Prisoners (Disclosure of Information About Victims) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 20th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has observed. In cases of this kind, the judge will wish to take into account the disclosure or non-disclosure of the whereabouts of a victim and the circumstances in which the offender can or cannot make that disclosure. There may be circumstances in which that might necessitate a Newton hearing, and so be it. That would be done contemporaneously with the determination of the tariff in the sentence. When later on we get to the preventive element after the tariff has been served, the Parole Board will be able to call for all that material, whether it be a Newton hearing or otherwise.

I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has to say about the importance of determining these issues at the time of trial and sentence; I do not disagree with him at all. It may be that some element of encouragement will be given if it is required, although I take from the observations of the former Lord Chief Justice—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas—that there may be little requirement to encourage in a matter that is dealt with in this way day in and day out.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I refer the Minister to his remarks about historic refusals. Reading proposed new subsection (1)(c), I do not get the impression that it is talking about historic refusals and I do not think that anything in the noble Baroness’s amendments would cut the ability of the board to look at them. What the opening words of the subsection are talking about is a situation where the board

“believes that the prisoner has information”—

talking about it in the present tense so that the board can consider it in a situation where it thinks that the prisoner is able to do something. That is where the words suggested by the noble Baroness would fit in very well.

Would the Minister like to reflect carefully on exactly what subsection (1)(c) is talking about and reconsider his point as to whether these amendments would cut out historic refusals, which would be highly undesirable, of course?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It does appear that the amendment has that effect even it was unintended. I will give the matter further consideration, as invited to by the noble and learned Lord.

Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft instrument forms part of the Government’s work to ensure there are functioning domestic laws in the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal on cross-border co-operation on family law. The instrument relates solely to the Government’s no-deal exit preparations. Again, should we reach an agreement on our future relationship with the EU, the Government will review the instrument and amend or revoke it as necessary at the end of a transition period.

This instrument gives effect to a commitment that I gave on behalf of the Government during the debate on 29 January on the Government’s main no-deal family law instrument, the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. That family statutory instrument has now been made. It puts in place the arrangements in cross-border family law cases that will apply if we leave the EU without a deal. That instrument revokes the retained EU law in relation to Brussels IIa and the maintenance regulations and makes consequential changes to domestic law, including changes to ensure that the jurisdiction rules for cross-border maintenance matters are restored to their pre-EU form.

This small amending instrument addresses a technical issue raised by family law stakeholders. Some family law stakeholders have raised concerns that by the amendments to the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 made by the main family instrument, we have inadvertently narrowed the jurisdiction of the court and the range of financial remedies that the court may order when compared to the position that currently exists under the EU maintenance regulation. That was not the Government’s intention. Without fixing this issue, the consequence would be that in some cases the court would be limited in terms of the financial remedies that it may grant. For example, the court would be able to make an order only for periodical payments and not for a lump sum or a property settlement or transfer. I extend thanks to the family law practitioners for bringing this issue to our attention.

While the existing approach is workable, the Government have decided to address those concerns to ensure that jurisdiction grounds and remedies are not reduced as a result of a no-deal exit because these are jurisdiction grounds and remedies that emerged after we had engaged with the relevant EU regulation. The instrument therefore amends the principal 2019 regulation so that, post exit without a deal, the courts in England and Wales or Northern Ireland will be able to order all types of financial remedies available under the Act or the Northern Ireland order in circumstances where either a parent, a guardian or the child is habitually resident or domiciled in England and Wales or Northern Ireland at the date of the application. The amendments also ensure that the court has jurisdiction to order a financial remedy in respect of a child where the parents are not married, in a similar way to when child maintenance is being considered ancillary to divorce.

The impacts of the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 were set out in an impact assessment published on 24 January 2019. This instrument amends those regulations so that the unintended impact of the amendments to the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 on the court’s jurisdiction and remedies is rectified. As amended, the impact of the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 will be as described in the original impact assessment. In other words, we had assumed that they would operate in the way in which they now operate in light of this supplementary instrument.

As I said, the instrument addresses concerns raised by stakeholders. My officials met these stakeholders to discuss their concerns. A draft of this instrument was provided to the statutory Family Procedure Rule Committee. Its members include some of the family lawyers who raised these concerns about the amendments to the Children Act 1989 and they were invited to comment on the draft. Those comments were taken into consideration before the instrument was finalised and laid. In addition, my officials have spoken to officials within the devolved Administrations.

In these circumstances, I stress that this is a highly technical instrument, which is intended to take us to the point we believed we would get to with the principal instrument. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, the amendment which the regulation seeks to make is obviously highly desirable. However, I have a question for the Minister, because I cannot for the life of me see how it achieves its purpose in expanding the financial remedies available under domestic legislation. As far as I can see, the only passage which might possibly have a bearing is Regulation 2(2)(a), where we are told that the words,

“in relation to matters relating to maintenance”,

are being deleted. Without more context, it is extremely difficult to see whether this achieves what the regulation seeks to do. I am happy to take the Minister’s assurance that it does, or perhaps he can explain it a bit more. It is characteristic that these instruments are so economically worded that, without a whole lot of legislative material in hand, it is sometimes hard to make sense of them.

