Lord Keen of Elie
Main Page: Lord Keen of Elie (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Keen of Elie's debates with the Scotland Office
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberNo, and I am sorry if the noble Lord took that the wrong way. However, I spend my life in Scotland, week in, week out. I listen to people there and am heavily involved in community organisations. I am not trying to devalue the noble Lord’s point of view but I can speak only from my experience. There is a suspicion there—justified or not—about Westminster trying to lay down the law. I know I tempt fate saying that in front of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, but there we go. We are suspected of laying down the law in a popular way, not in a legal way—once again, there are too many lawyers. We are talking about how this would be seen as being dictated to by Westminster and interference in the mandate. The Smith commission had the agreement and we are pushing that forward. We would be interested in supporting the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and I look forward to an interesting night.
First, I thank all noble Lords and the right reverend Prelate for their informative submissions, observations and comments, with regard to both Clause 1 and the proposed amendments to it. I begin by making a number of general observations. First, no one on the Government Benches is in any doubt about the supremacy and sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. In that regard, I take issue with some of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. Ultimately, it is for this Parliament to determine the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, alluded to some observations he made in the case of AXA General Insurance and others in 2011. I recall those well. He may in turn recall that my client came second in that case. Reference was also made to some obiter dicta of the noble and learned Lord in the case of Jackson, to which we would not necessarily subscribe. However, they are there and are a helpful insight into the thinking of the court at that time with regard to the issue of sovereignty.
The purpose of this Bill is to implement the Smith commission agreement. To suggest that there is no mandate for that is, in my respectful submission, quite inaccurate. Each of the five political parties in Scotland went into the Smith commission and negotiated the terms of an agreement. The Government have undertaken to seek to implement that agreement. That is the purpose of this Bill.
On that point, all the political parties went into that Smith commission and all of them signed the report. However, the Scottish National Party immediately came out of the Smith commission, John Swinney among them having signed the report, and rejected it.
I am aware of the conduct of the Scottish National Party in that regard and do not make any comment at this stage upon that. Perhaps it will be seen by others as extremely unfortunate that it should have lent credence to the agreement and then sought to renege from it. The point that we make is that it was signed—it is an agreement. It is in that context that this Bill is brought forward.
As I say, no one on the government Benches seeks to take issue with the proposition that this Parliament is sovereign and supreme. What we have here is a provision in the Smith commission agreement that we should recognise the permanence of the Scottish Parliament. It has been observed that it is, in a sense, already permanent—so be it—but let us remember that Clause 1 is concerned with a political statement, as much as any legal statement. That is its purpose, and it is not wholly exceptional in that regard. The noble Lord, Lord Norton, made reference to the Cabinet Office provisions on legislation at Chapter 10.9 of the Guide to Making Legislation. But when looked at, it expresses a generality—and, where there are generalities, there may of course be exceptions. This is one of those exceptions. I note that my noble friend Lord Forsyth agrees with me on that point.
My noble friend in turn suggested that there was little if any precedent for this form of legislation. I remind him that the Act of Union with Scotland of 1706, under the Gregorian calendar, referred to a Parliament of Great Britain for all time. In saying that, it made a political statement as much as a legislative provision—and that, again, is what we are doing here. We are recognising the political reality reflected in the Smith commission agreement.
Amendments 1 and 3 seek to modify Clause 1 by removing reference to permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the UK Government’s commitment to the permanence of that Parliament. We would not consider that appropriate. It appears to us that, in light of the Smith commission agreement, the Government should be prepared to make that political declaration of permanence. It does not take away from the supremacy or sovereignty of this United Kingdom Parliament. That remains.
Can my noble and learned friend give any other example of an extra-parliamentary body—the Smith commission in this case—binding Parliament, saying that Parliament will do this or that? Can he give any example of any other outside commission or body making such a declaration and binding Parliament?
The proposition is not well founded, with respect. The Smith commission is not binding this Parliament in any sense. Whatever the wording of the Smith commission agreement itself, it does not and could not bind this Parliament; it will be for the Parliament of the United Kingdom to decide whether it passes this Bill into law. So I do not accept the underlying proposition that was relied on by my noble friend Lord Cormack in that context.
On the terms of subsection (2) of new Section 63A, a point was raised about the words,
“with due regard to the other provisions of this Act”.
In my submission, those are helpful, because the other provisions of this Act include the cross-references to Section 28 and, in particular, Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998. There again, you have underlined the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament and the right of this Parliament to legislate on all matters, including devolved matters, in respect of Scotland.
I am slightly behind my noble and learned friend’s speech, but I wanted to check the facts. He has made great play of the importance of including the word “permanence” as a result of the recommendations of the Smith commission. Will he explain why the Bill as originally presented to the House of Commons made no mention of permanence and why Part 1 was headed “Constitutional Arrangements” and “The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government”?
In the course of the Bill’s consideration, steps have been taken to strengthen the political statement contained in Clause 1. Indeed, the noble Lord’s proposed Amendment 2 picks up this very point. He noticed that in the other place the words “recognised as” were removed from Clause 1 for the same purpose. Perhaps I anticipate the further contribution that the noble Lord may wish to make to this debate.
