Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hogan-Howe and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I am quite open- minded about the clause on face coverings and whether it is a good or bad thing to have face coverings at protests. I have just a couple of points for the Government in considering whether to change the provisions in any way.

First, imposing more conditions, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested, to narrow the provisions might be laudable but will make them harder and harder to enforce. The officers on the street can take action only on what they see, and if the person alleges that they have a member of their family in Iran, or wherever it happens to be, it will be quite hard for the officer on the street, so it may make no difference at all to the initial action. At the ongoing investigation and prosecution that might follow, they may then want to rebut—if they intend to—the claim that that defence is available. It will impose more burden on the prosecution, so we must be very careful about the conditions that we impose on it.

Secondly, although we tend to think about face masks being worn by only some people in the crowd, we could anticipate that everybody in the crowd wears a mask. If that is the case, it can be quite intimidating, and it makes normal policing quite difficult to embark on. For example, one way in which you would notice if someone has a bail condition that they should not attend a protest is whether you can recognise them. In terms of general investigation, if everybody has a mask, it is quite difficult to distinguish one person from another. We might anticipate some of the things that we saw in the 1930s. We have the Public Order Act 1936, which was intended to stop people from wearing uniforms. It could become a kind of uniform, or at least an aspect of a uniform, to signify support for a political purpose.

This clause needs some thought if it is to go forward. I ask for as much consideration as possible for the enforcers, who will be criticised if they get it wrong, but we can anticipate now whether they might be left in an invidious position.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I rather agree with the noble Lord’s concern about how ever more protest laws are to be operated in practice by police officers, who are dealing with a growing and ever more complex statute book. But I wonder what he thinks about the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that the powers already exist to require and direct people to remove a mask, which could be done to individuals. In the hypothetical situation that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, gives of everyone wearing a mask as a form of intimidatory uniform, what does he think about the fact that the power already exists? What is an officer to do, faced with those duplicative powers and offences?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

It is a fair question. I would only say that, generally speaking, if you have a large crowd and a significant number within it wearing masks, the chances of you telling them all to take them off are very limited. If I understand the proposal, it is to prevent people arriving at the march with a mask rather than having to deal with it once they arrive. If you have to deal with it, you will have to deal with it. That is the only thing I would say: having allowed people to mask up, you cannot then expect officers to deal with a crowd of 5,000 or 6,000—it is just impractical. That is the argument against it, but I understand why the argument is made.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Hogan-Howe and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Thursday 10th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendment 99 is not directly related to the previous amendments other than by the connection of biometric data. My question is about which database the biometric data is being checked against. The question comes from the briefing that was helpfully provided by the Minister and his advisers prior to the Bill being laid. At that briefing, I asked whether the databases were being checked for particular purposes, and the advice we received was that they could not be used by the police. I found that confusing when I re-read the Bill and saw that there is a law enforcement clause. The questions today are about whether the databases are being checked for these particular reasons.

If the people you are checking are entering for the first time, they should never have their data in these databases because they have never been to the UK. But, of course, many of the people who arrive, sometimes illegally, have been here before, have left and now are returning—so it is important to establish their identity first, obviously.

The databases that I am interested in are, first, the unsolved crime scene database. Crimes happen every day, samples are taken—DNA, fingerprints and sometimes photographs now—and, of course, not all crimes are solved. A database is kept of those crimes that are not solved, so is the biometric data of the people who are entering being checked against that?

The second group I am interested in is people who are wanted. They might be wanted in this country or in other countries. It may be that we choose not to let the third country know that this person has arrived, but at least we should know whether we are at risk of importing someone who is wanted somewhere else. This is probably quite important, given the group of countries that many of the people who are coming to our country are linked to. When many of our soldiers in Afghanistan were murdered and badly maimed by IEDs, we collected an awful lot of forensic material, which is now stored in this country in case we ever discover the people who carried out those crimes. It would certainly be ironic if somebody claimed to want to come to this country legally and had previously killed or maimed one of our soldiers—we should at least be aware of that. Are we checking this against that database?

This is quite a specific set of questions, but it relies on the data being checked. The advice we received at the briefing was that it was not. The purpose of this amendment is to get on record exactly what it is being checked against.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which have been so ably supported across the Committee—pretty much every voice so far has been in support of them. They are a very useful humanitarian mirror to arguments that have been made on the previous group about the importance of data sharing for law enforcement purposes.

Amendments 97 and 98, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, very much endorse the views of the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Alton, on the need for even more breadth and possibly a government amendment. These amendments are very sympathetic to the Government’s stated policy of smashing the gangs et cetera. It is a perverse outcome to hear that people who were trying to satisfy the Government’s legal and practical requirements for family reunion are having to resort to people smugglers. So, with respect, I hope that the Minister will see that this is a no brainer in terms of the practical facilitation of government policy.

Finally, I talked about these amendments being very much the humanitarian mirror of the need sometimes to share data—in this case, biometric information—for the purpose of giving effect to lawful family reunion. Please do not shoot the messenger, but I want to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Harper, that the Data Protection Act and the UK GDPR contain very broad law enforcement exemptions, but broad is not blanket. I hope I can say to Conservative noble Lords that it is one thing to have a broad law enforcement exemption, but another to have blanket immunity from data protection. I am sure that noble Lords opposite would not want, for example, data controllers to be negligent or not to maintain a secure system so that sensitive information, even about potential criminals, was dumped on the internet, easily hacked or simply negligently maintained. Data controllers, particularly public authority data controllers, and especially of sensitive information, should at least have to maintain a proper, secure system. Yes, data should be shared for law enforcement purposes where that is necessary and proportionate, but they should not be totally negligent with this information.

I hope that provides some reassurance on that issue. In any event, if it does not, the Minister has already said that he can write.