Cross-Border Mediation (EU Directive) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

First, this instrument is not concerned with the role of the court: it is concerned with the role of mediation outside the court. Secondly, it is not usual to discover mediation as a form of resolving a child abduction case. The very nature of an abduction is such that the parties are not amenable to agreeing a voluntary mediation to resolve the matter. We have already made provision for civil orders in relation to child abduction.

With regard to criminal orders, it is impossible to replicate the existing provisions of EU law because, under the relevant provisions of EU law, an EU court would not recognise an order from a UK court in any event, and therefore it would give false hope to a party to grant them an order that was not enforceable. Overall, therefore, my answer to the noble Lord is that mediation does not impact directly on the sort of issue that has been raised. We recognise the importance of trying to ensure, as far as possible, that there are means of enforcing child abduction orders. The only qualification if we leave without a deal is that there would be no right of the originating court to make an order that trumps the order of the court in the country to which the child has been abducted. That is simply because in the absence of reciprocity, it is not possible to make such an order enforceable. Otherwise, my understanding is that we will be able to proceed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I think I am right in saying that we are party to a treaty about child abduction that extends well beyond the EU. I have had experience of a case involving abduction where one of the parties was resident in Australia and the other one in Norway, which, of course, are outside the EU network. We have rules about the speed at which cases can be dealt with, but the basic treaty arrangements are unaffected.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble and learned Lord is quite right. The Brussels convention on these matters reflects the terms of the Hague convention to a large extent. The one qualification is the element to which I referred about the trumping order, which is not available under the Hague convention. However, it works very effectively in respect of non-EU states and there is no reason it should not continue to operate. I believe that a week or so ago, I addressed these matters in this House when moving other regulations relating to exit, so I hope I have not contradicted myself since then.

Finally, although the confidentiality provisions in the EU directive will no longer be law in the context of mediation in England and Wales, it is usual for parties, when agreeing to mediation, to have an agreement on confidentiality as well. Indeed, even in the absence of such agreement, there is a provision from the High Court in the case Farm Assist Ltd in 2009, which says that such a confidentiality obligation would be implied in any event. It would, of course, be subject to the interests of justice, but we are not going to lose entirely the benefit of the confidentiality provisions if we leave without a deal. In these circumstances, therefore, I beg to move.

Mutual Recognition of Protection Measures in Civil Matters (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, about half-way down page 3 there is a reference to “participating Member State” and that it means “a Member State other than Denmark”. Am I right in thinking that, although it is dealt with specifically there, there is no change as far as Denmark is concerned because it does not participate in the EU regulations? Is it purely a matter of drafting that this provision appears?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The position as I understand it —I mentioned this earlier—is that pursuant to Article 22 of TFEU, Denmark has an opt out from all of these issues but has a bilateral agreement with the EU in respect of them. I have been corrected. It does not have a bilateral agreement in respect of this one but it does with the others—I apologise—and that is why Denmark is excepted.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

It is really a clarification in the drafting—it does not change anything. That is my point.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is entirely right.

Services of Lawyers and Lawyer’s Practice (Revocation etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The terms of the instrument make it perfectly clear that it is to apply in the absence of a deal. My department is certainly well aware of the scope and application of the instrument, which is why I made it clear in opening that this instrument will apply in the event of there being no deal. However, in the event that there is a withdrawal agreement of some kind, clearly that would not be a situation in which the instrument would be required.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I do not want to cause any difficulty, but why does paragraph 1(2) refer to the transitional period? There will not be a transitional period if there is a hard Brexit and no deal.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It does not refer to the transitional period as proposed in the withdrawal agreement: it refers to a transitional period that will apply for the purposes of this particular instrument in order to ensure that there is no immediate cut-off for EU lawyers in the United Kingdom. It is for that particular purpose that this particular regulation allows that, and it is considered that that is allowable under the GATS regime as well—in other words, we are allowed a period of time to transition to a point where European lawyers registered in the United Kingdom come to find themselves in the same position as third-party country lawyers.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 27th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am most obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his positive contribution to the debate, to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for their observations on this amendment, and to the noble and learned Lord for moving it.