Forgive me, but as in the best parliamentary answers, my noble and learned friend is telling me something I already know. My question was: if the Government thought that they were meeting the obligations of the Smith commission by presenting the Bill as it was originally presented, that they met the terms of the Smith commission and that that is the overriding purpose and the agreement, why was it necessary to add these words which create such difficulty, as is clear from the speeches made in the House? My noble and learned friend has not really answered the point.
With respect, I rather thought that I had answered the point made by the noble Lord, but let me reiterate it. The word “permanence” appears in the Smith commission agreement. After further consideration, it was felt that in order to strengthen the political statement contained in Clause 1 that word should feature in the clause itself.
I return to Amendments 6 and 7 which seek to alter the basis upon which any decision would be made with regard to the provisions of Clause 1. As was observed, it is not anticipated that there will at any point in the future be a referendum upon that issue, but nevertheless as this matter proceeded in another place it was again considered that this would strengthen the political statement that is being made here. Let us be clear: the use of a referendum in this context is consistent with precedent. In 1997, the people of Scotland supported the creation of a Scottish Parliament on the basis of a referendum. In 2014, in the independence referendum they reaffirmed their wish to have two Parliaments and two Governments for the purposes of reserved and devolved administration in Scotland. Therefore, it is appropriate that any question about the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government, which is not envisaged, should be based on the expression of the will of the people of Scotland in a referendum. Let me be clear: that is a theoretical point. There has never been any question that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are anything other than permanent parts of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. That remains the case.
It is unusual, but not wholly exceptional, for a clause of a Bill such as this to contain a political statement, an affirmation of the status quo, a declarator that it will not change, and that is the fundamental purpose of Clause 1.
I am grateful to the Minister because I feel that he may well be making my point for me on the subject of new Section 63A(3). If the Government’s position, which I support, is that there can be change only if the people of Scotland make it in a referendum, does that not adjust the absolute sovereignty of this place, which can make an unfettered decision?
Clearly it is not, because, notwithstanding the outcome of any such referendum, this place might decide not to legislate in accordance with the outcome of the referendum. One cannot use these arguments to undermine the ultimate sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament.
I shall take up the point that the Minister made about Clause 1 as a whole—I think he was referring to the whole clause as it now stands, with all three new subsections—that it was simply a political statement. New Section 63A(3) is not just a political statement; it lays down a condition. If that is the right reading of the new subsection, does the Minister not recognise that it might be better to address some of the possible imperfections in new Section 63A(3) as it stands? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, among others, made the point that the phrase “the people of Scotland” is a little ambiguous, and it might be better to say “a referendum held in Scotland” to tell you where the referendum is going to be.
It is quite commonplace in Committee debates for Ministers to say, “We’ll take this away and look at it and perhaps reconsider whether the wording we have in the Bill is the best that could be used”. I wonder whether the Minister would be prepared at least to look at proposed new paragraph (b) in Amendment 6; leaving aside the mention of the Scottish Parliament in its proposed new paragraph (a), it suggests a rewording of new Section 63A(3) to see if it is the best wording that could be adopted. I absolutely accept that it deals with a hypothetical situation but, if one is laying down a condition, would it not be better to use the best possible terms in doing so?
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for reminding me of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. At this time the Government consider that we have achieved the best possible wording for the purposes of new Section 63A(3) in Clause 1. I compliment the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, on his eyesight and his ability to read my notes at such a considerable distance. However, the position of the Government remains that we are satisfied that a relatively open provision in this context with regard to the people of Scotland voting in a referendum is the appropriate way forward.
The Minister said a minute ago that the result of any referendum would not be implemented if the Bill were passed and became an Act. That is the reply that was given, and in the current atmosphere it will set lots of hares running. Would he care to clarify?
I would be pleased to clarify. We were speaking theoretically in the context of the supremacy and sovereignty of this Parliament. In the light of the referendum finding that the Scottish Parliament should be abolished, it would be necessary for legislation to be put forward. It would in theory be possible for that legislation to be defeated in this Parliament. That is all that I was saying. However, we are in the realms of extreme speculation here—or it appears to me that we are.
My noble and learned friend Lord Hope has pointed out the possible difficulty in the current wording. I am very fond, as are many Scots, of the well-known tennis player called Andy Murray. Is he one of the “people of Scotland” in new Section 63A(3)?
I am not in a position to say whether he or any other individual falls into that category, and at this stage I would not speculate on his status.
If my noble and learned friend cannot answer that very simple, straight question, does not that in itself indicate that he must recognise the validity of the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that the Bill is capable of further improvement? In his eyes—not necessarily in ours—it was improved in the other place. Is he saying that the Government have got it absolutely right and it cannot be improved in this place?
Maybe I can help the Minister. Perhaps he is saying that this is all just declaratory, because after all it does not matter what you put in new subsection (3). That subsection just makes the permanence referred to in new subsection (1) conditional because there are conditions there which, if fulfilled, would not make it permanent.
If I can complete the journey around the houses that the noble and learned Lord has begun on that point: it appears that new subsection (3) simply underlines the political structure—the declaratory statement contained in the clause as a whole. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed that of course it goes a step further in so far as it introduces conditionality to the abolition of the Scottish Parliament, which I acknowledge. As to it being,
“a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”,
that term is capable of clear and objective definition in due course. Respectfully, however, it appears that that wording is sufficiently clear for these purposes.
