Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I should say briefly in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle—perhaps it is not my place to do so because it was her amendment that I signed—that I should thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. We have been using various terms in Committee, but on this occasion he must be right. If one were considering children under 18 in the context of a review of the age of criminal responsibility, it would be a glaring omission to include “gender” instead of “sex” in the legislation.

Sometimes it may be appropriate to use both terms, and I supported that position on Monday in the particular context of a different amendment about hostility towards people. What I tried to suggest, and which Twitter does not reflect, is that hostility can be towards people in broader categories than those protected under the Equality Act. I would not want someone to be subjected to violent hostility, even on grounds that are not currently in the Equality Act, because they were non-binary or whatever. That is not really the point in this context. If I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put it very well.

What is more, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, will forgive me for making that concession, given that this is a probing amendment and her list of factors to be considered in any review was inclusive and not closed. I hope it is helpful to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in this way.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I broadly support a rise in the age of criminal responsibility. I think the review is a good idea, and of course it should be science-based. The danger of going for 12 years, which is an improvement, is that it could be higher if only we thought about it well. I would be open-minded on whether it needs to be a matter of law or a government commitment to carry out a review.

There is just one area which I hope such a review might consider. The Bulger case is often referred to, for obvious reasons. Hard cases can make very bad law; we are aware of that. But I do think that that type of case imposes a duty on government to consider people’s concerns. There are two concerns that people might have if they lived in the area. One is where the child would live on return to society. That could be covered through care proceedings—you can control where someone lives and who they live with. The second is their occupation. If, at the age of 18, the murderers were released—as they were in the Bulger case—and wanted to go into childcare, or any of the care professions, would people be content with that? There would at least be a question about whether that would be wise. If they only have a care proceeding against them, they would be perfectly entitled not to declare what they were involved in at the age of 10. My point is not that they should be criminalised and therefore always carry that with them, but about how you manage their occupation, subsequent to their reaching an adult stage. It can be managed without criminalisation, but such a review might want to consider how that could be done most efficiently.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am constantly amazed by the persistence of this generally civilised country in being willing to treat children of 10 and 11 as criminally responsible.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, my noble friend Lord German, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and all other noble and noble and learned Lords who have spoken have made the argument persuasively and on the basis of the scientific, social and international evidence. I say no more about the strength of the evidence.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, also pointed out the degree to which government inaction on this issue has been based on public prejudice and the Government’s pandering to it. Bluntly, that is moral cowardice, not leadership. Many of us find it unbelievable that, uniquely in western Europe, our children of 10 and 11 can be treated as criminals, when it is entirely clear that they lack the psychological maturity that is appropriate for any legitimate view of criminal responsibility. Why did change come successfully to Scotland and yet the Government seem unprepared to make it here?

I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Dholakia, who has campaigned tirelessly on this issue for many years. I know he will have been most disappointed to have been unable to attend to speak today. But the House has fully recognised in this debate his commitment and his major contribution on this issue, and we will wish to send him our good wishes for a full and swift recovery.

Amendment 221A in my name and that of my noble friend Lord German has a different purpose. It is to pursue the worthwhile goal of diverting young offenders away from the criminal justice system and towards alternative methods of encouraging them to avoid offending. Youth offender teams have been established since 1998 and have as their function helping young offenders under 18 under supervision of the Youth Justice Board. Central to their function has been to establish services within their local communities to help prevent offending and reoffending. They have a wide remit that permits them to organise a range of activities in an effort to keep young people away from crime. Sometimes this involves involving young people in a form of restorative justice by bringing them into contact with their victims and helping them to organise reparation where it is thought that might help the offender and be accepted by the victims. Among their functions is to help supervise community sentences for young people. Our amendment is designed to help youth offender teams fulfil their function by diverting young people within their area away from the criminal justice system.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that when the Minister responds to this debate, he can put away the departmental brief and respond to two simple questions. The first is whether he accepts that the present system is unacceptable. The second, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, posed, is: what will the Government do about it? This is not a new problem. The Government have had years to think about the options and to consider what to do. The noble Lord is already a very distinguished Minister of Justice. Can he say what the Government will now do to address a manifest injustice?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have met a few of the people who these sentences are designed to control, and quite often they are terrifying. Some of the things that they have done are awful. However, the present situation is indefensible. It is unfair because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said, they do not know how long they will be detained, and because many of them have been detained since before the law was changed. It is really trying to deal with the basic problem of dangerousness, which is very hard to define. Doctors cannot define the mental illness that they suffer from, as has been mentioned already. This should be addressed far more clearly.