From the very outset—I go back to the Law Commission’s 1994 report on structured settlements—it was intended that a provision of this kind to depart from a prescribed rate should be very much the exception rather than the rule. Clearly, it recognised that it would be both expensive and time-consuming if the prescribed discount rate could regularly be the subject of challenge on the basis that there might be another more appropriate rate for any number of reasons. That goes some considerable way to explaining the position of the Court of Appeal in the case of Warriner v Warriner.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, I referred to a guillotine, but I qualified it with the words “almost complete”—this is a deficient guillotine; it is not a complete guillotine. I said that because, for example, the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session, the appeal court in Scotland, in Tortolano v Ogilvie Construction, indicated that there may be cases in which the power to depart from the prescribed rate can be applied—but I accept that they will be wholly exceptional. In Tortolano, the court suggested that there might, for example, be a need to take account of a claimant who had to pay tax in a foreign jurisdiction, and that impacted upon the valuation of the award.

These are wholly exceptional circumstances, but the provision in Section 1(2) of the Damages Act 1996, which would be preserved by the words in subsection (2) of the proposed new Section A1, would allow for those wholly exceptional circumstances where the judiciary would be entitled to exercise an inherent discretion in order to achieve justice between the parties. It is in these circumstances that I would resist the amendment; I recognise that there may be room for taking this further, although I have been unable to identify it so far, to ensure that we can perhaps more clearly identify circumstances in which the exception would be applicable.

As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, indicated, the Bill will be considered in the other place, and I and my officials would be content to explore further with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, if he wishes to do so, whether the provision might be improved in some way. However, I have difficulty with that because I am concerned that if we intrude too much into this quite exceptional discretion, there is a risk of encouraging unnecessary and expensive litigation over the appropriate rate in individual cases.

On that basis, and recognising the point that the noble and learned Lord makes, I invite him to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all those who have taken part in this short debate. I am grateful in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his suggestion that this might be considered a little further when the Bill moves to the other place. It is a very difficult issue and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has indicated, it is very hard to find another form of words which can address it.

I am concerned about putting into the Bill something which raises false hopes. The circular from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers indicates that it was trying to find something in the wording which is not really what the Minister was talking about. We are not dealing with cases of exceptional injury within the domestic system, which is what the association was talking about. I take it from the Minister’s reply that he would not encourage people to have a go at changing the discount rate between reviews, which would be contrary to the idea of laying down certain rules for application while the reviews subsist.

It is a very tight issue as to whether there is a point in this provision at all. But having heard what has been said, and with particular thanks to the Minister for his reply today and for the way in which he has listened to me on two occasions, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, it is for me to say what will happen to my Amendment 89DAA, which is an amendment to Amendment 89DA, moved by the noble and learned Lord the Minister.

I want to make a few short points. First, I want to pick up on a remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that he will not accept the opprobrium that was visited on the Scottish Ministers for the way they conducted themselves in these negotiations. Having had discussions with Michael Russell and the Lord Advocate—like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—the points I put forward in my introduction to my amendment were sincerely held. Those points were not made to cause trouble. The Lord Advocate in particular gave advice on his reading of the Scotland Act; Michael Russell, for his part, was entirely genuine in his points about principle as well. That should be clearly understood.

When I was in practice at the Scottish Bar, I was junior to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As he pointed out, if I appeared with him, I would speak first; it would then be his function, as my senior, to speak second. Quite frequently, I found that when he spoke, he refined the kind of argument that I was attempting to put forward. It took on a slightly different—rather more attractive, perhaps—appearance after he had refined it. As he pointed out in his speech, the points that I made about the construction of Section 30 and the other sections do not really apply in the situation with which we are dealing here. I was grateful for his remark that the situation is unique and not seeking in any way to undermine the devolution settlement. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for making the same point that there is no question of this being the thin end of the wedge or in any way seeking to undermine the devolution settlement, to which he wishes to adhere. These remarks should help a lot in reassuring those in Scotland on how they should approach the continuing discussions. I was glad to hear from the Minister that the door is still open; I think that the Scottish point of view still regards the door as open too.

Perhaps this debate has refined things and shown that the purist argument—that of principle—does not really apply here. This is not about trying to construct the market that we were trying to construct in 1998, which was done by separating out the bits that mattered for that market into Schedule 5 so that they were clearly identified. We are dealing with a different, rather more subtle, situation in trying, as the Minister said, to create a functioning internal market with what has come back to us from Europe. That requires a rather more subtle approach that is not really dealt with in the Scotland Act, for understandable reasons. That being so, I hope very much that the way forward will be pointed by our discussion this evening. Without any further ado, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I intervene to raise a point that I have spoken to the clerk about. Noble Lords might recollect that earlier in the evening I gave a passing imitation of a rabbit in headlights. The reason for that was that it appeared to me that the amendments in group three had been moved and agreed without me speaking to them—which is absolutely ideal, as far as I am concerned. They are highly technical amendments, but I felt I should mention that to the House, lest any noble Lord wishes me to speak to them. As I said, they have been agreed, but noble Lords did not have an opportunity to hear my dulcet tones on the subject.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I have put my name down in support of the amendment. The arguments which led me to do that are those which I set out when I was moving my amendment earlier this evening, so I need not take up the time of the House in repeating them. What I said earlier is the full explanation as to why I put my name down.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his amendments, which are pertinent given the different positions of the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the imminent timing of votes in their legislatures that will address consent.