Just to carry on a little around the House: the Minister did not make it clear at the Dispatch Box when he said that the people of Scotland would not necessarily be sovereign if this Parliament did not adhere to the result in that referendum. That is absolutely contrary to the Edinburgh agreement that the Prime Minister signed, which stated that the Government would respect that view. The sovereignty of the people should be absolute, not anything else he may say at the Dispatch Box this evening.
I cannot agree with the interpretation of sovereignty the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, puts forward. At the end of the day, if there was a referendum—and we are talking about a theory, not political reality—it would be necessary for there to be legislation to implement the outcome of that referendum if it involved the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. No one in reality is contemplating the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The whole purpose of Clause 1 is to make clear the permanence and the recognition of the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has to recognise that the outcome of any referendum could be implemented only by way of legislation that went through this, the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. That is the only point I seek to make.
I may be able to help my noble and learned friend to get off this line of argument. I have been reflecting on what he is saying about this clause, which is essentially that the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament remains unaltered, and that what is contained in this clause is simply a declaratory political statement. Can he explain to me what a declaratory political statement is? Is a political statement one that says something but means something else? He appears to be saying that the statement is that the Scottish Parliament is permanent, and at the same time that it is not permanent because this place is sovereign. Is his definition of a political statement one which can mean whatever you want it to mean and which is basically not entirely straightforward?
I do not accept that expression of the position. As I said at the outset, the whole purpose of Clause 1 is to make a political statement that reflects the terms of the Smith commission agreement, which determined that there should be an expression to the effect that the Scottish Parliament is permanent. We acknowledge that, and that is the political statement being made. It is a declaration of will. However, we also recognise, as I believe this House will recognise, that the United Kingdom Parliament is ultimately sovereign and supreme. I am seeking to make that point. At the end of the day, this Parliament is sovereign, and it cannot disclaim that sovereignty.
In that case, can the noble and learned Lord expand on the meaning of the Government’s wording in this clause? It states that,
“the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”.
Therefore, if the people of Scotland vote in a referendum and make a decision, and the Government or Parliament then disregard the view and the decision of the people of Scotland, does that mean that this clause has no purpose at all in legislation? If that is the case, what is the point of this wording being in the Bill?
It has a purpose inasmuch as it determines that there cannot be abolition without a referendum. I am simply making the point that, as this is a sovereign and supreme Parliament, it could decline to legislate in accordance with the terms of that referendum result. However, politically that just would not happen.
Perhaps I may intervene. The noble and learned Lord—I was going to say “my noble and learned friend” but he is not in this context—has made it entirely clear, beyond peradventure, that this Parliament may do what it chooses because it is sovereign. When he says that this Parliament makes a declaratory statement, that is within its sovereign power. Surely that is the end of this point. If Parliament decides to make this declaration, then so be it.
I am obliged to my noble and learned friend. It seems to me that we make no further progress on this point, notwithstanding the further observations of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I simply underline the sovereignty of this Parliament, and nothing in Clause 1 derogates or takes away from that. That is the bottom line. It is necessary to make progress with this Committee debate rather than to stay in still waters on one sterile point. Therefore, at this point I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Perhaps I may return to new subsection (3), which relates to a separate point from the one that the Minister has been emphasising concerning the sovereignty of Parliament and so on. If we look ahead to the day some time next year when this Bill comes back on Report, it is quite likely that there will be an amendment seeking to reword new subsection (3), perhaps along the lines that have already been discussed. I respectfully suggest to the Minister that he would carry a little more credibility if he were to depart just a fraction from the briefing that he is reading from and were prepared to say that he would look again at this. He does not have to commit himself to any rewording, but sometimes when we have these debates in Committee it softens the atmosphere a lot if one is prepared to say simply, “Well, some interesting points have been made. We’ll have another look and perhaps come back with something on Report, or perhaps not”. It would ease the atmosphere a little on this point and avoid repetitive interruptions.
I notice what the noble and learned Lord says with regard to new subsection (3) in Clause 1.
Section 1(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 also refers to the fact that it is a declaration that:
“Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section”.
Subsection (2) goes on to say:
“But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland”.
Obviously there is a context to that, but does the noble and learned Lord think that it might be helpful to add a further subsection indicating that, if a wish is expressed by a majority in a poll of the people of Scotland that the Scottish Parliament should be repealed, the Secretary of State will bring forward the necessary legislation to give effect to it?
With respect, it does not appear to me that the two situations are immediately comparable. In those circumstances, it does not appear to me that that would add to new subsection (3) in Clause 1. I renew my submission that the noble Lord should withdraw the amendment.
I ask my noble and learned friend to respond more positively and helpfully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. It was a very simple point that he made. All he asked was that my noble and learned friend would reflect on what has been said during this debate and come back at a later stage, having reflected. He may be equally adamant, but he really owes it to this House to reflect on what has been said in this debate.
With respect to my noble friend, I will reflect upon all observations that have been made in this House, but without commitment.
Well, my Lords, this has been a quite fascinating debate. I say to the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, that I fully accept I am a Lord and not the Lord and therefore am quite capable of getting things wrong. However, on this occasion, I am not sure that I have, given the excellent speeches that we have heard in support of these amendments. I really think it is incumbent to pursue the matter further along the lines that several noble Lords have suggested.
