Lord Keen of Elie
Main Page: Lord Keen of Elie (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Keen of Elie's debates with the Scotland Office
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, for the removal of any doubt, I do not support any amendments in this group. But I am pleased to be given the chance to try again to pronounce the name of the noble Lord, Lord Louth of Norton—I have done it again—the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, because he is a profound constitutional expert and he has my total admiration and respect, and I apologise for the mix-up.
The original draft of Clause 1 conveyed the permanency of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government as institutions but our amendments put their permanency beyond any doubt and put the decision of whether they should be permanent in the hands of the Scottish people. We do not want any change to this aspect of the Bill. It is with some trepidation that I enter this debate, with so many constitutional experts, lawyers and esteemed legal people, but there we are; I might bring the perspective of an ordinary Scottish person without having all those grand titles—which are all deserved, I hasten to add.
I do not think we should spend too long on this aspect of the Bill. We support the Scottish people having the final say on any of these matters. Without going too much into the history of things, in 1707 Scotland entered the United Kingdom as a full country. It did not sacrifice totally its right to have its own say. We entered as an equal partner. I think we have played our part, pro rata, on an equal basis. I believe strongly that that should be the case. The sovereignty of the Scottish people should be recognised. It is not a coincidence that one of our monarchs in Scotland, Mary, Queen of Scots, was not known as the Queen of Scotland. Of course, her final legacy was that every monarch of Scotland and the United Kingdom since her death has been her direct descendant. That is totally in tune with the Scottish people. The Scottish people should have the say. I am sorry to say it but particularly the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, to take everything away from the Scottish people is just not acceptable or realistic. Realpolitik has been mentioned and that is absolutely right.
I do not want to feed the flames but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that he could have been a bit more careful with his words, bearing in mind the history of Northern Ireland. My party and I—and, I believe, the Government—are not feeding any flames. I believe in the merits of what we have here, not just as expediency or something passed down from on high. I believe firmly in it and if any of these amendments are pressed, we will be voting against them.
My Lords, perhaps I may begin with a material concession. When the noble Lord, Lord Empey, referred to a capable Minister on the Front Bench he was clearly referring to my noble friend Lord Dunlop.
I thank noble Lords for their careful and detailed consideration of Clause 1, which expresses in law the understood position that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. I will endeavour to respond to each of the points made and, in doing so, I thought that it would be helpful to reflect on the adjustments made to this clause during the Bill’s passage through Parliament.
The Smith commission said that the United Kingdom’s legislation,
“will state that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are permanent institutions”.
In the draft legislation which the Government published in January 2015, the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government were recognised as permanent parts of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. At that stage, the clause did not contain a provision on a referendum. This drafting was retained when the Bill was introduced to Parliament in May 2015. Detailed feedback was then received on the clause during the Bill’s passage through the other place and from others such as the Scottish Parliament’s Devolution (Further Powers) Committee. The Government reflected carefully on this feedback and on 18 September, the Prime Minister announced the Government’s intention to include a referendum provision in the clause to strengthen the provision and underline our commitment to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. Following refinement of the drafting, the clause as it now appears was inserted into the Bill on Report in the other place.
I pause to observe in response to the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, that I am not aware of any understanding between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government to the effect that no amendment will be allowed to the provisions of Clause 1 or to any other part of the Bill. The clause was also subject to substantial debate during our Committee in December.
I turn to Amendment 2, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. This amendment considers the specific wording of subsection (3) of the new section in Clause 1. Following our deliberations in Committee we have reflected carefully on this amendment, which I believe seeks to clarify details of the operation of such a referendum. None the less, our view remains that the current wording of the clause delivers the outcome needed effectively, as it reflects that in 2014 the people of Scotland voted to remain in the United Kingdom and that that would mean a commitment to two Parliaments. New subsection (3) ensures that if the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government were ever to be abolished, which of course is a scenario that no one is envisaging, the people of Scotland would need to vote in a referendum to that effect.