The Government have been clear that they wish to make the positive case for consent for this Bill. We have not just talked about our commitment to making that case but have shown it. We have engaged in extensive discussions with the devolved Administrations and have now introduced the amendment to Clause 11 that we have just discussed at some length to try to meet the expectations of the devolved legislatures. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will accept that our commitment to the legislative consent process is reflected in the agreement that we struck with the Welsh Government last week.

This is the legislative consent process in action. We have put forward policy objectives; we have worked through the differences, and we have found an appropriate compromise. As a result, the Welsh Government have recommended that the National Assembly for Wales grant legislative consent to the Bill when it votes on this matter, I believe, on 15 May. The Welsh Government agree that our amendments now strike the right balance between providing legal certainty and maximising assurances to the devolved legislatures on how we will jointly manage the process of powers returning from the EU in otherwise devolved areas. Of course we are disappointed that we have not been able to reach the same agreement with the Scottish Government, but this, I suggest, is not for want of trying. I stress again that time remains for the Scottish Government to join this agreement, so that we can all demonstrate that we have done what we consider to be the responsible thing in this context.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It will last until we have managed to implement all of the framework agreement. That will be a finite period—there is no question about that. Indeed, if the noble Lord looks at the proposed amendment to Clause 11, he will see that there are various checks and balances, including the requirement that Ministers report to Parliament if they retain the powers for any longer. So that is already addressed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this debate has ranged a good deal wider than was necessary for the Minister to deal with my points on this group of amendments. With respect to him, he has not given me the kind of reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave me on earlier groups. My point is that this very disparate group contains a number of points that I raised with regard to Schedules 2 and 8, which need to be reconsidered in the light of the reformed Clause 11. A simple example is on page 56, where there is a reference to a fetter on the power to,

“make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation”,

which extends to the wording of Section 57(4) of the Scotland Act as in the Bill. However, that section is reworded by the proposed new Clause 11.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I just remind the noble and learned Lord that I said that when we come to Clause 11, we will move and withdraw the amendment. We appreciate that although we want Clause 11 in its present form, to put it forward in a form that covers all these matters we will have to address the impact it has on Schedule 2 in these contexts.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am grateful for that. Not every one of my amendments is a Clause 11 point—there are other points of detail which need to be looked at. If the Minister would be kind enough just to say that these will be looked at, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment. Can he give me that assurance?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am content to indicate that we will look at these points.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 274.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I will respond briefly, without repeating what I said on the immediately preceding group, but this raises essentially the same issue. On these provisions, the circumstances in which consent applies to the powers—which are the obverse of some of the others—are those where the devolved Ministers could use powers in ways that have implications outside of their devolved jurisdiction, for example when making provision regarding the World Trade Organization obligations. That is why we have framed it in this way, but it raises the wider point made by the noble and learned Lord and I appreciate that that might be addressed in more detail when we come to Clause 11 and the government amendments. I wonder if, in these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord will, at this stage, withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am glad we have not provoked a longer debate on this group of amendments. There is a reason for being concerned about this; the provision I am concerned about deals specifically with something within competence—in other words, it deals with regulations made for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO agreement. It does not deal with the WTO agreement itself; it simply exercises the power given under paragraph 7(2)(b) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 to deal with these matters domestically. Since it is within competence under the Scotland Act, it is hard to see why the position should be regulated in the way proposed. However, I have listened to what the Minister has said and—on the understanding that we can look at all this again when we get to the revised formula for Clause 11—I am happy to withdraw this amendment.

Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses (EU Committee Report)

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 20th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is absolutely correct, but the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, brought this out more fully when he distinguished between cases in the pipeline and those that arise post Brexit. As paragraph 91 of the joint report points out, there will essentially be agreement—or consensus; let me put it that way—on how we deal with existing cases at the point when we leave the European Union. But there is no desire to see us walk away or wind down the existing regulatory regime.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, posed two questions in the context of the Government’s response, where we talk about a “close and comprehensive agreement”. It cannot be a mirror of what is already there, because of the jurisdiction of the CJEU, but “close and comprehensive” is what we seek.