The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, argues that declaratory statements are appropriate—and indeed they are but, as the guide to legislation makes clear, not necessarily in legislation. Declaratory statements are the sort of thing that should be done at the Dispatch Box. As the Minister pointed out, there have been occasions when declaratory statements have appeared in statute. But what is quite clear from the debate is the unusual context in which we are discussing this, given that it derives from extant legislation and actually complicates, rather than clarifies, what Parliament has already stipulated in legislation.
My starting point in all this is very similar to that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead—that the Smith commission heads of agreement said that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government will be made permanent. All parties accepted that, as he said, and the debate has proceeded on that basis. It has largely been taken as given.
It strikes me that there are two problems deriving from that. The first is that it has not been properly debated. I really think that the debate this afternoon in your Lordships’ House is the first thorough, proper debate on principle in relation to this issue. What it has demonstrated is the need for further consideration of the matter. The second problem is the extent to which the Government appear to have taken almost literally the heads of agreement—they have just taken what was said and plonked it in legislation. We will see that shortly when we discuss the Sewel convention. The Government’s line is that this is what Lord Sewel said, so that is the convention and the words go into statute. It is not put on a statutory footing; it is just plonked in statute. I think that the same has happened here. Because the heads of agreement said that it would be made permanent, the Government decided to put in place legislation to make it permanent without thinking through the implications.
Those implications have been well drawn out by the Constitution Committee, as my noble friend Lord Lang has pointed out, and I declare an interest as a member of the committee. In the context of the debate, it is well worth reminding your Lordships of the committee’s report on the Bill, especially paragraph 36:
“It is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution that Parliament is sovereign and that no Parliament may bind its successors. There is now a strong argument that Parliament is seeking to limit its own competence in a way that the courts may seek to uphold in future given that it rests on a requirement for popular consent. While we recognise that it is extremely unlikely that this will ever be tested in the courts, it is nonetheless symbolically important and we are concerned that these provisions, as currently worded, risk introducing uncertainty concerning the absolute nature of parliamentary sovereignty where there should be none”.
This is an extremely serious issue.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Lothian and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, who have come up with some very positive suggestions. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said, I see no reason why the Government could not at least go away and think about the wording of the clause and come back. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has said, we must try to do better. I hope that between now and Report that is exactly what we will do. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the Government in their wisdom accepted the Labour amendment in the other place to reflect the Bill as it is. We support that. We think that it was very wise of the Government to do so. It puts the permanency of these institutions beyond any doubt. We all know the law regarding ultimate sovereignty but nevertheless it would be foolish—I am repeating myself—to reject the symbolism of having that in the Bill, so for those reasons we oppose the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth.
My Lords, I begin by making the observation that, without commitment, of course we are listening and of course we reflect upon the terms of this debate. There can be no question about that. We are here for that very purpose. I do not accept the implication that somehow we have come here with our ears closed or our minds closed, because that is not the case. I say that without commitment.
In the context of this amendment, the words “recognised as” appeared in the original drafting of the clause. I cannot accept the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Lang, that by amending a clause of this kind we end up with second best. With great respect, that is to invert the whole process of Parliament. The object of amendment—of adjustment—is to achieve a better result, and that is what the Government believe was achieved by accepting the amendment put forward by the Labour Opposition in the other place.
I note—and with great respect adopt—the observation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that if you go down the route of “recognised as”, it opens up the question of recognised by whom, in what circumstances and why? That seems wholly unnecessary in the context of this form of declaratory provision within the clause. In these circumstances I invite the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, not to anyone’s surprise, we oppose the amendment. It was our amendment in the House of Commons that made it clear that it should be the Scottish people who determine the permanency of their Parliament. It is not a decision for the United Kingdom as a whole.
I believe firmly in the role of this House as a revising Chamber. Therefore, there is no question of having to have a mandate, to be elected or any other method of claiming to represent people. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, it has to be taken into account that he has no mandate for this type of quite dramatic intervention. There is not much of a cry in England, Wales and Northern Ireland for inclusion in such a referendum. It would also pose the additional point made by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that it would lack consistency and political reality to include the whole of the United Kingdom in a referendum in Northern Ireland, although I accept that there are unique circumstances in Northern Ireland.
I hope that I am not getting too repetitive, but it is my opinion, based on my experience of living and staying in Scotland—I have been in Scotland all my life—that there would be complete outrage if such an amendment were supported by this House. I ask colleagues to reject it.
I am obliged to noble Lords. I reiterate that the purpose of the Bill is to implement the recommendations in the Smith commission agreement. I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Smith, has already observed that the terms of the Bill do that. This provision is consistent with the spirit of the agreement. It is also with precedent, if I can put it in that context. The referendum in 1997 over the matter of devolution was a referendum of the people of Scotland. The referendum on independence in 2014 was a referendum of the Scottish people. It is considered appropriate that we should continue with that model. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Empey, pointed out that the Northern Ireland Act 1998 proceeds in a similar vein. So it is consistent and appropriate that, for the purposes of this Bill, any such referendum—the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, himself acknowledges how extremely unlikely it is that that would even be contemplated —should be a referendum of the Scottish people. I therefore urge him to withdraw the amendment.
I am most grateful, but before my noble and learned friend sits down, could he tell me where in the Smith commission agreement there is a proposal that there should be a referendum of this kind?
