “Trust the people”. That is not a bad watchword. With great respect, we in this House should be particularly cautious about casting doubt on that watchword. As my successor as Home Secretary, Mr Jack Straw, put it—admittedly in a different context—in an excellent article in yesterday’s Times:
“There is a patrician tendency among the British political elite that asserts that some issues are too serious to be informed by the vulgar instincts of the common people”.
It is a tendency that we in this House should particularly guard against. His words were, as I say, in a different context; he was criticising some of the policies of the current Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary—criticisms that I wholly share. I assure your Lordships that I am not invariably a supporter of all the policies of the Government. However, his words are equally apposite when applied to those who distrust the electoral process that the Bill would put in place.
The provisions of the Bill are consistent with the localism that is such an important part of the coalition Government’s approach. They create transparency, which is also at the heart of that approach, and so essential if true accountability is to be asserted. There are many points of important detail that will certainly merit careful attention and scrutiny on the part of this House. I wholeheartedly support Part 1 of the Bill and I commend it to your Lordships’ House.
My Lords, I will confine my remarks to Part 1 of the Bill. I declare a past interest: some 43 years ago I was appointed a Minister in the Home Office responsible on a day-to-day basis for policing. When I look back at that period, it seems almost a distant pre-incarnation.
The central reality that one should regard as a template for all matters that one considers in the context of the police is that the police service represents two things. In the first instance it represents a disciplined service with a disciplined hierarchy. In that regard, it has much in common with the armed services. However, unlike the armed services, the police force comes into daily contact with the citizens of this land. The idea of a disciplined force is central, because it raises the question of whether a civil commissar can overlook any part of the functions of a disciplined force. The second point, which is equally valid, concerns the force’s independence. The independence of the police is as crucial to the rule of law as the independence of the judiciary. Any tampering with those twin pillars—the disciplined hierarchy and the independence of the police—jeopardises the future of the police service. Whatever the temptation may be to pander to any whim, caprice or populist trend, it must be resisted.
The Government’s case has not been made in the slightest. Three cases have been put forward. The matter was debated in the other place on 13 December last year. I will not quote the exact words of the Home Secretary; they appear in col. 707 of Hansard. She gave as the main reason for the reforms the fact that the police had failed the public when it came to curbing crime. We heard nothing of that today—and understandably so. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, reminded us—the figures are slightly broader than those that he mentioned—from 1994 to the present, under successive Governments, the spectacular fact is that crime has fallen by almost 50 per cent. That is a huge diminution. Therefore, obviously, the main plank of the Home Secretary’s case disappears there and then.
Today we are told by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, that there has to be a transfer of authority from the Home Office—from Whitehall—to local bodies. Nothing of that is proposed in the Bill. Indeed, one could well argue that the police panels would be utterly without identity, as compared with the police authority. We heard from the former Home Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, whose main case was that people do not know the name of the chairman of the police authority. I do not suppose that those people know the name of the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls or the head of the Family Division, but one does not impose a civil commissar on them.
Is the noble Lord suggesting that the Lord Chief Justice or the Master of the Rolls exercises some local accountability on behalf of the community? That is the difference between the two. Surely that difference must be apparent to the noble Lord.
My Lords, let me at the very outset, in the presence of the noble Lords, Lord Stevens, Lord Condon and Lord Imbert, put my hands up and say, “It’s a fair cop Guv, I’ve got form as long as your arm on police accountability”, because I have. I have had the pleasure of working with all three of those noble Lords in different capacities over the years as a civil liberties lawyer campaigning for the reform of the police, as chair of the GLC’s police committee campaigning for the political accountability of the police in London, and as Minister of State for Police in the Home Office. In all those various capacities, I have supported and campaigned for directly elected political oversight—I stress “oversight” as opposed to “control”—of the police. Therefore, I am bound to say that I cannot oppose as a matter of principle the proposal that is put forward in the Bill—and I do not. However, I am also bound to say that I share the very real concerns that have been expressed in the debate about the proposal that the Bill envisages and the way in which it is being introduced.
I cannot but recollect the vehement opposition of the then Home Secretary to the very modest proposals that were put forward by my colleagues in the Labour Party in 1994 when we proposed directly elected police authorities. That modest proposal—modest in comparison with this reform—was met with the following words of the then Home Secretary. He said:
“I reject entirely the view long held by members of the Labour party that there should be directly elected police authorities. That would be a recipe for politicising the police service. It would also mean removing all magistrates from the work of police authorities. I believe that that would be a retrograde step”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/94; cols. 112-13.]
The noble Lord is in his place. He knows whose words those were. They were the words of the then Home Secretary.
When circumstances change, I change my mind. What does the noble Lord do?