The noble and learned Lord’s first question was whether we could give an assurance that the aim is to achieve the same degree of certainty and predictability. The answer, I would suggest, is yes. The aim is most certainly to achieve that. I assure him that there will be no cliff edge. We have no desire for there to be any cliff edge anywhere, but that will be the subject of negotiation because we are now entering the second phase. Perhaps it is more important to point out that the Government’s aim in this context is to ensure that we have certainty, predictability and continuity.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

What would happen if at the end of the time-limited implementation period it had still not been possible to achieve what the noble and learned Lord said in answer to my first question?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

If at the end of the transition period there had been no agreement, there would be no basis for reciprocal enforcement pursuant to Brussels Ia, Brussels II and those regulations, because we would no longer be a member of the EU for those purposes. That would appear to follow. Nevertheless, there would still be recourse to the Hague convention, although I am the first to accept that the convention provisions do not replicate or achieve the level of predictability and certainty that is in the Brussels regulations.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Does that not just heighten the importance of achieving agreement during the implementation period as a matter of urgency?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I absolutely concur, which is why we and the EU have expressed a desire to move forward to the second phase of negotiations as swiftly as possible. I emphasise that this is about reciprocity. It is about the interest not only of the United Kingdom but of the EU. It appears to me that those interests will eventually prevail.

I am afraid that I keep on getting a note saying that I have one minute to go and I keep on stretching that one minute. I have not expressly addressed all points raised by noble Lords, but perhaps I may touch on one or two. I entirely concur with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, that one cannot negotiate in public. We can express our intentions and our aims, but it is very difficult for us to give a running commentary about where we are on these issues any more than on other issues, but I underline our aims in this context.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, referred to the delay in the Government’s response to the report. I apologise for that. The report was followed by the general election and then by the Summer Recess. The government paper was issued on 22 August, when I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was invited to take part in a briefing on the matter, but I accept that it took until the beginning of December for the response to be published.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked about progress in “discussions”. These are not discussions; these are negotiations. The noble Lord is a very experienced lawyer and knows perfectly well that one cannot have or maintain a running commentary on such matters when one is hoping to achieve consensus at the end of the day. However, we verily believe that we will achieve certainty and predictability, which, I emphasise again, is our aim.

I again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and her sub-committee for the report.

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 24th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As I indicated, we are dealing with an entirely hypothetical situation. Should that situation ever materialise, the terms of the referendum to be held would be determined according to the circumstances in place at that time. It would not be appropriate to anticipate the circumstances of such a referendum, which might be many millennia in the future. It is therefore left open in these terms.

I turn to the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean. The points he has raised in them are those he made in Committee in December, and I assure him that we have continued to reflect carefully on the points made at that time. My noble friend has focused on whether Clause 1 impinges on the sovereignty of this Parliament. I thank him for his consideration of this point but must respectfully disagree that there is any question that it does. Constitutionally, the United Kingdom Parliament cannot bind a successor Parliament: the sovereignty of Parliament remains. The purpose of paragraph 21 of the Smith commission agreement, and of Clause 1 in the Bill, is not to change the constitutional position but to reflect in legislation the political understanding that already exists. The clause thus delivers the Smith commission agreement while respecting the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements.

Amendment 1 would reinsert the words “recognised as”, which were removed from Clause 1 by government amendment on Report in the other place. The Government have been quite clear throughout that there has never been any question that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are anything other than permanent. However, we have listened to feedback on the clause, and it was felt appropriate to amend the clause to take account of the observations made. The criticism levelled at the clause was that the provision was weak. The Government have strengthened the provision to demonstrate the commitment of the United Kingdom Parliament and Government to the Scottish Parliament and to the Scottish Government.

Amendment 4, tabled by my noble friend, provides that the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and Government would have to be agreed by United Kingdom-wide referendum. The referendum provision in Clause 1 rightly reflects the importance of the people of Scotland in determining the existence of the Scottish Parliament. It is important to be clear that there are no circumstances under which the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government is envisaged. However, in responding to the points raised by my noble friend, I state that, in that entirely hypothetical circumstance, this Parliament would of course play its full and proper role, as I mentioned previously.

Amendment 5 would state in the Bill that Clause 1 does not limit the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. Again, I hope I have already sufficiently addressed that point. Clearly, the sovereignty of this Parliament remains, and is unhindered by the provisions. I therefore urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Before the Minister sits down, I wonder whether he can help me on one point. I made it clear in Committee that the amendments I proposed to this part of the Bill were based on recommendations of the Scottish Government, which were made plain in June last year. The wording of the amendments is not my creation; it comes from Edinburgh, from people who were studying the Bill and trying as best they could to clarify the points they thought needed clarification.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has drawn attention yet again to the obscurity of the phrase, “the people of Scotland”. One of the virtues—it may be small, but it is there—of my amendment is that it makes clear that it is a referendum of the people in Scotland. I simply cannot understand why the Minister is not prepared to make some concession to clarify that matter. To go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said, I should have thought that the Government would take on board collaboration between the two Governments to try to improve the Bill and achieve as much clarity as possible. I really am mystified why the Minister is so stubborn and will not accept the need for some further clarity.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. It determines clearly and unambiguously that there can be no question of any unseen, secret understanding between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government when his proposals in the amendments have their source in Scotland, with the Scottish Government. That perhaps puts that in its place.