There is no express reference in the Smith commission agreement to a referendum. As my noble friend is aware, that provision was brought into the Bill in the belief that it would strengthen the political statement contained in Clause 1 with regard to the permanence of the Scottish Parliament.
My Lords, I believe that this introduces the Welsh element. There would be a profound disinterestedness in Gresford about whether the Scottish Parliament exists or not, save in so far as the Barnett formula gives them so much more money than we get. On the other hand, we would resent it hugely if the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, had a vote in a referendum for the abolition of the Welsh Assembly, or, indeed, any successor.
My Lords, is it not the case that the sovereignty of the UK Parliament is already protected by Section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998, which provides that the UK Parliament can always legislate for Scotland?
My Lords, I compliment the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, on his optimism. The position is clear: we have repeatedly stated, across this House, that the United Kingdom Parliament is a sovereign Parliament. The noble Lord decided to seek a declaratory statement of that. I submit that this is wholly unnecessary: it is beyond doubt that this Parliament is supreme and sovereign. This is restated by Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998. The existing declaratory statements in Clause 1 are not in any sense misleading. They are an expression of a political reality and they are intended to declare that reality as clearly as possible, acknowledging all along the supremacy of this, the United Kingdom Parliament. The proposed amendment is wholly unnecessary and, if anything is misleading it is the necessity for it. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
I will not prolong this brief debate unduly, but my noble and learned friend seems to be adopting a fairly intransigent line. If it is permissible to make declaratory statements to appease those who would destroy the United Kingdom, is it not permissible to insert them for those who are dedicated to its future?
The actual wording of Section 28(7), which I do not suppose many noble Lords will have memorised, reads:
“This section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland”.
It does not talk about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament at all. It talks about its continuing power to make laws for Scotland.
I shall give way to my noble and learned friend in a moment. I wish to deal with the points that have been made and what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay indicated the section said. I have huge respect for him. You always know that the Government are in difficulty when he has to come to their aid. He said that the relevant provision was already in the Bill. However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has pointed out, it says nothing of the sort. If this provision was already in the Scotland Act, my noble and learned friend could have said, “In order to make that clear, we will move that provision into this clause in the new Bill”. It is not necessary to duplicate it. The point is that the Scotland Act, as amended by this Bill—if it becomes an Act—will have in it sentences which, to say the least, are very provocative in terms of the continuing powers of sovereignty of this Parliament. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think that any declaration about the sovereignty of this Parliament should be placed alongside the provision in that section of the Act.
I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, because I thought that what my noble and learned friend said from the Dispatch Box was a little misleading, to say the least.
My noble friend puts it so succinctly. I wish that I had the ability to put it as concisely as he does. I absolutely agree. My noble and learned friend the Minister wanted to intervene. I will happily give way to him if he still wishes to make his point.
I apologise to my noble friend Lord Forsyth. I must confess that I was unclear who was intervening on whom. I add to the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As I understand the point he was making—it was one that I had endeavoured to make before, but obviously had not made clearly—it is simply that Clause 1 is amending and introducing Section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998. It is necessary to read that in conjunction with Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, which refers to the ability of this Parliament to legislate in respect of Scotland on all matters. That is a matter to which the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, alluded earlier as well. That is why the issue of sovereignty—the supremacy of this Parliament—is already contained in the relevant section of the Scotland Act, as it will be amended by this clause of the Bill.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, but Clause 2 amends Section 28. We are still talking about Clause 1, which amends a different part of the Scotland Act, so there is a separation there. However, I very much endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said—namely, that any reader of the Scotland Act knows perfectly well that you have to look at Section 28 to understand the competence of the Parliament and the relationship between the two Parliaments. The point is simply that Clause 1 does not deal with Section 28.
I accept that correction from the noble and learned Lord. I believe that Section 63 would be amended under Clause 1. However, essentially, the point is that if you read through the whole of Section 28, subsection (7) of that section makes it absolutely clear that this Parliament remains supreme and sovereign in the matter of legislation for Scotland, whether it be reserved or devolved.
My Lords, I think this may be a good moment for me to withdraw my amendment. However, before doing so, I gently point out to my noble and learned friend the very wise words of my noble friend the Earl of Lothian.
My Lords, I back up what my noble friend has said. I was in the House when we passed the Scotland Bill and I was never, ever happy with having the Sewel convention translated into law. So I am very glad to support the amendment and it is high time that this was put right.
My Lords, first, there is the question of whether the heading is a matter for the parliamentary draftsmen rather than this House, and that is an issue, in my respectful submission. But let us turn to the substance of the—
I did take advice on this. The amendment has been tabled so the amendment is in order, surely.
I was going to continue by saying that, the amendment having been tabled, I would look to its substance, which is that the heading should be, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament”. I am reminded of Voltaire’s observation about the Holy Roman Empire, that it was,
“neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire”.
Clause 2 is not about competence; nor is it about the Scottish Parliament. It restates in statutory terms the procedural convention of the United Kingdom Parliament with respect to its legislation for devolved matters. If we were to have a heading, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament” when in fact we are dealing with a matter that concerns the legislative competence of the United Kingdom Parliament, in my respectful submission, we would not only puzzle historians but confuse everyone else with regard to the content of the relevant clause.
I note what has been said about the present heading. I will reflect upon the observations made about that heading. But given that it is strictly a matter for the draftsmen, I go no further at this time. I hope that my noble friend will see fit to withdraw the amendment.