The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, spoke to Amendment 3, which would replace the requirement for a decision of the people of Scotland in a referendum with a requirement for a two-thirds majority in a vote of the House of Commons, in which 75% of Scottish Members of Parliament voted in favour. I am grateful to the noble Lord for the points he has made and recognise his desire to underline the centrality of this Parliament in determining the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom. However, it remains our view that it is right to include provision for a referendum of the people of Scotland in the clause to strengthen the political statement, and to underline the commitment of this Parliament and this Government to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government.
The referendum provision rightly reflects the importance of the people of Scotland in determining Scotland’s constitutional future. In the referendum in 1997, the people of Scotland overwhelmingly supported the creation of a Scottish Parliament. In the independence referendum in 2014, they reaffirmed that they wanted to have two Parliaments by voting to remain within the United Kingdom.
Before the Minister moves on, may I ask just one question? In the earlier debate, I asked whether the words “the people of Scotland” included Andy Murray, the tennis player, and he could not answer. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has suggested a simple amendment that would make it clear that the persons entitled to vote are not the people of Scotland—which is a slightly meaningless phrase—but those entitled to vote as electors in a local government election in Scotland. What is wrong with accepting that?
As I indicated, we are dealing with an entirely hypothetical situation. Should that situation ever materialise, the terms of the referendum to be held would be determined according to the circumstances in place at that time. It would not be appropriate to anticipate the circumstances of such a referendum, which might be many millennia in the future. It is therefore left open in these terms.
I turn to the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean. The points he has raised in them are those he made in Committee in December, and I assure him that we have continued to reflect carefully on the points made at that time. My noble friend has focused on whether Clause 1 impinges on the sovereignty of this Parliament. I thank him for his consideration of this point but must respectfully disagree that there is any question that it does. Constitutionally, the United Kingdom Parliament cannot bind a successor Parliament: the sovereignty of Parliament remains. The purpose of paragraph 21 of the Smith commission agreement, and of Clause 1 in the Bill, is not to change the constitutional position but to reflect in legislation the political understanding that already exists. The clause thus delivers the Smith commission agreement while respecting the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements.
Amendment 1 would reinsert the words “recognised as”, which were removed from Clause 1 by government amendment on Report in the other place. The Government have been quite clear throughout that there has never been any question that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are anything other than permanent. However, we have listened to feedback on the clause, and it was felt appropriate to amend the clause to take account of the observations made. The criticism levelled at the clause was that the provision was weak. The Government have strengthened the provision to demonstrate the commitment of the United Kingdom Parliament and Government to the Scottish Parliament and to the Scottish Government.
Amendment 4, tabled by my noble friend, provides that the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and Government would have to be agreed by United Kingdom-wide referendum. The referendum provision in Clause 1 rightly reflects the importance of the people of Scotland in determining the existence of the Scottish Parliament. It is important to be clear that there are no circumstances under which the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government is envisaged. However, in responding to the points raised by my noble friend, I state that, in that entirely hypothetical circumstance, this Parliament would of course play its full and proper role, as I mentioned previously.
Amendment 5 would state in the Bill that Clause 1 does not limit the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. Again, I hope I have already sufficiently addressed that point. Clearly, the sovereignty of this Parliament remains, and is unhindered by the provisions. I therefore urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Before the Minister sits down, I wonder whether he can help me on one point. I made it clear in Committee that the amendments I proposed to this part of the Bill were based on recommendations of the Scottish Government, which were made plain in June last year. The wording of the amendments is not my creation; it comes from Edinburgh, from people who were studying the Bill and trying as best they could to clarify the points they thought needed clarification.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has drawn attention yet again to the obscurity of the phrase, “the people of Scotland”. One of the virtues—it may be small, but it is there—of my amendment is that it makes clear that it is a referendum of the people in Scotland. I simply cannot understand why the Minister is not prepared to make some concession to clarify that matter. To go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said, I should have thought that the Government would take on board collaboration between the two Governments to try to improve the Bill and achieve as much clarity as possible. I really am mystified why the Minister is so stubborn and will not accept the need for some further clarity.
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. It determines clearly and unambiguously that there can be no question of any unseen, secret understanding between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government when his proposals in the amendments have their source in Scotland, with the Scottish Government. That perhaps puts that in its place.