On the question of the referendum, I reiterate the point that I made earlier: this is a wholly hypothetical situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, but I can observe only that it is not appropriate to layer legislation with unnecessary detail and that if the matter is to be regarded as implicit in the present clause, it would be inappropriate to add a further clause. I cannot elaborate upon the point at this stage.

The concluded position of the Government is that Clause 2 as drafted delivers what was required by the Smith commission agreement by placing the Sewel convention, as it is properly understood, on a statutory footing. It is in these circumstances that I invite your Lordships to withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all those noble and learned and noble Lords who have supported my Amendment 7. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord McCluskey, for the points they made in support of Amendment 12, which in a way hangs together with it, because they have identified a crucial issue before us.

With all due respect to the Minister, he cannot get away with simply declaring that the “issue” is not justiciable. He has chosen the word “issue” as meaning something different, but the same point arises. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, identified the point precisely: there is a crucial difference between the position of Parliament legislating—and Ministers declaring what words mean when they legislate—and the position of the courts. The courts will assert their right to interpret legislation according to the meaning of the words as they judge them to be. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has said, the courts cannot close their door to arguments. People will bring arguments before the court, and when an argument is before the court it has to decide on it. The Minister simply cannot get away with the idea that we can be assured that this issue will never be before the courts and require determination.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I shall first address Amendments 15 to 21. Under the Bill, and in line with the Smith commission agreement, the timing of Scottish parliamentary elections is devolved to the Scottish Parliament, subject to the provision in the Bill that Scottish parliamentary ordinary general elections may not be held on the same day as UK parliamentary general elections, European parliamentary general elections or local government elections in Scotland.

Following a request from the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, the UK Government agreed to bring forward an order under Section 30 of the Scotland Act, rather than use the Bill, to give the current Scottish Parliament the power to determine the length of the next Scottish Parliament following the poll in 2016. The order devolved to the Scottish Parliament power to legislate on the date of the first Scottish parliamentary ordinary general election after the 2016 poll. Following approval in the Westminster Parliament and the Scottish Parliament, the order was made by Her Majesty in Council on 8 October and came into force the following day. The Scottish Elections (Dates) Bill, currently before the Scottish Parliament, provides for the Scottish Parliament ordinary general election scheduled for 7 May 2020 to be moved to 6 May 2021.

We have tabled a number of technical amendments to make changes to a number of clauses in the Bill that are required as a result of the Section 30 order. Essentially, these amendments revoke the Section 30 order and remove provisions from the Scotland Act inserted by the order, which will be unnecessary as they overlap with provision made by the Bill. The area of legislative competence being devolved to the Scottish Parliament by the Bill is such that the Scottish Elections (Dates) Bill will still be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament following the revocation of the Section 30 order. Additionally, we have tabled an amendment to Clause 5(2) to improve the drafting of this provision in order to ensure that it operates as intended.

We have also tabled an amendment that removes a reference in Clause 10 to a provision of the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc.) Order 2010 which is now unnecessary as this instrument has been revoked by the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc.) Order 2015 that was made by Scottish Ministers and which came into force in December 2015.

In addition, I wish to give notice that the Government consider that drafting improvements are required to the reservation of the timing of ordinary local government elections in Scotland where the poll would otherwise be held on the same day as an ordinary general election for the Scottish Parliament, and to some provisions in Clause 5 relating to this reservation, to provide clarification and ensure that the drafting of these provisions operates as intended. As a result, the Government intend to table amendments to clarify and improve the drafting of these provisions at Third Reading.

Amendments 15 to 21 are technical amendments which will ensure that the clauses in the Bill relating to elections operate as intended.

I now to turn to Clause 11, which contains the supermajority requirements and acknowledge the input and assistance of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, on this matter. I thank him for his willingness to discuss this matter and to propose improvements to the provisions, which are reflected in government Amendments 23 to 26.

Clause 11 requires that the Scottish Parliament must pass certain legislation by a two-thirds majority. Government Amendments 23 to 26 to this clause will enable a Bill in the Scottish Parliament to pass to Royal Assent if the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament decides that a simple majority is required, the Bill is passed with a simple majority but is referred to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agrees that only a simple majority was required. The measure currently provides that in those circumstances, the Bill must be reconsidered by the Scottish Parliament before it can be passed for Royal Assent. We have taken account of the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in order to make a little more sense —if I can put it that way—of the provisions of Clause 11 on the application of the supermajority. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I think I should thank the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland for his kind words. The amendments improve the intelligibility of these provisions. It is important that the system work as smoothly as possible, so I am extremely grateful.