I am neither a lawyer nor a historian so I wonder if the noble and learned Lord can help me with his interpretation of this. As this is an amendment Bill to the 1998 Act, once this clause takes effect, if Parliament approves it, will this title actually exist in the amended 1998 Act? If it does not, is this not all rather academic?
As I understand it, the title will not exist in the amended 1998 Act. The title is a matter for the parliamentary draftsmen but, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth observed, the amendment was put on the Marshalled List and therefore it is addressed. As I say, I will reflect upon his observations, but at this stage I urge him to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am very happy to withdraw it. I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for relieving me of the responsibility for adding to the statute book the words, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament”. But the point remains that it would be ridiculous to put the Sewel convention into statute and to retain a reference to the Sewel convention. If he is saying, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has very helpfully indicated, that in the consolidated Bill the words “the Sewel convention” will disappear from statute and that the Sewel convention will cease to exist as such because it will now be incorporated in statute, I am absolutely delighted. I am happy to withdraw the amendment with that reassurance. Perhaps he could just give us that assurance and then there will be less for him to reflect on.
The term “the Sewel convention” will remain in this Act but will not appear in the amended Scotland Act 1998, which is going to be the relevant amended legislation.
Right, well, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment but give notice that we will return to this at a later stage in the Bill.
Perhaps I can try to explain the proposition put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in his amendment. As we see this, it reflects the reality of the way in which legislative consent Motions have been used over the 15 years, beyond the original.
I am obliged for the contributions that have been made with regard to Clause 2 and the proposed amendments thereto. I shall begin by making an observation on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, with regard to English votes. The provision with regard to English votes does not limit the sovereignty of this Parliament in any sense. English votes introduces the principle of English consent for English measures. The new procedures maintain the important principle of Members of Parliament from all parts of the United Kingdom being able to deliberate and vote on all legislation. Members of Parliament are not excluded from the legislative process. I would not accept the proposition that these provisions somehow derogate from the sovereignty of this Parliament.
Does the Minister accept that the House of Commons could pass something and the House of Lords could agree with that proposal but it could then be vetoed by the subgroup of the House of Commons who are defined as English Members of Parliament?
It merely means that in respect of matters that are English measures, there must be an element of English consent, but I do not accept that that derogates from the sovereignty of this Parliament. In due course, this Parliament might decide to legislate contrary to those provisions.
While it is true that legislation still requires the consent of both Houses, EVEL gives a group of Members of the House of Commons who are English MPs the ability to veto a provision so that it proceeds no further. I think that is the point that the noble Lord is making.
The term “veto”, if you wish to employ it, is there. It means that English measures require the consent of English Members, but it does not derogate from the sovereignty of this Parliament.
Clause 2 delivers paragraph 22 of the Smith agreement which sets out quite clearly that the Sewel convention will be put on a statutory footing. As with Clause 1 on permanence, the Smith commission agreement did not intend that the constitutional position should be changed, but that legislation should accurately reflect the position that already exists and has existed for 15 years.
I shall put this into context. Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998 makes it perfectly clear that this Parliament can legislate in respect of Scotland in all matters, including devolved matters. It preserves the sovereignty of this Parliament.
When the Minister talks about the Sewel convention as it has been for 15 years, that does not include the various modifications that have been introduced in the 15 years. The Government will have to be careful about how they describe it.
I am obliged to his Grace. That does not, and that is why the convention is expressed as it is in Clause 2. There has been Devolution Guidance Note 10 with regard to how from time to time the convention may operate, but those are working arrangements which may alter from time to time and should not be enshrined in statute. That is not considered appropriate. That is why Clause 2 is in the terms in which it is found—because it reflects paragraph 22 of the Smith commission agreement.
My understanding of why the Sewel convention came to be expressed as it was is that Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act allows this sovereign Parliament to legislate, notwithstanding the terms of the 1998 Act, in respect of all matters pertaining to Scotland. There was, I apprehend, concern that if, for example, in a devolved area of competence, such as education or health, the Scottish Government got into serious difficulty, this Parliament might be open to the criticism that it had done nothing about it, even though it reserved to itself the power to legislate for Scotland on devolved matters in terms of Section 28(7). Therefore, the convention was expressed that normally this Parliament will not legislate for Scotland in devolved areas. That was expressed in those terms in order that this Parliament would not face criticism that it had done nothing as the health or education service in Scotland had deteriorated in the face of legislation from the devolved Parliament. That is the background to the introduction, as I understand it, of the Sewel convention. It works both ways.
I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend. Does that mean that as the number of passes being achieved by school leavers since I left office back in 1997 has fallen by 20% compared with England, there is still the possibility that we might intervene in the hash that is being made of the education services by the present Government in Scotland? I assumed that the answer to that question would be absolutely not, so what is my noble and learned friend getting at?