On the question of the referendum, I reiterate the point that I made earlier: this is a wholly hypothetical situation.
Will my noble and learned friend deal with the point about the people of Scotland, as opposed to the people in Scotland?
I am obliged to my noble friend for reminding me of the question. As I said earlier, we are dealing with a wholly hypothetical situation. It is not envisaged that this will ever arise, but in the event that it does, the question of who will be engaged in the referendum and the manner in which it will be conducted will be determined at that time according to the circumstances that exist at that time, rather than by some predetermination, perhaps millennia earlier. That remains the Government’s position on that point.
My Lords, I have come to the view that the noble Lord, Lord Empey, tactfully suggested—that we are actually wasting our time. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I believe that the House is ready to hear from the Minister.
I can say that the Whip did not consult me on that proposition.
I am grateful for the detailed consideration that has been given to this clause and, indeed, for the time that has been given up by a number of noble Lords in meeting both me and my noble friend Lord Dunlop to discuss aspects of the clause.
I begin by considering the extent or scope of the provision with which we are dealing. It touches on amendments moved by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope, Lord McCluskey, Lord Wallace and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the noble Lords, Lord Norton and Lord Stephen.
I will come to that in a moment because normally I would come to “normally” when I am addressing “normally”, and that is when I will address the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. I would not want him to feel out of this.
The Smith commission agreement stated:
“The Sewel Convention will be put on a statutory footing”.
That is precisely what Clause 2 achieves. Let us step back for a moment to the Sewel convention. What did Lord Sewel say? He said that,
“we would expect a convention to be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish parliament”.—[Official Report, 21/7/98; col. 791.]
Of course, the word “normally” was important. I will come back to that because it is a word that respects the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. Without it, you might have had a provision that intruded very materially on the sovereignty of that Parliament. That was what was said at the time in 1998.
The noble Lord, Lord Norton, observes that that is not a convention in the conventional sense; and, of course, he is right because a convention is something that grows up and is invariably applied or employed. Where you have the word “normally”, you are saying that there can be a qualification or an exception, so, strictly speaking, in constitutional terms, the Sewel convention is not a convention. But, you know, by convention it became a convention. And that is where we are. Over a period of years, what was referred to as the Sewel convention was understood not only by the United Kingdom Parliament but also by the Scottish Government and by the Civil Service. They understood and applied the Sewel convention, albeit that in strict constitutional terms it was not a convention. They operated it successfully and without difficulty until now. Then the Smith commission decided that the Sewel convention should be put on a statutory footing. Of course, the technical difficulty is this: if you express a convention in statutory terms, it ceases to be a convention.
Does the Minister accept that since 1999 the practice has been that if there is a proposal to alter the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament or the executive competence of the Scottish Ministers, the convention is that a Motion should go before the Scottish Parliament in relation to that matter? In other words, the convention on these separate issues has been that there would be a decision of the Scottish Parliament on that issue.
I cannot accept that because of the language employed. It was not the convention that dictated that; it was a practice that grew up as a consequence of the convention having been entered into. It reflected, for example, working note DGN 10. That is why I say there was a clear understanding by the parties not only in 1999 but in October 2013 of what was meant strictly by the Sewel convention. I also commend to the noble Lord the heading to paragraph 22 of the Smith commission report, which was also agreed to by the parties to the Smith commission. It makes it abundantly clear what the parties understood was meant in this context by the Sewel convention.
I quite appreciate that over the years practice has developed and no doubt practice will continue to develop, which is one reason you do not want to freeze practice in statutory form. What you want to express in statutory form is the strict requirement of the Sewel convention and its scope. It is important to remember that by doing that we preserve not only the convention as it is understood and has been understood but the sovereignty of this Parliament. For this Parliament is sovereign and can legislate for devolved matters, just as the Scottish Parliament can legislate for devolved matters.
The matter that Lord Sewel was addressing when setting out the principle that this Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to devolved maters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament was this: to make it clear that, despite Parliament’s sovereignty, the devolved legislature would be left to get on with the business of legislating in devolved areas. No one wanted the prospect of legislative ping-pong between the two Parliaments. That is also set out—as I say, quite clearly—in the memorandum of understanding, as it has been revised on seven occasions and agreed to by the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Ministers.