There are only two ways forward. First, many of these amendments are talking about research in the future, but we need more research into the medical definition of the type of illness which we define as “dangerousness”, of people seeming likely to commit an offence in the future. This is not mentioned anywhere in the amendments. I recommend that there is good investment to be made there.

Secondly, what is presently indeterminate must be made determinate. I do not suppose that anyone has yet argued that all the people who are detained under these restrictions should immediately be emptied from the prisons on to the streets, but it is entirely possible to see a transfer of that risk either into the health element of prison control—Broadmoor or similar institutions—or a far better way of dealing with them within the community. To continue carrying the risk entirely within the prison estate in the numbers that are described is entirely wrong and I cannot see that it is defensible for this Government to continue doing so.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 22nd October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the proposal to assist people to die is a question that can divide reasonable people. It is said that people hold their views strongly and will not change their minds, but I have. I support this Bill now in a way I would not have a few years ago.

Over the years I have heard the medical profession argue strongly that a good death is available to everyone and we need not fear our final hours and days. And yet we have heard today, and we know personally from friends and family, of people who had appalling deaths. I do not understand how that can be if a good death is so universally available. Does it depend on the point of view from which a good death is viewed? Surely the only one which matters is that of the patient.

We are warned that the proposal could lead to the patient being bullied or making a guilt- ridden decision to end their life, but this Bill applies only to those within six months of their death. Why would the patient’s relatives take the risk of a criminal investigation, when all they had to do was wait for six months to be released from their burden of care or receive the financial benefits of inheritance? However, should they take that risk, the intervention of a doctor or High Court judge is, I am sure, more likely to discover a case than the present system, which provides no systematic investigation at all before a patient dies.

My principal reason for now supporting this proposal is to do with choice. Choice has two stages: the first is to have an option available to assist a patient in ending their life, and the second is the possibility of accessing that option. I can only imagine the torment and hopelessness of a person who knows they are dying. Most people explain instinctively that they are not worried necessarily about losing their life but about the process they have to endure. None of us wants to suffer pain. All of us want to retain dignity, and, where there are remaining friends and relatives, our concerns are always for them and can be stronger than concerns for ourselves. In such circumstances, how can the state, or indeed this Parliament, deny individuals the option of a controlled death, when surveys tell us that 85% of those surveyed believe our democracy should put in place such an option for them should they need it?

Finally, it has to be wrong that the option of an assisted death is available to those who can afford to travel to Switzerland, those who have someone who cares enough for them to help them and those who are physically able to make the journey. What happens if you are poor, alone or physically unable to make that journey? Surely we should help those patients too. Why should they have to die on a grey industrial estate in a foreign country rather than in their own home, in surroundings that provide comfort, with friends around them to say goodbye—as we have heard—and pets to hug and seek solace from? In my view, this is unfair, and I have always been angered by unfairness.

Until 1961, it was a criminal offence for a person to attempt and fail to commit suicide. At this great watershed we halted what I believe to be a nonsense: an institutional approach which lacked empathy and care. In 2021, the time has come for this Parliament to send a clear signal that we have heard and had enough of the suffering caused by the present law and to provide a choice that the people of this country deserve.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard part one
Wednesday 20th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it has been fascinating and very moving to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but I am coming at this from a completely different direction. Although I am partly thinking about the police officers involved, I am also thinking about people who bring complaints against police officers. I have seen the police complaints system at first hand. At some point in the past, a Met Police sergeant came to me and told me that he had seen a few officers deleting files that the Met held on me. These were files that I had asked to see and had been told did not exist—so I saw the police complaints system at first hand. I took a complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, a vastly underresourced organisation trying to do its best on very difficult work. This was not an emotional issue for me—it was a professional, work issue—but that Met Police sergeant suffered PTSD and was essentially hounded out of the Met Police because he had come to me as somebody who wanted the truth exposed, and so was in a whistleblowing situation. I could not do anything for him, but I persisted with my complaint.