The point is that in terms of Section 28(7) we in this Parliament could, on the face of it, intervene in such a matter. That was the whole point of the convention: to make it clear that normally we would not do so. I may have misunderstood the intervention of my noble friend Lord Forsyth but, with respect, it seems to me that that is precisely why the Sewel convention was expressed in the terms in which we find it—so that if educational attainment in Scotland was failing we would not be faced with the criticism that the United Kingdom Parliament had done nothing about it because conventionally we would not normally intervene in a devolved matter, but we retain sovereignty and we have the right to do so. That is why the Sewel convention is expressed in the manner in which it is. The intention is not that Clause 2 should give rise to any justiciable issue. It is a political expression of the convention in statutory form. That is why the term “normally” appears within Clause 2. It makes it clear that this is not a justiciable issue. It is quite clear that in terms of the Smith commission agreement the Sewel convention will be expressed in statutory terms. It is there, but whether this Parliament would consider it appropriate to legislate for Scotland in a devolved area, which it can do pursuant to Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, is a political issue. It would not be for a court to decide what “normally” meant in that context. It would be a political issue. If it could be litigated in court and made justiciable, the question would be: what possible remedy could the court provide other than a political one? That is why it takes us back to the simple proposition that Clause 2, as set out, would not give rise to a justiciable issue. I give way to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.
The problem is that paragraph 22 of the Smith commission report states that the Sewel convention will be put on a statutory footing. Rather like the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, I wondered what “statutory footing” meant, and I went to various sources to find out. A translation of it is fairly obvious: it means being put on a firm footing by being written into statute. That raises the question of what the effect is of writing something into statute.
The problem is that, whatever the Minister may say, someone seeing it written into statute is going to say, “Here is something which I can use to challenge a piece of legislation that is apparently being passed without the Sewel convention being observed according to its current usage”. With great respect, it does not do for a Minister to say to the court, “This is just a political matter”, because the judges will say, “It’s a matter for us”. The judge may look at the normal rules to see what the legislation was designed to do, and with a bit of research they will find that it was designed to give effect to the Sewel convention to put it on a statutory footing. The judge will then say, “Well, it’s a matter for me to construe what this means”. I am not at all impressed by the Minister saying that it is all a political matter, because it is now in the hands of the court to adjudicate upon.
The Minister asks, “What remedy does that give rise to?”. It creates uncertainty about the effectiveness of legislation. One of the things that we have to be very careful about is that the legislative process is well founded and not open to challenges, except those that are already subject to legislation in the Scotland Act. So, with great respect, it is necessary to warn the Minister that he cannot get away with assuming that the judges will accept that it is simply a political issue; it is not that at all, once it is written into statute.
The noble and learned Lord acknowledges that there would be no remedy other than a political remedy in that context, or appears to do so. He shakes his head; nevertheless, there is no remedy except a political remedy. This underlines the importance of the words “recognised as” and “normally” where they appear in Clause 2.
However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, spoke to his Amendment 19, a proposal that it should be expressly stated that the clause is not justiciable and does not give rise to justiciable rights. That is a matter that I would be pleased to discuss with him, albeit that the Government’s position at present is that there is no requirement to expressly state that in the context of a clause that, on the face of it, is implicitly not justiciable. That would be my position on Amendment 19.
On that point, this provision can be put in to render the matter not justiciable, but that is in the context that the decision would in fact be taken by the UK Parliament and that decision could not be challenged in court. The point about the Sewel convention, which the Minister says is being enshrined in legislation, is that the effect changes entirely because the Sewel convention was not justiciable at all, as I understand it, whereas the statute is always justiciable. The court cannot say, “We don’t want to give it a meaning”; the court has to find a meaning because it always has to answer the question before it.
In that context, it would be declaring that this is a clause that gives rise to only a political remedy, and that it was not for the court to intervene and determine whether a particular piece of legislation was normal or abnormal. That would not be an issue for the court, and that is the position of the Government with regard to the clause. That could be made clearer, or could be made express, but, as I say, I would be happy to discuss that in the light of the noble and learned Lord’s proposed amendment.
If the Minister is prepared to have those discussions, which are welcome, would he also be prepared to have a discussion with those of us who have signed the amendments to delete the word “normally”? I say very gently to him—echoing someone who should not be echoed in this Chamber, Cromwell—conceive it,
“possible you may be mistaken”.
I would respond to my noble friend by saying that anything is possible.
The debate at the moment seems to be concerned exclusively with primary legislation. Clause 2 is concerned with primary legislation made by Parliament, but the bulk of legislation these days is made by statutory instrument—made under powers that are granted by Parliament, of course, and many of these are existing powers—but I cannot see anything in the Bill that really grapples with the position of statutory legislation as opposed to primary. I wonder if that is an oversight or whether it is intended.
If I may, I shall respond to the observations from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, after the dinner break. I confess it is not immediately apparent to me what the thrust of his point was, and maybe I am missing it, but I shall give it some consideration.
If the Minister will allow me, those of us who are not as expert as he is are getting a little puzzled. Can he help the House by giving practical examples of the sort of circumstances in which the UK Parliament would legislate on devolved matters? A few such examples would be helpful for us to understand precisely what this is getting at.
In a sense, this is connected to my earlier observation that at the end of the day the clause is not justiciable. It will be for Parliament at the time to decide that it is or is not going to legislate for Scotland in a devolved matter. The term “normally” means “usually” or “generally”, but Parliament at the time may decide that it is going to legislate for Scotland in respect of a devolved matter. There is no limit on that power, as is expressly provided by Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998. There is no limit on this Parliament’s sovereignty and supremacy in respect of that matter. The Sewel convention merely says that normally it will not do so; that is all.