The question of the words “not normally” was raised. The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, among others, pointed out that the word would be justiciable. Of course, all the words of a statute are justiciable in the sense that you can go to a court and ask the court what it believes they mean. But it is not the word that is not justiciable, it is the issue. The question of whether the United Kingdom Parliament can legislate in devolved areas is not justiciable. It is for the United Kingdom Parliament to decide whether on some occasion it will do what it normally, usually or generally does, or will not do so, for it is a sovereign and supreme Parliament. That underlines the importance of the words “not normally” and to remove them from this clause would be to impinge on the sovereignty of this Parliament in a most unprecedented and extraordinary manner.
I am listening very carefully to my noble and learned friend and basically he is saying that the Sewel convention is working perfectly well; everybody understands what it is. We are hearing from very expert opinion that the clause as it stands is rubbish and is subject to judicial challenge, so why does he not just drop the clause and stick with what is working, which is the convention as it exists?
I am obliged to my noble friend for his invitation. I refer to the recommendation of the Smith commission report, which was that it should be put on a statutory footing, and this Government are determined that it will be put on a statutory footing. I hope that answers my noble friend’s inquiry.
That brings me to my noble friend’s Amendment 11, which he spoke to but followed up with the comment, “You can ignore my amendment”. I would like to treat that as a precedent in the case of my noble friend but not on this occasion. If he has spoken to his amendment, I have to respond to it.
Given the noble Lord’s invitation to ignore it, it is more than a novelty; it is rather generous. Be that as it may, I come back for a moment to the question of justiciability. The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and others of your Lordships have sought to ensure that the provisions of Clause 2 will not create a justiciable right. I understand and appreciate the reasoning behind that amendment, but our position remains that it is not necessary because Clause 2 cannot and does not create a justiciable right. I emphasise that it is not a question of whether the word “normally” is justiciable, as every word of a statute is in that sense capable of being interpreted by a court. It is the issue that is not justiciable. I return to a point that I mentioned briefly—
I had not intended to interrupt until I heard the noble and learned Lord just now. Since the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is simply a rule of recognition by the Queen’s courts that Parliament should be sovereign, is it not also a matter for the Queen’s courts and not for Ministers or government, or even Parliament, as to what is or is not justiciable?
I am obliged to the noble Lord. I would suggest that it is a moot issue because there have been occasions where this Parliament has expressly stated that an issue will not be justiciable, but of course the courts themselves will then look at that exception to see whether it is enforceable and lawful. There is that further point, so it is a further layer placed upon the issue by this Parliament but it is not conclusive. I believe there have been occasions where the courts have looked at statutory provisions in which Parliament has purported to say, “This is not a matter for the courts”.
Then why does the Minister not simply accept Amendment 12, which says that,
“the decision as to whether or not the circumstances are such as to allow the Parliament of the United Kingdom to legislate with regard to any devolved matter shall be a decision for that Parliament to take, and shall not be justiciable in any court of law”?
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord and I can express it only in these terms. It is the Government’s considered position that the clause implicitly determines that point in any event. It would therefore not be necessary to express it in the terms proposed in the amendment.
The Minister says that the Government think that it is implicit in the clause. What is the problem in making it explicit? It would be interesting to consider whether their view is that there is a problem in making it explicit, because if there is not it would be very much to their advantage to accept the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey.
I note the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, but I can observe only that it is not appropriate to layer legislation with unnecessary detail and that if the matter is to be regarded as implicit in the present clause, it would be inappropriate to add a further clause. I cannot elaborate upon the point at this stage.
The concluded position of the Government is that Clause 2 as drafted delivers what was required by the Smith commission agreement by placing the Sewel convention, as it is properly understood, on a statutory footing. It is in these circumstances that I invite your Lordships to withdraw or not move their amendments.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all those noble and learned and noble Lords who have supported my Amendment 7. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord McCluskey, for the points they made in support of Amendment 12, which in a way hangs together with it, because they have identified a crucial issue before us.