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords. Clearly I cannot comment on any dialogue that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has had recently with the noble Lord, Lord Smith. I merely observe that there is a distinction between improving the Bill in order to implement the Smith commission agreement and, on the other hand, extending the Bill so that it goes beyond the terms of the agreement, or in fact retreating so that the Bill does not implement it. We would of course be happy to pursue further dialogue ourselves with the noble Lord, Lord Smith, if he felt that that would be useful.

These amendments seem to fall into two broad categories: on the one hand, amendments to the current clauses that are intended to improve the drafting of the Bill, and, on the other, a second theme extending the scope of the supermajority clause to matters that were not included in the Smith commission agreement. I shall deal with these in turn. I turn first to those amendments put forward as a means of improving the operation of Clause 11 as and when it is implemented. Amendment 35 would allow for a Bill to be passed without a Division. Our considered position is that a Division is the most straightforward way of verifying that a two-thirds majority in the Scottish Parliament has been achieved. For this reason, we cannot agree with the proposal in Amendment 35, which provides for a Bill to be passed by consensus.

In addition, we do not agree with the proposal in Amendment 39 that the Scottish Parliament should be able to “reconsider” a Bill if the Presiding Officer decides that a supermajority is required and the Supreme Court later affirms this. Nor do we agree with Amendment 40, which appears to provide that the Scottish Parliament should be able to reconsider a Bill if the Presiding Officer decides that a supermajority is required and the Bill receives only a simple majority. We consider that in both these situations there should be careful consideration and no short-cut to a final vote which requires the supermajority in the context of such legislation.

While we agree with the rationale behind Amendments 30 and 38 and parts of Amendments 37 and 40, we believe that the Bill as drafted provides for these considerations and that therefore such amendment is unnecessary. We would of course be happy to discuss this further with the proposers of the amendments.

I will address those amendments which seek to extend the scope of the supermajority provision, particularly Amendments 31 and 33, and I think a part of Amendment 34. Amendments 31, 33 and 34 seek to ensure that legislation brought forward by the Scottish Parliament concerning the period of time between ordinary general elections to the Scottish Parliament should also be covered by the requirement for a two-thirds majority. The second part of Amendment 33 seeks to ensure that Bills concerning the alteration of boundaries of constituencies, regions or any equivalent electoral area for the Scottish Parliament should also be covered by the two-thirds majority. The simple response of the Government is that the Smith commission agreement specifically outlined the subject matter, which it considered should be subject to the supermajority requirement. It did not propose that legislation concerning the term length of the Scottish Parliament, the date of any Scottish Parliament elections or the alteration of boundaries should be subject to a two-thirds majority of the Scottish Parliament. In these circumstances, we would not be content with the proposed amendments. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in view of the points that have been made by the noble and learned Lord.

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly it is not, because, notwithstanding the outcome of any such referendum, this place might decide not to legislate in accordance with the outcome of the referendum. One cannot use these arguments to undermine the ultimate sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I shall take up the point that the Minister made about Clause 1 as a whole—I think he was referring to the whole clause as it now stands, with all three new subsections—that it was simply a political statement. New Section 63A(3) is not just a political statement; it lays down a condition. If that is the right reading of the new subsection, does the Minister not recognise that it might be better to address some of the possible imperfections in new Section 63A(3) as it stands? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, among others, made the point that the phrase “the people of Scotland” is a little ambiguous, and it might be better to say “a referendum held in Scotland” to tell you where the referendum is going to be.