Does the Minister realise that if the UK Government decide that the situation is abnormal and therefore decide to legislate, and the Scottish Government go to a Scottish court and say, “We don’t agree with the judgment about normality”, the court will have to make a judgment about that if the word “normally” remains in the wording. There is no mechanism for that other than the court having to sit down and decide what it thinks Parliament intended when it used the word “normally”.
With respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, I do not accept that proposition. It would be for the court to say that Parliament decides whether it is normal to legislate for Scotland in a devolved matter. It is not for us to interrogate that decision by Parliament. “Normally” means just that—no more, no less. It is not for the courts to say, “We don’t think the situation was abnormal”. That is a political decision.
In view of the time, no.
Amendment 11 would clearly impact on the ability of the United Kingdom Parliament to make laws for Scotland. To that extent, it would modify Section 28(7) of the 1998 Act. The effect of that amendment could be interpreted as an attempt to limit the sovereignty of this Parliament, a point that I believe the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, acknowledged, and the Government would not be prepared to accept such an amendment.
Amendment 13, conversely, seeks to state in the Bill that Clause 2 places no limits on the sovereignty of Parliament. We would say that if you say that expressly in one part of the Bill, you have to take care as to the impact that it will have on other parts of the Bill, and that it is appropriate to acknowledge that nothing in the Bill impinges on the sovereignty of Parliament.
My Lords, before my noble friend withdraws his amendment, can I ask my noble and learned friend a question, as he would not accept an intervention? We are in Committee. I am not a lawyer, but earlier in our discussions I gave the example of where the Scottish Government have fallen down on education in the context of his remarks that we retain the right to pass legislation on education, health or other matters where we feel that they are falling down. I put that forward as a debating point, but in circumstances where a Government, perhaps led by me, decided to do this, it would be outrageous if it was a political decision to intervene on an education matter based on a belief that the Scottish Government —an elected Government—were not doing their job. Therefore, if I were on the other side, leading the Scottish Government, I would go straight to the courts and say, “This word ‘normally’ does not provide for the kind of intervention which is being provided”. I do not understand why my noble and learned friend says that the courts would not take a view of what “normally” meant, and in fact, in this case, if I were the judge I would say, “Actually, ‘normally’ means ‘exceptional’”, but they may take a different view. That is what is causing the concern among the lawyers. However, in common sense terms, to have a word such as “normally” and to argue that there would not be judicial challenge and that, if there was, the courts would just walk away from it, cannot be right. Can my noble and learned friend explain why I am wrong?
I do not accept the proposition that my noble friend Lord Forsyth advances. The position is that this Parliament is sovereign; in terms of Section 28(7) of the 1998 Act it may legislate for Scotland in all and any matters, including devolved matters. The Sewel convention simply expresses the view that this Parliament will not normally do so. However, that does not fix some black-line test to be applied by the courts as to what is normal and abnormal; it will be a matter for Parliament going forward to decide if or when it would ever legislate for Scotland in respect of a devolved matter.
My noble and learned friend’s argument was that the Bill puts into statute the recommendations of the Smith commission, and in this case, recommendation 22:
“The Sewel Convention will be put on a statutory footing”.
Surely on his own argument the Government will have to withdraw Clause 2, not only on the grounds of what constitutes a statutory footing but because it embodies the words of Lord Sewel, which he spoke when the Scotland Bill was before Parliament, and not the convention as understood at the time the commission produced its report.
I do not accept that, because it appears that what is understood by the Sewel convention is the expression of that convention by Lord Sewel during the passage of the Scotland Act 1998 through Parliament. I indicated before the sundry working arrangements that developed and changed over the passage of the 15 years after that convention came into place, such as DGN10, which is why there is no attempt, and properly so, to express those working arrangements in statutory terms within the Bill.
Can the Minister say whether that means that there will be a new convention that includes those elements?
It may be that further working arrangements will develop as between the two Parliaments with respect to legislation that touches upon devolved matters. However, the provision as expressed in the Bill is simply that as expressed by Lord Sewel at the time the Scotland Act passed through Parliament in 1998. It merely says that while in terms of Section 28 we have the power to legislate for Scotland in all matters, including devolved matters, we will not normally do so.
As noble Lords will know, the Liberal Democrats are very supportive of the Bill, but the explanation just given by the Minister of the Sewel convention and the issues around it worries me greatly. From the outset, I say that I strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which would leave out “normally”. It seems that much of the Minister’s argument about protecting the sovereignty of the UK Parliament hangs on retaining the word “normally”, because that then gives the UK Parliament very wide discretion, as I read it, to legislate, as the Minister explains it, in areas that could include education, transport, housing, health and all the issues that are the very stuff of the Scottish Parliament. If that is the Minister’s intention, that is hugely controversial. I will say no more than that, because I do not want to develop this issue into a major argument on these points.
However, let me be clear. Back in 1998, when the Sewel convention was introduced, it was not in any circumstances with a view to this Parliament stepping in to legislate in the areas of transport, health and education if the Scottish Parliament was to make a mess of it. That was absolutely not the reason why it was introduced. Its wording and the reasons for its introduction are quite clear; they are here in Clause 2, which says that,
“it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”.
Therefore, even by the Minister’s own explanation, the consent of the Scottish Parliament to legislate in these potentially controversial areas would be required, and it would not happen. There is no way that the Scottish Parliament, in terms of the Sewel Motion as it went back to 1998, would cover legislation in health and education—