I very much welcome that almost damascene conversion. I would be the last person to oppose the conversion that the noble Lord has evidenced in his remarks today in support of the Bill. However, I should counsel against the sort of zealotry that often comes with conversions of that nature—the zealotry that cannot find any place in its heart for piloting or the modest proposals for safeguards that have come from noble Lords not only on this side of the House but on his own side. I hope that the Minister, in her response and during Committee, does not exhibit quite the same degree of zealotry that has been exhibited in the noble Lord’s speech, because this will be an occasion when the House will need to come together to improve the Bill and try to find common ground where we can find it, while accepting the principle of directly elected political oversight of the police.
I return to stressing the word “oversight” because the bottom line for all of us—certainly for me, as someone who has sought to exercise in the best way that I could the role and responsibilities of Police Minister—is that we must safeguard at all costs the operational independence of the police. That is the bottom line. That is absolutely vital if we are to maintain the best traditions of British policing and to uphold the rule of law.
As we do so, we need, of course, to understand that political oversight brings with it some real advantages, because we would not have seen the reforms that there have been in policing in this country over the past 20-odd years if politicians on all sides of the House and of all political parties had not been pushing and working for the sort of reforms that have made our policing now so much better than it was 20 years ago. I pay tribute to the police, and to a number of noble Lords who sit in this House who have exercised responsibility as operational chief officers of police, for the way in which they have taken the police forward in the course of some very difficult times and in the face of some difficult and hard cases that have exposed real failures on the part of the police. It would be a tragedy if we were to go backwards as an inadvertent result of the proposals in the Bill.
I want to make two remarks on matters to which we will need to return in Committee, and I pay tribute to the two maiden speeches that we have heard this afternoon—those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Berridge and Lady Newlove. They have touched on two areas in which policing has been found to have failed: diversity and ethnic minorities, and victims and their families. The two speeches were exemplars, in their different ways, of what maiden speeches should be, and were a timely reminder of the need to ensure, as we debate the Bill, that in the exercise of the functions of police commissioner and the composition of the panels, victims and ethnic minorities have their concerns taken into account. I certainly hope that we will return to that issue in Committee.
The other issue that we will have to explore with real care is operational independence. It is a matter of concern that we have not, to date, seen the protocols. We will want to see them, examine them carefully and see what the interplay will be between the panels, the police commissioner and the chief constable. As to getting that balance right in the budget, policing policies and priorities, we need to make sure that all three constituent parts of that arrangement are properly equipped, able and resourced to carry out their responsibilities. I do not accept the assurances that we have heard from those on the government Benches that the whole exercise is cost-neutral. If it is cost-neutral, it will be unable to deliver what the Government hope for, because you must resource properly the panels and the police commissioner. If you do not do that, this will be a sham exercise or an exercise that is designed purely to pander in some way to the notion that we have a form of direct accountability, when in fact we do not.
What matters above all else is the principle that Sir Robert Peel sought to enshrine in his version of policing—to recognise always that:
“The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it”.
Those words are worth repeating. Those of us in this Chamber who have been politicians know that for us the test is always visible action. That is, frankly, the great danger of some of what is proposed, unless you properly resource the role of panel and commissioner alike, because all our officers—those noble Lords who have had operational responsibility for the police—will tell us that the real test of efficiency is the test that Robert Peel set out. We need to ensure, as we take this matter forward, that it is the Peelian concept that is supported and upheld rather than any other.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is not a question of giving in to the courts; it is undoubtedly a question of the proper implementation of court judgments and the role of Parliament in making legislation.
My Lords, we all respect the independence of the judiciary, but does not this case illustrate one of the difficulties caused by the Human Rights Act, which requires judges to go beyond their traditional role of interpreting the will of Parliament and to substitute their own views on proportionality? Is it not that which justifies the concerns of those of us who believe that these matters should be decided by Parliament?
I am sure that the whole House recognises the importance of proportionality and it will note the important point that has just been made.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have not yet had a Conservative Back-Bench question.
My Lords, I, too, congratulate my noble friend and, through her, the Home Secretary on striking the right balance in this very difficult area between the need to protect the public and the need to safeguard personal and individual liberty. May I ask about the emergency legislation to extend the period of pre-charge detention? Given what my noble friend has said about the Government’s ability to put that in place very quickly, do they intend this emergency power to be available not simply in a general period or emergency but for an individual suspect under detention, in respect of whom the police, and perhaps a magistrate or a judge, are convinced that a longer period of detention is necessary?
I thank my noble friend for his kind remarks, which I will pass on to the Home Secretary. On the question of emergency legislation, the intention is really to cover an emergency. I suppose that I can imagine—this is hypothetical territory—two broad categories, for instance, where the general threat level had risen even further. Those will be very dire circumstances in which we might be in a real emergency. There is also the possibility that one or a number of complex conspiracies come together and it is clear that a different approach is needed to the amount of time for, say, pre-charge detention. However, we stress that we believe that these kinds of measures, which at the moment are the norm, should be reserved for really exceptional circumstances.