With all due respect to the Minister, he cannot get away with simply declaring that the “issue” is not justiciable. He has chosen the word “issue” as meaning something different, but the same point arises. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, identified the point precisely: there is a crucial difference between the position of Parliament legislating—and Ministers declaring what words mean when they legislate—and the position of the courts. The courts will assert their right to interpret legislation according to the meaning of the words as they judge them to be. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has said, the courts cannot close their door to arguments. People will bring arguments before the court, and when an argument is before the court it has to decide on it. The Minister simply cannot get away with the idea that we can be assured that this issue will never be before the courts and require determination.
My Lords, I shall first address Amendments 15 to 21. Under the Bill, and in line with the Smith commission agreement, the timing of Scottish parliamentary elections is devolved to the Scottish Parliament, subject to the provision in the Bill that Scottish parliamentary ordinary general elections may not be held on the same day as UK parliamentary general elections, European parliamentary general elections or local government elections in Scotland.
Following a request from the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, the UK Government agreed to bring forward an order under Section 30 of the Scotland Act, rather than use the Bill, to give the current Scottish Parliament the power to determine the length of the next Scottish Parliament following the poll in 2016. The order devolved to the Scottish Parliament power to legislate on the date of the first Scottish parliamentary ordinary general election after the 2016 poll. Following approval in the Westminster Parliament and the Scottish Parliament, the order was made by Her Majesty in Council on 8 October and came into force the following day. The Scottish Elections (Dates) Bill, currently before the Scottish Parliament, provides for the Scottish Parliament ordinary general election scheduled for 7 May 2020 to be moved to 6 May 2021.
We have tabled a number of technical amendments to make changes to a number of clauses in the Bill that are required as a result of the Section 30 order. Essentially, these amendments revoke the Section 30 order and remove provisions from the Scotland Act inserted by the order, which will be unnecessary as they overlap with provision made by the Bill. The area of legislative competence being devolved to the Scottish Parliament by the Bill is such that the Scottish Elections (Dates) Bill will still be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament following the revocation of the Section 30 order. Additionally, we have tabled an amendment to Clause 5(2) to improve the drafting of this provision in order to ensure that it operates as intended.
We have also tabled an amendment that removes a reference in Clause 10 to a provision of the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc.) Order 2010 which is now unnecessary as this instrument has been revoked by the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc.) Order 2015 that was made by Scottish Ministers and which came into force in December 2015.
In addition, I wish to give notice that the Government consider that drafting improvements are required to the reservation of the timing of ordinary local government elections in Scotland where the poll would otherwise be held on the same day as an ordinary general election for the Scottish Parliament, and to some provisions in Clause 5 relating to this reservation, to provide clarification and ensure that the drafting of these provisions operates as intended. As a result, the Government intend to table amendments to clarify and improve the drafting of these provisions at Third Reading.
Amendments 15 to 21 are technical amendments which will ensure that the clauses in the Bill relating to elections operate as intended.
I now to turn to Clause 11, which contains the supermajority requirements and acknowledge the input and assistance of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, on this matter. I thank him for his willingness to discuss this matter and to propose improvements to the provisions, which are reflected in government Amendments 23 to 26.
Clause 11 requires that the Scottish Parliament must pass certain legislation by a two-thirds majority. Government Amendments 23 to 26 to this clause will enable a Bill in the Scottish Parliament to pass to Royal Assent if the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament decides that a simple majority is required, the Bill is passed with a simple majority but is referred to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agrees that only a simple majority was required. The measure currently provides that in those circumstances, the Bill must be reconsidered by the Scottish Parliament before it can be passed for Royal Assent. We have taken account of the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in order to make a little more sense —if I can put it that way—of the provisions of Clause 11 on the application of the supermajority. I beg to move.
My Lords, I think I should thank the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland for his kind words. The amendments improve the intelligibility of these provisions. It is important that the system work as smoothly as possible, so I am extremely grateful.
My Lords, we agree with the Government on this very sensible measure. We appreciate the minor and technical amendments and fully agree with them. We thank the Minister.