It is quite commonplace in Committee debates for Ministers to say, “We’ll take this away and look at it and perhaps reconsider whether the wording we have in the Bill is the best that could be used”. I wonder whether the Minister would be prepared at least to look at proposed new paragraph (b) in Amendment 6; leaving aside the mention of the Scottish Parliament in its proposed new paragraph (a), it suggests a rewording of new Section 63A(3) to see if it is the best wording that could be adopted. I absolutely accept that it deals with a hypothetical situation but, if one is laying down a condition, would it not be better to use the best possible terms in doing so?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for reminding me of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. At this time the Government consider that we have achieved the best possible wording for the purposes of new Section 63A(3) in Clause 1. I compliment the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, on his eyesight and his ability to read my notes at such a considerable distance. However, the position of the Government remains that we are satisfied that a relatively open provision in this context with regard to the people of Scotland voting in a referendum is the appropriate way forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to my noble and learned friend. It seems to me that we make no further progress on this point, notwithstanding the further observations of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I simply underline the sovereignty of this Parliament, and nothing in Clause 1 derogates or takes away from that. That is the bottom line. It is necessary to make progress with this Committee debate rather than to stay in still waters on one sterile point. Therefore, at this point I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Perhaps I may return to new subsection (3), which relates to a separate point from the one that the Minister has been emphasising concerning the sovereignty of Parliament and so on. If we look ahead to the day some time next year when this Bill comes back on Report, it is quite likely that there will be an amendment seeking to reword new subsection (3), perhaps along the lines that have already been discussed. I respectfully suggest to the Minister that he would carry a little more credibility if he were to depart just a fraction from the briefing that he is reading from and were prepared to say that he would look again at this. He does not have to commit himself to any rewording, but sometimes when we have these debates in Committee it softens the atmosphere a lot if one is prepared to say simply, “Well, some interesting points have been made. We’ll have another look and perhaps come back with something on Report, or perhaps not”. It would ease the atmosphere a little on this point and avoid repetitive interruptions.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I notice what the noble and learned Lord says with regard to new subsection (3) in Clause 1.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I apologise to my noble friend Lord Forsyth. I must confess that I was unclear who was intervening on whom. I add to the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As I understand the point he was making—it was one that I had endeavoured to make before, but obviously had not made clearly—it is simply that Clause 1 is amending and introducing Section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998. It is necessary to read that in conjunction with Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, which refers to the ability of this Parliament to legislate in respect of Scotland on all matters. That is a matter to which the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, alluded earlier as well. That is why the issue of sovereignty—the supremacy of this Parliament—is already contained in the relevant section of the Scotland Act, as it will be amended by this clause of the Bill.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, but Clause 2 amends Section 28. We are still talking about Clause 1, which amends a different part of the Scotland Act, so there is a separation there. However, I very much endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said—namely, that any reader of the Scotland Act knows perfectly well that you have to look at Section 28 to understand the competence of the Parliament and the relationship between the two Parliaments. The point is simply that Clause 1 does not deal with Section 28.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The point is that in terms of Section 28(7) we in this Parliament could, on the face of it, intervene in such a matter. That was the whole point of the convention: to make it clear that normally we would not do so. I may have misunderstood the intervention of my noble friend Lord Forsyth but, with respect, it seems to me that that is precisely why the Sewel convention was expressed in the terms in which we find it—so that if educational attainment in Scotland was failing we would not be faced with the criticism that the United Kingdom Parliament had done nothing about it because conventionally we would not normally intervene in a devolved matter, but we retain sovereignty and we have the right to do so. That is why the Sewel convention is expressed in the manner in which it is. The intention is not that Clause 2 should give rise to any justiciable issue. It is a political expression of the convention in statutory form. That is why the term “normally” appears within Clause 2. It makes it clear that this is not a justiciable issue. It is quite clear that in terms of the Smith commission agreement the Sewel convention will be expressed in statutory terms. It is there, but whether this Parliament would consider it appropriate to legislate for Scotland in a devolved area, which it can do pursuant to Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, is a political issue. It would not be for a court to decide what “normally” meant in that context. It would be a political issue. If it could be litigated in court and made justiciable, the question would be: what possible remedy could the court provide other than a political one? That is why it takes us back to the simple proposition that Clause 2, as set out, would not give rise to a justiciable issue. I give way to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

The problem is that paragraph 22 of the Smith commission report states that the Sewel convention will be put on a statutory footing. Rather like the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, I wondered what “statutory footing” meant, and I went to various sources to find out. A translation of it is fairly obvious: it means being put on a firm footing by being written into statute. That raises the question of what the effect is of writing something into statute.

The problem is that, whatever the Minister may say, someone seeing it written into statute is going to say, “Here is something which I can use to challenge a piece of legislation that is apparently being passed without the Sewel convention being observed according to its current usage”. With great respect, it does not do for a Minister to say to the court, “This is just a political matter”, because the judges will say, “It’s a matter for us”. The judge may look at the normal rules to see what the legislation was designed to do, and with a bit of research they will find that it was designed to give effect to the Sewel convention to put it on a statutory footing. The judge will then say, “Well, it’s a matter for me to construe what this means”. I am not at all impressed by the Minister saying that it is all a political matter, because it is now in the hands of the court to adjudicate upon.

The Minister asks, “What remedy does that give rise to?”. It creates uncertainty about the effectiveness of legislation. One of the things that we have to be very careful about is that the legislative process is well founded and not open to challenges, except those that are already subject to legislation in the Scotland Act. So, with great respect, it is necessary to warn the Minister that he cannot get away with assuming that the judges will accept that it is simply a political issue; it is not that at all, once it is written into statute.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble and learned Lord acknowledges that there would be no remedy other than a political remedy in that context, or appears to do so. He shakes his head; nevertheless, there is no remedy except a political remedy. This underlines the importance of the words “recognised as” and “normally” where they appear in Clause 2.

However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, spoke to his Amendment 19, a proposal that it should be expressly stated that the clause is not justiciable and does not give rise to justiciable rights. That is a matter that I would be pleased to discuss with him, albeit that the Government’s position at present is that there is no requirement to expressly state that in the context of a clause that, on the face of it, is implicitly not justiciable. That would be my position on Amendment 19.