There is a saying that justice delayed is justice denied, and it is true on both sides—perhaps more when people are emotionally involved in the complaint they are making, which as I say did not really apply to me. In a way it is doubly true for complaints against the police, because there is a power imbalance. The police are seen to retain their positions, authority, power and legitimacy while complaints are ongoing, and this can be extremely upsetting.

This issue has come to light because of the allegations against the murderer of Sarah Everard. It is staggering, and truly terrifying, that the police had within their ranks somebody they knew, jokingly perhaps, as “The Rapist”. A noble Lord from this House, a previous Metropolitan Police Commissioner, who is not in his place today, said in an interview on the radio that it was not true that he was called “The Rapist”—but he is the only person I have heard saying that was not true. Perhaps another ex-Metropolitan Police Commissioner here might know better.

So it is time to cut the delays that everybody on both sides experiences in police complaints and disciplinary hearings and, most importantly, to give the independent watchdog the resources it needs to do the job. I have complained in the past about the number of police officers it employs, because it seems to me that you do not necessarily set a police officer to catch a police officer—but in fact it is so underresourced that I feel it would benefit from almost anybody if it increased its staff. So this is something that the Government have to deal with.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. The basic problem around IOPC investigations is one of timeliness and quality. I am afraid it has gone on an awful long time. To be fair, from time to time it concerns police investigations under other bodies, but it has persisted, despite the fact that the organisation has changed over the years from the IPCC to now the IOPC. This particularly affected groups of officers such as firearms officers, some of whom have been under investigation for in excess of 10 years. That cannot be for anyone’s good.

We talked earlier about the trauma suffered by individual officers, and that is one of the major causes of such trauma. I therefore think that some time kind of time limit would be helpful. Even in a criminal case such as murder, the point from commitment to arriving at Crown Court is expected to be of the order of 100 days. If such a complex case can be taken so quickly, it seems to me that these cases are surely susceptible to travelling far more quickly and then being decided in the hearing far more quickly, too.

There are some peculiarities around the police misconduct process which have to be understood and, I think, given some sympathy—but these things can be changed. For example, when a complaint is made, particularly where a criminal allegation is alleged, there is a transmission of the case, first from the force to the IOPC, then it may go to the CPS, and then it may go back to the IOPC and then it may go to the force. This merry-go-round goes on for months. It is not at all unusual for these cases to go for at least one year and usually more, and for there still to be no outcome.

There is a further level of complication when, for example, special evidence needs to be given in a court case. It is difficult to talk about this in public, but essentially, when intelligence is gathered by the police that cannot be shared in court and cannot be shared in a coroner’s court, a public inquiry has to be held in front of a qualified judge. All this does is lengthen the whole process. It particularly affects firearms officers when they have to justify why they shot someone and they are unable to explain the intelligence they received. It means that the whole process goes round this rigmarole again.

There are various remedies to try to resolve this. One is a simple time limit. The difficulty with a time limit is that it can be hard-line and does not fit every case. Sometimes you need some discretion. I would argue that the decision-making between the IOPC, the CPS and the force should be done in parallel and not in sequence. The consequence of it being done in sequence is that it keeps going on and on and they keep referring it back to each other. Surely, they could consider the same case in parallel and therefore reduce the time. It would be a good idea to have a legally qualified chair seriously examining the timeline and whether or not it is justified. If it is not justified, the chair should be able to intervene. If it is justified, of course the case should continue.

My final point may be to one side of the amendment, but it is important because it goes to the point about timeliness and quality. One of the challenges faced by the IOPC is that it does not always send its most experienced investigators to deal with the most complex cases. The equivalent for the police service would be that you never send your shoplifting squad to deal with a murder—that would not be very sensible. Officers build their experience in the shoplifting squad and may go on to do more complex things.

The reason may be, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said, that the IOPC has insufficient resources. I think it also has insufficient specialism and does not build up its expertise. When a serious case comes in—someone loses their life or it is a serious allegation—they should dispatch the A team, not the people who happen to be available. I do not think that does anyone any good when they have to deal with serious matters which the families want straight answers to and the officers want to believe that the investigators have some maturity of judgment. It is not a matter of age but a matter of experience. For those reasons, the IOPC should consider this. It is not exactly pertinent to the amendment, but it is relevant to the discussion about quality that we can fairly have about IOPC investigations at the moment.